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A B S TR A C T
Exploring Preschoolers’ Personal Epistemologies
Using Focus Groups
by
Denise Lynne W insor
Dr. Lisa D. Bendixen, Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Edueational Psyehology
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
This is a qualitative study designed to use focus groups as a means o f identifying the
personal epistemologies o f preschool children in an authentic learning environment.
Personal epistemology is generally defined as the theory about the nature o f knowledge
and the process o f knowing. Investigations o f young children are scarce in this field, and
little is known about the early onset o f epistemological development. However, recent
research suggests a possible eonneetion between epistemie development and theory o f
mind.
This study explores very young children and how their cognitive ability and
interactions w ith peers may reveal information regarding epistemological development.
The aim o f this study is tw o-fold: (1) to investigate three- to four-year-olds’
demonstration o f personal epistemology, and (2) to integrate developmental levels and
dimensions o f knowledge into an epistemie matrix as a way to identify epistemological
patterns.

Ill
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Focus groups are rarely utilized w ith children; however, they provide a platform to
capture the essence o f the children’s knowledge in their own words. For this study the
focus groups were based on the weekly classroom theme, and the whole class instruction
was used as a catalyst to formulate epistemological questioning. The six ehildparticipants were divided into two groups o f three and involved in a total o f eight focus
groups over a four week period. Each week the children participated in a preinstructional and a post-instructional focus group to distinguish their prior knowledge and
past experiences from their understanding o f new information pertaining to the theme.
Constant comparative analysis was used during data collection in order to allow for
follow -up questioning as a way to understand the children’ s epistemological thinking in
more depth. Data was coded inductively and deductively using A T L A S -T l software.
The twelve levels o f analysis ultimately resulted in three sets o f themes: individual
epistemie profiles, group epistemie profiles, and overall preschooler’s epistemie profiles.
These themes suggest that preschoolers can and do demonstrate epistemological
development and that focus groups provide a unique and abundant source o f
epistemological insights. This study stands to promote theoretical, methodological, and
edueational advancements in the field o f personal epistemology and w ith the research o f
young children.
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CHAPTER ONE

IN TR O D U C TIO N

Epistemology has been the focus o f philosophy for centuries and addresses questions
regarding an individual’ s beliefs about the nature o f knowledge and the nature and
process o f knowing (H oler & Pintrich, 1997). What arc an individual’ s beliefs about the
nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing? How do we know what we know?
When we are in the process o f constructing our knowledge, how do we make decisions
about what we believe and whom we believe? These are just a few o f the questions
asked in personal epistemology research, which is deeply rooted in Piaget’ s “ genetic
epistemology.” Piaget (1950) had an interest in developing a theory o f knowledge, that
is, how individuals come to know the world, and he approached it by researching
children’ s cognitive development. Vygotsky (1978) introduced a socio-cultural
perspective to cognitive development. Both theories have important aspects in common
and have been influential in personal epistemology theory and research.
Contemporary personal epistemology research was rejuvenated by Perry in the
1970’s. Since then it has been heavily researched in college students and more recently
has focused on development in adolescents. Young children’s personal epistemology
research continues to be absent; however, that may be shifting w ith the recent connection
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between young children’ s personal epistemology and theory o f mind development (B urr
& Hofer, 2002).
Most researchers in the field agree on a general trajectory o f epistemological
development that begins as a type o f dualism, progressing into multiplism , and then
fin a lly into evaluativism. Chandler (2002) states that this is the same stage progression
that appears in most research in personal epistemological development, regardless o f who
is studied and no matter what the conditions or measure. Over the past 35 years, personal
epistemology has been conceptualized in a variety o f frameworks. The current study w ill
review various models that view personal epistemology in terms o f development, belief
systems, theories, cognitive resources, and integrative process.
Despite that personal epistemology research has neglected investigating children,
many have hypothesized about the onset o f personal epistemological development in
young children. Other areas o f cognitive development have flourished in their
investigation o f young children. Theory o f mind refers to a developmental milestone in
which children begin to recognize that other’ s perspectives d iffe r from their own. This is
an area that has dominated children’ s cognitive developmental research. Researching
young children’ s personal epistemology may uncover important information about the
current trajectory o f personal epistemology development.
The puipose o f this study is to investigate preschooler’ s developing epistemologies
by exploring relationships among their peers in a classroom environment. Additionally,
this study aims to develop an innovative methodology that is new to the research in
personal epistemology and very young children. This study uses foeus groups as one
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component o f the methodology as a means o f identifying interactions among peers that
could contribute to their developing epistemologies.
It is the goal o f the study to contribute to personal epistemology research by meeting
the future needs o f the field, enhancing educational perspectives for young children, and
impacting the larger spectrum o f personal epistemology with insights about early
childhood epistemological development.
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CHAPTER TWO

R EVIEW OF THE L IT E R A TU R E
Introduction
The range and variety o f literature that exists in personal epistemology research is
becoming increasingly tnore innovative and diverse at a variety o f levels, ineluding age,
gender, culture, subject domains, and measurement instruments, just to scratch the
surface. Even w ith the considerable amount o f theoretical and empirical literature, there
is little consideration given to researching children’ s personal epistemology. Only until
very recently have researchers been active in their investigations with children. The
foeus o f this study involves young children’ s personal epistemology in a preschool
environment. It w ill also attempt to provide a more diverse lens for interpreting the
trajectory o f individuals’ personal epistemology. W ithin this perspective, using a
dynamic systems view from Bronfenbrenner (1975) and M inuchin (1974), a framework
w ill be developed to identify children’s emerging personal epistemology. The dynamic
systems framework that is proposed focuses on the child and his personal epistemology.
Other internal factors related to the child w ill be investigated including his theory o f
mind, affect, and language. In addition, the framework w ill include external factors in
the c h ild ’ s environment including the child’ s parents, preschool teacher, and classroom
peers. This framework w ill guide the entire study including the literature review,
research questions, and design.
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In itia lly in this chapter there w ill be a broad and historical introduction to the study o f
epistemology. The study o f epistemology is derived and deeply rooted in the disciplines
o f philosophy, sociology, and anthropology. In order to integrate the complex framework
■that w ill be proposed, it is essential to understand the foundation o f the diverse
components o f epistemology. Follow ing the historical overview o f the study o f
epistemology, a much more narrow focus on personal epistemology literature and how it
has been interpreted and integrated into the field o f edueational psychology w ill begin.
The theoretical frameworks o f Piaget and Vygotsky are central factors to the field o f
educational psychology and personal epistemology. These two theoretical frameworks
w ill be discussed in terms o f how cognitive and social development are generally viewed
w ithin the field. The next section w ill review the various models o f personal
epistemology that are predominantly recognized in the field o f educational psychology
and w ill be discussed according to their relevance fo r interpreting childhood
epistemology. The models generally represent what is known about an ind ividu a l’ s
beliefs about the nature o f knowledge and knowing (H ofer & Pintrich, 2002). The
models w ill be reviewed according to their definitional differences, term inology, traits
and characteristics, empirical support, strengths, and limitations. Narrowing the focus
more closely to this study, the next section w ill involve young children’ s personal
epistemology. In this section the importance o f investigating young children w ill be
discussed, including developmental issues, research in children’ s personal epistemology,
methodological issues, theory o f mind, and children’ s personal epistemology and theoiy
o f mind.
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C hildren’ s theoiy o f mind has been researched eonsiderably over the past thirty years,
and this chapter w ill review the theory o f mind literature that is relevant for the purposes
o f the study. Once the overview o f children’s theory o f mind is presented, the discussion
w ill turn to the integral eomponents related to the proposed study and w ill begin w ith the
connection between children’ s personal epistemology and theory o f mind.

Theoretical Frameworks
Epistemology: The H istorical Perspective
Epistemology is a branch o f philosophy that focuses on knowledge and is important
to this study because it relates to a debate about subjective and objective truths. This
debate has gone unresolved and continues to haunt educational psychology. Researching
children may provide infom iation regarding subjective and objective knowledge. For
centuries this has been a controversial issue, but in spite o f the confusion about many
seemingly contradictory positions, a clear trend has emerged. Early trends in philosophy
stressed knowledge as absolute and permanent (empiricism). Later theories placed more
emphasis on the relativity o f knowledge and suggested a dependence on experience or
context (rationalism). These more recent theories o f epistemology focus on the
continuous development o f knowledge and active inferences about one’ s world in a
subjective and objective manner. What is noticeable in the trend is that it has shifted
from a passive and static view o f knowledge towards a progressively more active and
adaptive perspective o f how we think o f knowledge.
Early Greek philosophers, including Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, viewed knowledge
as sim ply absolute. Knowledge ineorporated ideas that existed independent o f
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ind ividu a l’ s understanding o f the ideas themselves. It was Aristotle who contributed to
plaeing more emphasis on logical and empirical methods o f obtaining knowledge but
continued to support the position o f universal principles (Reed & Johnson, 2000).
Looking back, it was Plato’s Republic that focused on the impact o f one’ s emotional
perspective. The study o f personal epistemology embraces this perspective but
repetitively falls short. Although Socrates had moral and political ambitions toward the
nature o f justice, it was Plato’ s interpretation o f Socratic conversations that extended to
virtues o f justice, wisdom, courage, and moderation as they exist w ithin the individual
and in society collectively. Plato spoke o f this unity by utilizing emotions, prim arily love
in the Phaedriis. For Plato, education was a matter o f leading the student from
knowledge as a mere belief to knowledge as truth. Plato used the “ A llegory o f the Cave”
to represent how uneducated individuals are restrained by their lack o f knowledge and
hold the mistaken belief that the shadows on the walls are real. When individuals
become knowledgeable, they then can escape from the cave into the light. Plato claimed
that it was this type o f individual who would discover justice, knowledge, and objectivity.
Aristotle valued the idea o f truth and had an appreciation for the value and
contributions o f observation and opinion in the pursuit o f knowledge as truth. A ristotle’s
contributions to philosophy are too numerable to comment on here, but some say
Aristotle has been labeled “ The Philosopher” because he was vastly p ro lific in his w riting
(Audi, 2001). One o f A ristotle’s significant works that made a large impact on the study
o f epistemology is the Nicomachean Ethics, in which he contemplated the natural desire
to achieve happiness, described functions o f human volition, expanded Plato’s ideas o f
morals and virtue in a more neutral sense, diseusscd friendship, and stressed the
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importance o f knowledge. Aristotle suggests that because humans are rational, an
educated individual unites m orality and reason through wholesome actions. For
Aristotle, the ultimate goal o f education is to assist individuals in understanding the w orld
and their role in it (Reed & Johnson, 2000). By doing this the individual acquires
happiness, becomes a good and just representative for the community, and is able to
function w ithin the community as a rational member. The aspect o f A risto tle ’ s
philosophy that has been particularly important in the elaboration o f epistemology is the
idea o f not only choosing and doing good and just actions but identifying that humans
need to execute the actions in a good and just manner. This supports humans as
possessing the ability to be intentional beings. That is, Aristotle believed that individuals
do things or possess knowledge that they believe to be good and just. These perceptions
which take place in the m ind o f the individual as images and are produced by the
individual are linked to the social context and how we experience external objects.
Descartes is the most influential figure o f the intellectual revolution which challenged
and overthrew the theories o f Aristotle. Fie was perplexed by the philosophieal
skepticisms, and therel'ore used his knowledge o f mathematieal applications to develop
the scientific method which helped gain certainty about human knowledge. In the
Discourse o f Methods, Descartes realized that it is human nature for humans to be
deceived and mistaken. He thought i f such mistaken beliefs did not undergo inq u iiy and
became foundational, then all knowledge built from the mistruth would be faulty. He
proposed a program that all beliefs should be examined until a b e lie f was arrived at that
could not be doubted. He termed this “ systematic doubt” (Reed & Johnson, 2000).
Deseartes concluded that an individual needs to reject all beliefs that can be doubted and
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the core o f an individual’ s foundational knowledge begins when they reach the b e lie f that
cannot be doubted. Descartes’ theory is elassieally represented as, “ ./e pense, donc Je
s u is f as it was first published in French but is more commonly identifiable in Latin as
“ cogito sum ergo” which means “ 1 think; therefore, 1 am.” Once individuals achieve this
understanding, they ean go forward to develop a secure system o f knowledge. This is the
core o f all scientific method we use in research today.
Descartes established other significant components that researchers continue to
grapple w ith. Meditations was unique fo r the time; it explored the discoveiy o f doubt and
the journey to certainty o f one’ s own existence. It also further elaborated on the turm oil
associated w ith establishing the existence o f God, incorporation o f the external world,
and the relationship between the mind and the body. Much later in his w ritings Descartes
incorporated questions o f psychology and ethics as they might relate to one’s
epistemology in The Passions o f the Soul (Audi, 2001).
In contemporary thinking we frequently refer to Descartes’ philosophy as the
Cartesian System. Generally, there are three main points: (a) The essential unity o f
knowledge, in which all sciences are linked together; (b) knowledge that is achieved
should be useful in the life o f the individual; and (c) knowledge is constructed from the
roots, and no knowledge should be considered absolute until it is compatible w ith one’ s
core beliefs. Descartes acknowledges that knowledge and humans are fallible; therefore,
it must be common practice at least “ once in a lifetim e” to “ demolish everything and start
again, right from the foundations” (Meditations, 1641, cited in Kleiman & Lewis, 1990,
p.29). Descartes stresses the human’ s fallible nature by pointing out that our senses can
be deceiving; therefore, an individual needs to be cautious to place judgment during such
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doubtful times and defer to the reliable intellect o f the mind that was G od’ s g ift to man
(Audi, 2001).
This idea that God is perfect and would not be deceitful by giving humans the ability
to believe that many o f our ideas come from external objects must be sound, and
therefore the external w orld exists (Kleiman & Lewis, 1992). This is the facet o f the
theory that perpetuates indifferences towards the Cartesian system, known as the
Cartesian circle. It is a rhetorical stance that Descartes establishes. I f the answer is that
we can prove God’ s existence from the premise that we have the capacity o f perception,
then how is it that we can assume our perceptions are reliable? This is noteworthy in
terms o f the present study o f epistemology because it relates to beliefs about the
justification o f knowledge and personal epistemological development in general.
Descartes believed that everything in the external w orld was quantifiable. He saw
material things as possessing indefinite variations o f shapes, sizes, and motions o f simple,
single, and homogenous matter (Foucault, 1994). The unconscious experience was the
single phenomenon that Deseartes could not explain mathematically; therefore, he
proposed a dualistic theoiy. The theory suggests that there is a material substance and a
thinking substance that are independent o f one another. The mind is related to an
individual’ s soul and exists even i f the body fails to exist. This is a controversial but
noteworthy aspect o f the Cartesian system because it has never been satisfactorily sorted
out, and it is eonnected to a substantially significant portion o f his attempt to construct a
system o f knowledge (Kleim an & Lewis, 1992). Descartes’ system o f knowledge starts
with the subjective awareness o f the conscious self.
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Spinoza’ s philosophy b u ilt upon the works o f Descartes w ith added reflection on his
personal and social importance o f epistemology. He veered away from the Christian and
Jewish biblical interpretations; his thinking was detached from the anthropomorphic
conceptions o f god and he viewed these as both logical and theoretically unsound.
Spinoza proposed a modern historical-critical method that was p o litica lly tolerant o f all
religions. He believed that all individuals could live peacefully together provided that
they look beyond the theological and cultural controversies that divided them (Popper,

1992y
Spinoza proposed that individual truth comes from the knowledge that we have about
ourselves and what facilitates our actions. This information we derive from w ithin can
then be connected w ith our unbiased attachment to reason. Spinoza realized the
complexity o f this type o f thought and concluded “ all noble things are as d iffic u lt as they
arc rare” (Ethics, 1677, cited in Pojman, 2003 p. 570). This continues to demonstrate the
struggle researchers have had w ith subjective and objective truths and how beliefs about
knowledge have evaded intellectuals for centuries.
John Locke’s philosophies are presented m A n Essay Concerning Human
Understanding {\69Q, cited in Kleiman & Lewis, 1990, p. 193). According to Locke,
what we know is always properly understood as the relationship between ideas. He
viewed ideas as simple or complex and were ultim ately derived from experience. His
thinking was empirical, and he thought that human knowledge was based solely on what
was w ithin realistic reach o f the individual and certainty. Further, he believed that our
knowledge is comprised o f many pieces and uniquely exists in the manner that we
represent them; therefore, our knowledge is individually constructed and can be traced to
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the way that we access our mind through our innate abilities. Locke argued that
knowledge alone was not adequate. He said that life requires the formation o f beliefs on
matters where knowledge is not available. Our beliefs, Locke believed, need to be
supervised by an authority for the purposes o f getting accurate information; it is a
individuals’ moral obligation to do their best to get things right. He advocated for two
types o f knowledge: (a) Knowledge that could be em pirically verified, and (b) knowledge
related to religion and ethics that is culturally embedded. Locke adapted the scientific
method to be utilized when knowledge, perception, insight, and awareness were not
possible. This would include collecting evidence fo r and against the proposition in
question, analyzing the evidence to determine the probability o f the proposition, and
weighing the evidence to determine one’ s belief. This has a direct link to more advanced
epistemological development.
It was a century later that David Hume maintained that moral obligation was a facet
o f affect rather than reason. O f philosophy, Hume said it, “ cannot go beyond experience
and any hypothesis that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities o f human
nature, ought to be at first rejected as presumptuous and chimerical’’ (Hume 1740, cited
in Pojman, 2003, p. 726). This view was Hum e’s starting point, and at the time it
narrowed the scope o f human understanding by disconnecting the external world. He
focused prim arily on perceptions, and his w ork paralleled Locke but directly opposed
Descartes’ attempts to prove the existence o f the external. Hume distinguishes between
two types o f perceptions: impressions and ideas. He suggested that impressions come in
two forms, sensations and reflections, and are stronger than ideas because they more
frequently lead to beliefs. In this way, ideas are causally dependent on impressions.
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Hume thought m orality to be an entirely human affair founded on human nature and the
circumstance o f human life whieh we experience due to affective and social dispositions
(Foucault, 1994). This can be linked closely to the sociocultural perspective o f this study
because it is aligned w ith many o f V ygotsky’ s theories o f development.
Immanuel Kant was among the ranks o f the Idealism movement, otherwise known as
Kantian Synthesis in his work The Criticjne o f Pure Reason (1781, cited in Pojman, 2003,
p. 819). In it he criticizes theories and makes claims beyond the realm o f experience; he
refutes Hume’s attempts to dismiss physics as a possible science. He argued fo r a p rio ri
knowledge but lim ited principles in that everything is open for individual inteipretation
and therefore can be criticized. This test is that human reason must face the responsibility
o f determining the source, extent, and bounds o f its own principles. This restricted
theoretical knowledge in such a way as to make it possible for practical knowledge to
reveal how pure rational faith has an absolute claim on an individual’s knowledge.
Practical reason is defined as determining rules for dispositions such as desire and w ill, as
opposed to thoughts and feelings. What this means is that by the time an individual
experiences something it is already determined by a p rio r i categories o f intuition that he
called space and time. This way o f thinking was in direct opposition w ith traditional laws
o f metaphysics that were in place since Plato. Kant believed that understanding needs
sensations to be applied to and sensations need to be categorized. According to Kant,
there could not be “ transcendence o f sensible reality” (Kant 1781, cited in Pojman, 2003,
p. 909). This would explain all o f the problems w ith metaphysics that allow fo r human
thinking to overstep boundaries. His justification for this belief was that metaphysics
could not be possible as a science, but it was possible as a natural disposition due to the
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systematic nature o f reason itself. Ultim ately, for Kant the question was, “ how are
synthetic a /?/7or/judgments possible?” He concluded that the human mind structures
reality by applying universal categories; therefore, synthetic a p r io r i knowledge is true
for everyone since everyone has the same categories in mind. The subjective nature o f
Kant’ s philosophy has influenced post-modernism and the way we view language and
mind (A udi, 2001). Constructivism is deeply rooted in Kantian philosophy and had a
large impact on one o f the more contemporaiy philosophers o f our time, .lohn Dewey.
John Dewey was a modern philosopher in the twentieth century; he placed experience
at the heart o f education. For Dewey obtaining knowledge was all about providing
students w ith new and innovative experiences and offering environments they could draw
meaning from. Dewey’ s resistance was toward the “ teacher-expert” in which important
information as they interpreted it was relayed to the “ child-student,” then the student task
was to record the information and deliver it back on an exam (Dewey, 1991).
John Dewey was influenced by the idealism o f Georg W ilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who
extended the work o f Kant in terms o f transcendental idealism and searched for
categories necessary fo r experience to be discriminated and evaluated. He also tried to
develop a theory o f the subject that could be responsible fo r K ant’s categories in a nonempirical manner (A udi, 2001). The problem for Hegel (Pragmaticism) was the
completeness, interrelation, and ontological status o f such a structure. Dewey direeted
his foeus toward Hegel’ s dilemma in his grand w ork Experience and Nature (1925, cited
in Dewey, 1991) and based his philosophy on its observations. Prim arily an empiricist,
Dewey was concerned w ith separating his idea o f experience from idealism and
empiricism. Idealists focus on the cognitive aspects o f experience whereas Dewey
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highlighted the non-cognitive dimensions o f one’ s cognition. Dewey thought that the
Idealists’ perspective was too subjective and alienating to the external world. The
foundation o f Dewey’ s theory viewed experience as basic and used human action and
emotion to demonstrate the irreducibility o f experience. W ith this thinking as his
backdrop, Dewey believed that an individual’ s cognitive experienced derived from and
was conditioned by our more basic experiences. In this way cognitive experience
resulted from inquiiy. Inquiry was then the mechanism that em otively develops w ithin
the individual and prompts concern or doubt. This construeted an initial experience,
provoked conceptual elaboration toward possible scenarios o f truth, and fin a lly resulted
in a reconstruction o f our experience. This process o f transforming experience for
Dewey was a collaborative experience (M cDerm ott, 1981 ).
Dewey argued against Plato and others in the modern period o f philosophy, saying
that their view o f knowledge was a spectator theory, meaning that it was a passive
collection o f facts in the external w orld and derived from a connection w ith an
ind ividu a l’s beliefs. First, Dewey believed that knowing developed from doing; it is the
activity that is constructed and conceptualized. It shapes and adapts past, present, and
future interactions w ith our environment. Second, Dewey believed that the criterion fo r
knowledge is “ wamanted assertability,” (M cDerm ott, 1981, p. 129) which was a concept
he used as a tool to destabilize truth because o f its ambiguous connotations and the
relationship to the metaphysical world. By doing this, individual cognition could be
viewed as a dynamic process in which a present situation allows fo r an individual to
contemplate a situation and conclude w ith a consummation. Dewey was inspired by the
pragmatic thinking o f his contemporaries, C. S. Peirce and W illia m James.
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Dewey’ s idea o f experience was tightly connected to the idea o f nature but not as
“ the-world-as-it-would-be-independent-of-human-experiencc” (M cDerm ott, 1981).
Dewey believed that nature is a system o f natural transactions that consisted o f three
parts. Human experience was one o f these parts and was not reducible to any smaller
form. Consequently, this notion opposed the more strict scientific representations o f
nature. Although Dewey embraced the scientific method o f investigation as a way o f
thinking, he thought that the existing dualism between mind and body, fact and value,
and individual and social, was inaccurate because it made it d iffic u lt to apply reason to
human actions. Dewey proposed that a way to overcome dualistic thinking was to focus
on what we want as an individual and what we ought to pursue. In this format using ‘ w e’
grounds our experience in our development and our social history. Extending the
scientific method to accommodate practical judgments is sim ilar to the process o f
collecting facts (M erriam , 2002). This is the fundamental thinking that led Dewey to the
issues o f Democracy and Education (1916). It was in the 20"’ century that Jean Piaget
and John Dewey developed theories o f childhood development and education that led to
the evolution o f constructivism and continue to heavily influence personal epistemology
too.
The modem consideration o f constructivism is rooted in classical philosophy. It was
Socrates who asked his students questions that prompted them to realize the weaknesses
o f their knowledge. This Socratic dialogue continues to be an important tool in the way
constructivism views student learning and understanding o f knowledge and uses the
environment to create new experiences for understanding knowledge. In constructivism
the external w orld is not rejected; it is merely lim ited to reinforcing individuals’
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availability for representing their experiences by reinforcing a scheme or rejecting it.
There are two basic principles: (a) Knowledge is not passively received through the
senses or by communication but is actively constructed by the thought and social
interactions o f the individual w ith the environment, and (b) the function o f the
individual’ s cognitive processes is adaptive to the individuals’ experiences, not the
objective ontological reality (Carpendale & M uller, 2004, p. 113). Constructivism
declines to directly validate knowledge by comparing individual truths w ith the external
environment; the primary issue is how an individuals experience their world, organize
their thoughts, and determine their experience. It is important to distinguish
constructivism and social constructivism, also known as constructionism.
Social constructivism views knowledge solely as the product o f social processes o f
communication and mediation and is drawn from K ant’ s idealism. Kant believed that our
interpretive categories used to construct the world were developed a p rio ri, and
constructivists believe that these concepts and practices are different among groups and
historical periods. Because there is no standard for evaluating conceptual schemes, the
constructivist view seems relativistic and is present in Thomas K uhn’s, The Structure o f
Scientific Revolutions (1962). Kuhn argues that observations and methods in science are
deeply theory-dependent and that different paradigms function in different realms. His
position is centered between scientific realism and empiricism. More recently, Neimeyer,
Brooks, & Baker ( 1996) stated that “ as long as there were people asking each other
questions, there has been construction o f knowing. Further, constructivism is the study o f
learning and knowing and is how we all make sense o f our world; and that really hasn’t
changed” (p. 102).
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Hofer & Pintrich ( 1997) point out the eonnection between constructivism and
personal epistemology research in the influences o f Descartes, Piaget, and Dewey who
were all concerned w ith the nature and justification o f human knowledge. This is more
specifically identified as how individuals come to know, the theories and beliefs they
hold about knowing, and the manner in which such epistemological premises are a part o f
and an influence on the cognitive processes o f thinking and reasoning (H ofer & Pintrich,
1997). In addition, we see the epistemic questions o f justification o f knowledge (K ing &
Kitchener, 1994; Perry, 1970), doubt (Bendixen, 2002; Chandler, 2002), and epistemic
change (Bendixen & Rule, 2004) in our work in epistemological research.
Piaget's Theoretical Framework
In the United States w ithin the last h a lf century, psychology as a discipline has made
a major impact on the work o f personal epistemology as we have experienced a paradigm
shift from behaviorism to a cognitive perspective. In light o f this paradigm shift, much o f
the focus in educational psychology has centered on Piaget's theory o f development and
constructivist instructional methods. Piaget has been one o f the most influential
researchers in the area o f developmental psychology. He was prim arily interested in the
biological influences o f how it is that we “ come to know,” or what he referred to as
“ genetic epistemology” (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969, p. 81).

Piaget separated humans from

other livin g creatures because o f our ability to do “ abstract symbolic reasoning” (Smith,
1993, p. 8). Piaget (1971) focused on four developmental factors related to an
individual's cognitive functions: (a) biological factors, (b) equilibration factors, (c) social
factors, and (d) education and cultural factors.
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According to Piaget (1971), the process o f development is carried out in a series o f
stages, each o f which has a cognitive and logical form. He viewed developmental stages
as being in a particular order because o f the equilibration process (Kitchener, 1986).
Piaget applied his stage theory and introduced four basic stages o f cognitive
development: (a) sensory motor, (b) pre-operational, (c) concrete operational, and (d)
formal operational.
According to Piaget (1969), during the sensory motor stage, birth to age 2,
intelligence takes the form o f motor actions. Infants and toddlers use their senses to input
infonnation observed in the external w orld but are lim ited to motor reflexes to
communicate and understand. However, as they build up their reflexes as a means o f
developing more sophisticated procedures, they learn to generalize their activities to a
wider range o f situations and coordinate them into a repertoire o f behaviors.
In the pre-operational stage, between the ages o f 3 and 7 according to Piaget,
intelligence is seen as intuitive in nature. This is the stage o f development in which
children begin to acquire representational skills, and their thinking is more conceptual.
This is also a time when language begins to develop rapidly. Piaget used the term
egocentric to describe the self-oriented nature o f their thought processes. He thought that
children were limited to using their representational and language skills to view the
external w orld only from their own perspective.
In the concrete operational stage, between the ages 8 and 11, cognitive structures are
logical but depend on simple, unidimensional, concrete ideas. A t this phase, children
have the capability to consider another person’s point o f view and consider more than one
perspective simultaneously. In doing so their thought process becomes more logical.

19

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

flexible, and organized. Piaget argued that children at this stage have the capacity to
understand concrete problems, but they are incapable o f considering or solving abstract
problems and have not become cognizant o f the diverse consequences that exist as a
result o f their behavior. Children during this phase o f development acquire the a b ility to
understand principles o f conservation, classification, sequencing, and spatial reasoning.
According to Piaget, the final stage, formal operations, takes place from the ages o f
12 and 15. Thinking in this stage involves integrating complex, abstract, and
multidimensional eharacteristics (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969). Children in this phase o f
development have the capability to think logically and reason deductively w ith regard to
evidence and decision making. Piaget thought that this was the ultimate level o f
cognitive development. He believed that individuals would come to a crossroads as they
moved into and through adulthood, in which they would have to revise knowledge their
knowledge base; however, he supported his position that thinking at a formal operational
stage is really the peak o f cognitive processing and maintained that thinking does not get
anymore powerful (Piaget, 1970).
W hile thinking in terms o f the development o f how children understand knowledge
and the process o f knowing, it is beneficial to distinguish the criteria that Piaget
conceptualized as a stage. There are five criteria that reflect a stage according to Piaget
(1971):
1.

Sequential order o f succession must be constant, although the age at which an
individual reaches a particular stage may vary. It is not necessary to reach the
highest stage, but no stage can be skipped, switched, or regressed. The last detail
is not clear because Piaget has indicated that regression can occur in unusual
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circumstances. There is some debate about clarity o f the regression, specifically
i f it is a regression o f a performance or competence nature (Kitchener, 1986).
2.

Concepts at a lower level are necessary fo r building and advancing to the next
stage. Even though the concept w ill be present in the advanced stage, it w ill be
present in a different form.

3.

Each stage is compartmentalized to represent one piece o f the whole structure,
and once a compartment is achieved, an individual can perform all functions
outlined for that stage. Piaget sets this stage criterion to pertain solely to his
cognitive theory o f intelligence (Kitchener, 1986).

4.

The view o f preparation and completion at each stage is represented by Piaget
through some disequilibrium:
a.) Each stage begins w ith preparation o f the goal and ends w ith completion
o f the goal at that stage (Piaget, 1967).
b.) Stages overlap; each stage is the completion o f the previous stage and the
preparation for the next stage (Piaget, 1971).

5.

Every stage produces some degree o f equilibrium ; however, individuals’
cognitive structures become balanced at each stage, again, substantiating the
progressive nature o f each piece as it contributes to the whole sequence (Piaget,
1971).

Piaget’s theoretical framework w ill be revisited in more detail as it pertains to each model
o f epistemological development. Many o f the models are grounded in some form o f
Piaget’s conceptualizations o f cognitive development.
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Piaget outlined several principles fo r building cognitive structures throughout his
stages o f cognitive development. Based on a ch ild ’ s experience and genetics, i f an
experience is fam iliar, they derive information and assimilate, whereby the information
fits neatly into their existing cognitive map. However, i f the information or the
experience is unfam iliar or contradictory the child must accommodate their cognitive
map, therefore adjusting their cognitive map to make the information correspond. The
process o f accommodation occurs, Piaget believed, because the cognitive structures lost
equilibrium and required an equilibration process. For Piaget, this equilibration process
is a constant attempt to adapt to the environment and construct stronger cognitive
structures.
The goal o f Piaget’ s genetic epistemology was to expand the theories o f knowledge
about cognitive development in children. He thought that children’ s logic and modes o f
thinking start out extremely different from adult cognitive processes. He viewed
knowledge as a progressive construction, beginning w ith lower and less capable
structures that develop into much stronger mechanisms as individuals progress through
life (Flavell, 1999). Piaget assumed that there was a bond that existed between a ch ild ’ s
biology and their environment; he called this function interactionism (Piaget, 1969).
The problem that arises in Piaget’ s stage theory is that children’ s development is
driven precisely by the stage that they presently in. This means, i f a child is in one stage,
he cannot successfully master tasks in another stage. There have been substantial
criticisms o f Piaget’ s stage theory. There are questions that are raised about whether
children really develop adhering to these criteria and also the argument that not all
children reach fom ial operations (D riscoll, 1994). His w ork has been criticized for
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underestimating the ability o f very young children and being overly optim istic about the
capabilities o f older children (Slavin, 2006).
Regardless, Piaget has been incredibly influential in the search to tap into children’ s
cognitive understanding. In the 1960’s, researchers focused on Piaget’ s ideas that
children begin development with an egocentric subjectivity, meaning that they are
incapable o f understanding conceptual, perceptual, or affective perspectives (Flavell,
1999). In the 1970’s, researchers focused on many o f children’s metacognitive abilities
such as strategies, problem solving, and critical thinking (Flavell, 1999). It was in the
1980’s that researching children was dominated by the investigations regarding a ch ild ’ s
theory o f mind. This thread o f investigation remains strong in the research o f children
today. Theory o f mind development investigates children’ s knowledge about an
individual’ s most basic mental states, desires, perceptions, beliefs, knowledge, thoughts,
intentions, and feelings (Flavell, 1999). The foundation o f this research is based on
Piaget’ s cognitive developmental stages. Piaget explored the implications o f his theory
prim arily in the areas o f cognition, intelligence, and moral development. His theory has
been applied to classroom teaching methods and curriculum design, prim arily in
elementaiy education. It has influenced and is sim ilar to constructivist theories such as
Vygotsky and Bruner.
Vygotsk}’ 's Theoretical Framework
V ygotsky’ s (1978) framework has been w idely overlooked in terms o f young
children’ s personal epistemology w ithin a classroom context. Researchers in the area o f
personal epistemology are beginning to notice the importance o f social interaction. For
example, Bendixen (2002) reported that as college students reflected about their
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epistemic doubt and b e lie f change they emphasized the role o f social interactions in their
perseverance over epistemic doubt. Bendixen & Rule (2004) elaborate on resolution
strategies as a final component in their mechanism o f epistemic change process and stress
the importance o f social interaction in overcoming epistemic doubt. Perhaps there is
much to be gleaned from investigating what might be understood from young children’ s
social interactions and how this may impact their personal epistemologies.
It is often thought that Piaget and Vygotsky were in direct disagreement in terms o f
individuals’ cognitive development and how they construct knowledge (Smith, Dockrell,
& Tomlinson, 2000). Between the two theories, many significant sim ilarities are present
w ith regard to intellectual development: (a) It occurs as a sequence o f hierarchical levels
or stages; (b) there is a significant social component involved; and (c) biological
contributions play an important role (Smith et ah, 2000).
The major theme o f V ygotsky’s theoretical framework is that social interaction is
fundamental in the development o f cognitive development. Vygotsky (1978, p. 57)
states; “ Every function in a c h ild ’ s cultural development appears twice: first, on the social
level, and later, on the individual level.” Therefore, he suggests that interactions among
individuals and w ith their environment first occur extemally, as interpsychological
experience, and then second, w ithin the individual, which he referred to as
intrapsychological. Vygotsky argued that all higher-order functions are actually
internally manifested in itia lly through external relationships between individuals. This is
in direct contrast to the beliefs o f Piaget’ s philosophy o f egocentrism and socialization.
Another primary difference between the Vygotskian and Piagetian theories is the role
o f language (W ink & Putney, 2002). Vygotsky considered language and nonlinguistic
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behavior as the process that begins at birth w ith external exposure to the words and
actions o f others, which are then subsequently internalized by the child. It is only after
repeated experiences and a gradual mapping o f the language and actions o f the outside
world that a child gains the capacity to become egocentric or autonomous. Vygotsky
(1978) viewed language w ith a cultural, historical, and social lens and believed that
development is first facilitated by interaction and the use o f language among individuals.
Conceptually it is this process that allows learning to occur and precipitates the
restructuring o f an individual’ s thought process, and, in a reciprocal fashion, the new
thinking thereby impacts language (W ink & Putney, 2002). Vygotsky believed that
initial developmental stages are derived externally through interactions w ith others and
the higher levels o f development are those in which the individual becomes more
independent (Vygotsky, 1978).
One o f the most important differences in terms o f educational implications noted
between Piaget and Vygotsky is that Piaget thought development comes first and learning
follows, and Vygotsky saw this in reverse, that learning precedes development (W ink &
Putney, 2002). A second aspect o f contention between the two theories is that o f
perspective in a broad sense. Piaget viewed his w ork as epistemological, whereas _
Vygotsky chose the perspective o f pedagogy, the study o f the process o f teaching and
learning (Wertsch, 1985). He focused on components o f human learning and
development such as: (a) Learning w ith assistance is paramount to cognitive
development; and (b) w ith the support and assistance o f others, an individual’ s seemingly
limited capacity for learning or problem-solving can be expanded.
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This pedagogical perspective allowed Vygotsky to look closely at certain assumptions
o f intellectual development including; (a) Intellectual development is driven from w ithin
an individual; and (b) the capacity for understanding is based on cognitive ability.
Vygotsky, like Piaget, thought that children differed in their innate ability but viewed
each child as having the potential to achieve higher cognitive understanding based on the
circumstances o f their learning and by the contributions o f their environment. He
focused on the ch ild ’ s learning not solely as a reflection o f inherent ability but also as a
dimension o f the effectiveness and communication o f the teacher and the learner.
Another assumption is that children learn best i f they experience tasks that are w ithin
their cognitive level o f development, so that tasks which are developmentally appropriate
can be achieved independently or w ith m ild to moderate assistance. Piaget’ s argument is
that wlien children are given tasks that require interventions or assistance from someone,
they are prevented from constructing their own knowledge or self-discovery which then
lim its an individual’ s understanding. V ygotsky’ s view is quite different. He believed that
children should be exposed to tasks that were developmentally advanced in order to
strengthen intellectual capacity. Vygotsky (1978, p.53) stated that “ Instruction is only
good when it proceeds ahead o f development.” A potential drawback to the Piagetian
way o f thinking is that when children are given free rein to construct knowledge
independently, there is a greater chance o f increasing the amount o f misconceptions that
they formulate which, in turn, increases their opposition to changing their misconceptions
(Vygotsky, 1978).
It is Vygotsky’ s theory that leaves more allowances for the influences o f parents,
teachers, and peers in terms o f cognitive and epistemological development o f children

26

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

which are important aspects o f the current study. It focuses on the construction o f
knowledge as a mutual reciprocation o f learning through thought and language.
Although it was Vygotsky who introduced the influences o f language, he failed to
elaborate about how language was actually used in the process o f teaching and learning.
It was Jerome Bruner (1978) who followed Vygotsky’s vision and studied the language
o f teaching and learning, prim arily through observing young children interacting w ith
their mothers, using Vygotsky’ s ideas about the Zone o f Proximal Development.
Language is in itia lly used as a means o f communication w ith a very small and
deliberately chosen circle o f individuals; but, once mastered, language becomes
internalized and makes internal speech possible. V ygotsky’s work has been influential in
Bandura’ s theory o f social learning and as a key component in Lave’ s situated learning
theory.
A second important aspect o f Vygotsky’s theory is the concept o f the Zone o f
Proximal Development (ZPD) in which higher levels o f development are attained when
children are engaged in social behaviors (Bruner, 1978). W ithin the ZPD, it is believed
that a child can reach the highest level o f understanding and skill w ithin a range o f
development utilizing either adult guidance or peer collaboration, and this would far
exceed what the child could attain independently. In this way Vygotsky’s approach is a
demonstration o f how intentionality and conscious awareness is produced by using
socialization as a catalyst for the development o f knowledge.
Piaget and Vygotsky are important in developing a framework for children’s personal
epistemology because o f their theoretical contributions to early childhood cognitive
development, their support o f constructivist instruction, and their profound influences on
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adult personal epistemological research. Piaget’ s equilibration process and V ygotsky’ s
zone o f proxim al development stray from the idea that knowledge is fixed and
independent o f the individual. Instead, they have opened the door to view knowledge as
constructed by the individual based on beliefs and experience. Piaget has contributed to
personal epistemology through his emphasis on individual cognitive development and
meaningful construction (Moore, 2002). Vygotsky has contributed to our understanding
o f knowledge as being socially constructed, which involves merging experiences and
interactions w ithin one’ s cultural environment (Bendixen, 2002).

Theory and Research on Personal Epistemology
Epistemology is the study o f the nature o f knowledge and justification; more
specifically it is the study o f (a) the defining features o f knowledge, (b) the substantive
conditions or sources o f knowledge, and (c) the lim its o f knowledge and justification
(A udi, 2001). Views o f epistemology do not come without controversy. From as far
back as Socrates, rationalism, empiricism, and skepticism have debated about the nature
o f knowledge. Descartes’ dualistic view o f epistemology undoubtedly has raised more
problems that it solved but remains deeply influential (Kuhn, 1962). The cluster o f
profound problems that he raised about the nature o f the human mind and its relationship
to the material world are still very far from being adequately resolved.
Educational and developmental psychology have produced a great deal o f research
pertaining to epistemological development in the past forty years, beginning w ith
W illia m Peiry. This has resulted in a variety o f perspectives about knowledge from
definitional differences to the way knowledge is constructed and evaluated. The focus o f
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epistemological investigations in the field have revolved around students’ thinking and
beliefs about the nature o f knowledge and knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). There w ill
be three sections that follow : (a) discussion and critique o f the current models o f
personal epistemology development including: five developmental models,
epistemological beliefs, personal epistemological theories, epistemological resources, and
the integrated model o f personal epistemology; (b) young children’ s personal
epistemology including: developmental issues, researching personal epistemology in
young children, methodological issues, theory o f mind, and connections between theory
o f mind and personal epistemology; and (c) a seetion that links all o f the components
together, introducing the purpose o f the study and the research questions.
Review o f Developmental Models
In the follow ing section, five models o f personal epistemology development w ill be
reviewed including; (a) PeiTy’s Scheme o f Intellectual and Ethical Development (Perry,
1970), (b) W om en’s Ways o f K now ing (Belensky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule,
1986), (c) the Model o f Epistemological Reflection (Baxter Magolda, 1992), (d) the
Reflective Judgment Model (K ing & Kitchener, 1994), and (e) the Model o f
Epistemological Thinking (Kuhn, 1991). Each section includes a b rie f introduction that
links contributions to personal epistemology that relate to this study. Sections on each
model have a discussion o f the model, empirical support, and a summary and critique
section.
P e n y 's Scheme o f Intellectual and E thical Development
In the 1950’ s and I9 6 0 ’ s W illia m Perry Jr., an educational psychologist, conducted
two longitudinal studies. He began collecting information about his students’

29

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

interpretations o f their learning experience using open-ended interview questions. Perry
was not interested in the student’ s academic achievements, but rather the open-ended
questioning was a strategy used to capture the perceptions o f the individual’ s overall
development.
Discussion o f the m odel Perry’ s subjects were Harvard University undergraduates,
predominantly white males from a high socioeconomic class. The students completed a
survey, which Perry developed and called Checklist o f Educational Values (C LE V ). This
came from research in the areas o f personality and beliefs (H ofer & Pintrich, 1997). The
C LE V was administered to a large sample, and using results from the C LEV, Perry
would select a significantly smaller sample to participate in annual interviews at the end
o f each academic year. Contrary to Perry’s hypothesis, the patterns o f development
resulting from the interviev/s did not reflect changes in personality traits so much as the
confm nation o f many logically, coherent, cognitive developmental processes (Perry,
1999).
Perry and his colleagues compiled the interviews and worked out a Scheme o f
Intellectual and E thical Development (Perry, 1970). The scheme was comprised o f
intellectual and ethical development and described a nine-position model and introduced
terminology to explain how an individual progresses from one position to another. The
scheme reflects mechanisms o f change closely resembling Piaget’ s model o f cognitive
development (Piaget, 1950). The team quickly set out to validate these initial findings,
which they did successfully. Although continuing to collect more non-homogenous data,
the second study had even less female representation, but Perry (1970) stated that
women’ s experiences would fo llo w the same developmental scheme.
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Perry’ s scheme includes four main categories: (a) Simple Dualism, (b) Complex
Dualism, (c) Relativism, and (d) Commitment in Relativism. The nine positions fall
under these main headings.
Position 1: Basic Duality. This position represents the simplest set o f assumptions
about the nature o f knowledge and values. The assumption o f the dualistic structure in
the w orld is taken for granted and unexamined. This position holds the belief o f right
versus wrong, good versus bad, and we versus other. Perry ( 1970, p.87) phrases the
division as such: “ the fam iliar w orld o f Authority-right-w e, as against the alien world o f
illegitimate-wrong-others.” It is authority that rules, and the scope o f thought is that
w illpo w e r and work w ill yield corresponding actions and rewards. M u ltip lic ity is not
viewed, and the position is self-defined by ability to fo llo w in the right or desirable
fashion o f the tradition. The operational concept o f knowledge is objective, definite, and
organized as a body o f facts that constitute the truth about a subject, to be distinguished
from opinion, which is subjective and cannot be proven as true.
Position 2: M u ltip lic ity Pre-Legitimate. In this position M u ltip lic ity (M ) is
perceived but only as unreal or alien; both perspectives are represented as (M ) because
they are perceived but not as a signal o f legitimate epistemological uncertainty. As
unreal, (M ) serves a vague appearance; opposition acknowledges authority not as wrong
but rather failing to convey their position w ith adequate warrants. As alien, (M )
assimilates easily to error and otherness. Perry (1999) uses this example; “ others are
wrong and confused (M ).” Assimilated to authority, it leads to opposition: “ 1 am right”
translating the authority as being confused. Teachers are the seen as the source o f Truth
rather than resources. The operational concept o f knowledge consists o f facts, principles.
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axioms, and other items that can be proven although it may be d iffic u lt to derive proof.
Overcoming this d iffic u lty is a challenge best left to the experts, and individuals hold the
idea that there are levels or degrees o f expertness.
Position 3: M u ltip lic ity Subordinate. In this position. M u ltip lic ity is perceived but
w ith some limitations because authority may not have all o f the answers. In the ideal
perspective, authority is not threatened and is perceived to evaluate the individual on skill
presentation. Students may fear that they are being judged inappropriately. The w orld
view o f Position 2 begins to break down in a number o f different ways, perhaps most
frequently through confrontation w ith several Authorities who are already established as
good authorities and who just happen to disagree. This position is the first display o f
uncertainty in the world. There continues to be a right-box and a wrong-box, but in
Position 3 a box is added fo r items that are unknown (Moore, .larrold, Russell, Lumb.
Sapp, & MacCallum, 1995). So, in other words, i f two good authorities are disagreeing,
it is probably because they are dealing w ith an area where all o f the answers have not
been found.
Position 4: M u ltip lic ity Correlate o r Relativism Subordinate. W ithin this position,
there is considerable overlap. In the beginning level o f the position, duality is
restructured in more complex terms, such as right-wrong versus (M ) absolutes that may
be doubted or seen as unattainable w ithin a reasonable amount o f time. Therefore in (M )
individuals have liberty to their own opinion, and there are no better interpretations; one
is just as good as another.
Relativism Subordinate is a more advanced perspective that is attained just p rior to
advancing to the next position. Clearly there are more progressive interpretations on the
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part o f the individual happening, but there is still a sense that information or ways o f
thinking remain in the control o f the authority. There is more realization that hard work
is not sufficient in and o f itself, and the individual achieves a stance that there is not an
autocratic governing basis for determining what is right. Evaluation is frequently a
fragile component as the individual begins to understand the idea o f quality versus
quantity and the application o f information.
Position 5: Relativism Correlate, Competing o r Diffused. In this position.
Relativism is viewed as a way o f perceiving, analyzing, and evaluating. Different
authorities exist, such as authorities that hold the Truth in math and physics as opposed to
authority for which relativism must be used, for instance, an English paper. The
operational concept o f knowledge lends its e lf to an in d iv id u a l’s awareness that thought
and knowledge can be more intrinsic, that knowledge is always changing or has the
potential to change. Knowledge can be shared but not measured, predicted, or counted
on to remain the same.
It seems that the latter part o f Position 4 and then Position 5 describe the individual’ s
most significant movement because it represents a transformation in one’ s view o f the
w orld from essentially dualistic to essentially relativistic and context-bound. Along with
this transition, individuals’ attitudes about their role as a student and the way they
interpret knowledge and learning shift. The self becomes a viable source o f knowledge
alongside previous sources. The biggest distinction between the relativism o f Position 4
versus 5 is the introduction o f being self-consciously aware o f the se lf as an active
meaning maker (H ofer & Pintrich, 1997). An individual’ s goal is fin a lly understood
here, that is to develop intellectually and ethically in order to make sense o f and evaluate
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knowledge as a means o f generating judgments in a diverse and relativistic world
(Moore, 2002).
Position 6: Coininitinent Foreseen. In this position, relativism is accepted for all
moral or nonreligious purposes, including systematic judgments and actions.
Commitment may be perceived as a logical necessity for action in a relativistic world.
Interestingly, Perry (1970) includes emotions as a separate entity and emphasizes they
can appear w ith or without any external observable validation o f logic. The realization
may provoke a variety o f responses including: eagerness, ambivalence, dismay,
sturdiness, turm oil, or simple acceptance (Perry, 1999). The concept o f knowledge is that
it is not something that is any longer external and definite, rather something that each
individual constructs according to his/her own experience and background.
Position 7: In itia l Coininitinent. This position is on the heels o f Position 6 where the
individual becomes aware o f a need for commitment. This position includes the
ind ividual’ s first commitment. Knowledge is perceived as what individuals have
constructed themselves from learning and experience, along w ith the ethical implications
o f this view, synthesized into a consistent philosophy.
Position 8: Orientation in Im plications o f Commitment. In this position, individuals
may encounter the realization o f some o f the implications o f their commitments. They
may experience tension between feelings o f tentativeness and finality, expansion and
narrowing, freedom and constraint, and action and reflection. This intellectual freedom
makes for a dynamic interaction between the se lf and the environment, requiring stability
and fle x ib ility . There is more reflection and elaboration o f identity commitments because
the individual is coping w ith and synthesizing solutions for the consequences o f their
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commitments. The naïve assumption that making a commitment w ill take care o f
everything dissolves, and individuals discover the need for m ultiple commitments. They
begin to realize that these m ultiple commitments, such as career, partner, friends, and
lifestyle, are often conflicting.
Position 9: Developing Commitments. In this position, individuals assume new
priorities and begin to reassess their commitments. Commitments can be either
augmented or reconstructed, and balance is welcomed as the individual experiences less
tension and more ease w ith knowledge and commitments. It remains a tentative level in
that individuals come to terms w ith the complexity o f the w orld and their position. They
are now able to acknowledge a willingness to struggle through the proeess in a search for
answers.
Perry’ s scheme has been instrumental in the development o f four other developmental
models and continues to be the integral component o f current investigations into the
study o f personal epistemology. He has designed a trajectory o f development that
progresses in a natural forward direction and assumes patterns in the reorganization o f
meaning that incur, both a structure and systematic momentum.
E m pirical support. Kurflss ( 1977) focused on validating three developmental
constructs from Perry’ s seheme: (a) sequentially, (b) hierarchical development, and (c)
structural unity. She studied college students from two psychology classes who
participated in three interviews. The first session was a two-hour interview in which the
students used a Likert scale to verbally rate 40 short statements representing the concepts
from eight o f Perry’ s positions. In the second session the students addressed the same 40
statements as in their first session, except this time they did so in w riting. The third
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session was identical to the second session. Because o f the w riting, it was necessary to
add another hour so the students could get through all 40 statements. There were eight
questions in each o f five categories that related to Perry’ s positions: (a) making moral
decisions, (b) role o f advisor, (c) how essays should be graded, (d) responsibilities o f
teacher, and (e) the nature o f academic knowledge.
In terms o f sequences, Kurfiss (1977) concluded that Perry’s individual positions are
sequential and are ordered by increasing cognitive complexities. The hierarchieal
development did support Perry, but it was not strong support, which was anticipated. The
structural unity construct demonstrated that cognitive development proceeds unevenly
across different areas, and, not surprisingly, the area where the individual is actively
involved was found to advance first.
Clinchy, Lief, & Young (1977) used the Perry scheme to validate its generalizability
to adolescent girls. Their major purpose was to examine the relationship between type o f
schooling and students’ ways o f reasoning about moral and epistemological issues.
Using Kohlberg’ s (1969) scale o f moral development and Perry’ s scheme o f
epistemological development, they compared the performance o f girls from a traditional
and a progressive public high school. Clinchy et al. (1977) detennined that previous
methods o f identifying positions on Perry’s scale (Kurfiss, 1975; Meyer, 1975; W idick,
Knefelkamp, & Parker, 1975; Stephenson & Hunt, 1975; Slepitza & Knefelkamp, 1975)
had yielded inconclusive results. They chose to adopt an interview fonnat (C linchy &
Zimmerman, unpublished) because interviews seem to consistently provide data that was
easy to score and allowed for the highest interrater reliability. They found that the
traditional (teacher-eentered) and the progressive (student-centered) school students
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transitioned through identical positions (but at different rates) o f epistemological
development which confirmed Perry’ s scheme. They also, like Perry, failed to identify
the actual characteristics o f the scale’s extremities.
Interestingly, where Perry found little relativistic thinking in college freshmen,
C linchy et al. (1977) found that over 40% o f the progressive high school seniors
exhibited relativistic reasoning, moving from position 3 to position 5. Considering their
findings, the argument was that perhaps progressive schools facilitate development by
providing more opportunities for cognitive conflict, perspective taking, and more active
participation w ith one’ s environment. One o f the most significant lim itations o f this
study was the small sample that was used to draw the comparison to Perry. It was also
argued by the authors that i f the sample had been larger the differences between the
schools may have been different. The important point is that using the interview method
was a time consuming process and reduced the number o f students- they were able to
evaluate.
Moore (1991) concluded that w hile interviews may provide a rich and valuable
resource for evaluation o f epistemological beliefs, they are inefficient to use in academic
settings. He suggested two alternative approaches to unstructured interviews: (a) the
Measurement o f Intellectual Development (M ID ), a production-task measurement; and
(b) the Learning Environment Preferences, a recognition-task measure. He suggested
both measures were better than interviews because they eliminated individual’ s high
degree o f subjectivity in the individual’ s responses. Moore (2002) continues to
acknowledge the value o f in-depth qualitative methods; however, he continues to
recommend that efforts be placed toward developing and refining assessments geared
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toward individual’ s perfonnances set in real-world contexts, and he believes selfassessment data is especially insightful and should not be overlooked.
Mentkowski & Strait (1983) used the M ID to validate Perry’ s positions w ith high
school students, using a cross-sectional analysis, and found that seniors scored
significantly higher on two o f the three essays than did the freshman. However, when
compared to a longitudinal study looking at the same two essay questions, students had a
significant increase over the four year span on the first question w hile the other question
showed a small decrease. K ing & Kitchener (1990) point out the importance o f the
Mentkowski & Strait (1983) findings claim ing that among college students such a gain
typically reflects a qualitative shift from a style o f reasoning based largely on personal
beliefs to one that e xplicitly uses evidence in making judgments.
Using his M ID and the D efining Issues Test (D IT ) (Rest, 1979), Moore (1989)
developed an alternative to the intepidew protoeol fo r measuring epistemological beliefs,
called the Learning Environment Preferences (LEP). His findings focused on the design
and construct va lid ity o f the LEP, but they also offered evidence o f Perry’s scheme o f
intellectual development. The LEP focuses prim arily on the stages that Perry found to be
most salient in college education (Knefelkamp & Com feld, 1978). This narrowed the
focus to positions 2 thru 5, which is legitimate because Perry’ s upper levels seemed to be
most properly assessed by in-depth interviews, and the lowest level had been
hypothesized from the onset and never truly measured. U ltim ately, the LEP was
comprised o f five specific domains related to epistemology and approaches to learning:
(a) view o f knowledge and course content, (b) role o f the instructor, (c) role o f the student
and peers in the elassroom, (d) the classroom atmosphere, and (e) the role o f evaluation.
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Moore (1989) recruited students enrolled in a mixture o f universities, state,
community, and private colleges ranging from small to large with curriculums that varied
among selective, comprehensive, and honors. Gender was equally split between males
and females, and students were evenly distributed according to the year o f attendanee
from freshman through senior years. Construct validity was measured on each item by
(a) internal consistency o f the position-keyed items across the live domains and
according to Peiry’ s four positions, and (b) an item factor analysis to determine whether
and to what extent the LEP measures the underlying factor constructs corresponding to
positions 2 thru 5 and to explore any empirical relationship that could link the items
theoretically to the instrument scoring protocol (Moore, 1989).
It was reported that some items were poor because they did not obtain the empirical
performance they had anticipated. Some o f the items could be discarded without any
threat to the internal consistency o f the scale w hile others needed to be revised. There is
such little distinction between Perry’s position 4 and 5, which Moore refers to as
“ hybrid” (p. 511), that for clarification between the positions it would be beneficial to
rework or replace some o f the items in order to make it easier to draw distinctions
between the two positions. Moore (1989) indicated that it was helpful for interpreting the
LEP to have the scoring system reflect Peny’ s positions, but admittedly it may not be the
most effective empirical reflection for identifying underlying cognitive processes. To get
at such cognitive processes, the LE P ’s scoring system may need to relate more closely to
its factor structure.
Zhang (1999) suggested that student’ s cultural background and experience as it
relates to the learning environment may influence students’ cognitive development. This
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was a cross-cultural investigation for generalizability, comparing one group o f students
from the United States and two groups from the People’s Republic o f China. The Zhang
Cognitive Development Inventory (ZC D I) was constructed based on Perry’ s intellectual
development and was found to be valid and reliable. Her findings were problematic for
incorporating Perry’ s scheme to the Chinese culture. However, using the ZC D I the U.S.
students matched Perrys’s progression.
Zhang (1999) reported an interesting pattern in the Chinese college students. She
found the patterns o f cognitive development were not hierarchically consistent with
Perry. One o f the Chinese groups showed that the college freshman groups scored the
highest in relativism and commitment in relativism but lowest in dualism. The dualism
scores showed steadily more strength in the sophomores and still stronger in the juniors.
The juniors actually had the lowest relativism scores, followed by the sophomores with
the lowest. The seniors from the People’ s Republic o f China were m inim ally less
dualistic and had slightly more relativism and commitment in relativism. The other
Chinese group did show some cognitive development changes very sim ilar to Perry’ s
scheme. One o f the problems was that the two Chinese groups were investigated over
two years apart. Although this study may im ply that Perry’s model is not generalizable to
diverse cultures in general and the Chinese culture specifically, it did show a systematic
progression but in reverse. This finding could have significance in the proposed study or
even provide support for varying theories w ith trajectories that d iffe r from the traditional
developmental models o f personal epistemology.
Some researchers suggest that students’ understanding o f knowledge is related to the
types o f epistemological assumptions they are exposed to, fo r example, the
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epistemological assumptions o f teachers (Hofer, 2004a; Schraw & Olafson, 2006). Based
on Perry’s model o f evolving epistemological development, Hofer (2004a) concluded
that teachers can influence student’ s understanding and epistemological development in
m ultiple ways. Her study used elassroom observation and interviews with the college
students in two different courses. The observations aimed toward investigating how
beliefs about knowledge and knowing are communicated in a college course and how
they are situated w ithin classroom interactions. This methodology veered slightly from
Perry’s C LE V and interview process in that it incorporated classroom observations. One
o f the significant conclusions from the study came from the interviews: students’
evolving understanding o f knowledge might also alter their sense o f self. This is
important in researching young children’s epistemological onset because it suggests that
the impact o f entering a classroom environment can influence beliefs and knowledge but
might affect a children’ s sense o f identity and their relationship w ith others, for example,
parents and peers.
Siim m aiy and critique. Perry’s w ork is ground-breaking and paved the way for
nearly 35 years o f investigation o f epistemological understanding. However, Perry
him self attributed several lim itations to his research. First, his research sample was
comprised largely o f young, white, upper-class, male subjects who attended Harvard
University in the 1950’s and 1960’ s. Second, the subjects were strictly volunteers, and
many o f the members o f the research team served a dual role, in that they were subjects
and helped analyzed the data. This matter places the validation o f the study in question.
Third, the first and ninth positions were not actually identified in Perry’ s study but rather
extrapolated based on the other seven positions. Fourth, the beginning positions seem to
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be more e xp licitly epistemological than the latter positions; therefore the scheme’s
description is less noticeably “ spatial-cognitive restructuring” and more toward
“ emotional and aesthetic assessments” (K ing & Kitchener, 1994; Perry, 1970, p. 205).
Perry and his colleagues appear to have loosely adopted the Piagetian framework for
two reasons: (a) They had expected to link their findings w ith personality characteristics,
but when they began seeing patterns o f epistemological understanding between
individuals and over time they had to search for desirable alternatives; and (b) very
sim ply it was the best framework available that would portray a cohesiveness throughout
the progression and could withstand the coherence o f the individual’ s interpretations in
sueh a way that would allow them to implant position 1 and 9 based on inferenee.
Ultim ately, Perry’ s nine positions were reduced to four categories (Hofer, 2001 ; Moore,
2002): dualism, m u ltip licity, contextual relativism, and commitment to relativism.
Researchers in the field (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; King & Kitehener; 1994) have
criticized Perry’s w ork because o f concerns about whether the responses capture a true
structural, developmental trajectory or are more ju st artifacts o f the socialization process
in values o f a liberal arts education at that place and time. It is not clearly explained in
the Scheme about what occurs prior to and including Position 1 or is it hypothesized what
might happen to knowledge after Position 9. The progression from dualism to relativism
is not all that well-defined in terms o f how knowledge is interpreted beyond the positions,
especially in the later positions where intellectual and ethical development, issues o f
epistemology, and identity intersect during the affirm ation o f commitment (Perry, 1981).
The methods used by Perry (1970) are not particularly efficient at measuring change
and are functionally time-consuming. There is a question o f va lid ity in that the
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developmental process o f the individuals and their value systems could be easily
misconstrued. M any researchers have taken on the task o f m odifying the Scheme w ith
interviews and various written assessments (Baxter Magolda, 1992; K ing & Kitchener,
1994; Knefelkamp & Slepitza, 1978; Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002). Even with
these theoretical and methodological contributions, epistemological development
continues to have many unresolved issues, considerable virgin soil, and much speculation
especially w ith younger children.
Perry’ s w ork precipitated the movement o f investigating college-age students’
epistemological beliefs (Baxter Magolda, 1992; Belenky Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule,
1986). However, many researchers who have followed a sim ilar framework to Perry’ s
positions have gone on to suggest that this phenomenon can be detected at varying ages
such as middle childhood (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996; Kuhn, Chaney, & Weinstock,
2000; Lalonde, 1996) and teenage years (Boyes, & Ball, 1990; Reich, Oser, & Valentin,
1994; Rosenberg, Hammer, & Phelan 2006).
Perry’ s Scheme o f Intellectual and Ethical Development has activated a wealth o f
research in the area o f personal epistemology, prim arily in college students. The
pendulum appears to be shifting, and researchers are beginning to investigate how Perry’ s
scheme might apply to children and even very young ehildren (B urr & Hofer, 2002).
Women's Ways o f Knowing
Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule (1986) joined forces to investigate v/omen’s
issues concerning knowledge and learning. They adopted Perry’ s Scheme and developed
Women's Ways o f Knowing, a developmental model w ith five perspectives “ from which
women view reality and draw conclusions about truth, knowledge, and authority”
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(Belenky, 1986, p. 3). Perry (1970) utilized an im p licit visual metaphor, but, in contrast,
the Belenky et al. (1986) model uses voice as their metaphor. They conducted their
research w ith only women in the same fashion as G illigan (1982) and, in direct
opposition to Perry’s sample; they chose women from all walks o f life, from college
institutions to the Department o f Public Wel fare. Their goal was to explore whether there
were certain conceptions o f knowing that could be detected in the “ voices o f women”
(Belenky, Bond, & Weinstock, 1997, p. 55). Hayes & Flannery (2000) explain that in
women specifically but m inority groups in general, voice can imply communication or
connectedness w ith other people. Voice can be viewed in the same way in researching
young children. Voice becomes a more sophisticated way fo r children to communicate,
and while language may be an obstacle in learning what children know and understand,
voice is always present (D ow ling. 2005).
Discussion o f the Model. Woman’s Ways o f Knowing differs from Perry’s scheme
structurally. Perry describes his stages in a systematic format much in the same way
Piaget introduced his cognitive stages o f development. Belenky et al. (1986) do not view
their findings as developmental in nature but rather as traditions that can be contextual
and non-linear (Belenky et al., 1997). It should be pointed out that the different ways o f
knowing are not intended to be fixed or universal stages o f epistemological development,
and that culture and social context would undoubtedly unfold as a significant factor;
therefore, in most cases ways o f knowing should not be expected to be generalizable.
Belenky et al. (1986) conducted 135 in-depth interviews, ranging from two to five
hours. The approach was phenomenological, so it allowed the women to convey their
own meaning making experience through the semi-structured interviews. The protocol
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involved gender, relationships, education, and ways o f knowing. They did not include
culture, economic, or affective dispositions, but they did segregate the ways o f knowing
section from the educated women and the less educated women. The educated
participants were asked to respond to one or more statements about the conception o f
knowledge and were then probed further about issues o f expertise and truth. They were
then quizzed on topics o f intellectual judgment and justification. The less educated
participants had a much less involved interview; they were asked five shorter questions
involving the expertise o f their own learning.

Table 1: Summary O f W omen’s Ways o f Knowing
Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, And Tarule (1986)
PERSPECTIVES

D E FIN ITIO N

M ETAPH O R
Deaf & Dumb

Voiceless, relies on external sources o f
knowledge

2
RECEIVED
K N O W IN G

Listening to voices
o f others

Use o f listening as a key to knowledge

3
SUBJECTIVE
K N O W IN G

The inner voice &
the quest for self

Beginning trust o f own knowledge

The voice o f
Reason

Separate and connected ways o f knowing
become systematic at finding solutions

Integrating the
voices

Knowledge is reliable & comes from self
& others

1
SILENCE

4
PROCEDURAL
K N O W IN G
5
CONSTRUCTED
KN O W IN G

The inteiwiew questions Belenky et al. used were a collage from the theories o f Perry
(1970), Gilligan (1982), and Kohlberg (1969). For data analysis the questions were
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separated by theorist and evaluated, and an attempt was made to fit the information into
Pen-y’ s Scheme. When the Women's Ways o f Knowing Model did not coincide w ith
Perry’ s scheme, they introduced five new classifications fo r epistemological perspectives
that are represented by the metaphor o f “ voice and silence” (Belenky et al. 1986, p. 17)
(See Table 1).
Silence. This was not a highly represented position in their sample but is a significant
example o f the extreme denial o f self and the extreme dependence on external authority
for direction. The women representing this level were among the most economically,
socially, and educationally deprived. Other characteristies include the follow ing: (a) a
poor sense o f self, w ith no internal voice; (b) thought processes linked to the immediate
present and eoncrete experiences; (c) a short attention span; (d) a complete polarization
o f authority; (e) obedience to authority because o f fear o f punishment; and (f) d ifficu lty
form ing bonds w ith others.
Interestingly, w hile considering the cultural implications o f Women's Ways o f
Knowing, Belenky & Stanton (2000) m odified the Silence perspective to Silenced, a
small but mighty shift when considering the different connotations o f each term
separately. Their intention was to help distinguish that perspective from contrasting
observations made in non-Westem cultures. Hurtado (1996), for example, found that
African-Am erican women use silence as an information-seeking strategy. An interesting
question could be as follows: is there any relationship between the way in which m inority
women use their voice, and how young children develop their voice? The proposed study
may be able to shed light on this question.
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Received Knowing. In this stage, epistemological perspective is either/or thinking; all
information and ideas are viewed as good or bad, and there can only be one right answer.
The origin o f knowledge is external, and the se lf has nothing to do w ith knowing;
however, individuals are able to verbalize the external source o f knowledge where the
silenced women are paralyzed. The women who oceupied this position do not view
themselves as aligned w ith any authority. Although this position corresponds to Perry’s
dualism, the male counterparts in his research do view themselves as aligned with
authority (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).
In this position, individuals are open to what others say but do not speak w ith their
own voice and do not view themselves as on an equal level. Some other outstanding
characteristics are the follow ing: (a) faith that others can provide valuable information
and direction, (b) confidence in their ability to store information but a reluctance to do
anything w ith the information, (c) dualistic thinking, (d) intolerance for any ambiguity,
(e) dependence on authority, (f) desire fo r ways to adapt and conform (g) a tendency to
leave challenging environments where they cannot adjust, (h) concern fo r others but not
themselves, and (i) extreme d iffic u lty w ith communication (Belenky et al. 1986).
Subjective Knowing. Women in this position continue to think somewhat
dualistically but realize that the source o f knowledge is w ithin the self; therefore, it seems
interchangeable with Perry’s early m u ltip licity position. Hofer & Pintrich (1997) point
out gender differences in the meaning making w ith the men in Perry’ s (1970) results.
Men expressed the right to have their own opinions, whereas the women viewed truth as
coming from personal experiences in an intuitive manner. The sense o f self overcomes
reliance on outside authority and replaces it w ith intuition. This type o f knower w ill
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often deflect influences o f others and refer all decisions to a gut feeling. This
epistemological perspective can be characterized by: (a) an understanding that individual
inteiprctations are more valid than authority, (b) placing value on feelings over ideas and
on intuition over reason, (c) skepticism toward rational thought and procedural
approaches, (d) vast attention to personal experience, and (e) utilization o f self-talk as a
means o f developing a voice.
Procedural Knowledge. This perspective is divided into two parts: separate and
connected ways o f knowing. Separate knowing is the abandonment o f subjective
knowing to assume a skeptical frame o f reference, using procedures as a means for
evaluating any situation or making decisions. Gaining use o f procedures empowers the
individual (now viewed as a learner) to go beyond subjectivism. This is aligned with
Perry’ s relativism. It is a type o f critical thinking but more detached. Subjective thinking
perceives it as possible for everyone to be correct, but separate knowing perceives that it
is possible for others and themselves to be incorrect. Separate knowers can be identified
by their: (a) preference for argument and emphasis on doubt; (b) need to be prepared and
confident before speaking; (c) strategic approach to dealing with people and tasks; (d)
acceptance o f established standards; (e) emphasis on procedure, methodology, and
objectivity; and (f) problem solving ability.
The second part o f procedural knowing, connected knowing, maintains the subjective
aspect o f knowing but at the same time develops procedures for gaining access to others’
knowledge and interpretations. The impersonal knowledge becomes personal, and the
learner transitions to a more empathetic and caring perspective as a means o f
understanding rather than judgment. The individual who experiences connecting
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knowledge demonstrates eharacteristics such as: (a) putting forth effort to emphasize
trust, (b) being able to adhere to m ultiple perspectives w ithout necessarily being swayed
to alternative points o f view, (c) displaying a preference for being non-competitive and
non-judgmental, and (d) showing no hesitation to accept assistance from others to
negotiate and develop ideas.
Conslmcted Knowing. This perspective integrates received subjective and procedural
ways o f knowing in order to construct knowledge. This individual w ill use the follow ing:
(a) reflection to articulate understanding in an exploratory way; (b) self-awareness to
complement sensitivity to others; (c) tolerance as a strategy fo r conflict, ambiguity,
stress, and internal contradictions; (d) eontextualization when needed for solving
problems w ith little structure; and (e) environments that value diverse perspectives and
ideas. The individual definitely views herself as a participant in the construction o f
knowledge, as one who can construct and reconstruct different frames o f reference.
One conceptual difference that exists between Perr>'’ s Scheme and Women’s Ways o f
Knowing is that Periy^s positions are descriptive about the nature o f knowledge and truth,
whereas Belenky et al. (1986) focus more toward the source o f knowledge and truth.
Their scope o f questioning relied heavily on reflection o f s e lf in relation to knowledge.
They reported that once the idea o f self generalizes it strongly affects how women think
about knowledge, truth, and expertise. They compare this process to Piaget’s horizontal
decalage, which refers to the repetition that takes place w ithin a single period o f
development as opposed to vertical decalage, v/hich is repetition that occurs at different
levels o f functioning. In other words, the individual experiences changes about
knowledge w ithin themselves or self-knowledge prior to their understanding o f self in
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relation to knowledge and truth. Women's Ways o f Knowing uses a soeioeultural
perspective (Vygotsky, 1978) in its use o f diversity in culture and age. The combined
Perry (1970) and Belenky et al. (1986) theories can demonstrate structural differences
that are developed from different gender voices.
E m pirical support. Measurement o f personal epistemology has historically been an
obstacle for researchers, including the tremendous time factor involved w ith interviews
and the imposition it requires in educational settings. Buezynski (1993) attempted a
paper-and-peneil questionnaire designed to measure the perspectives developed by
Belenky et al. (1986); the measure is called the Ways o f Knowing Instrument (W O K I).
The sample investigated was comprised o f 348 female undergraduates. The analysis
supported a 5-factor model o f intellectual development for women and appeared to
support the five dimensions o f Belenky et al. (1986); however, the instrument was not
vastly adopted by the research community although it was found to be a reliable and valid
measure.
Tennant & Poquson (1995) used Women 's PVays o f Knowing and found no differences
in perspective between traditional and non-traditional students. This seems
counterintuitive and in direct opposition to the findings o f Belenky et al. (1986). This is
an important finding because one o f the emerging issues in personal epistemology is the
possibility that there is a recursive nature to beliefs about knowledge. In addition, it
contributes to the idea that personal epislemologies may be more context-dependent or
eontext-specifie. We have yet to scratch the surface o f either issue, and the present study
provides an opportunity to investigate both possibilities.
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Luttrell (1989) studied working-class women and their ways o f knowing and how it
was affected by gender, race, and class. This study looked at two groups o f women: (a)
African-Am erican working-class women who attended a basic education program serving
maintenance and housekeeping employees at a Southeastern university, and (b)
Caucasian working-class women who attended an urban northeastern community-based
program. She intentionally targeted women in learning environments and women who
were also working. Vast demographic information was collected on the women.
Additionally they were observed in their respective classrooms, notes were taken, and
grade equivalency testing was conducted. Fifteen women from each group were chosen
to participate in in-depth interviews, and the final interview fo r each woman took place at
their home and ranged from 2 hours to 4 hours in length. W ithin each group o f women,
there were identifiable similarities, which were expected, but there were m inimal
similarities between the groups o f women. Surprisingly, the one area that both groups o f
women had in common was that they all had ehildren and that was the biggest factor for
all o f them dropping out o f school. Luttrell (1989) concluded her findings were similar to
Belenky et al. (1986) when compared to Perry (1970) because o f the underlying themes
geared toward unconscious psyehodynamie factors, cognitive development, and genderrole socialization. These women had developed inclinations toward their self and
knowing that were less linear, separate, and hierarchieal as compared to men in the Perry
(1970) study. The findings also suggested a sim ilar trajectory in that the women showed
more o f a continuous and connected sense o f self-knowledge which was embedded in
their social relationships and was related to their background knowledge and experiences.
Through qualitative analysis it was summarized that although it was still d iffic u lt to
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pinpoint precisely how the women internalized rationality and knowledge, it was clear
that the outcome continues to falsely dichotomize emotion and thought; subjectivity and
objectivity; and mind and body (Luttrell, 1998).
Brown and G illigan (1992) did a study that directly links Women's Ways o f Knowing
to the current study because it investigates personal epistemological development in
young g ir l’ s over time. Brown & G illigan (1992) is a ten-year longitudinal study with
young girls entering adolescence and through their teens. What they found over the
course o f their discussions was that younger girls have strong voices and are unafraid o f
speaking the truth about their feelings, thoughts, and experiences. However, once on
their way to becoming young women, these same girls who seemed at first open and
uninhibited had experienced a significantly diminished voice and appeared to be
disconnected from themselves. They concluded that the transition they had witnessed
was that “ developmental progress goes hand-in-hand w ith evidence o f a loss o f voice” (p.
6). They observed a struggle to authorize or take seriously their own experience, to listen
to their voices in conversation, and to respond to their feelings and thoughts, increased
confusion, and sometimes defensiveness.
In another study using the Women's Ways o f Knowing framework, Llorens (1994)
claimed that the voice that is missing in educational research is the voice o f the teachers.
Her goal was to find out w hy more teachers did not conduct more action research in their
classrooms and what it might take to encourage teachers to find their voice. The study
looks in-depth at 38 teachers from a variety o f perspectives; educational background,
teaching experience, instructional approach, goals, and classroom assessment. Data was
collected from the experimental group over four months and included semi-structured
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interviews, group brainstorming, a weekly reading meeting, and individual journal
entries. The control group had a pre-interview and a post-interview discussing the same
topics as the experimental group without the intervention. The findings were compatible
w ith Women’s Ways o f Knowing. The teachers involved in the experimental group began
to realize that the silencing they were experiencing was related to the female role models
in their lives. Upon reflecting on their female students, the teachers were able to see
patterns o f what they had been exposed to and how they themselves might be impacting
silence w ithin their female students. Personal commitment and passion were also
missing in the teachers in previous action research projects. This precipitated a
disconnection from their w ork in the classroom. This is pivotal fo r successful action
research because personal connection w ith the content and the students is the only way
fo r a teacher to regain their voice (Zeichner, 1993). In Llorens (1994) it is the personal
disconnect and lack o f commitment that is consistent w ith Belenky et al. (1986).
Summary and critique. Like Perry ( 1970), Belenky et al. ( 1986) opened themselves
up for criticism by intentionally investigating all women. They also generalized that their
findings could be found in the male population but provided no means to assess the
gender-related nature o f their findings (H ofer & Pintrich, 1997). Their decision to
expand the investigation to include less educated women had good possibilities to really
see differences, but the decision to utilize two different protocols immediately infuses
questions about the conclusions regarding the differences in the epistemological
perspectives o f the women. Perry’s scheme included a position o f Basic Dualism in
which ideas are either right or wrong, but there is no inference o f a power imbalance
between the authority and the knower. Belenky et al. (1986) failed to include a
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perspective representative o f this type o f thinking or knowing. They give validation to
the Subjective K n o w e r’s voice, provided the voice can be interpreted as the only
authority. Subjectivity does not prevail in Women’s Ways o f Knowing, however, except
when knowledge is subjective to the knower.
Hofer & Pintrich (1997) raise the question about the order o f the question sets: that
there is a possibility that by asking the “ relationship” set prior to the set on “ ways o f
knowing” the women may have been primed. They raise the question because o f the
findings that women have a relational, connected approach to knowing. The division o f
procedural knowledge into separate and connected knowledge has had an impact on
epistemological development as they appear to be gender related. Feminists have taken
on w ork in this field, including the authors, and assert that power issues may drive many
o f the differences (Erw in, 1983). Belenky et al., (1986) lean toward empathy as another
possible explanation. Baxter Magolda (1989) asserts that differences in ways o f knowing
may be related to feelings o f confidence. These hypotheses eventually relate to affective
dispositions and how they can affect an individual’ s perspectives about the nature o f
knowledge and the process o f knowing. This is pertinent to the proposed study because
affect w ill be investigated in terms o f how personal epistemologies may be eonstrueted in
young children.
Belenky et al. (1986) broach the issue o f cultural diversity (which is a lim itation o f
Perry’ s scheme) and its importance to the ways women know, and they never claim
universality. This resonates w ith personal epistemology research and how it tends to
overlook sociocultural issues and their contributions to shaping individuals’ beliefs about
knowledge. Goldberger (1996) calls fo r more research that uses a more diverse
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sociocultural perspective, and the Zhang (1999) study w ith the Chinese students supports
this request. Further, Zhang (1999) proposes that the different cultural and educational
systems between China and the U. S. may create different patterns o f cognitive
development. She suggests that cultural background has a supreme impact on critical
factors related to cognitive development such as decision making, instructional
approaches, and personality formation..
Belenky et al.’s (1986) model does not use the concept o f stages but rather
perspectives. However, w hile there may be no explicit hierarchical claim, their work is
fu ll o f developmental references. For example, when Belenky et al. (1986) discuss
subjectivism, they state that “ developmentalists in the past have noted that this kind o f
shift in orientation toward authority-from external source, which binds and directs our
lives, to an adherence to authority w ithin us-is one o f the central tasks o f adolescence”
(p. 139). Belenky & Stanton (2000) refer to constructed knowing as the endpoint o f
development w ith regard to discussion about Women’s Ways o f Knowing. Weinstock
(1989) has accepted the transitional and developmental nature o f the model, breaking
them down even further into specific developmental phases.
Exploring women’ s conceptions o f knowing through their own voice is an important
goal in the proposed study because in developing a framework for children’ s
epistemology it w ill be critical to hear the voices o f the child and the significant
participants that scaffold the knowledge and understanding that the child finds
meaningful. Women’s Ways o f Knowing is also particularly useful in the proposed study
because o f its focus on the influence o f parents and teacher. The study calls for the
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parents and the teacher to be very reflective o f their own experiences and their
observations o f the ehild.
Epistemological Reflection Model
The Epistemological Reflection Moc/c/(Baxter Magolda, 1992) has been influential in
the study o f personal epistemology. The model builds on the w ork o f Peny (1970) and
Belenky et al. (1986) in a way that addresses one o f the primary limitations o f the
previous works by targeting the potential gender-related differences in epistemological
development. Baxter Magolda began her contributions somewhat differently. First there
was the development and validation o f a written instrument, the Measure o f
Epistemological Reflection (M ER), as a way to quantify ways o f thinking (Baxter
Magolda, 1987). In contrast to Perry (1970) and Belenky et al. (1986), the MER is a
short-essay production task that poses questions about the role o f the learner, instructor,
and peers; an evaluation o f learning; the nature o f knowledge; and educational decision
making. These domains were central to Periy’ s theory and relied on Loevinger &
Wessler’ s (1970) data analysis and Gibb & W idaman’s (1982) domain coding procedure
(Baxter Magolda, 2004). In itia lly, Baxter Magolda (1992) analyzed the data using the
first five positions from Perry (1970) and the five perspectives from Belenky et al.
(1986), also allowing for room to insert additional categories i f needed. Later, she
reanalyzed the data in a more qualitative form which resulted in the Epistemological
Reflection Model (Baxter Magolda, 1992). Further studies to validate the M ER resulted
in a coding manual based on more than 1,000 M ER responses (Baxter Magolda &
Portfield, 1988).
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Table 2: Summary o f Epistemological Reflection Model
Baxter Magolda ( 1992)

FE M A LE

M ALE

Nature
of

A BS O LU TE

W A Y S OF K N O W IN G
T R A N S IT IO N A L
IN D EPEN DEN T

Receiving
Private
listening
Recording
Mastery
Public
demonstration
Challenging
Knowledge is
certain or
absolute.

Interpersonal
Discussion
Resolve uncertainty
by personal judgment
Impersonal
Debate
Resolve uncertainty
by logic
Knowledge is
certain and
partially uncertain.

To obtain
knowledge
from
the instruetor.
They believe
that authorities
have all o f the
answers.

To achieve knowledge
from the instructor
and make meaning o f
that
knowledge.
Discovery
that authorities are not
all-know ing and begin
to aecept the
uncertainty o f
knowledge.

To
eommunicate
knowledge
appropriately,
they should
ensure the
student
understands the
knowledge.
To share
materials.

To use methods that
aim toward student
understanding and to
use methods that help
apply the knowledge.

Evaluation is a
vehicle to show
the instruetor
what the
student has
learned.

Inter-individual

Inter-individiicil

Individual

Individual

Knowledge is
uncertain, and
evei-yone has his
own beliefs.

Knowledge is
eontextual &
judged on the
basis o f
evidence w ithin
the context.

To think fo r
themselves &
share their views
w ith others. They
are able to question
authority as the only
source & w ill begin
to develop their
own perspective &
hold their opinions
as
equally valid.
To be w illin g and
able to promote
independent
thinking & promote
the open exehange
o f ideas.

To have the ability
to
exchange &
compare
perspectives.
They are capable o f
constructing an
individual
perspective by
ju d gin g evidence in
context.

To get involved in
active engagements.

To openly exchange
ideas & serve as a
source o f
knowledge.

To be able to
enhance learning
through quality
contributions.

Evaluation is a means
to measure students’
understanding o f the
material.

Evaluation rewards
independent
thinking.

U ltim a tely all
students are
responsible for their
own judgm ents and
constructed
perspectives.

Knowledge
Role
of
Learner

Role
of
Instructor

Role
of
Peers
Evaluation
of
Learning

CONTEXTUAL

To promote the
application o f
knowledge in
context & promote
evaluative
diseussions on
perspectives.
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Discussion o f the model. The Epistemological Reflection Model (Baxter Magolda,
1992) consists o f four ways o f knowing; (a) absolute, (b) transitional, (c) independent,
and (d) contextual (See Table 2). It is important to note that three o f the four categories
contain a gender-related distinction; contextual ways o f knowing is not based on evidence
but rather hypothesized (See Table 2). Each category leads to a “ particular expectation o f
the learner, peers, and instructor in learning settings, as w ell as to an understanding o f
how learning should be evaluated and how educational decisions are made” (Baxter
Magolda, 1992, p. 29). There is less focus on knowledge alone, but rather the emphasis
is on the nature o f learning in the context o f a college classroom. Baxter Magolda was
particularly interested in gender-related issues o f epistemological understanding, and her
motivation to shift the conceptual frame slightly was due to the troublesome attempts to
match student responses to Perry’s scheme and the apparent discrepaneies between the
men in Perry’s study compared to the women in Belenky et a l.’s (1986) work.
E m pirical .support. Baxter Magolda’ s ( 1992) framework is the result o f a five-year
longitudinal study o f epistemological development and how epistemological assumptions
affect individuals’ interpretation o f their educational experiences. However, this was
lim ited because the terms in which she defined epistemology for the study largely
consisted o f students’ perceptions o f their learning experiences and involved only
students at M iam i University. The model is a representation o f 70 graduate and
undergraduate college students who completed annual open-ended interviews, and at
each interview the students were given a M ER to complete and return later. Year-one
inteiwiews addressed the original six issues involved in the development o f
epistemological understanding but was m odified later to incorporate questions about the
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nature o f knowledge, out-of-class learning, and individual changes as a result o f students’
experienees w ith learning.
The Epistemological Reflection Model impacted the research in personal
epistemology because it investigated gender-related patterns o f epistemologieal
development by researching both men and women. The conclusion was that there are in
fact patterns in gender-related differences o f knowing, which Belenky et al. (1986)
speculated; however the patterns can be detected in both genders, so they are not genderspecific. The model encapsulated more middle-class socioeconomic groups o f students,
however, and sociocultural diversity was lim ited since the population was restricted to a
Midwestern university whose enrollment was 97% Caucasian.
In a later study, Baxter Magolda (2003) illustrates how four practice samples using
her constructivist approach to analyzing qualitative inquiry m im ic findings o f Baxter
Magolda (1992) during a broader study investigating identity and learning. Her
microgenetic study looks at four students and focuses on making identity central in
learning to promote learning and self-authorship. There are four frameworks:
multicultural education, community development, academic advising, and student affairs’
role in leading educational transformation. This b rie f study resonated w ith many o f the
findings from her longitudinal work, including how students encountered significant
challenges during college. When challenged, students were most often offered external
formulas for how to handle them instead o f being engaged in real struggles to determine
how these challenges shaped their beliefs about themselves in relation to their
environment. She concludes that her proposed framework for promoting self-authorship
could alleviate some o f the difficulties students encounter in academic settings by making
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the experience more real, allocating responsibility, exposure to tough issues, engaging in
decision-making and active argumentation and negotiation. These would be helpful
because they most closely relate to what happens in the world outside o f academia. She
places the burden o f authority-dependence on teachers and calls for higher education to
be more malleable for students to make the shift to higher levels o f epistemological
development. Despite the repetition o f finding the gradual progression, Baxter Magolda
(2003) reported that higher levels o f sophistication seem to develop closer to age 30
rather than age 18, which in some cases has been marked as the beginning o f more
complex epistemological thinking (Baxter Magolda, 2001; King & Kitchener, 1994).
More recent work from Baxter Magolda (2004) uses a constructivist lens discussed in
Cuba & Lincoln (2000). The constructivist lens allows inquiry to view reality as
contextualized so that the knower mutually constructs knowledge through the interaction
between what is known and the knower or self. Her original work was aimed toward the
nature, limits, and certainty o f knowledge and how epistemological assumptions evolve
during young adulthood. Her bottom line is that epistemological transformation is a
movement toward more sophisticated epistemological thinking and not the development
o f specific learning strategies or skills.
Baxter Magolda (2004) portrays personal epistemology as socially constructed and
context bound. This paints a picture o f individuals actively making meaning o f their
experiences using short-essays to convey their reflections. Their interpretations are based
on what occurs internally and externally to them during the experience; they evaluate the
experience and derive a conclusion based on their cunent level o f understanding. The
result or the meaning they construct depends on their present knowledge and
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understanding that they hold regarding themselves and the world, the particular context
o f the experience, and conflicting assumptions or misconceptions they confront.
Baxter Magolda (2004) did not sim ply wake-up w ith this epiphany. Rather she
explains that her own experience as a researcher has allowed her to construct her current
views on epistemology. She explains that through attempting to make meaning and
understand her experiences, it was the combination o f her current interpretation o f
knowledge, the interaction w ith her participants’ interpretation o f knowledge, and what
the possibilities o f the two interpretations meant. This process helped guide her ability to
ask fru itfu l questions, probe specific areas, or otherwise conduct a productive
investigation o f the students’ personal epistemologies. This has been an insightful
finding and is one that is particularly beneficial in qualitative analysis. Denzin & Lincoln
(2000) encourage this type o f researcher introspection and recommend the researcher
detail their personal remarks in an epoche. An epochc is a technique that assists data
analysis from incorporating subjective interpretations onto the inteq^retation o f the
participants. This approach w ill be used in the current study and w ill be discussed at
more length in chapter three.
One o f the more interesting aspects o f Baxter M agolda’ s (2004) self-reflection study
is her arrival at a new level o f understanding in her thinking about personal epistemology,
Phase Three. Phase Three includes exploring systems fo r managing uncertainty. In itia lly
perplexed about how many seniors constructed the w orld from a transitional perspective,
she found it more disturbing that others had shifted to an independent or contextual
perspective but still used external formulas to approach life after college. This meant that
the post-college environments had prompted movement toward independent and
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contextual knowing faster than the college environment. The question here: how could
that be the case? Baxter Magolda found an answer during the interview process; the
students stressed the message that learning was not a meaningful framework for their
post-college experiences and they preferred to talk about their experiences in more
general terms (Baxter Magolda, 2004). This finding opened the door for the possibility
that there were additional developmental dimensions such as identity and relationships
that regulated the students’ intellectual development. Baxter Magolda found Kegan
(1994) helpful in identifying other systems that can contribute to epistemological
development; for example, challenges and supports the individuals experienced at their
job, advanced education, and social contexts; and the differences in the way the
individuals reacted to the challenges and supports. Although the immediate frame for
defining personal epistemology was not altered, the lens certainly broadened for
identifying factors that contribute as an operating system associated w ith personal
epistemology.
Summary and critique. Baxter M agolda’ s refreshing constructive-developmental
perspective and her methodological approach o f inquiry and qualitatively analyzing data
may invite research in more diverse populations w ith respect to age, gender, and race.
Am ong the most significant contributions that Baxter Magolda has brought to the study
o f personal epistemology include the follow ing: the perspective o f m ultiple realities,
contextualizing the individual’s experience, and socially constructed interactions. These
components w ill be central to proposed study for developing a framework for researching
children’s personal epistemology.
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Baxter M agolda’s (1992) model is particularly useful beyond the gender-related
issues because it approaches epistemological thought as it relates to the educational
environment. It aims to grasp the students’ dispositional perspective about a host o f
educational factors that marks the beginning o f interpreting the system that is related to
the nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing. View ing personal epistemology
from a broader system such as the individual’ s environment and the connection to the
development o f personal epistemologies is o f particular importance because the proposed
study combines a personal epistemological framework w ith a systems framework to
identify young children’s personal epistemologies w ithin the context o f the classroom
environment.
Reflective Judgment Mode!
King and Kitchener (1994) developed the Reflective Judgment Model that is the result
o f fifteen years o f studies and interviews w ith countless participants ranging in age from
high school students to middle aged adults. The Reflective Judgment Model is derived
from several theoretical bases including Dewey, Piaget, Kohlberg, and Perry (Kitchener,
1983). John Dewey first used the term reflective judgment in 1933 to discuss the process
o f thinking that must occur when no clear-cut solution can be identified (Dewey, 1933).
According to K ing & Kitchener (1994) reflective judgment can be thought o f as
“ beginning w ith an awareness o f uncertainty” ( p. xvi). The Reflective Judgment Model
(RJM) is based on reflective thinking which can be identifiable on its own because
neither an individual’ s current understanding nor logic w ill assist w ith finding the
answer. The model focuses on epistemic cognition, which they define as “ the ways that
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people understand the process o f knowing and the corresponding ways they ju s tify their
beliefs about ill-structured problems” (K ing & Kitchener, 1994, p. 13).
Discussion o f the nwdel. The most outstanding features o f the RJM are the
sophisticated quality o f the theory and the gender-balancing as compared to the models
reviewed thus far (H ofer & Pintrich, 1997). They also have succeeded in covering the
largest age range (adolescence to late adulthood). King & Kitchener (1994) have linked
their work closely to K ohlberg’ s ( 1984) model o f moral judgment. Some o f K ing &
Kitchener’ s studies have indicated that the ReJJective Judgment Interview (RJI) and
Rest’ s (1979) D efining Issues Test (the D IT is a pencil-and-paper assessment for moral
judgment) correlate moderately; however, correlations are less when age and education
are controlled (K ing & Kitchener, 1994). King & Kitchener (1994) have also connected
their model o f reflective judgm ent to Erikson’s psychosocial development fo r the stage o f
identity versus role confusion. Another moderate correlation was indicated to exist
between an increase in reflective judgment and M arcia’ s (1964) identity statuses: identity
diffused, foreclosed identity, moratorium, and identity achieved (K ing & Kitchener,
1994).
Perry’ s scheme o f intellectual development has influenced most all o f the research in
epistemological beliefs over the past 35 years, but his contribution has been directly
influential in the case o f RJM (K ing & Kitchener, 1994). Perry was the first to observe
that underlying assumptions about knowledge and learning can make a difference in
reflective judgment (Knefelkamp, 1999). According to King & Kitchener (1994), the
later stages o f Perry’ s model did not satisfactorily account fo r or articulate the nature o f
an individual’ s reflective judgment. The RJM has pioneered most o f the reflective
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judgment research over the past twenty years (King & Kitchener, 2002). The Reflective
Judgment M odel elaborates on the structural and epistemological aspects o f Perry’ s
higher positions. King & Kitchener (1994) identify the RJM as a developmental model
because it is consistent w ith what Flavell (1971) lists as criteria for a stage model: (a)
underlying organization, (b) units are qualitatively different, and (c) the whole forms a
loosely or consistent sequence. Mechanisms o f developmental change come from
Piaget’ s theoretical framework; that is, assumptions about knowledge develop through
assimilation and accommodation o f existing cognitive structures as individuals interact
w ith their environment (H ofer & Pintrich, 1997). There is no assumption that an
individual’ s reasoning can be summed up by one stage at any one point in time.
King & Kitchener (1994) do, however, interpret their findings to indicate that
individuals possess both an optimal and a functional level; this area between the two
levels is considered the developmental range. This concept corresponds to V ygotsky’s
(1962) zone o f proxim al development. According to Vygotsky, stage change may be
marked by rapid bursts o f growth, then a plateau that promotes generalizations across
domains (H ofer & Pintrich, 1997). The idea o f developmental range is in contrast to
Piaget’ s thinking; he thought development progressed abruptly and was discontinuous.
The RJM was developed after more than 1,700 individual interviews had been
analyzed, and the participants ranged in age from 14 to 65. In the sample there were 150
high school students, 1,100 college undergraduates, 200 graduate students, and 150 non
students. These individuals were questioned about their epistemological assumptions and
the ways in which they justified their beliefs when they were confronted w ith uncertainty.
The individuals were presented w ith four ill-structured problems and asked to state and
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ju s tify their perspective. The ill-structured problems had to do w ith things like the
objectivity o f news reporting or issues o f evolution. In addition they had to respond to
six probing follow -up questions designed to capture the essence o f their assumptions
about knowledge and how they perceive gaining knowledge.
Based on these interviews the Reflective Judgment Model was developed. It has three
general levels and seven specific stages. Level (I); Pre-Reflective, (stages 1, 2, & 3),
individuals are not like ly to perceive that problems exist that have no correct or absolute
answer; Level (II): Quasi-Reflective, (stages 4 & 5), reflection characterizes thinking;
Level (111): Reflective, (stages 6 & 7), knowledge is actively constructed and must be
understood w ithin a context and judgments are susceptible to réévaluation. (See Table 3).
Each stage has a focus on both the individual’ s conception o f the nature o f knowledge
and the process o f justification fo r the knowledge. Hofer & Pintrich (1997) point out
some consistent parallels between the RJM and Perry’s scheme (fo r a detailed chart
comparing all the developmental models see Hofer & Pintrich, 1997): (a) the PreReflective thinking Stage 2 corresponds w ith Perry’s dualism, (b) Quasi-Reflective
thinking. Stage 4, represents Perry’ s M u ltip lic ity position; and (c) Quasi-Reflective Stage
5 parallels Perry’s relativism. In addition, like Perry, K ing & Kitchener make no claims
that an individual’s reasoning must be compatible w ith only one stage at a particular
time.
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Table 3: Summary o f The Reflective Judgment Model
K ing and Kitchener ( 1994)
REFLECTIVE
T H IN K IN G

PRE-REFLECTIVE
T H IN K IN G

Q U ASI-R EFLEC TIVE
T H IN K IN G

Stage 1
Knowledge is assumed to be
simple, concrete, absolute and
exist exclusively. Beliefs
need no ju stifica tio n because
no alternatives are thought to
exist.
There is a direct connection
between what is observed and
truth. What an individual
believes to know is the
complete inform ation and
exists p rim a rily in young

Stage 4
Knowledge & the justifica tion o f
knowledge are perceived as
abstractions but are poorly
differentiated. Individuals
believe differences o f opinions
exist b/c knowledge is uncertain.
They believe that no one can
know w ith absolute certainty, &
some knowledge w ill remain
uncertain. A ll people are entitled
to their opinion.

Stage 6
Knowledge is uncertain &
contextual. Conclusions are
based on context. Able to link
know ing & justification.
Answers can be more correct
than others b/c o f plausib ility
o f arguments. Evidence may
be tentative & c ritic a lly
evaluated on the basis o f
justifica tion .

Stage 5
Knowledge is contextual &
relative & filtered through the
perceptions o f the individual
evaluating the evidence. What is
ultim ately known is lim ited to
the individual's perceptions. It is
possible to relate evidence &
arguments to knowledge, but
reasoning is not possible because
evidence is evaluated
qualitatively & some evidence is
stronger than other evidence.
Knowledge is no longer certain,
and interpretation is inherent in
all understanding. Individuals
can recognize that choosing one
alternative does not deny the
legitim acy o f others but cannot
explain the relationships
between the alternative
perspectives.__________________

Stage 7
Knowledge is constructed by
using skills o f critical inquiry
and by combining evidence
and opinion into cohesive and
coherent explanations for
beliefs about problems.
Solutions are probabilistic and
are reevaluated when relevant
new evidence, perspectives, or
tools o f inquiry become
available.

children. N ot identified ______
Stage 2
Knowledge is absolute and
lim ited to authority. Not
everyone knows the truth.
Individuals w / authority
know the truth & all others
who disagree must be wrong.
Individuals function as filters.
They are not able to explain
inform ation but know it to be
right because o f the source.
They believe that knowledge
is certain & not everyone has
access to it.
When individuals are
uncertain about the truth, they
ju s tify their beliefs by
accepting the view s o f
authority. D iffic u lty
recognizing that there are
legitimate d if. in opinion.
Stage 3
Knowledge is s till considered
to be absolute but only in
some areas. U ncertainty is
temporary.
Authorities may not currently
have the truth, but it is
assumed that in the future the
absolute correct ansvrer w ill
be known.
Beliefs are ju s tifie d by
authorities. O pinions &
beliefs are viewed the same as
factual evidence.
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K ing & Kitchener (1994) found that an individual’s assumptions toward what and
how something can be known provide a particular lens that dictates how they tend to
view a problem and how they ju s tify their beliefs about the problem in the face o f
ambivalence. The foundation o f the RJM stresses that reflective judgment is an ultimate
outcome and developmental endpoint o f reasoning and the ability to evaluate knowledge
claims. This developmental transition presumably occurs w ithin the context o f an
individual’ s background, prior educational experience, and present life situation.
E m pirical support. K ing & Kitchener (1994) indicate that over time higher-stage
reasoning is more evident than lower-stage reasoning, and that educational achievement
is strongly related to higher stages o f reflective judgment. In general, comparing o f the
findings w ith the college students in terms o f educational achievement, periods o f
development conesponded to the individual’s college attendance and a relationship exists
between the individual’s age and stage. Interestingly, none o f the college graduates are
reported to be functioning any higher than low stage quasi-reflective thinking, and the
traditional and non-traditional age participants were identical. Amazingly, there is only
approximately a h a lf a stage difference between the college freshmen and college seniors.
The most significant gain in reflective thinking is among those individuals in the early
portion o f graduate training who are between stage 4 & 5. Stage 6 reasoning has
appeared only in advanced doctoral students. Out o f four testing episodes, the first two
did not yield any gender-related differences in the ways o f knowing; however, the last
two studies showed results w ith gender-related differences. They found men to score at
the higher stages and speculated that it might be due to educational achievement, mainly
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because more o f the men in the study had furthered their education beyond a
baccalaureate program.
The task o f validating the RJM consisted o f a ten-year longitudinal study that is
condensed nicely in King & Kitchener (2002). It consists o f the collaborative efforts o f
King & Kitchener (1981), King, Kitchener, Davison, Parker, & Wood (1983), King,
Kitchener, Wood, & Davison (1989), K ing & Kitchener (1990), and King & Kitchener
(1994). Over the ten years, data on reflective judgm ent was collected in the years 1977,
1979, 1983, and 1987. King & Kitchener (2002) refer to two ways a proper validation
study is conducted: (a) Cross-seetional data can identify developmental sequences that
emerge over time, and (b) longitudinal data are needed to assess change in the
individual’s reasoning over time. The initial sample consisted o f 40 21-year-old college
juniors, 20 16-year-old high school students, and 20 third-year doctoral students whose
average age was 28. Gender and academic achievement was matched between the two
younger groups and the doctoral students. The results were reported after retest
participation in 1979 (74%), 1983 (69%), and 1987 (66%) and was noted that most o f the
participants were still prim arily active in their educational endeavors (K ing & Kitchener,
1981).
King, Kitchener, & Wood (1994) followed by reporting individual mean and modal
scores for each participant at each o f the testing times above. They reported a
progressively upward pattern o f change w ith 92% o f the students demonstrating an
increase in their RJI score from 1977 to 1987. They went on further to report that these
changes corresponded to the general stage progression o f the RJM but include movement
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between stages, and they identified waves o f variability w ithin each stage; however, the
waves had different forms across the stages.
Brabeck & Wood (1990) was veiy/ sim ilar to K ing et al. (1994) in participant
confirm ation but investigated well-struetured versus ill-structured problems in a
longitudinal and cross-sectional study. Wood (1995) is a secondary analysis o f studies
involving reflective judgment interviews. The most significant longitudinal research is a
10-year study w ith 80 students; 38 o f these students were involved in four rounds o f
assessments using the RJI. The results indicated that the RJI increased w ith age and
education; however, both variables were confounded, but that seems to be the case w ith
reflective judgment research (K ing & Kitchener, 1996).
There have been studies that look at educational-level differences as a way to confirm
whether epistemic cognition develops over time when measured by reflective judgment.
Most o f this w ork has been completed by King, Kitchener, & Wood (1994), but Dale
(1995) assessed reflective judgment levels in 45 male students (freshmen through
seniors), and 18 faculty at a conservative seminary. The results confirm the gradual
progression o f reflective judgment; the faculty scored highest, and the more advanced
students scored higher on the RJI than did the younger students. The interesting finding
in Dale (1995) was that the stronger the student’ s b e lie f in God, the lower their score on
the RJI. Freshmen and sophomores tended to fall into stages 4 and 5 whereas the juniors
and seniors leaned more toward stages 5 and 6. K ing and Kitchener (2002) add that
many o f their findings show that the highest RJI scores for early level graduate students
are consistent w ith Dale (1995), falling in stages 4 and 5 and more advanced level

70

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

graduate students clustering around stages 5 and 6. They add that stage 6 has only been
indicated in doctoral equivalent education and faculty o f advanced education.
Summary and critique. Reflective judgment research has used m ultiple methods for
assessment, most o f which have been developed by K ing & Kitchener themselves; the
most w idely utilized is the Reflective Judgment Interview (RJI).
The Reflective Judgment Interview is lim ited to trained raters, placing it largely out
o f reach. The research using the instrument has been prim arily white middle-class college
students and needs to be used to evaluate other diverse populations. Although there is
evidence o f gender-related differences in knowing, the results from K ing & Kitchener
(1994) and Baxter Magolda (1992) seem to be the tip o f the iceberg and remain
inconclusive. Classroom studies are needed view reflective judgment development in a
broader scope, especially because the results have shown that there is very little refleetive
judgment development occurring in the first few years o f college and that age may be
linked to stage.
King & Kitehener view the Reflective Judgment Model to be w ithin the broader realm
o f intellectual development and have been critieized for conceptually resembling eritical
thinking constructs (Hofer, 2001 ). K ing and Kitchener ( 1994) argue that the reflective
judgment model is separate from critieal thinking which may occur as a result o f
induetive or deduetive logic. It is this type o f reflective thinking that seems important in
order for students to move from knowledge to applied practice o f coneeptions and to
transfer those eoneeptions to sim ilar situations. Dewey (1933) differentiated critical
thinking and reflective thinking in this way; critical thinking is used to solve problems
that have an absolute answer or well-structured problems but as for problems that exist in
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the real-world, Dewey claimed these have no single absolute answer and are ill-structured
problems. It is w ith ill-structured problems that reflective thinking can be most useful.
The problem is theoretical K ing & Kitchener (1994) say; epistemological assumptions
are missing w ithin the critical thinking research, and critical thinking is driven by solving
well-defined problems.
The Reflective Judgment Model has made invaluable contributions to epistemological
development in several areas: (a) their thoroughness o f the developmental sequence; (b)
the elaboration o f Perry’s higher positions; and (c) that through reasoning there is a better
understanding o f knowledge itself, which King & Kitchener refer to as epistemic
cognition. However, little can be detemiined regarding the process which occurs during
personal epistemological development. King and Kitchener have sheltered their
methodology; therefore, much o f the empirical support conies from them and places the
reliability o f the measurement in question. They have, however, been proactive in the
research o f adolescence and recommend research in this area be extended to younger
children (K ing & Kitchener, 2002).
A rgumentative Reasoning
Kuhn, Cheney, & W einstock’ s (2000) model is an attempt to manage and resolve the
difficulties o f epistemological understanding by sim plifying it in the hopes that it might
attain more consistent theoretical and empirical analysis. Despite that all o f the
developmental models have varying numbers o f stages with slightly different overlapping
distinctions, they do, however, maintain sim ilar developmental trajectories that are
represented by a sequence from dualistic objective beliefs about knowledge, to subjective
views which are more relativistic, and then fin a lly advancement toward a contextual way
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o f knowing that is constructed by the individual.

It is suggested by Kuhn & colleagues

that there is a coordination o f the subjective and objective dimensions o f knowing that
create the foundation fo r knowing, and this is the end goal o f epistemological
development.
The model is supported by research ranging from childhood to adulthood and is
motivated by the question: “ What is the developmental task to be achieved or the
developmental goal toward which changes in epistemological understanding are
directed?” (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002, p. 123) It is claimed that the integration o f
subjective and objective knowing is where and how epistemological understanding is
manifested. The result o f this type o f integration, according to Kuhn & Weinstock
(2002), is a sequence o f qualitatively distinct understandings o f what it means to make a
claim. The essence o f epistemological development is defined in this model as the
progression from claims as copies to claims as facts and opinions, then fin a lly claims as
judgments. Kuhn & W einstock’ s (2002) study includes children, which supports the
proposed study, and this type o f investigation w ith children is currently quite sparse.
Discussion o f the model. K uhn’s model o f epistemological development is sim ilar to
Perry ( 1970) and includes three categories: (a) Absolutism, (b) M ultiplism , and (c)
Evaluativism. Absolutist individuals believe knowledge is certain and absolute; they
emphasize expertise and facts as the foundation fo r knowing. These individuals convey
their beliefs w ith a high degree o f certainty. M u ltip lis t individuals have a high degree o f
hesitation regarding expertise and do not accept the b e lie f that there is expert certainty or
that experts w ill ever reach certainty. They observe that experts are imperfect. Experts do
not agree and are regularly inconsistent; therefore, they are plagued w ith “ radical
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subjectivity” (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Due to a lack o f tolerance for expert certainty,
this type o f individual is driven by emotions. The emotional way o f interpreting
knowledge makes the individual’s belief personal in nature and is surmised to be
legitimate, as well as equal to, an expert’s view. Finally, in the Evaluativistic
perspective, individuals view knowledge with varying degrees o f uncertainty. They have
respect for expertise and view the expert to have less uncertainty while they have more
uncertainty. They possess the ability to evaluate differing points-of-view before making
a judgment. They realize the productivity o f logic and argumentation and are accepting
that knowledge can change.
Kuhn’s model is the first to relate epistemological understanding to argumentative
reasoning, which requires cognitive skills such as reflection, evaluation, and judgment o f
other perspectives and evidence. Kuhn (1991) links these processes to individuals'
metacognitive ability to review their own thinking. There are claims that this
metacognitive ability is not likely in young children (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Kuhn
Amsel & O’Laughlin, 1988). Kuhn & Weinstock (2002) discuss what they perceive to be
an important goal o f understanding the development o f personal epistemology and that is
getting to the bottom o f what is being measured in the most precise and meaningful way.
They further add that this is done through similar subjective and objective dimensions of
knowing and is present in children. The subjective dimensions o f knowing are
represented by knowledge that is constructed internally in the individual, and the
objective dimensions o f knowing are represented by knowledge that is constaicted
externally by the individual. This view is consistent with Vygotsky’s (1978) theory that
objective (external) knowledge develops first and is a stronger influence that is needed
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prior the development o f subjective (internal) nature o f knowing. Ultimate achievement
is accomplished, according to Kuhn & Weinstock (2002), when there is a balance
between the subjective and objective ways o f knowing and is represented through a
developmental progression from realist to absolutist, absolutist to relativist, and relativist
to evaluativist.
E m pirical support. Kuhn et al. (2000) tap into informal reasoning through the use o f
ill-structured problems as a way to identify the impact o f epistemological thinking as a
process. This is sim ilar to Baxter Magolda’ s (1992) research; however, Kuhn’s illstructured problems were placed w ithin authentic w orld contexts.
One o f K uhn’ s (1991) early studies was comprised o f 160 participants broken into
four groups o f 40 individuals (teens, 20’ s, 40’ s, & 60’ s), and each group was equally
distributed according to gender and education. Two one-hour inteiwiews were conducted
w ith each participant. The interview protocol consisted o f the participants generating
causal explanations for three current urban social problems; (a) What causes prisoners to
return to crime after they are released; (b) what causes children to fail in school; and (c)
what causes unemployment. This line o f questioning was expected to generate three
areas o f interest: (a) an explanation o f how individuals came to have their point-of-view
and justification w ith supporting evidence, (b) the individual’ s perception o f an opposing
point-of-view including a rebuttal, and (c) epistemological reflection about their
reasoning when asked explicitly. Embedded in the interview protocol were prompts for
epistemological reasoning including proof, expertise, m ultiple viewpoints, origins o f
theory, and certainty. Even though they based their questions solely on expertise, they
still identified m ultiple dimensions o f personal epistemology.
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The most surprising aspect o f K uhn’s (1991) study is the miniscule number o f
individuals who met evaluativist criteria, especially considering the educational diversity
and age range o f the participants. This is contrary to what is expected, considering h a lf
o f the sample attended college, although h a lf o f the sample was over 40 years old. This
raises the question about epistemological thinking in terms o f education versus life
experience and is consistent w ith King & Kitchener (1986) who found very small change
w ithin and between individuals after four years o f college.
Kuhn, Katz, & Dean (2004) found that participants differed substantially as a function
o f education level. In the study 150 ninth graders in a college-bound, upper
socioeconomic private school had higher levels o f epistemological beliefs than ninth
graders in a non-college-bound inner city parochial school. Kuhn (1991) asserted that the
differences indicated represent the impact o f home environment and background and that
type o f school does make a difference in epistemological thinking. F ifty percent o f the
students she interviewed were absolutist who viewed their knowledge w ith profound
levels o f certainty and viewed experts or authority figures as their prim ary source o f
knowledge. For example, to the question, “ Do experts know what causes school failure?”
one student responded, “ 1 would have to say yes, because they have proven to me” (p.
171). In m y old school we had guidance counselors and they know what was wrong with
me” (p. 174). M ultiplists acknowledged their view o f knowledge from a combination o f
ideas and emotions but in a subjective manner and with subjective evidence. For
example, one participant stated that “ anyone can prove 1 am wrong, but 1 have my view
and 1 am set in my view on the basis o f my experience and inform ation” (p. 182).
Finally, evaluativists claimed that knowledge is open to argument and examined
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alternative theories o f their understanding o f knowledge. For example, regarding the role
o f experts again, one student’ s comment was, “ I ’ m arguing from just a personal kind o f
perspective, but by the same token I would be reluctant to change m y position unless a
substantially varied, lucid, and documented argument was presented to me” (p. 191).
Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock (2000) pursued argumentative reasoning and described a
systematic progression across several judgment domains: personal taste, aesthetics,
values, and truth. In this study they used seven groups total; three groups were o f fifth,
eighth, and tw elfth graders; a group o f undergraduate students: a group o f vocational
students; and two groups o f adults targeted for either high level o f professional
achievement or high degrees o f life experience. A ll groups were mixed aeeording to
context, gender, achievement, ethnic background, and age. They used a 15-item
questionnaire which they designed to tease apart the influences o f age, intellectual ability,
and life experience fo r epistemological understanding. The instrument contains
contrasting statements regarding two individuals and the response varied from, “ only one
can be right” to “ both could have some rightness.” Kuhn et al. (2000) concluded that all
o f the adult groups were capable o f transitioning from absolutist thinking to m ultiplist
ways o f thinking. However, only one h a lf o f the adults from any background made the
transition from m ultiplist to evaluativist where the discrimination between judgment and
commitment to a particular position is critical. Experts and undergraduates showed the
highest level in evaluativist thinking and understanding. This finding indicates that
educational experience is a contributor to the development o f epistemological
understanding. This means that the data does not support age and educational level as
sufficient variables that can promote the transition to evaluativist types o f thinking. This
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relates to the basis o f their argument that it is a lack o f reasoning while formulating an
argument that maintains the objectivity in ways o f knowing and epistemological
understanding.
The work o f Kuhn & Pearsall (2000) is significant to the proposed study because it is
among the few in the area o f personal epistemology that supports the investigation o f
young children and one o f two works that investigates the possible link between personal
epistemology and theoiy o f mind. In young children, Kuhn & Pearsall (2000) state the
ability to distinguish ways o f thinking (scientifically) is defined as the consciously
controlled coordination o f theory and evidence. Although, their theory has not been
empirically validated the research used to construct the theory is valid and recognized by
researchers in the field (Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn, Shaw. & Felton, 1997). It is difficult to
locate research that investigates young children’s personal epistemology, however, this
theory provides a warrant for the purpose o f the current study. Scientific thinking may be
central to many forms o f lower and higher levels o f thinking and cannot be ruled out in
children prior to being investigated (Kuhn, 1996; Olson & Astington, 1993). While
investigating how individuals know, and what they know it may be beneficial to consider
epistemological categories such as; fact, opinion, theory, and evidence.
Kuhn & Pearsall (2000) argue that children as young as ages four to six exhibit an
“ epistemological category mistake” regarding source of knowledge. This should catch
the eye of epistemological belief researchers because this implies that very young
children begin to think episteinologically, a concept that is not investigated with the
tenacity in which this study is proposing. Kuhn & Pearsall (2000) present a theory of the
development o f scientific thinking in young children based on previous experimental
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results in which Kuhn & Pearsall (1998) investigated 35 four-to-six-year-olds. They
were shown a sequence o f pictures in which, for example, two runners are competing in
race and asked to tell why one w ill win. One runner has fancier running shoes or one has
bigger legs so they w ill be stronger and faster. The final picture in the sequence shows
the outcome o f the race and the child is asked to state what the outcome is and tell w hy or
ju s tify how they know. The youngest children merged the two questions— How do you
know and why is it so? This means that they could not always identify evidence about
how they knew the runner had won (because he was holding the trophy) but rather w ith a
theory o f why it makes sense (because he has faster sneakers). This indicates important
characteristics o f preschool-aged thinking and some o f the findings indicated that the
four-year-olds were able to successfully answer questions about source and justification
o f knowledge separately.
Kuhn and Pearsall (2000) combined research from personal epistemology and theory
o f mind to make a case for how young children confuse a theory, making it plausible that
an event occurred along w ith evidence that indicates the event. For the child, the source
o f their knowing is evidence that the event actually occurred; a construct that develops
rapidly during this young age (Flavell, M ille r, & M ille r, 2002). The argument is that
when children begin to make the distinction between themselves and others as a source o f
knowledge is the point in which a foundational platform for the development o f scientific
thinking occurs. Support fo r this type o f hypothesis in older participants showing
engagement in thinking about a topic enhances the quality o f reasoning about that topic,
and higher levels o f reasoning using evidence-based arguments is an indicator for higher
levels o f epistemological understanding.
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Summary and critique. K uhn’ s w ork and the complementary efforts o f her colleagues
have been used in the context o f the real-world; this is in contrast w ith Baxter M agolda’ s
ill-structured problems. This allows fo r a much wider scope o f educational implications
(Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). However the model is significantly trimmed down from
Perry’ s original work which takes away from the true developmental progression and
com plexity o f his developmental theory. Hofer and Pintrich (1997) criticize the three
stage model, as compared to other models such as Perry’ s scheme or W omen’ s Ways o f
Knowing (Belenky et al., 1986), because they provide much more detail in their
developmental models. The criticism is that Kuhn (1991) does not allow fo r sufficient
precision in the criteria at each level and does not offer adequate sublevels to identify a
pattern o f developmental progression in epistemological thinking.
K uhn’ s oversim plification o f the epistemological phenomenon is perceived as
problematic because it doesn’t provide the diversity or fle x ib ility to reveal complex
epistemological issues that an individual constructs. This could be viewed as a criticism
because ill-structured problems require background knowledge and personal experience;
therefore, they exclude the potential to validate the personal epistemology o f the
individual more. They are unable to adequately apply objectively situated arguments
whereas other less emphatic topics may demonstrate the individual’ s balance o f objective
and subjective balance. It is noticeable at this point that all o f the developmental models
reviewed use some derivative o f an interview format to determine levels o f
epistemological understanding; however, all o f the theories do not believe that the
justification o f knowledge claims is important fo r epistemological sophistication to
develop. For K ing & Kitchener (1994) and Kuhn (1991) source and justification o f
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knowledge claims are central, but they recognize that the standards o f rationality are
fallible.
K uhn’ s model o f argumentative reasoning and scientific thinking has contributed
support fo r research in personal epistemology to extend to investigating young children.
Kuhn has provided support about the importance o f scientific thinking and how it relates
to both personal epistemology and theoiy o f mind. Perhaps the progression o f personal
epistemology w ill make identifying evidence in young children theoretically and
methodologically more approachable.
Summaiy o f Developmental Models
The previous sections o f this chapter have been a review o f the developmental models
that have been most commonly recognized by personal epistemology researchers in the
field o f educational psychology and developmental psychology. A ll o f these models
have empirical research that supports them, and all o f these models discuss the same
basic concept, which is, they describe how individuals’ beliefs about the nature o f
knowledge and the process o f knowing (K ing & Kitchener, 1994) develop and change
over time. It is no coincidence that all o f the models are derived from Piaget’s theory o f
cognitive development; however, each model consists o f slightly m odified dimensions,
and they can be contrasted by the number o f sequences and the defining characteristics o f
each level o f development. It follow s that despite the differences among the personal
epistemological models there are also distinctive commonalities, such as, the same
general trajectory from dualism-relativism-evaluativism (absolutist-m ultiplistevaluativist). The purpose o f this section is to discuss these similarities and differences.
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Baxter Magolda ( 1992), Perry ( 1970), and Belenky et al. ( 1986) all suggest the
existence o f different levels and types o f epistemological development and are
qualitatively diverse (Buehl & Alexander, 2001). The developmental models convey the
m ultiple dimensions o f personal epistemology and are represented through a variety o f
perspectives. For example, Perrry (1970) studied the nature o f knowledge, but Kuhn
(1991) and K ing & Kitchener (1994) studied the nature o f knov/ing. These are two
different dimensions o f personal epistemology; therefore, each model contributes its own
unique set o f stage-like or less-stage-like progressions o f development and its own
definitional elements that range from what exactly is being studied to precisely how it is
investigated. Describing the distinctions among each o f the five models becomes more
coherent when it is taken into account which dimension the model is investigating. This
is not to indicate that each model actually measures what it claims to measure because
this continues to be a controversial issue w ithin the field o f personal epistemology.
An additional issue is the definition o f personal epistemology that has been adopted
by eaeh model, and this definition varies prim arily w ith the way in which they identify
the significance that learning has in the scope o f personal epistemology. In addition,
there are a range o f lim itations that exist in each model. The lim itations attributed to
each model pose two prim ary problems; they take away from the analytic a b ility o f each
model and dim inish the strength o f the educational implications.
It is clear in reviewing the developmental models that the obvious difference is their
seemingly different titles. Recall the developmental models: Perry’ s Scheme o f
Intelleetual and Ethical Development (Perry, 1970), W om en’ s Ways o f Knowing
(Belenky et al. 1986), Epistemological Reflection M odel (Baxter Magolda, 1992), The
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Reflective Judgment Model (King & Kitchener, 1994), and K uhn’ s Skills o f
Argumentative Reasoning (and often referred to as Epistemological Understanding)
(Kuhn, 1991). The point so far is that despite the obvious and underlying differences, the
field o f personal epistemology accepts that these models share a common goal o f
addressing beliefs about the nature o f knowledge and knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).
This typically includes four dimensions: (a) the certainty o f knowledge, (b) the sim plicity
o f knowledge, (c) the source o f knowledge, and (d) the justification o f knowing (Hofer &
Pintrich, 1997).
Conceptually, the developmental models also have common interactionist and
constm ctivist perspectives, and they fo llo w the same basic developmental trajectories
(Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). The general trend o f personal epistemological development
can be captured in three separate phases, all o f which are represented in each o f the
developmental models. The first phase begins w ith the individual believing in an
external objective (dualist) view o f knov/ledge, in which knowledge is certain and
typically known w ith authority. The second phase begins to embrace some amount o f
uncertainty about knowledge, and the individual takes on an overriding notion o f
subjectivity which represents a transition to a m ultiplistic perspective o f knowledge. In
the third phase o f development, there is an integration o f the objective and subjective
views o f knowledge; wherein the individual has the capacity to weigh evidence and apply
the evidence to differing knowledge claims. Individuals construct their own knowledge,
knowledge is perceived to be evolving and malleable, and the individuals balance the
process o f knowing with justification for knowing.
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This pattern o f development is captured in each o f these models regardless o f the
number o f stages, levels, or positions. The varying number o f levels between the models
has to do w ith how they are defined, which in turn has to do w ith what they are defining.
Some models do it in three (K ing & Kitchener, 1994; Kuhn, 1991) levels and others take
four (Baxter Magolda, 1992), five (Belenky et al., 1986), or nine levels (Perry, 1970) to
get from dualism to evaluativism. Even though the general stage progression is similar,
the levels themselves d iffe r among the models. Interestingly, when the five models are
overlapped, the degree to which certain levels map onto one another is euriously
different. For example, the Reflective Judgment model splits Perry’s m ultiplism position
and incorporates dualism and part o f m ultiplism into their initial stage, Pre-Refleetive
judgment, and in the same sense splits the relativism position and accounts for m ultiplism
and evaluativism in their second level, Quasi-Reflective thinking.
Sim ilarly, Hofer & Pintrich (1997) state, “ A review o f the existing developmental
models suggests that each o f the primary models posit developmental trajectories that
parallel one another. Regardless o f the number o f stages, positions, or perspectives, the
sequence invariably suggests movement from a dualist, objective view o f knowledge to a
more subjective relativistic stance and ultim ately to a contextual constructivist
perspective o f knowing” (p. 7). In reference to reviewing the RJM, Knefelkamp (2002)
states that “ Even after thirty years o f extensive and varied scholarship, the Perry scheme
continues to reflect the most critical dimensions to educators’ understanding o f learning
and students’ approaches to learning” (p. 238).
Another commonality in the area o f personal epistemological development is that
none o f the models have successfully identified the earliest naïve stages o f dualism. In
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fact the first to even attempt it was B urr & H ofer (2002), but a single study is not
em pirically valid or reliable on its own. Conversely, the models in general are seldom
consistently provided w ith detail o f a profile for individual functioning at the highest
epistemological level. Although the level has been identified, it is limited. No knowledge
o f what may come later is ever affirmed in the research. The developmental models are
proficient when it eomes to describing a sound trajectoiy fo r personal epistemological
development and are considerably in-line w ith one another about the calibration o f each
level. However, they falter when it comes to adequately explaining what occurs on each
end o f the trajectory and how an individual transitions from one level to the next.
These five developmental models represent the foundation from whieh current work
in personal epistemology is building and integrating new ideas. Many o f the researchers
who have developed these models continue to extend their w ork and expand their
knowledge and contributions w ithin personal epistemology and in other domains.
Personal epistemology research in young children struggles to describe dimensions and
trajectory o f children’ s understanding o f knowledge, in part to be adaptable to Piaget’ s
stage theory o f cognitive development and because it appears to be juxtaposed w ith
Perry’ s scheme, which is not developmentally compatible nor does it account for
experiences or memories o f early childhood development (M ansfield & Clinehy, 2002).
This presents dissonance fo r researchers o f children’s theory o f mind and researchers o f
epistemology prim arily because o f conflicting views o f to classify what children know
and how they understand what they know. There are a variety o f views about the role o f
environment, as far as im plicit versus explicit influences on the development o f cognitive
structures and independent versus social dimensions. Chandler (2002) points out that
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despite the age that is investigated, all o f the sequences that unravel appear to be similar
to Perry’s Scheme. Although Perry hypothesized about position 1, researchers o f children
have still concluded some corresponding notion o f the individual’ s personal
epistemology. Moore ( 1994) suggests that Perry’ s stages are not developmental in nature
but rather products o f the socialization process set in the values o f the individual’s
environment. Hallet, Chandler, & Krettenauer, (2002) counter that the age that children
demonstrate some construction regarding the nature o f knowledge differs depending on
objects o f knowledge or domains o f understanding. Therefore, it is a possibility that
epistemological beliefs are not a developmental trajectory, and some researchers argue
for a general sense o f recursion (Hallet, Chandler, & Krettenauer, 2002; Moore, 1994).
Contrary to Perry’s developmental model there is a theory that epistemological
progression is actually a recycling o f earlier epistemic positions in different domains
(Kitchener, 2002).
Kitchener (2002) addresses many o f the discrepant claims o f personal epistemology
researchers, such as how to make sense o f them and the data that supports the claims. In
an attempt to explain conflicting notions o f epistemological progression, according to
Kitchener there are two levels: (a) the lower functional level, which refers to the
cognitive processes that exist w ithout contextual support or practice; and (b) the upper
optimal level, that represents the high-order processes o f an individual’s cognitive
activity.
Age is a factor which remains controversial w hile investigating personal
epistemology. According to their research, the National Center fo r Education Statistics in
2001 reported that the number o f college students who are non-traditional college-age has
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risen dramatically and, surprisingly, not much is known about the development o f these
older re-entiy students.
Other Theories o f Epistemological Beliefs
Personal Epistemologies as Independent Dimensions
Developmental models are one way o f conceiving o f personal epistemologies, but
there arc alternatives to these developmental models such as the w ork o f Schommer
(1990; 1993; Schommer, Crouse, & Rhodes, 1992) and colleagues. This view suggests
that epistemological beliefs influence comprehension and academic perfonnance. In this
perspective, epistemological beliefs or dimensions are seen as “ systems o f more-or-less
independent beliefs” (Duell & Schommer-Aikins, 2001, p. 440). According to
Schommer, this perspective comes on the heels o f previous research on developmental
theory that conceptualizes personal epistemology as more unidimensional and focused on
single dimensions o f epistemology, for example, certainty o f beliefs (Perry, 1970;
Chandler, Boyes, & Ball, 1990) or the justification o f knowledge (K ing & Kitchener,
1990). Schommer (1990) proposed measuring individual’s beliefs about knowledge and
beliefs about learning which challenges more linear developmental models o f personal
epistemology.
Schommer's Epistemological Beliefs Model
Schommer’ s system o f more-or-less independent dimensions refers to a
conceptualization that beliefs are multidimensional and may not necessarily develop at
the same rate. Therefore, Duell & Schommer-Aikins (2001) claimed it should not be
assumed that an individual’s epistemological beliefs are more-or-less synchronized, and
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this is particularly important during periods o f development in which an individual has
changing beliefs, much like the b e lie f systems o f young children.
Schommer (1990) constructed her model from the previous work o f K ing &
Kitchener (1981), who proposed the Reflective Judgment Model\ Dweck & Bemechat
(1983) who inquired about children’ s beliefs about their a b ility to learn; and Schoenfeld
(1983; 1985) who studied in the domain o f math beliefs for omniscient authority and
speed o f learning. Interestingly, the integration o f these works highlights the effects o f
the learner’s beliefs. Learners’ beliefs about learning in general and their beliefs about
their abilities to learn have different impact on actual learning outcomes. For example, a
student who has a lower ability could outperfonn a student w ith more superior ability
because the lower ability student believes that intelligence can increase while the higher
a b ility student holds the belief that intelligence is fixed (Schommer, 1992).

Table 4: Epistemological Beliefs As Independent Dimensions
Schommer ( 1990)
LEVELS
1
2
3
4
5

N A TU R E OF
K N O W LED G E
Structure o f
Knowledge
Stability o f
Knowledge
Source o f
Knowledge
Speed o f
Learning
A b ility to
Learn

D E F IN IT IO N OF
K N O W LED G E
Isolated bits o f information to more integrated
concepts.
Unchanging to continuously changing.
Known by authority to derived from empirical
evidence.
Quick all-or-none to gradual.
Fixed at birth to improvable over time & experience.
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Identifying distinct beliefs Schommer-Aikins (2004) says, “ was a way to tease apart
aspects o f previous thick descriptions and allow for a more analytical inspection o f
individual’ s personal epistemologies” (p. 21). More advanced or sophisticated thinking
implies that the system is supported by higher-order thinking. According to Schommer
(1994), to believe that knowledge is complex is a more sophisticated way o f thinking
compared to believing that knowledge is unchanging (more naïve). This idea o f differing
dimensions o f personal epistemologies can still apply to a developmental stage
progression i f one considers that the two can develop at different rates, which could
im ply that the periods o f inconsistencies represent periods o f transition, growth, or
change. It is also thought that the most naïve conceptions o f knowledge and learning are
the beliefs that knowledge is simple and certain, and learning is believed to be quick and
fixed from birth.
Discussion o f the model. Schommer’s model has been used to research middle
school-aged children into adulthood. In addition, over the past fifteen years it has been
w ell represented in the literature for making outstanding contributions in theoretical and
methodological significance in researching epistemological beliefs (H ofer & Pintrich,
1997).
There are five dimensions comprising the model which are designed to be viewed on
a continuum beginning w ith naïve perspectives on one end and more sophisticated beliefs
on the other end. (See Table 4). For example, Schommer ( 1990) argues that it is possible
for a high school student to believe that knowledge is intertwined, meaning that at one
instance he can hold the naïve belief that knowledge is absolute or certain w hile at the
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same time believe that the structure o f knowledge is complex, showing his sophisticated
concept o f knowledge.
During the early period o f Schommer’ s research on personal epistemology as moreor-less independent structures, she worked on developing an instrument to measure her
proposed dimensions (Schommer, 1990, 1991, 1993; Schommer, Crouse, & Rhodes,
1992). The Epistemological Questionnaire is a paper-and-pencil assessment used to
measure general epistemological beliefs which pose positively and negatively stated
questions about knowledge and learning. It is a 63-item, five-point self-report Likert
scale. The measure ranges from (1) strongly agree to (5) strongly disagree. It was
subsequently subdivided into 12 sets to measure Schommer’ s (1990) five dimensions o f
personal epistemology listed in Table 4. Four factors from both exploratory and
confim iatory factor analyses have been generated (Schommer, 1990, 1993; Schommer et
ah, 1992). Each o f the four factors is represented on a continuum, beginning w ith naïve
views on one end to more sophisticated perspectives on the other. The dimensions
include the follow ing: Beliefs in Fixed A b ility (fixed versus incremental). Beliefs in
Simple Knowledge (isolated and ambiguous pieces o f knowledge versus highly
interrelated concepts). Beliefs in Certain Knowledge (knowledge is absolute versus
knowledge is tentative), and Beliefs in Quick Learning (learning is quick or not at all
versus learning is gradual) (Schommer & Walker, 1995). The Source o f Knov/ledge has
not been em pirically validated through Schommer’ s efforts (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).
Beliefs about learning came from Schoenfeld (1983, 1985) which qualitatively
accounted fo r students solving geometry problems aloud. Three conclusions are
transferred to the Embedded Systemic Model (Schommer-Aikins, 2004): (a) Only gifted
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authority figures can truly understand math is a precursor for a b ility to learn; (b) solving
math problems happens quickly or not at all is a precursor for speed o f learning; and (c)
omniscient authority bequeaths math proofs to less knowledgeable, which signifies the
precursor fo r source o f knowledge.
A more recent contribution made by Schommer-Aikins (2004) describes a basic
paradigm o f the epistemological b elief system, and she proposes some new ideas for
thinking about and studying personal epistemology through the lens o f an embedded
systemic model with coordinating team approaches to research. Schommer-Aikins
(2004) claims her Embedded Systemic M odel is notably different from previous models
in the fo llo w ing ways: (a) It adds beliefs about learning; (b) it identifies distinct beliefs;
(c) it acknowledges asynchronous progression; (d) it recognizes a need fo r balance; (e) it
introduces the designation o f beliefs; and (f) it utilizes quantitative methodology. She
defines this Embedded Systemic Approach as m ultiple beliefs that are connected w ithin
an ind ividual’s personal epistemology, and by being more-or-less independent the related
beliefs could be or could not be developing along different continuums.
Schommer-Aikins (2004) used the term nomenclature to refer to how beliefs are
designated and has varied in the history o f personal epistemology research. Perry (1970)
used epistemic positions. K ing & Kitchener (1994) referred to epistemic cognitions,
Baxter Magolda (1998) claimed epistemological reflections, Hofer (2001) chose
epistemological theories, and Kuhn & Weinstock (2002) adopted epistemological
thinking. Schommer ( 1990) built upon Pajares ( 1992) which found that the construct o f
be lie f extends alongside constructs o f knowledge and was later supported by Alexander
& Dochy (1994). Schommer-Aikins (2004) supports personal epistemologies as beliefs
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because beliefs can be linked to affect, have a close relationship to logic, challenges in
terms o f change, and have strong importance on thinking.
Recently, Schommer-Aikins (2004) introduced the epistemological b e lie f system
which suggests that future research needs to move a direction which incorporates
m ultiple interactions o f an individual’ s epistemological beliefs. This innovative method
is unique to the study o f personal epistemology but not necessarily to research in other
areas such as clinical psychology (M inuchin, 1974) or human behavior (Bronfenbrenner,
1975).
E m pirical support. Schommer’ s ( 1990) factor structure (four factors) was replicated
w ith other college students in Schommer et al. (1992); high school students in Schommer
(1993); and non-academic adults in Schommer (1998). The Epistemological
Questionnaire has been adapted fo r high school students (Schommer, 1993) and middle
school students (Schommer-Aikins, Man, Brookhart, & Hutter, 2000). The
Epistemological Questionnaire has undoubtedly received substantial interest among
personal epistemological researchers because it is a more quantitative approach, and it
takes a more analytic approach to the dimensions o f beliefs (H ofer & Pintrich, 1997).
According to Schommer (1995) moderate domain-independence was reported using
the correlations between epistemological factors across domains and suggests that
students may have beliefs about knowledge, in general, that are later adjusted depending
on the domain and context. The general findings are that different epistemological
beliefs exist in different domains and in different contexts because in specific contexts
students may reflect considerably different.
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Research has supported some o f the more developmental claims. Schommer, Crouse,
& Rhodes (1992) investigated 424 students (157 men and 267 women) who were
enrolled in an introductory psychology course. The students ranged in academic level;
freshmen (67.7%), sophomores (21.5%), and the remaining 21% were evenly divided
between undergraduate juniors and seniors and master-level students. The age range was
17 to 65, w ith the mean age being 22, and all were native English-speaking Americans.
The purpose o f the study was to replicate Schommer (1990) findings; therefore, the
procedure and analysis were similar. In the first experiment all o f the participants were
given the EQ. In experiment 2, the purpose was to determine i f simple knowledge
predicts statistical text comprehension and metacomprehension, to test i f task demands
influence epistemological effects, and to investigate whether epistemological effects on
learning are mediated by study strategies. Therefore, out o f the original 424 students
from experiment 1, 138 (39 men and 99 women) returned. Age ranged from 17 to 65
w ith the mean age being 25, still the m ajority was freshmen (66.6%), sophomores
(18.8%), and the remaining 15% were juniors, seniors, and master-level students. In this
study, the students were given two sets o f instructions: one asked students to reflect on
their understanding o f the text, and the other asked students to prepare to teach the
information in the text. Schommer, Crouse, & Rhodes (1992) concluded the follow ing:
b e lie f in simple knowledge is negatively associated w ith comprehension and
metacomprehension; the influences o f simple knowledge on comprehension may be
manipulated by study strategies; and the Epistemological Questionnaire provided the
groundwork for the development o f epistemological assessment.
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Schommer (1993) studied secondary school students: 405 freshmen (180 boys and
225 girls), 312 sophomores (145 boys and 167 girls), 274 juniors (127 boys and 147
girls), and 191 seniors (89 boys and 102 girls). The sample was m ainly Caucasian
Americans (68%), w ith A frican Americans (21.5%), Asian Americans (5.5%), Hispanic
Americans (3.4%) and Native Americans (1.5%). In itia lly the EQ was developed for
college-level students and when piloted on 100 high school seniors, questions found
confusing were altered to be age appropriate for high school students. For example, the
word “ theory” was changed to “ idea” and “ unambiguous” was changed to “ clear-cut”
(Schommer, 1993). Once the test was adapted for high school students, it was
administered to all o f the participants. The factor analysis yielded four factors: simple
knowledge, certain knowledge, innate ability, and quick learning. These scores were
correlated with Schommer (1992) which had a sim ilar sample from a different state.
Test-retest reliability was .74. The results indicated that there was some epistemological
development occurring at the high school level. Simple knowledge, certain knowledge,
and quick learning had the most significant incline from the freshmen to the seniors.
However, one o f the lim itations was the cross-sectional design. It could be hypothesized
that students w ith beliefs consistent w ith the freshmen drop out o f school, particularly
because there were considerably less seniors in the study than freshmen. The most
interesting finding o f this study is the relationship between quick learning and
performance, even when general intelligence was controlled. Schommer (1993)
concluded that b e lie f in quick learning predicts performance based on the student GPA.
There were also some sim ilarities between ju n io r college students and the high school
student in this study in terms o f their metacognitive abilities.
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Schommer (1994, 1996) also included high school students and indicate the
importance o f balance in order to gain more sophisticated personal epistemological
thinking and reasoning. Schommer (1993, 1994, 1996) compare high school students’
epistemological beliefs w ith their academic success. Schommer (1994) compared the
epistemological beliefs o f high school students using the EQ w ith identified gifted and
non-gifted students in an urban high school. She found that gifted students’ beliefs for
sim plicity o f knowledge decreased more than non-gifted students from freshman to
senior year. However, the beliefs o f certain knowledge between gifted and non-gifted
showed no change during their high school years. The students in Schommer (1994)
believed in the unchanging nature o f knowledge. Therefore it was concluded that
students in high school may not be exposed to content that reveals the evolving nature o f
knowledge.
In order to label balance as a significant proponent in personal epistemology
Schommer-Aikins (2004) claims that epistemological beliefs need to be portrayed as
frequency distributions rather than as continuums. Schommer-Aikins (2002) also
supports how critieal balance can be for epistemologieal sophistication. For example,
Schommer-Aikins (2004) claims her findings, in terms o f balanee, are consistent w ith
Perry’ s (1970) idea that as students mature, their highest fonn o f thinking is relativistic,
but he found that dualistic thinkers were the exception, in a subsequent study Schommer
and Dunnell (1997), 69 gifted students completed the EQ and answered two Dear Abby
letters.
Conversely, the students who did not demonstrate beliefs in certain knowledge on the
EQ, offered more frequent consolation fo r the students’ lack o f success, offered ways to
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change their academic outcome, and provided strategies to help the student succeed in
school. They saw that younger students tended to blame others such as teachers and
parents fo r the lack o f academic success. Interestingly, they found no correlation
between personal epistemological factors and the prison question.
Measuring personal epistemologies quantitatively was initiated by Schommer (1990)
and has been w idely recognized; however, many researchers have chosen to attempt
slight modifications. Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle (2002) created the Epistemological
B e lie f Inventory (E B l) as a way to resolve a debate regarding the validity o f Schommer’s
(1990) epistemological dimensions, specifically the dimensions that pertain to omniscient
authority and innate ability (Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002). Further, Schraw et al.
(2002) speculate additional d iffic u lty w ith the omniscient authority because it did not
factor load but yet Schommer (1990) proposes a relationship between epistemological
beliefs and omniscient authority.
The EBl (Schraw et ah, 2002) is a 28-item paper-and-pencil questionnaire linked to a
five-point L ikert scale. The goal was to construct an instrument that was significantly
condensed by creating more homogeneous items that could prove to be more reliable than
other instruments but still measured Schommer’ s five dimensions. In a comparison study
Schraw et al. (2002) use a sample sim ilar to Schommer (1990), 160 undergraduates
(n = I0 4 female & n=56 males), ages 18-46 from an edueational psychology course in a
Midwestern university. The participants were given the EBl and the EQ plus a reading
comprehension test, and 120 o f the same participants completed the retest packet one
month later. A fter two principal factor analyses, one was a oblique rotation, which
means the factors were correlated, and the other was a varimax rotation, meaning that the
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factors were uncorrelated; five different factors emerged as follows: (a) innate ability, (b)
certain knowledge 1, (e) incremental learning, (d) certain knowledge 2, and (e) integrated
thinking. Ineremental learning and integrated thinking were in contrast to Schommer’ s
(1990) analysis o f quick learning and simple knowledge. Schraw et al. (2002) concluded
that: (a) The number o f factor loadings differed between the two instruments and the way
in w hich they match theoretical predictions vary; (b) the proportion o f sample variance
that is explained by each instrument was different; (c) when correlated w ith the reading
comprehension test, the EBl had better predictive validity; and (d) the E B l had better
test-retest reliability. The final dimensions that corresponded w ith Schommer (1990) and
were em pirically supported were these five: (a) innate ability, (b) certain knowledge, (c)
quick learning, (d) simple knowledge, and (e) omniscient authority. The Epistemological
B e lie f Inventory has been pertinent in developing further insightfulness in the area o f
personal epistemology and epistemic beliefs and how they play a role in ill-structured
problem solving (Schraw, Dunkle, & Bendixen, 1998), how they contribute to moral
reasoning (Bendixen, Schraw, & Dunkle, 1998), and how they predict the disconnection
in argumentation (Nussbaum & Bendixen, 2003).
Jehng, Johnson, & Anderson (1993) reduced the Epistemological Questionnaire into
34 items and proposed a b e lie f about the orderly proeess o f learning to take the place o f
the structure o f knowledge and reported epistemological beliefs on five dimensions: (a)
certainty o f knowledge, (b) omniscient authority, (c) orderly process, (d) innate ability,
and (e) quick learning. They studied 398 undergraduate and graduate students as a
function o f their educational level and field o f study. They found that students in solfier
(psychology, sociology, education, and others related to liberal arts) classes had a
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stronger tendency to believe that knowledge was uncertain and relied more heavily on
their independent reasoning ability. They also had a stronger feeling that learning was not
an orderly process. That was compared to more hard (liberal science courses, such as
math, biology, physics, or chem istiy) classes in which students believed that learning was
more controlled and orderly. The epistemological beliefs o f the graduate students
differed from those o f the undergraduate students; therefore, they concluded that
epistemological beliefs are a product o f the activity, the culture, and the context in which
the individual’ s beliefs were nurtured.
Kardash & Wood (2000) then combined Jehng et al. (1993) and the EQ and
developed the Epistemological Beliefs Survey, an 80-item self-report, Likert-type
instrument. Kardash & Wood (2002) analyzed individual items and concluded five
factors: (a) speed o f knowledge acquisition, (b) structure o f knowledge, (c) knowledge
construction and m odification, (d) characteristics o f successful students, and (e)
attainability o f truth. Kardash and Wood (2002) tested 793 undergraduate and graduate
students. Some o f the results were confusing because many o f the factors that were
hypothesized to be consistent with certainty o f knowledge, actually were reported loading
on the dimensions o f speed o f knowledge acquisition and attainability o f truth. They also
had items associated w ith quick learning load on dimensions in addition to speed o f
knowledge. Kardash & Wood (2002) does support Schommer’ s (1990) claim that
epistemological beliefs are multidimensional; however, there did not appear to an overlap
w ith the dimensions reported by Schommer (1990) or Jehng et al. (1993). Kardash &
W ood’s (2002) findings do support Schommer’ s (1993) results that epistemological

98

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

beliefs are related to grade point average, and differences in the beliefs were identified
based on sex, age, and educational level, sim ilar to the findings o f Sehommer (1992).
Schommer-Aikins (2000) found that age predicted growth in beliefs about learning.
This finding indicates that the less formal education an individual is exposed to, the more
lim ited their beliefs about knowledge become. Schommer-Aikins (2000) reported that
middle school students d iffe r from high school students prim arily on the nature o f
epistemological beliefs. Beliefs about learning appeared to be better developed on each
factor. She speculated that this may have occurred because the nature o f learning is less
abstract than the nature o f knowledge. Another reason could be that the early appearance
o f beliefs about learning closely reflects the developmental reality o f the middle school
children. Learning is more the focus o f school, where children are intentionally focused
on learning and teachers place more emphasis on getting children to talk and think about
learning. This is not so much the case w ith knowledge.
Schommer-Aikins (2004) adm ittedly perceives the reliability scores on many o f the
instruments (.54 to .76) as moderate but acceptable considering the complexities involved
in measuring a eonstruct such as personal epistemology. In relationship to the perplexing
hurdle o f quantifying personal epistemology Schommer & W alker (1995) propose that
re lia b ility scores may improve i f researchers narrow the focus o f their assessment to
domain-specific epistemological beliefs or epistemological beliefs w ithin the context o f a
specific classroom.
Summœy and critique. In the process o f developing the Epistemological
Questionnaire, Schommer has been instrumental in demonstrating how epistemological
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beliefs affect academic work, specifically in building relationships between the beliefs
about knowledge, use o f strategies, and performance (H ofer & Pintrich, 1997).
Hofer & Pintrich (1997) argue that the coneept o f epistemological beliefs should be
restricted to beliefs about knowledge. Their point-of-view is that beliefs about learning
are slightly removed from the core o f epistemological beliefs. It seems that both beliefs
about learning and beliefs about knowledge impact learning. Knowing more about how
epistemological beliefs develop w ill certainly have im plications for education, hence
impacting learning. Schommer-Aikins (1990) hypothesized that beliefs about learning
may come before beliefs about knowledge.
It is important to point out that although many researchers may utilize the EQ as a
means o f quantifying their participants’ epistemological beliefs, mueh o f the research that
consistently supports the instrument has been done by Schommer-Aikins and her
colleagues. This observation definitely speaks to her dedication to im proving both the
instrument and the model she proposes. However, it absolutely raises questions about the
source o f the discrepancies in the factor loading o f the instrument. It remains open for
debate whether personal epistemologies should include dimensions o f personal
epistemology. Some researchers o f personal epistemology have gone forward to include
personal epistemology in larger frameworks such as social interactions (Baxter Magolda,
2004; Bendixen & Rule, 2004). Lastly, the age o f the participants presented in all o f the
studies discussed represent a small group o f some o f the youngest populations (age 12)
assessed in the area o f personal epistemology and remains an area that should be
investigated from an earlier age (Haerle 2005, Hofer, 2002).
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Included in the Embedded Systemic Approach (2004) is another important
contribution: the suggestion that researchers consider the interactions o f peers and other
influences on epistemological beliefs. The proposed study draws on many aspects from
the w ork o f Schommer-Aikins in the follow ing ways: (a) the investigation o f young
children, (b) the idea o f utilizing a systems perspective, (c) the role o f peers; and (d)
contcxtLializing the research methodology.
Personal Epistemologies as Theories
V iew ing individuals’ epistemological beliefs as epistemological theories was
introduced by Hofer & Pintrich (1997) and is based on a review o f existing models and
empirical w ork in the area o f personal epistemology. Hofer and Pintrieh (1997) propose
two general areas that represent the core o f an individual’ s personal epistemologies: (a)
the nature o f knowledge and (b) the nature o f knowing. In each general area there are
two dimensions for a total o f four dimensions o f epistemological theories: the nature o f
knowledge is characterized by (a) certainty o f knowledge and (b) sim plicity o f
knowledge, and the nature o f knowing is characterized by (c) source o f knowledge, and
(d) justification for knowing. This definition comes in part from the way in which
personal epistemology has been developed in the past th irty years but is also deeply
rooted in the philosophical nature o f the study o f epistemology (Hofer, 2001). This view
w ill also be used as the current study’ s definition o f personal epistemology
According to Hofer (2001) the personal theories view is aligned w ith theory o f mind
research (Wellman, 1990) and conceptual change literature (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994;
Wellamn & Gelman, 1992) which suggest that knowledge o f a specific domain is
structured in much the same way that scientific theories are structured. This combination
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may be the ideal compromise as a way o f avoiding the overgeneralization o f stages that
do not account for enough variation w ithin individuals in the structure o f their beliefs and
models that represent beliefs and thinking as multidimensional that lack cohesiveness
between the structures.
The personal theories model follow s the description o f a theory described by
Wellman (1990) that includes three elements: (a) a continuum o f in itia lly loosely
connected ideas or concepts that are discrete in their connectedness but gradually mature
into sophisticated inteiTelated parts in a domain; (b) a mechanism that categorizes the
domain by making ontological distinctions between its parts; and (c) a causal-explanatory
framework for the events w ithin the domain. In reviewing the personal epistemological
literature, Hofer & Pintrieh (1997) concluded that: (a) D ifferent aspects o f beliefs about
the nature o f knowledge and the process o f thinking are interrelated in ways that could be
theory-like; (b) all o f the models o f epistemology make some distinetion between the
nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing; and (c) it is premature to say that
personal epistemologies include a causal-explanatory framework but that aspects o f the
nature o f knowledge can serve as constraints on the process o f knowing.
Since the introduction o f this model, many researchers in the field o f personal
epistemology have adopted the application. The model has prompted research in younger
populations (e.g.. Burr & Hofer, 2002; Haerle, 2004) and is particularly significant to this
proposed study because it is the model which is most closely related w ith the design o f
the study.
Discussion o f the model. Hofer & Pintrich (1997) propose a multidimensional view
o f epistemological development from naïve to sophisticated epistemological beliefs taken

102

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

prim arily from the combined works o f Perry (1970) and Schommer (1990). Hofer (2001)
points out that using this model o f epistemological theories is consistent w ith
Schommer’s (1990) epistemological beliefs but is more open in terms o f the integration
o f epistemological dimensions or structures. The model does not function in a rigid
structural manner; it is more representative o f loosely interrelated structures that become
integrated as an individual’ s epistemological beliefs become more advanced and
complex. This is sim ilar to the neo-Piagetian view o f cognitive development that has
turned away from the more rigid view o f stage development (B idell & Fischer, 1992). It
is conceptualized that identifying these ideas as theories may clarify epistemological
thinking related to b e lie f acquisition and change.
The view o f epistemological theories subsumes most o f the epistemic dimensions
according to developmental (e.g. K ing & Kitchner, 1994) and independent belief (e.g.
Schommer, 1990) theory, w ith the exception o f Schommer’ s beliefs about learning.
Although Hofer & Pintrich (1997) admit there is a close connection between beliefs
about knowledge and beliefs about learning, they are persistent in their notion that beliefs
about learning should be represented as a peripheral psychological construct that can
contribute to an individual’s beliefs about knowledge but is separate. Further, Hofer
(2001), in support o f delineating beliefs about learning, argues that personal
epistemology models need to stay tucked in tig h tly w ith the philosophical meaning no
matter how they get designated. Therefore, beliefs about learning and education are
viewed as supplemental means o f acquiring information about an individual’ s beliefs
about knowledge, rather than being included as a dimension o f their b e lie f about the
nature o f knowledge and knowing.
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E m pirical support. Hofer (2000) provides empirical support for the Epistemological
Theories Model by investigating the dimensionality o f personal epistemology and the
nature o f disciplinaiy differences. This study involved 326 first-year college students
(53% female, 47% male) who were enrolled in an introductory psychology course. The
participants completed an abbreviated version o f the Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ)
(Schommer, 1990) and two newly developed epistemological belief instruments which
were identical except that one was labeled for “ Psychology” and the other was labeled for
“ Scienee.” They used académie achievement and academic performance scores in the
analysis to measure achievement in either psychology or science and used GPA to track
overall academic performance. The factor analysis supported the existence o f m ultiple
epistemic dimensions, but certainty o f knowledge and sim plicity o f knowledge did not
emerge as separate factors. Perhaps certainty o f knowledge and sim plicity o f knowledge
are not distinctive enough factors (Hofer, 2000).
In another study Hofer (2004a) used case study methodology to investigate 25 college
students during their first semester. The study focuses on experiences, perceptions, and
meaning making o f students in sciences and social science courses. She triangulated data
from classroom observations, individual semi-structured interviews, and instructional
documentation (syllabi, exams, and handouts from each class). The goal was to uncover
how the students expressed personal epistemologies in their own words w ithin the
educational context. The data was reviewed m ultiple times for evidence o f
dimensionality o f beliefs, representations o f a continuum o f beliefs, and connections
between beliefs and instructional practices.
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There were four dimensions that emerged from the data: (a) Sim plicity o f knowledge
was perceived by the students as a continuum spanning from perceiving knowledge as an
accumulation o f discrete, concrete, knowable facts to interrelated networks o f concepts
that are relative, contingent, and contextual; (b) certainty o f knowledge was found all
along the continuum ranging from the idea that knowledge can be known w ith some
certainty, to knowledge as less certain, evolving, and always changing;, (c) source o f
knowledge was found to be prim arily external, coming from lectures or textbooks, and
only a small amount o f students claimed that knowledge was internally constructed, and
(d) justification o f knowledge was predominantly uncovered on a naïve level; students
were m inim ally eognizant o f criteria and procedures that would verify scientific
knowledge. Hofer (2004a) points out that although there were four dimensions o f
personal epistemology accounted for, the evidence that represents the student’ s source o f
knowledge could also have been aecounted for by the criteria used to label the
dimensions o f certainty and justification o f knowledge. In other words, when students
responded that the source o f knowledge is derived externally from lectures and textbooks,
it could be overlapped w ith certainty or justification o f knowledge.
Summary and critique. Hofer & Pintrich’ s (1997) Epistemological Theories Model
has contributed largely to the literature. It is consistent w ith many o f the recognized and
em pirically validated models o f personal epistemology. It incorporates a developmental,
as w ell as, an independent dimensional perspective. It can be applied to quantitative,
qualitative, and mixed methodologies w ith ease. It offers acknowledgement o f beliefs
about learning in the periphery rather than encapsulating them w ithin the realm o f
personal epistemology per se. In her efforts to validate her model, Hofer has tapped into
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possibilities to acquire further information to support the model using domain-specific
areas, classroom context, and fine-grained elements.
V iew ing personal epistemologies as theories is paving the way for a better
understanding o f domain-specific beliefs as w ell which is consistent w ith other research
in cognitive developmental areas. This is a progressive and innovative notion in personal
epistemology. Hofer (2000) found that individuals appear to have differing
epistemological assumptions regarding different disciplines; in this case the students’
epistemological beliefs about psychology differed from their beliefs about science.
Conceptualizing personal epistemologies as theories is an emerging perspective and
requires much more research. The framework it provides may lead to a better
understanding about the teaching and learning process. It lends support to important
issues pertaining to students’ and teachers’ beliefs about knowledge and the way that they
think about knowledge; however, it does need to accumulate much more empirical
support.
Personal Epistemologies as Resources
Hammer & Elby (2002, 2003) and Loucas, Hammer, Elby, & Kagey (2004) have
introduced a new category o f designating epistemological beliefs as resources. For
Hammer & Elby (2002, 2003), conceptualizing personal epistemologies is troublesome
because o f ontology issues. They have a more condensed and domain-specific
perspective o f personal epistemology; they approach the topic through students’ beliefs
about science and science learning. Despite the fact that they are studying prim arily
introductory physics beliefs, they claim that their perspective can be applied to other
disciplines and concur that epistemology refers to the nature o f knowledge and knowing.
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This model challenges the existing theory, research, and methodology o f the personal
epistemology literature. For example, the model accounts fo r consistency w ithin a
specific domain or context, but it does not support the notion o f consistent beliefs across
domains or m ultiple contexts. According to what is generally accepted in the research on
personal epistemology, this model suggests that personal epistemology is less stable and
consistent and does not ontologically represent a trait-like or stage-like trajectory
(H ofer& Pintrich, 1997).
Hammer & Elby (2002) set themselves apart from the unidimensional stage-like
theories set forth by Perry (1970), Belenky et al. (1986), and K ing & Kitchener (1994)
and connect themselves more closely w ith those who have argued that personal
epistemologies need to be viewed in m ultiple dimensions such as Schommer (1990) and
Hofer & Pintrich (1997). Hammer & Elby (2002) also agree that personal epistemologies
need to be viewed as theories or traits but cannot be generalized
Discussion o f the model. Personal epistemologies as resources is defined by Hammer
& Elby (2002) as fine-grained components o f cognition that are highly sensitive to and
dependent upon the instructional context o f an individual. They categorize
epistemological resources in four ways: (a) the nature and sources o f knowledge,
(propaganda, free creativity, and fabrication); (b) as epistemological activities such as
accumulation, formation, and checking; (c) as epistemological forms, like stories, games,
rules, and facts; and (d) epistemological stances, fo r instance, acceptance, understanding,
and puzzlement.
Hammer & Elby (2002) argue that it is not a question o f unitary consistency or
inconsistency but rather a question o f i f the context (classroom or measure) is presented
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in a manner that enables the student to enter a specific epistemological space to tap into
their epistemological resources. They believe that to achieve higher levels o f
epistemological beliefs depends on two related processes: (a) the form o f the students’
personal epistemologies, and (b) the teachers’ perceptions o f their students’ form o f
personal epistemologies. Louca, Hammer, & Elby (2004) define form o f personal
epistemology as grain sized, stable, and context-dependent according to the cognitive
domain. In this view, children are not seen as possessing epistemological beliefs. Rather
they have a belief o f certain knowledge based on external information and internal
information which are finer grained resources that the child does not integrate or has not
yet compiled. Epistemological beliefs are reserved fo r experts and some thoughtful
novices because they are capable o f conscious beliefs (a theory) about the constructivist
nature o f scientific knowledge, and these beliefs do not vary by context. These
conscious, stable beliefs are considered to be compiled into a rich network o f finergrained cognitive resources.
In this resource framework. Hammer & Elby (2002) point out some m ild rigidity in
terms o f identifying epistemological beliefs research; they warn that this rigidity has
some methodological consequences because they do not support labeling a belief based
on an individuals’ response to a single statement(s) in one context. They point to the use
o f m ultiple contexts to more accurately derive an individual’ s epistemological beliefs.
They argue that different contexts can trigger different resources. Their goal is to model
personal epistemologies as context-dependent activations (choices) o f resources.
Em pirical support. Hammer & Elby (2004) present a theory about how teachers can
foster more advanced levels o f epistemological beliefs in physics. This research is based
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on two assumptions: (a) Students with higher levels o f epistemological beliefs are more
active in learning, and (b) classroom interventions that are directed toward addressing
students’ epistemological beliefs improve learning. In this way, the instructional
strategies are the key to having students achieve their highest attainable epistemological
belief. Rather than trying to confront and change students’ beliefs or trying to offer
mounds o f contextual evidence to support a specific concept to move students to reach
their developmental milestone, a teacher should attend to helping students find and apply
productive resources that they know and understand from other contexts that they would
fail to transfer in the present context (Hammer & Elby, 2003). Louca, Hammer, & Elby
(2004) examined a case study o f a third-grade teacher’s science instruction. The science
lesson was on the topic o f autumn leaves and took place in a public elementary school.
The data is divided into four segments: (a) the teaching diagnosis and initial intervention,
(b) discussion o f the “ how” question, (c) Miss Kagey’s new intervention, and (d) the
post-cookie discussion. Each segment is broken down further into teacher and student
perspectives.
In Segment 1, the goal o f the instruction was to prepare the students to have more
causal explanations o f the processes o f why leaves change color and what is happening
inside o f the leaves in order for them to change colors. Some students were unable to
distinguish between the two questions and ultimately wrote the same response for both
questions. The teacher followed-up with an explicit description o f the differences in the
two questions by comparing the first question to why you are hungry and the second
question to what happens in your stomach when you are hungry. She then returned to the
questions and proceeded through the discussion. The analysis, according to the resources
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framework, predicted the fine-grained context dependence in the students’ initial
confusion. They did not intuitively link why leaves change to why they are hungry. The
connection made has more to do w ith the teacher’s ability to link what she believes the
students can associate to the leaves, in this case hunger; therefore, the idea is that the
strategy used w ill advance the students’ understanding about the leaves. The teacher
attempted to tap into the students’ epistemological resources for understanding the causal,
mechanistic knowledge forms o f the lesson and how they differed from the students'
more general descriptive understanding.
In Segment 2, most students did not adequately settle the confusion regarding the two
questions and, despite repeated prompts, the students continued to develop general
descriptions significantly removed from the mechanistic goal. There were hints,
however, o f mechanistic understanding beginning to formulate. It is theorized in this
segment that the difficulties may stem from inadequate conceptual knowledge about
leaves; that the students sim ply did not have epistemological knowledge about the
mechanistic nature o f scientific explanations.
In Segment 3, the teacher made a new attempt to show the students the difference
between the general description question and the mechanistic question. She created a
scenario about baking cookies because her birthday is coming soon. Immediately
follow ing the descriptive cookie-making process, she asked, “ how are the leaves
changing colors?” in addition to several prompting questions follow ing. The analysis
goes accordingly; using a fam iliar scenario that the students readily are able to
distinguish the purpose from the mechanism triggered the students’ mechanism/causal
resourees, which enabled them to understand the lea f questions.
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In Segment 4, the students began to ask the teacher questions about how they now
thought about what was happening inside the leaves that make them change and,
interestingly, many o f the students’ understandings were more causal in nature. The
take-home assignment was to now re-write their new understanding. In their conclusion,
Louca et al. (2004) states this study is an illustration o f an everyday life example that
really helps students understand the difference between a “ how” and “ w hy” question.
Rosenberg, Hammer, & Phelan (2006) applied the same resource framework to an
eighth-grade science class about rock cycles. The study follow ed the same case study
format. The lesson was 15 minutes long and occurred toward the end o f a multi-week
unit on rocks and minerals. The lesson began w ith the teacher showing the class a video
o f themselves discussing the question, “ How are rocks formed?” , that had been recorded
at the beginning o f the unit. There were 22 students in the class, and the teacher’ s role
was similar. They concluded that their results were consistent w ith Louca et al. (2004).
The students had treated knowledge as comprised o f isolated, simple pieces o f
information expressed w ith specific vocabulary and provided by authority. The students
drew on what they knew to construct a sensible, causal account, looking to their own
reasoning a b ility to fill in gaps and make sense o f inconsistencies in their knowledge
strueture.
More w ork is needed in order to more clearly conceptualize and em pirically so lid ify
this framework; however, it introduces important issues to the field o f personal
epistemology such as, researching in the classroom, qualitative case studies, and places
an emphasis o f teacher’ s beliefs and their impact instruction and learning (Hofer &
Pintrich, 1997).
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Summœy and critique. Hammer & Elby have not dug deep into the archives o f
personal epistemology literature, but they have utilized literature that is not the norm in
developing a conceptualization o f personal epistemology (e.g., Dennett, 1991; L a k o ff &
Johnson, 1980; M insky, 1986). Hammer & E lby’ s (2002) resources view appears to be
in an infancy stage o f development. There are incomplete and vague representations o f
their proposed resources, and there is very lim ited empirical support (Louca, Hammer,
Elby, & Kagey, 2004; Rosenberg, Hammer, & Phelan; 2006) o f their model.
Hammer and colleagues currently have shown that they are able to analyze a case
study applying their framework, but it appears that it may be a perplexing challenge for
other researchers to replicate their research w ith any type o f re lia b ility or va lid ity to
support their interpretations. Although the context-specific component is embraced
positively in personal epistemology research, this approach could quite possibly be too
specific in nature. In fact, the approach could be edging on the verge o f being more
identified as a methodology than a true theory o f personal epistemology. It is also useful
for the field that they include young children in their attempt to identify epistemological
resources as this is a trend that needs far more attention than is received in personal
epistemology research. Another positive aspect o f this research that is valuable in
personal epistemology is the role o f the classroom teacher and the m odification o f
instructional techniques as a means o f tapping into students’ epistemological beliefs.
This may lead to their research making a greater impact on curriculum and instruction
than previous models o f personal epistemology because their educational implications
can be directly identifiable in terms o f suggestions for teachers.
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Integrative Personal Epistenwlog\’ Model
Bendixen & Rule (2004) point out several o f the more important issues in personal
epistemology that plague researchers and need attention in future epistemological
research; they compare and contrast the current models o f personal epistemology and
propose the Integrative Personal Epistemology Model. This model was introduced
because there is no existing integrated model o f personal epistemology that emphasizes
the “ relationship between personal epistemology and how epistemological beliefs change
and develop” (Bendixen & Rule, 2004, p. 69; Schraw, 2001). Most researchers in the
field o f personal epistemology would probably agree (Baxter Magolda, 2004; Haerle
2006; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; K ing & Kitchener; 2004; Schommer-Aikins, 2004) that
this is currently the most significant issue that needs to be addressed in the field.
Bendixen & Rule (2004) pose the question. What would we gain from a more integrated
model o f personal epistemology? They believe that mainstreaming the focus o f personal
epistemology can inform and guide future research and educational practices. They
provide an extensive list o f general issues in the field o f personal epistemology, but for
the purpose o f keeping this section closely tied to the proposed study, the list is slightly
condensed and adapted. Some o f the general issues and recommendations that they
discuss include the follow ing: (a) engaging in research that closely parallels cognitive
development (Hofer, 2001), (b) embedding research methodologies w ithin a real-world
context (Louca, Elby, Hammer & Kagey, 2004), (c) engaging in research that w ill yield
in-depth explanations rather than general descriptions o f personal epistemological
development (Burr & Hofer, 2002), (d) identifying the relationship between personal
epistemology and how beliefs develop and change (Schraw, 2001), (e) adopting a process
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that leads to change (Bendixen, 2002), (f) including affect as a factor in identifying
personal epistemologies (Schoenfeld, 1985), and (g) w orking toward consensual
definitions w ith more inclusive frameworks (Hofer, 2002). Bendixen & Rule (2004)
propose the Integrative Personal Epistemology M odel to address the issues they believe
to be prevalent in the field o f personal epistemology and do not assume that their model
subsumes all o f the issues or models in personal epistemology.
Discussion o f the model. The Integrative Personal Epistemolog}’ M odel (Bendixen &
Rule, 2004) is centralized around a mechanism o f epistemological belief change and is
the only model in the research literature that examines, in a more small scale, the change
process. There are three components w ithin the mechanism o f change: (a) epistemic
doubt, (b) epistemic volition, and (c) resolution strategies.
The model is intended to be both linear and hierarchical because its components can
progress incrementally but one is dependent on the next. This does not mean, however,
that the mechanism o f change occurs in a stage-like manner, but the model views the
development o f personal epistemology as a dynamic process that includes effects such as
context, affect, and environment. Three components are interrelated, and it is
conceptualized in the model that all three components must be in sync for epistemic
change to occur. For example, i f an individual experiences only epistemic doubt without
the epistemic volition component, then the meehanism o f change w ill not be effective.
Therefore, a reversion back to an existing epistemological belief at any point during the
process o f change is conceivable (Bendixen & Rule, 2004).
The model uses aspects o f Piaget’ s cognitive development theory to explain how
epistemic doubt paves the way for the mechanism o f change process. As was discussed
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previously, for Piaget, cognitive development is based on the equilibration process.
Individuals strive to obtain equilibrium between themselves and their environment. When
balance is not achieved, the individual enters a state o f disequilibrium . This
disequilibrium is alleviated when the individual either assimilates or accommodates the
information.
Epistemic doubt in the Integrative Personal Epistemology A4odel is thought to be
quite broad and extending from dualism to evaluativism. This line o f thinking accounts
fo r individuals at all levels o f epistemological development and that they could engage in
some degree o f doubting their beliefs at one time or another (Bendixen & Rule, 2004).
Due to the interrelatedness o f the components that make up the mechanism o f change,
epistemic doubt is one driving force for change to occur, but it quite possibly requires the
accompaniment o f epistemic vo litio n as well.
Epistemic volition incorporates many assumptions related to both Piagetian and
Vygotskian theory and conceptual change. Epistemic volition refers to the purposeful
actions o f the individual and, as Bendixen & Rule (2004) point out in their model, change
may occur when epistemic doubt is joined with epistemic volition. Even i f epistemic
vo litio n is achieved, it remains a possibility that an individual can return to an existing
b e lie f and change does not take place. Epistemic vo litio n is perhaps indirectly somewhat
present in the personal epistemology literature; it places emphasis on metacognitive
awareness as discussed Hofer (2004b) and stresses the accountability o f the individual to
take ownership fo r their epistemological beliefs (Baxter Magolda, 2004).
Resolution strategies are the final component o f the mechanism o f change process.
This component relies heavily on the individual’ s previous experiences o f epistemic
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doubt and epistemic volition. This is a time for the individual to be reflective about past
experiences; thinking is geared toward weighing the im plications o f one’ s beliefs in
connection w ith goals and finally resulting in an outcome that is reasonable and
acceptable. Reflection and social interactions are central factors during this process for
achieving epistemic change (Bendixen & Rule, 2004). Although individuals reach the
resolution strategies component, it is believed that they can still return to their existing
beliefs or revisit the epistemic doubt and/or epistemic vo litio n component. Reflection
strategies are also discussed in the personal epistemology literature. Baxter Magolda
(2004) discusses making educated decisions, and K ing & Kitchener (2004) discuss a
more detailed account o f reflection during later stages o f development. Also Dewey
(1925) believed that reflection o f one’ s own experiences was the catalyst for
development.
The Integrative Personal Epistemology M odel maintains the four dimensions o f
Hofer & Pintrich (1997): the nature o f knowledge (certainty and structure o f knowledge)
and the nature o f knowing (source and justification fo r knowing). The dimensions are
ultim ately affected by the process o f the mechanism o f change.
There are two conditions for change described in the Integrative Personal
Epistemology Model: dissonance and personal relevance. These conditions are believed
to be the precursors for personal epistemology change. Dissonance is separate from
epistemic doubt and does not ensure commitment to change; dissonance is a vague
emotion where individuals may encounter dissatisfaction that impacts them on the
surface but does not trouble them deeply (i.e. epistemologically). Personal relevance
involves emotional engagement on the part o f the individual that relates to personal
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issues or a high level o f efficacy. It is then conceptualized that these two conditions o f
change are sim ilar to conceptual change theory and may influence change in personal
epistemologies (Bendixen & Rule, 2004).
A ffect also contributes to the Integrative Personal Epistemology M odel and is sim ilar
to the term “ hot conceptual change” (Bendixen, 2002; Dole & Sinatra, 1998, p. 208).
A ffect is a critical element in the Integrative Personal Epistemology’ Model and is present
in every component o f the mechanism o f change. Bendixen & Rule (2004) believe that
this element is at least im p licit in most o f the personal epistemological frameworks. For
example, Bendixen (2002) found that college students choose to be evasive regarding
their emotions provoked by epistemic doubt fo r one o f two reasons; (a) They were so
strongly attached to their belief, or (b) they were overwhelmed w ith their emotion and did
not have adequate coping skills. Either way the individuals did not experience epistemic
change. More positively, emotions were shown to trigger the individual to take action
which prompted them to implement resolution strategies. More w ork needs to be done in
this area, but regardless o f the uncertainties, affect may contribute to the research in
personal epistemology development, and this remains a strong area fo r future
investigation.
Tw o other factors in the Integrative Personal Epistemology M odel are important to
the current study: the role o f peers and cognitive ability. Peers are significant due to
their level o f social equivalency. The role o f peer influence on cognitive development is
handed down from V ygotsky’ s theory o f cognitive development (Vygotsky, 1978).
Cognitive ability in this model stems from both Piaget’ s cognitive development theory
and V ygotsky’ s sociocultural approach because they both viewed development as the

17

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

interaction between the individual and the environment. For example, for an individual
to have a high level o f personal epistemology it requires the coordination o f interactions
from the individual’ s cognitive ability w hile ju g g lin g the influences o f environmental
demands.
Em pirical support. The Integrative Personal Epistemology Model is derived from
earlier work by Bendixen (2002). The Process M odel o f Epistemic B e lie f Change was
derived from a phenomenological study that investigated 12 undergraduate students and
their views o f epistemic change. She found that epistemic doubt was critical in fostering
the changes w ithin the student’ s epistemological beliefs. In addition, Bendixen (2002)
found that peers were instrumental facilitators o f epistemic doubt and dissonance and
were more often the eatalyst for resolving epistemic doubt.

Sim ilarly, peers were found

to be more sought after to assist w ith ill-structured problems than were individuals in
roles o f authority (Mansfield & Clinchy, 2002), and Schommer-Aikins (2004) found that
peers can play a large role in restincturing ind ividu a l’s personal epistemologies.
Summary and critkpie. The Integrative Personal Epistemology’ Model (Bendixen &
Rule, 2004) attempts to compile the most potent factors relevant in the personal
epistemology research to date while incorporating the most sound definitional foundation
o f the construct that exists in the literature. The goal o f this model is to clarify and guide
personal epistemology research.
The model not only ineorporates the personal epistemology frameworks but links the
theories o f cognitive development o f Piaget and Vygotsky. The emphasis on the
importance o f social interactions, context, affect, and environment are correlated and
form the fundamental operational system o f the individual’s personal epistemology, and

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

this is central to the proposed study. Although Bendixen & Rule (2004) do not call their
model a system, it definitely represents the ideas o f systems theory as it relates to the
development o f personal epistemology.
Young C h ild re n ’s Persona! Epistemology
Research on epistemological development has focused prim arily on adolescents and
adults and has neglected very young children. Most o f the research in personal
epistemology is conducted w ith college students ranging from young to middle
adulthood. There is more interest as o f late in researching adolescent personal
epistemology, but the field in general is strongly criticized fo r neglecting young children
(Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002). O riginally it was thought that epistemological development
began in late adolescence, triggered by the intellectual demands o f college (B urr &
Hofer, 2002). It is also speculated that researching young children was sim ply
inadvertently overlooked because early researchers in the field had their interests in
higher education and not developmental psychology and, therefore, studied the age group
o f most interest to them (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).
For the purpose o f the cun ent study, “ young children” refers to children whose age
ranges from 2- to 8-years-old, and the present study is specifically targeting 3-and-4year-olds (i.e. preschool age). The fo llo w ing section on young children’s personal
epistemology includes six parts: (a) the importance o f children’s personal epistemology,
(b) developmental issues, (c) research on children’ s personal epistemology, (d)
methodological issues, (e) children’ s theory o f mind, and (f) children’ s personal
epistemology and theory o f mind.
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The Importance o f C hildren's Personal Epistemology’
Researching young children addresses the broader issue o f engaging in research that
closely parallels cognitive development (Hofer, 2001). Development is historically a
prominent issue in the personal epistemology o f college students, but researching young
children can be instrumental in identifying periods o f epistemic development that have
only been hypothesized but never identified. Hofer (2001) proposes that researching
young children would contribute toward a “ Life-Span” view o f personal epistemology (p.
365). Kuhn (2000) states that the development o f epistemological theories is advancing
but consistently remains distant from other cognitive developmental research. Research
that investigates young children is severely underrepresented in the personal
epistemology literature. Currently, there is a single study o f young children’ s personal
epistemology by Burr & Hofer (2002) that w ill be described in a later section.
Developmental Issues in Children's Personal Epistemology’
It has been pointed out in reviewing the personal epistemology literature that
individuals generally organize and reorganize their beliefs about knowledge and knowing
in an orderly continuous flo w resulting in a developmental pattern. Although much o f
the research in personal epistemological development has focused on adults and some
adolescents, there still needs to be substantial investigation into young children’ s personal
epistemological development (Bum & Hofer, 2002).
Piaget's theory’. In most accounts, early childhood refers to an individual from age
two until seven years old, and, according to Piaget (1964), this period o f time is called the
preoperational stage o f cognitive development. This stage o f development is
characterized by children’ s ability to use symbols to mentally represent objects that exist
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in the world, and their thinking is egocentric and centrally focused. This is a period o f
time when children begin to acquire language skill at lightning speed and build
knowledge o f concepts at an equally fast pace. Piaget believed that much o f the way that
children think at this stage o f development is prim itive; however, there is some literature
that would argue that Piaget underestimated young children and believe that children’ s
ways o f thinking are more sophisticated and complex than in itia lly theorized (Flavell &
M ille r, 1998; W ellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).
Children in the preoperational phase o f development generally lack understanding o f
the principle o f conservation, which demonstrates their inability to focus on more than
one event or concept at one time. For example, i f a sandwich were cut in four small
pieces, preoperational children would have the tendency to think that the four smaller
pieces indicate a larger amount o f sandwich than an uncut sandwich because they can
only focus on the greater number o f pieces. This a b ility to focus on only one aspect o f the
situation is called centration. Gelman (2000) and Siegler (1998) have found that children
in the early preoperational stage o f development are capable o f succeeding on simpler
forms o f these tasks that require the same skill. Boden (1980) had sim ilar findings and
discovered that the pass rate on many o f the tasks depended on the variation o f the
instructions given to the child. Likewise, Nagy & G riffith (1982) found that when the
directions were more complex, the children did more poorly on the tasks than when the
directions were introduced more simplistically.
Irreversibility is another characteristic o f a preoperational child. This Piagetian term
means that the child cannot manipulate a change o f direction in their mind. For example,
just because a child knows how to walk to the store does not mean that it can be assumed
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the child could figure out how to walk home in early preoperations. A t this stage it is
assumed by Piaget that the child has mastered object permanence; they now know that an
object continues to exist even though i f may not be directly visible to them at the
moment. For example, i f mom puts candy behind her back, the candy is still present.
Egocentricity is another main characteristic associated w ith the preoperational child.
Egocentricity refers to children’ s belief that everyone views things in the same way that
they do. Supposedly, children have the inability to view situations and objects from the
perspective o f another individual. Piaget & Inhelder (1956) in a renowned study placed a
child facing in one direction and a doll in the opposite direction, then asked the child to
describe the view in the scene (that the doll could not see) from the d o ll’ s perspective.
Children below age six were more likely to describe the d o ll’s view sim ilar to what they
could see while it would be apparent to an adult that the child and the doll do not have the
same view.
In many areas o f cognitive development, Piaget’ s w ork is viewed as foundational
because o f his many insights and contributions; however, there is research that
demonstrates some weaknesses about his theory. Baillargeon, Graber, DeVos, & Black
(1990) found that when practical knowledge is assessed, young children are more
competent than Piaget originally thought. It could be that we do not consistently capture
the sophistication and com plexity o f preschooler’ s cognitive abilities because they are
more fragile than those o f older children and are therefore only present under certain
more fam iliar conditions than they are generally assessed (Gelman, 1979). The heart and
soul o f Piaget’s stage development is more recently being doubted; some researchers
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question that the broad stages o f cognitive development represent the true course o f
human development.
Personal Epistemology. The lack o f research w ith young children has made way for
researchers to speculate conceptually regarding the beginnings o f personal
epistemological development. Chandler, Hallet, & Sokol (2002) point out that regardless
o f the age, the participants studied thus far demonstrate sim ilar patterns o f thinking and
seem to have sim ilar starting points. There are five arguments fo r this phenomenon, and
Chandler, Hallet, & Sokol, (2002) propose three o f the five: (a) Early onset suggests that
young children have more sophisticated epistemologies than can be predicted based on
studies o f college students; (b) recursion is conceptualized as a spiral-like development in
which epistemological stages continue to occur and reoccur in a cyclic process, rather
than in a linear motion; and (c) suppression which suggests that prior to entering school
and during school, children’s advancing beliefs are discouraged which prompts them to
suppress their epistemological development until adulthood.
Two other arguments can be identified in the literature: (d) late onset supports the
idea that true epistemological development does not begin until students reach higher
academic environments and researchers have been overestimating the ability o f young
children (Perry, 1970; K in g & Kitchener, 1994), and (e) domain dependence suggests
that early epistemic thinking is dependent on the domain in question. For example,
young children may demonstrate m ultiplistic epistemological perspectives about
subjective knowledge (i.e., personal judgments or procedural knowledge) and, on the
other hand, not demonstrate sim ilarly m ultiplistic epistemological perspectives about
objective-type-knowledge (i.e., declarative knowledge) until much later (Kuhn &
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Weinstock, 2002; M ansfield & Clinchy, unpublished). One o f these alternatives may be
more valid than another, but it is much too premature to make this judgment.
Preschool. Addressing developmental issues w ith young children may require that
personal epistemology researchers adopt a more situated perspective and examine more
microgcnetic levels o f change (Hofer, 2001). This w ill be particularly useful at the
preschool level because most preschool curricula do not have designated standards;
therefore, once researchers begin to study preschool classrooms there w ill be a vast array
o f instructional philosophies and strategies that may be informative about how children
come to know and understand the nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing.
It is also important to point out the National Center for Education Statistics and the
Institute o f Educational Sciences at the Department o f Education in 2000 indicated that
there was a 15% increase in preschool enrollment from 1990 to 2000. Over those same
years they indicated that 40% o f all 3-year-olds attended preschool, followed by 60% o f
4-year-olds, and 92% o f 5-year-olds. This increasing trend is consistent across
Caucasian, African-Am erican, and Hispanic populations and showed no correlation
between household income and the parents’ highest level o f education (National
Household Education Survey, NHES, 2000). This is an indication that there is an
educational need to gather information about young children in the preschool classroom
environment. It is important to investigate young children in a structured learning
environment in order to identify patterns during their interactions w ith others and to
understand their epistemic development. Students are entering school younger, demands
on teachers are becoming greater, and many states do not require preschool teachers to
have specific educational backgrounds. Considering the increase in preschool
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attendance, developmental factors o f personal epistemology could prove to be beneficial
for learning and instruction by stimulating the classroom environment (Bendixen & Rule,
2004; Hofer, 2001) or linking personal epistemology with a construct such as situational
learning (Schraw & Lehman, 2001).
Research on C h ild re n ’s P erson a! Epistem olog}’

There is some research in personal epistemology that investigates older children
Haerle (2006) examined fourth-grade children, teacher epistemology, and classroom
climate and found that the student’s epistemologies were representative o f personal
theories about knowledge and knowing. He proposed that the findings were identifiable
and interrelated according to four dimensions: (a) certainty o f knowledge, (b) structure of
knowledge, (c) justification o f knowledge, and (d) source o f knowledge. This is
consistent with Hofer & Pintrich (1997). Further, the students were categorized
according to their developmental patterns: absolutism, multiplism, and evaluativism
(Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002). Haerle (2006) developed a model that ineorporates the
findings o f the fourth-graders’ personal epistemologies with the teacher and the
classroom climate called The E d u c a tio n a l M o d e l f o r P e rsonal Epistemology’
Enhancem ent (EMPEE). He argues that the students’ epistemologies are an essential

component in the model and the primary focus o f educational enhancement. Haerle
(2006) represents another important study that supports the importance o f researching
children’s personal epistemologies for the implications that it presents for education.
This study w ill focus slightly on the instructional technique o f the teacher primarily
because it is situated within the classroom context, but the main concern is with
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identifying the ways in which children develop personal epistemological systems in
relationship to influences and the processes w ithin their learning environment.
Methodological Issues
Measuring young children’ s epistemological awareness w ill be challenging i f
researchers do not make accommodations for their cognitive abilities. This may well
explain the discrepancies in the theory o f mind literature that illustrates how changing the
false-belief task changes the age that children can successfully complete the task
(Chandler, 2002; Gopnik & Graf, 1988; O ’ N eill, Astington, & Flavell, 1992; Perner,
1991). I f researchers have expectations that children need to perform at a higher level
than they are developmentally capable, identifying children’s personal epistemologies
may prove to be em otionally taxing for the child and ineffective for the researcher;
however, young children should not be underestimated in their a b ility to perform
sophisticated cognitive tasks. King and Kitchener (1994) argue that the research
instruments designed to study personal epistemology are geared more toward college
students and may be too cognitively challenging for young children.
Ultim ately, w ith virtu a lly no research in children’ s personal epistemologieal
development, identifying clear methodologieal issues remains unknown. It could be
anticipated that there w ill be some measurement issues related to those seen in the
research in adult personal epistemological development or present in other areas o f
cognitive development w ith young children.
Personal epistemologies are complex even in adult investigations; therefore, it is
reasonable to believe they may be equally as elusive in young children. K ing &
Kitchener (1994) and Kuhn (1991) emphasize measuring personal epistemologies as
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components o f reasoning. The concern with this type o f method is that they can vary
depending on the nature o f the participant, the investigator, and the setting o f the
investigation. The field o f personal epistemology has been critical o f measures and
frameworks that are too subjective insofar as they can lead the participants to the desired
results by focusing on a specific dimension or using a guiding or prompting question.
Hofer & Pintrich (1997) conclude that it may be more beneficial to develop more precise
measures and innovative ways to measure personal epistemologies that can investigate
specific dimensions o f knowledge or address specific developmental issues (Baxter
Magolda, 1992; King & Kitchener, 1994; Kuhn, 1991). The biggest problem with
phenomenological or open-ended types o f questions is the low degree o f replicability
(Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).
Interviews and more qualitative methodologies have led to a deeper understanding of
individual’s beliefs about knowledge; however, the problem with this type o f approach is
that it tends to be an issue o f time during data collection on the part o f the participants
and the researcher. This may prove to be a measurement issue in researching young
children in general because of their shorter attention span, but specifically, for this study,
because it is conducted in the classroom setting. While conducting research within a
classroom context, the researcher needs to be conscientious o f multiple factors that
cannot be controlled, in addition to being respectful to the teacher and students. An
alternative to structured and unstructured interviews with adults is a paper-and-pencil
questionnaire, but this can be problematic with younger children because o f their
developmental restraints. Not only are they limited in their reading ability, but i f the
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questions were to be read to them, the understanding o f the Likert scale may be too
complex for a young child to understand.
Language development in young children is a gradual proeess and is found to be a
limitation in other areas o f eognitive development, such as theory o f mind (Wellman &
Cross, 2001) and w ill need to be strongly considered prior to the examination o f any
cognitive constructs. The language and activities need to be tailored specific to the age
group being studied (Poole & Lamb, 1998). In this case, a pilot study was conducted to
address language issues. Piloting research with young children is recommended (Greig
& Taylor, 1999). Although piloting research can produce crucial information, it
contributes to the time factor.
Besides concerns o f measurement, there may be some conceptual issues that exist in
researching young children’s personal epistemology. Piaget’s theory o f cognitive
development has been criticized for underestimating young children’s ability (Burr &
Hofer, 2002). In addition, Hofer & Pintrich (1997) point out that current shifts in
educational thinking continue to impact the way personal epistemology is conceptualized
and approached, and this can impact the way in which individuals believe what they
know. Although the field is making strides toward achieving a unified consensus, it
remains negotiable. Considering findings from Burr & Hofer (2002), researching young
children may slightly impact current conceptions regarding the trajectory o f personal
epistemology. Regardless, there is insufficient research, and these thoughts are only
speculation based on the existing research. Researching young children’s personal
epistemology needs to be pursued more aggressively.
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Theo)y o f M ind
Theory o f mind development is an area o f cognitive development research that
investigates the nature o f and development toward understanding o f the mental world.
The individual’ s inner w orld consists of: beliefs, desires, emotions, thoughts,
perceptions, intentions, and other states (Flavell, 2004). In contemporary research the
term theoiy o f mind surfaced from Piagetian literature and w ith the w ork o f Premack &
W o o d ruff who investigated chimpanzees and their cognitive ability. W oodruff &
Premaek (1978) defined theory o f mind as a system o f inferences that can be used to
predict behavior by attributing mental states to individuals.
Piaget framed two separable entities o f an understanding o f mind: an understanding
o f the nature o f mental states, such as, thoughts and dreams; and the use o f psychological
reasoning to explain human actions, such as how intentions and desires cause and explain
human action (Wellman & Phillips, 2001). Piaget underestimated the capabilities o f
young children, specifically preschoolers. He thought that they reasoned incorrectly by
contemplating physical objects by psychological reasoning and applied physical
reasoning to human actions.
Although Piaget has been an enormous contributor, his theories have been criticized
and challenged on the basis o f these two assumptions: w ith the examination o f children’ s
mental states (Shatz, Wellman, & Sibler, 1983) and examination o f psychological
reasoning regarding mistaken actions resulting from false-beliefs (W im m er & Perner,
1983). One thing that has been determined as a result o f the resurgence o f this research is
that young children, in fact, do understand the fundamental differences between mental
versus the physical world (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995). Hams, Johnson, Hutton,
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Andrews, & Cooke (1989) demonstrated that when a child is told about a person who has
a dog versus a person who is thinking about a dog and then, subsequently asked which
dog is able to be seen or petted, even three-year-old children were able to judge correctly.
Estes, Wellman, & W oolley (1989) told three-year olds a story about a “ raisin in the
head” (i.e. a thought about a raisin) versus a “ raisin in the stomach” (i.e. a swallowed
raisin), and they correctly acknowledged that neither raisin could be seen or touched, and
that one was imagined and one was physically real. Further, young children are able to
distinguish between thinking and doing. Wellman, Hollander, & Schultz (1996) found
that even three-year-olds viewed thinking as internal, private, and just mental, as opposed
to external, public, and just physical phenomena.
In terms o f theory o f mind, another frequently researched topic is children’s
understanding o f beliefs and, in particular, false beliefs. Understanding false beliefs
demonstrates a c h ild ’s knowledge or awareness that differences exist between contents o f
the mind and content o f the world. W im m er & Perner, ( 1983) initiated the false-belief
task in which one subject (A ) puts an object in a certain location (a), but then while
subject (A ) is away and cannot see what happens, subject (B) moves the location o f the
object to location (b). Subject (A ) returns, and the child is asked where subject (A ) w ill
look for the object; location (a) or (b)? Children who pass the false-belief task are able to
predict that subject (A ) w ill look fo r the object in location (a) because that is where
subject (A ) put it and has no knowledge that subject (B) moved it. This infers that the
child can adequately distinguish between what they themselves know and what subject
(A ) knows. Conversely, children who fail the false-belief-task w ill report that subject (A)
w ill look for the object in location (b), assuming that subject (A ) knows that subject (B)
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has moved the object to location (b). This incorrect prediction on the part o f the child
indicates an inability to differentiate between what they think/know and what others
think/know.
Many researchers have conducted sim ilar false-belief task research; however, they
have altered the original task in various ways, such that the variety o f interpretations are
too numerous to elaborate (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Bartsch & Wellman, 1995;
Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Call & Tomasello, 1999). The vast findings raise
questionable doubt about children’ s thinking. It may reflect general language or social
development rather than truly reflect their understanding o f the mind. In general, most
accounts conclude that this developmental criterion is absent in three-year olds and
supposedly emerges closer to age four, and is in place by age five. This is not altogether
absolutely agreed upon and in some cases noted as inaccurate (Chandler et. al., 1989).
Chandler et al. (1989) showed that, at least in some situations on some task variations,
three-year olds can also demonstrate correct responses on the false-belief task when they
are more actively engaged in deceiving the target person. Lewis & M itchell (1994) found
that three-year olds could pass the false-belief task when the questions are phrased in a
certain manner. In a meta-analysis o f theory o f mind development, Wellman, Cross, &
Watson (2001) looked at over 500 false-belief conditions w ith a variety o f ages and
procedural conditions and concluded children from two-and-a-half to five years old
proceed from consistently making false-belief errors to successful completion.
Preschool children acquire an understanding o f representational mental states such as
thoughts, beliefs, and knowledge over several years, but at the start o f preschool display
evidence o f a subjective, psychological understanding o f others’ desires and emotions.
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Bradinetz & Schneider (2004) used a sim plified judgm ent task w ith two-year olds to
show that they know that others may have different emotions from their own. Wellman
& W oolley (1990) took the same age group and showed children’ s ability to understand
that others may hold different emotions and desires for the identical objects or events.
Despite the ch ild ’ s understanding o f desires and emotions, they consistently fail the falsebe lie f task. Why? Perhaps it is because the false-belief task utilizes an ineorrect
application o f a young ch ild ’ s language a b ility or misrepresents the role o f language in
child development. This eontrast in a child’ s a b ility needs to be investigated from a
much closer look at the role o f language in the development o f theory o f mind.
Children use words like happy, sad, want, and like by their second birthday to refer to
others’ internal mental states separate from the individual’ s external behaviors, physical
features, and facial expressions (Bartsch, 2002; Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). As the child
continues to develop and conversational skills advance, there is an apparent shift in
children’s mental states o f early understanding o f desire and emotion to later
understanding o f beliefs, thoughts, and knowledge. It is not until around three-years old
when children begin to use words like think and know to refer to thoughts and beliefs.
W hy the difference between children’ s connection w ith emotion and their delayed
connection to beliefs? Perhaps emotions are routinely viewed as external based on
personal experience (but in reality we cannot feel someone else’ s pain) whereas beliefs
are inherently internal and are not easily monitored.
There is an interesting proposition to deviate from the current theory o f mind
literature and adopt a “ community o f m ind” (Nelson, 2003, p. 311). The assumption is as
follow s: in early childhood dcveloppient, an individual is exposed to a large community
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and attempts to gain membership to this community. This community is synonymous
w ith a person’ s surrounding and social context, sometimes referred to as social cultural
environment. The emphasis is on the minds that interact with and also d iffe r from one
another as well as having certain similarities o f structure and content. In the end
understanding differences among minds requires understanding the source o f the
differences among people, their backgrounds, personalities, relationships, and
experiences.
Nelson’s perspective corresponds to a Vygotskian view which is more compatible in
terms o f incorporating affect and language as components o f an individual’ s
environment. In terms o f external associations, a ch ild ’ s receptive language skills, such
as listening to stories, are largely related to developing representational functions o f
language. In order to develop these types o f skills, children are dependent on their
environment to provide these experiences, and their community is fundamentally pivotal.
This idea o f “ community o f minds” (Nelson, 2003, p. 311) has significant
possibilities fo r assisting research to move forward with attempts to link theory o f mind
and personal epistemology in young children. Although it emphasizes the role o f the
external as the innovator o f self, the individual remains in an egocentric subjective phase
and potentially developing pre-dualistie epistemologies (B urr & Hofer, 2002) which may
be more specifically identified in relationship to the children’ s environment and
experiences as members o f their community.
There is very little known about the origins o f epistemological awareness or how
epistemological beliefs can be connected to other aspects o f children’ s cognitive
development (B urr & Hofer, 2002). Interestingly, the inkling o f research that has been
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conducted on the personal epistemology o f young children seems to indicate sim ilar
stages to those found in college students. Chandler, Hallett, & Sokol (2002) bring up an
important observation; they have noticed that, despite the age o f the participants, dualism
is consistently the initial stage identified. They identify several explanations for the
parallel; early onset, late onset, recursion, or suppression. Kuhn & Weinstock (2002)
pointed out evidence o f a domain dependence perspective for the similarities between age
groups. W ellman (2001) concludes that the theory o f m ind accomplishments o f young
preschoolers is consistent w ith the theoretical accounts that suggest young children have
an understanding o f beliefs and a related understanding o f mind.
Theory o f mind researchers have been asking questions such as “ How, when, and in
what manner does an everyday theory o f mind arise” (Wellman, 2001, p. 352).
Researchers in the last decades have made notable progress. The field o f personal
epistemology is at a sim ilar point. We need to ask, how, when, and in what manner does
personal epistemology arise. One area worth investigating is the relationship that
personal epistemology may have w ith theory o f mind development in young children;
this is a link which is proposed in this study.
Personal Epistemology and Theoiy o f M ind
Theory o f mind (TO M ) involves the awareness that others have different perspectives
about what is known, and this awareness bares significance on the concept o f
epistemological thought (Hofer and Pintrich, 2002). This is important for understanding
personal epistemology because it focuses on the nature o f human knowledge and how
individuals come to know the world (B urr & Hofer, 2002), and how individuals ju stify,
interpret, and construct knowledge and knowing (Sehommer, 1990). In a special issue o f
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New Ideas in Psychology (2002), researchers from personal epistemology and theory of
mind collaborated regarding a possible connection between the two constructs. Recently,
uniting these two strands o f research required some new vocabulary; folk epistemology
was produced to identify the child’s TOM and adolescent epistemological development
(Bartsch, 2002). It is conclusive among researchers in this field that there needs to be a
better understanding o f how folk epistemology develops from childhood to adulthood.
Although this section discusses how the two constructs may be linked, there is very little
empirical evidence that exists in the current literature.
The research proposed here w ill direct attention toward three- to four-year-old
children. Mansfield and Clinchy (1985) reported identifying epistemological beliefs in
three- to five year olds. Although children have been reported to demonstrate successful
false-belief achievement as low as age three and four (Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 1993;
Leslie, 1987; Lillard, 1998), TOM is far more commonly studied and reported at ages
five and six. It has been suggested by some in the field that personal epistemologies may
be developing and even in place prior to TOM. I f this is true, there may be a pre-dualistie
stage o f epistemologieal development that has not been investigated because a child
could not hold a belief about knowledge without acknowledging that there are alternative
perspectives (Burr & Hofer, 2002).
By successfully completing a false-belief task, understanding that others can/do have
different beliefs based on knowledge of their experiences is equivalent to achieving a
dualistic epistemological point o f view, acknowledging that there can be competing
notions o f reality, and understanding that there is no absolute right or wrong
interpretation (Kuhn, 2000). According to the literature, TOM research in children has
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much more depth and breadth than childhood epistemology; however, Piaget (1952)
labeled his investigations o f children’s cognitive development as ’’genetic epistemology”
(p. 778) w ith a focus on how individuals come to know the w orld and reflective o f his
interest in form ulating a theory o f knowledge (Burr & Hofer, 2002). Individuals do not
simply acquire a fu ll capacity for TO M or personal epistemology all at one time; it is a
gradual and continually evolving developmental process. In Piaget’ s theory o f
knowledge, he focused on how individuals “ progressively reconstruct the relationship
between the knower and the known” (Piaget, 1952). The research in this area is in its
infancy stage, and developmental researehers have raised some questions regarding the
order in which these two constructs (TO M and personal epistemologies) occur in
development (e.g., Chandler, 2002). First, a supposed pre-dualistie phase is characterized
by “ unwavering egocentric subjectivity,’' and evokes TO M (B urr & Hofer, 2002, p. 204).
Second and in contrast, Astington, Pelletier, and Homer (2002) suggest from their
findings that false-belief understanding is fundamental to children’ s epistcmological
development because it underlies their understanding o f the epistemic concepts o f
evidence, inference, and truth.
Studies linking TO M and epistemology need to move toward a deeper, richer level o f
understanding about what the child is contributing when he provides a response to a
false-belief task or answers an epistcmological question, and these studies need to look at
specific infom iation about the c h ild ’ s background knowledge, prior experiences, and
personal goals.
In a pre-dualistic stage o f epistcmological development, there would be no proposal
for uncertain knowledge or acknowledgment that an unsolvable problem could exist.
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King & Kitchener (1994) found evidence o f this type o f thinking in their sample o f teens
and hypothesized it would most like ly be present in much younger children because they
do not have the capability to respond to ill-struetured problems. Burr & Hofer (2002)
propose a connection that overlaps theory o f mind development, placing a “ realist” stage
prior to the absolutist stage, w ith both positions defining knowledge as certain and
objective. The core difference is that realist thinking would sim ply be copies o f the
external world needing no justification, and absolutist thinking views facts as being right
or wrong. Another possible theory o f epistemology in young children was presented by
Chandler et al. (2002) as a stage that represents knowledge is objective and is present
prior to awareness o f competing knowledge claims using the term, “ naïve realism”
(Chandler et al., 2002, p. 338).
One problem that consistently surfaces is that o f subjective and objective knowledge
and knowing (B urr & Hofer, 2002). This is a reoccurring problem in the theory o f mind
literature as w ell. Perhaps it is not a development o f either/or in terms o f one over the
other but that both are at a level o f incongruence because o f changing contexts or
environment. The structure that supports epistcmological development places absolutists
as objective knowers, m ultiplists as subjectively aware, and evaluativists as the judge
between the objective and subjective.
Burr & Hofer (2002) make a sim ilar claim: “ realist or pre-dualist stage needs further
attention, particularly in regard to the individual’ s comprehension o f ‘ objectivity’” (p.
209). It is necessary to distinguish between pre-dualistic and dualistic thinkers by
looking more closely at the significance o f the source o f knowledge and the justification
for knowledge used by younger children.
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Burr & Hofer (2002) propose a pre-dualistic stage o f epistemological development as
preceding theory o f mind development and conceptualize the transition from pre-dualistic
thinking to dualistic thinking in conjunction with the successful completion of the falsebelief task. They tested their theory with 25 children ranging in age from 3.1 to 5.4 years
using two false-belief tasks and four epistcmological vignettes. They found a period in
which children could not yet pass the false belief tasks and were completely unable to
address issues o f justification for knowledge. Following this level, there appears to be a
transitional level at which point children are able to conceptualize the idea o f justification
but continue to demonstrate the inability to successfully pass the false-belief tasks. The
last transition accounts for the child to provide acceptable justifications for their
knowledge and are able to successfully complete the false-belief task. Burr & Hofer
concluded that there is an important relationship between theory o f mind and personal
epistemology. A child’s developing personal epistemologies appear to be foundational in
theoi-y o f mind which involves the awareness that others have different perspectives
about knowledge.
The prospect o f drawing a cognitive link between personal epistemology and theory
o f mind is an intriguing proposition and could address many o f the issues that are
emerging in the field o f personal epistemology. In order to do develop this theoiy it w ill
be necessary to shift the ordinary theoretical lens. Many o f the questions that are in the
broader scope of this study are consistent in suggestions for future research from those
who are beginning to investigate children (Bartsch, 2002; Burr & Hofer, 2002). There is
much that can be learned about personal epistemology in general, and children in
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particular, by investigating possible links between personal epistemology and theory o f
mind development in young children.
Another contribution that has not been mentioned in the b rie f review o f the literature
is the impact that TO M and personal epistemology development have on areas such as
social skills (Harris and Kavanaugh, 1993), moral reasoning (Bendixen, Schraw, and
Dunklc, 1998), memory (Carlson, Moses, and Breton, 2002), and s e lf efficacy and
motivation (Linnenbrink and Pintrich, 2003). Exploring the interrelatedness o f TO M and
personal epistemology development can contribute to the research in several other areas.
As a future study maintaining sim ilar methodology it would be interesting to look at
gender and social cultural differences; this is an area which remains completely bare in
terms o f research on TO M and epistemic understanding in preschool child development.
A P ilo t Study on Preschool C hild re n ’s Personal Epistemology
A pilot study was conducted to ascertain information about designing each facet o f
the current study. The purpose o f the pilot was to fine-tune epistemological questioning
and procedures fo r the current study. The pilot was integral to studying children’s
personal epistemology; it provided information in regard to identifying protocol ideas for
specific research tasks, as w ell as scheduling, time limitations, cognitive abilities, and
other important procedural factors.
The pilot lasted 12 weeks during which the classroom was observed three times per
week from 8A M until 1PM. Observation included various aspects o f the preschool
environment including whole class instruction and small group activities (centers). There
was a theme o f the week which would drive the focus fo r all o f the activities that the
children engaged in throughout the week. Along w ith the observations, there were peer
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focus group activities that were implemented during times that did not conflict w ith the
classroom instruction.
Focus groups emerged from sociological theories regarding data collection and group
interaction to study values, attitudes, and the impact o f products and services (Walker,
1993). Bogdan & Biklen (2003) recommend that focus groups be used for hard to reach
groups and sensitive issues because they provide a mechanism that identifies what
individuals think/believe and promote questioning that potentially links to how or why
they hold a certain position. The focus groups help to gain an understanding o f the nature
o f knowledge (i.e., simple, certain) and the process o f knowing (i.e., source and
justification) in terms that the child-participants can identify. Focus groups provide the
child-participants w ith a platform for the investigator to capture the essence o f their
knowledge in their own words.
Participants
The p ilo t study took place in the Cricket classroom at a local public preschool and
involved 25 students (14 girls and 11 boys) from culturally diverse backgrounds. The
teacher was an 18-year veteran o f elementary and preschool teaching.
Child-Participants’ Personal Epistemology
The questions in the focus groups probed personal epistemological reasoning and
beliefs (Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000). The script for the interview and focus
groups was strictly based on the classroom instruction that was taking place in the
classroom at the time o f the pilot. Some o f the questions were probing for elaboration o f
cognitive processes and the participants’ own real-life experiences. Specifically, the
questions were related to the four dimensions o f epistemology (i.e., sim plicity and
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certainty refers to the nature o f knowledge; and source and justification refer to the
process o f knowing) (Hofer, 2001).
Observation o f Classroom Instruction. There were two weeks o f consecutively
observed lessons that lasted 20 to 40 minutes. The observation o f the lessons were used
as the context/catalyst for the child-participant interviews and the focus group, as a way
lap into the child-participants’ understanding o f the current lesson’ s theme and beliefs
about knowledge and knowing related to that theme.
C bild-Participant Interviews. There were two weeks o f semi-structured individual
interviews w ith each child-participant, and the interviews did not exceed 15 minutes per
child at any one time. Each child-participant was interviewed at least two times per
week, but some children were interviewed up to five times per week.
C hild-Participant Focus Groups. Each child-participant was active in six focus
groups during the study (introduction, two pre-instruction, two post-instruction, and a
conclusion). Each o f the focus groups consisted o f six child-participants and the
researcher and lasted approximately 15 minutes.
Results
The pilot study used focus groups w ith preschool children as a means o f identifying
dimensions o f beliefs about knowledge. Themes and patterns were identified among
individuals and w ithin and between groups. The follow ing section provides some insight
about the coding categories and describes the five general themes that emerged from the
analyses;
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1. Epistemological beliefs are multidimensional. In general, preschool children in the
pilot study do indeed have epistemological beliefs at different levels and can be
categorized along the various dimensions.
2. Influences on m ultiplist and absolutist beliefs. Child-participants w ith high
numbers o f m ultiplistic statements in terms o f simple and source o f knowledge
demonstrated consistently high scores in affective and social categories. These
individuals tended to be more confident, animated, and spontaneous. They also seemed
to have a better concept o f the rules o f the focus group and tended to take more o f the
lead in the discussions. They demonstrated less egocentric perspectives which is in
contrast to developmental theories about the social-cognitive capabilities o f this age
groups that say that egocentrism is quite prevalent in preschool-aged children (e.g.,
Flavell, 1999).
Conversely, child-participants w ith the highest absolutist ratings had the lowest
number o f overall contributions across all o f the focus groups. They were consistently
unable to give their views o f knowledge unless the conversation was initiated by their
peers. This finding suggests that children w ith more m ultiplistic views acted as a
scaffold fo r other children who were not as comfortable and/or able to discuss their views
on their ov/n. These findings support the theory that students are receptive to peerlearning environments. It also suggests that affective and social factors are important
influences in epistemological development and peer-learning.
3. Importance o f group dynamics. In comparing Groups 1 and Group 2 w ithin the
category o f social statements and behavior, the child-participants had more statements

142

Reproduced witti permission of ttie copyrigfit owner. Furtfier reproduction profiibited witfiout permission.

and behaviors categorized as social than the other two categories (epistemological and
affective).
The social group dynamics o f the focus groups were interesting because w ithout the
teacher as the clear authority, the peer groups seemed to work more efficiently w ithin the
structure o f the focus groups than what they demonstrated in their peer-play
environments. One interpretation o f this finding is that the children seemed to have
grasped their different roles in certain social environments and/or were able to conform to
the social conventions expected w ithin different focus groups and peer-play
environments. During the focus groups the children were less egocentric and less
aggressive toward their peers. When those same child-participants were observed during
unstructured play intervals, they seemed to display behaviors that were more
characteristic o f their age. The results indicate that the child-participants demonstrated a
greater sense o f social conventions w ithin the more structured environment o f the focus
groups in that they utilized more appropriate behaviors and implemented more
appropriate problem-solving and critical thinking skills.
4.

A ffect -positive affect. The dimensions w ithin this category were defined as

positive comments regarding the lesson and processes o f the group. It was apparent in
the children’ s enthusiastic responses, their eagerness to participate, and the cohesiveness
displayed in the focus groups when discussing their views o f knowledge. The affective
nature o f the child-participants is critical because it appears to be an important part o f the
foundation o f how they interact w ith one another as they construct group knowledge.
Lack o f negative affect. There were extremely low numbers o f negative responses
generated w ithin the groups. The low negative affective component supports the
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generally positive outlook most young children have fo r learning; they are upbeat and
excited about what they know (Rosenburg, 1998).
5.

The role o f peer groups in evaluativism. Is evaluativistic thinking even possible in

young children? The results indicate that child-participants did display this more
sophistieated way o f thinking about knowledge and knowing but only in a group sense.
In essence, patterns emerged from the data showing evidence that discussion during the
focus groups allowed fo r evaluativistic-like thinking to occur. In other words, by
building on what each o f the group members had to say, instances o f evaluativistic
thinking in more o f a collective sense was apparent..
Discussion
In terms o f preschool education, exposure to group evaluativism may allow students
to generate higher levels o f thinking, and this reciprocal influence among group members
is consistent w ith theory in the field o f personal epistemology (e.g., Bendixen & Rule,
2004) and in the framework o f V ygotsky’ s (1978) sociocultural theory o f child
development.
The study uses real-world examples and an authentic classroom setting; therefore, it
was integral to achieve relationships w ith the child, the teacher, and peers. It was a goal
to maintain the organization and flo w o f the classroom; therefore, it was important to
structure the study around the teacher’s lesson plan and instructional style rather than
develop a study and incorporate it into the classroom.
Another facet o f the study that was driven by the findings o f the pilot study was the
types o f questions that needed to be asked o f the children. On the surface much o f the
information may seem subjective and fragmented, but collectively there are visible
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patterns o f developing personal epistemologies that emerge from the children’ s own
words as collectively interpreted from three or four different perspectives (i.e., the
teacher, the researcher, and peers).
There were two outcomes o f the first focus groups that really laid the groundwork for
what turned out to be many successful focus groups. First, developmentally, preschool
children have significantly shorter attention spans and cannot focus for more than 15 to
20 minutes. Therefore, the length o f the focus group was decreased. Second,
preschoolers like to interact; therefore, six children in a group was too many. By
decreasing the number o f children in each group to three, everyone had a chance to
participate w ithout falling over another c h ild ’ s responses. Reducing the number o f
children in the focus group also distinguished it further from the child’ s experience in the
whole group instruction experience. Six children in a group ended up m im icking the
complexities o f the whole class instruction. In order for the children’s voices to truly be
heard, the number o f children per group needed to be decreased by half.
On a larger scale the pilot study was integral in constructing a framework for future
research. There were several themes that emerged dealing w ith the classroom teacher,
parents, and the children’ s peers. In addition, characteristics that may influence
preschool children’ s personal epistemology were identified (i.e., affect, social skills,
language, setting). The com plexity o f personal epistemology and researching very young
children guided the construction o f the Dynamic Systems Framework f o r Personal
Epistemology! Development (Winsor, 2005) (See Figure 1). This framework w ill be used
in Chapter 5 as part o f the discussion o f the results in this current study.
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Considering the Dynamic Systems Framework for Personal Epistemology
Development, the current study incorporates only a fraction o f the system. The goal o f
the current study is to investigate the relationship between the individual child and his
peers in a classroom environment while considering several o f the developmental issues
that coincide to preschoolers.

Figure 1: Dynamic Systems Framework for Personal Epistemology Development
(DSFPED)
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Purpose o f the Study
The purpose o f this study is to investigate three- to four-year-olds’ personal
epistemology through the use o f peer focus groups. The cun ent research stems from a
larger study that includes the Dynamic Systems Fram ework f o r Childhood Epistemology
(W insor, 2005; see Figure 1) that w ill be elaborated on in the discussion portion o f this
article. Investigating personal epistemology using focus groups is a new and innovative
approach fo r the age group being investigated. In terms o f developmental theory, this
research offers a more integrated and comprehensive view o f the ch ild ’ s experiences and
the ch ild ’ s w orld. For example, in this study we use the ch ild ’s words to guide the line o f
questioning in individual interviews, focus group sessions, and classroom observations.
This study contributes to personal epistemology research by addressing several needs o f
the field and offers new insights into the education o f young children.
The purpose o f this study is to develop a framework which investigates children’s
personal epistemology. To understand the dynamic aspects o f children’s epistemology,
the framework focuses on the child and includes its theory o f mind, affect, and language.
The framework also w ill investigate the subsystems that exist in the ch ild ’ s external
environment, including the child’ s parents, teacher, and peers. It is the aim o f the study
to contribute to personal epistemology research by meeting the future needs o f the field,
enhancing educational perspectives fo r young children, and impacting the larger
spectrum o f personal epistemology w ith insights about early childhood epistemological
development.
The area o f researching young children’ s personal epistemologies is virtu a lly absent
in the literature, and many personal epistemology researchers suggest this is an area that
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needs investigation. We know little about what children know and understand about the
nature o f knowledge and the processing o f knowing. Therefore, the primary purpose o f
this study is to look elosely at a small group o f young children’ s personal epistemology
w ithin a preschool classroom environment.
The results from this study may offer new insights in several ways: (a) It could
provide information about an early onset o f personal epistemology, (b) it might serve as a
foundational perspective regarding the trajectory o f epistemological growth or change
throughout the lifespan, (c) knowing more about the trajectory o f epistemological
development can contribute to the understanding o f the role o f epistemic doubt in
epistemological development (Bendixen, 2002), and (d) it may open the door for more
innovative methods o f measuring personal epistemology.

Research Question
To guide the current study’ s exploration o f young children’ s personal epistemology,
the research question was as follow s: What are the personal epistemologies o f preschoolaged children?

148

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER THREE

M E TH O D A N D DESIGN
This is a qualitative research study that examines the personal epistemologies o f very
young children. The theoretical framework used to place a new perspective on child
cognitive development is complex and multi-faceted: (a) There are m ultiple perspectives
(i.e., the individual child and interactions w ith their peers), (b) The individual and peer
interactions are observed and epistemologies are questioned in various ways as a means
o f looking for themes and patterns o f individuals and w ithin peer relationships, and (c)
Various qualitative research methodologies are used (i.e. formal and informal classroom
observation, cognitive and epistemological screening, individual semi-structured
interviews, and semi-structured focus groups). A ll data was analyzed independently. The
data was analyzed daily using a constant comparative method o f analysis. This type o f
method allowed for constant analysis o f the data making it possible to continually probe
specific aspects o f the c h ild ’ s b e lie f system. It was useful for identifying themes among
the participant early and made it possible to target certain aspects during subsequent data
collection. When data collection was completed, despite the constant comparative
method o f analysis throughout the study, all data was ultim ately triangulated to gain a
broader perspective about individual child epistemology and w ithin group interaction.
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Design
The design o f the study is based on a case study approach to investigating the beliefs
about knowledge and knowing in preschool children. A case study is a detailed
examination o f one setting, and/or a single/m ultiple subject(s), or one particular event
(Bogdan & Biklen, 2003; Merriam, 1988). The current study incorporates m ultiple
components o f a case study; (a) I look at one setting, the Cricket classroom, set w ithin the
context o f a preschool environment; (b) there are six child-participants; therefore, there
are six case studies; and (c) 1 utilize several protocols (i.e., whole class instruction,
informal center activities, individual interviews, and peer foeus groups). Creswell (1998)
defines a case study as, “ An exploration o f a bounded system or a case over time through
detailed, in-depth data collection involving m ultiple sources o f infom iation rich context”
(p.61). The prim aiy event that is being investigated is the use o f focus groups to
understand preschool children’s epistemological development. The current study looks at
six cases o f children interacting w ith their peers during several focus group tasks.
Researching children in this field is relatively new; therefore, it does not warrant large
samples or follow ing rigid protocols in order to examine a lim ited number o f variables.
Rather, is it more useful at this stage in the investigation o f young children’ s developing
epistemologies to use m ultiple instances or events as a means o f gaining a more in-depth
perspective (Creswell, 1998; Merriam, 1998). Case studies can provide a systematic way
o f looking at specific phenomenon, collecting data, analyzing infom iation, and reporting
the results (Ellet, 2007). As a result, the researcher gains a sharper understanding o f why
and how the instance/s have occurred and what m ight become more important or
w orthwhile to research in the future. Case studies lend themselves to both generating and
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testing hypotheses (Merriam, 1998). Choosing a case study as the research strategy for
the current study is critical for researching children and investigating epistemological
development because the context in which the study is designed is a naturally occurring
authentic learning environment, in which none o f the daily activities are altered but rather
are elaborated upon to get a more in-depth perspective o f the thinking patterns o f the
children.
1 rely on m ultiple sources o f evidence on which I use a constant comparative data .
analysis method (which is discussed in Chapter 4) to continually reduce data to identify
themes and regenerate details from each child to gain deeper knowledge and
understanding about their epistemological understanding (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003). In
other words, 1 used data as it was collected to construct more specific inquiry fo r fo llo w up interviews and peer focus groups (Corbin & Strauss, 2007). Case studies are sociallyconstructed research approaches situated between concrete data collecting techniques and
methodological paradigms and function as a tool that can assist in theoretical
development as is necessary for investigating children’ s epistemological development
(Charmaz, 2006; Hancock & Algozzine, 2006).
The very nature o f children’ s epistemological development is complex, which
supports the reasoning to understand the ch ild ’ s experiences using a case study technique
and constant comparative data analysis. M ultiple case studies provide a strong platform
to investigate children’ s developing epistemologies in an authentic learning environment.
This type o f approach does not make any assumptions about what meaning experiences
have to a specific individual (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003). Grounding the research in the
children’ s fam iliar environment, it was possible to gain insights into their epistemological

151

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

understanding and how they apply meaning to what they understand. One important
component o f the semi-structured interview process w ill be a focus on the words o f all
participants. A ctive listening and keen observations are necessary in case study research
(Strauss & Corbin, 2007) as the goal is to look for the meaning o f child perceptions and
experiences, both w orking independently and during interactions w ith others.
According to Bogdan & Biklen (2003), “ I f you want to understand the way people
think about their world and how knowledge is formed you need to get close to them, to
hear them talk, and observe them in their day-to-day lives” (p. 32). The current study
utilizes whole elass instruction, informal center observation, individual semi-structured
interviews, and structured to semi-structured peer focus groups as a means to understand
the children’ s experiences in their learning environment and learn how their experiences
are related to epistemological development. The interviewing process is always
unpredictable and ambiguous (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003.) Therefore, it was essential to be
flexible about the sequence o f the interviews and activities (Merriam, 1998). By using
case studies the interview questions were able to be adjusted as needed based on the
disposition o f the participants and their a b ility and willingness to provide the requested
information. During interview sessions, m inor inquiry adjustments are often needed and
this is a judgment call on the part o f the researcher (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003).
Role o f Researcher
The role o f the researcher in the current study was to become involved in the child’s
“ conceptual w orld” (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003, p.55) and to gain a deeper understanding
o f their experiences and the meaning o f these experiences. This type o f involvement
could be an intrusion on the daily activities o f the child and the teacher; therefore.
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thought was given to put time and effort into building a cohesive relationship including
trust, mutuality, and honesty w ith all o f the people involved. Once relationships were
established, it was important to eonform to the schedule that best fit all o f the individuals
involved in order to effectively collect the data without being intrusive or disruptive to
the schedule or routine. This type o f protocol is fundamental in establishing a successful
m ilieu in which the researcher is the participant observer. This occurs when the
researcher seeks to maintain a balance between being an insider and an outsider. There
were instances during the study where it was productive and informative to be an active
participant; however, conversely there were times when more information could be
acquired as a passive outsider.
A role as a participant observer entails fittin g into the everyday setting in ways that
enhance awareness and curiosity about the interactions taking place in the setting
(Glesne, 1999). The researcher becomes immersed in the research questions, the
individuals, and the environment in ways that are uncommonly heightened and that they
themselves would not witness ordinarily. The participant observer comes to a social
situation w ith two purposes: (a) to engage in activities appropriate to the situation, and
(b) to obseiwe the physical characteristics, the individuals, and the activities (Spradley,
I980y
A role as participant observer can be challenging. It requires that the researcher is
eonsciously aware o f the environment and its multi-faceted activities and interactions,
which means overcoming years o f attempting to block out these same kinds factors. Due
to the nature o f this study, it is necessary to look broadly at seemingly trivial items and
probe deeply at others. This technique can be more effortless i f the researcher perceives
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her role to be as an insider/outsider simultaneously to help experience the situation as a
participant and an observer (Spradley, 1980).
Conducting a case study provides an opportunity to utilize the researcher’ s
background knowledge and previous experience to capture the “ essence” (van Maanen,
1988, p. 78) o f the children’s subjective voice in their understanding o f what, how, and
why they know themselves and others..
Setting
A public preschool program in a Southwestern city in the United States was the site
for this study. It is a university-run preschool; it employs certified teachers and is open to
children o f students, faculty, staff, and members o f the community. It is a two-story
building w ith convenient parking, and the hours o f operation are accommodating from
7:30am until 7:00pm. The campus is handicap accessible fo r physically challenged
students, and they have the capability to accommodate visual and auditory impaired
students too. The school also has a thorough security protocol for visitors so that the
children are safe.
The center recently opened, in 2004. The purpose o f the preschool is to provide
assessments and training opportunities for the local university students and staff with
young children birth to 60 months, their families, and community members. The new
fa cility is state-of-the-art, utilizing student-friendly classrooms w ith a video-recording
system for teacher observation, training, and research. They have a multi-purpose room,
playground, and administrative offices for meetings and conferences.
The Cricket elassroom where the study took place is open and bright. One entire wall
consists o f two large garage-type doors (40ft. x 40 ft. clear plexi-glass windows). These
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doors open to a secure private courtyard that can be opened on nice days. The Cricket
classroom frequently has some activity going on in its courtyard, such as growing herbs
and vegetables, conducting various science experiments, or creating a product too large
for the inside. The colorful and friendly environment displays a large amount o f the
students w ork on the walls. They have five small tables and chairs in a cluster where
they have centers fo r activities throughout the day. There is a large open area w ith a
carpet that has each student’ s name, indicating where each student should be seated for
the collaborative inquiry instruction.
As for the more infonrial areas o f the classroom, the students are equipped nicely for
free time. They are encouraged to interact w ith their peers, w ork on the computer,
pretend in the dramatic play area, construct in the action area (this area has blocks,
puzzles, and games), or create in the craft area. The students are allowed to choose what
activities they want to do, and they can move from area to area. The classroom has its
own kitchenette where the staff prepares their snacks and lunch/dinner; children are
prohibited in the kitchen. They also have their own lavatory in the classroom, so that it is
easy for s ta ff to address any o f the children’ s needs easily.
There are 28 total students enrolled in the Cricket classroom, but there are never more
than 17 students in the room at one time. Some students only come for a-half-a-day
w hile others come for only 2 or 3 days per week. The Cricket classroom follow s the
campus-wide rule o f one aide fo r every three children in the classroom. This is strongly
monitored and enforced. The center has someone who goes class-to-class for attendance
so the aides can get to the classrooms i f they are needed. They try to keep the aides
consistent in the classrooms, but they do have a couple that float among classrooms as

155

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

needed. The classroom aides are undergraduate and graduate education or psychology
majors.
Whole Class Instruction
A central component o f the teacher instructional technique is an activity that begins
the school day. This activity w ill be referred to as whole class instruction and had a
different theme each week (See Table 5). There were four weeks o f whole class
instruction observation. The themes were as follows: Week One was monsters, Week
Two was winter, Week Three was building and construction, and Week Four was airports
and airplanes. The whole elass instruction involved question and answer interactions
between the teacher and the children and was the basis fo r the follow -up epistemological
probing. The theme carries a week-long (five days) progression o f group and individual
activities which center on that single theme. Whole class instruction included a discovery
learning technique that encourages children to reflect on their knowledge and actively
participate.
Students are in itia lly drawn into their room from the playground in the morning w ith
a “ Good M orning” song. When the students hear this song, they know it is time fo r the
school day to begin and time to prepare fo r the whole class instruction. They prom ptly
sit in a semi-circle on the flo o r around the teacher. During this time, the teacher
introduces the theme (e.g. monsters) o f instruetion fo r the week and begins to ask the
students questions, constantly probing their knowledge and their experiences regarding
the theme. Frequently, when the teacher asks a question, there may be several students
who answer. This prompts more in-depth questioning o f all o f the students. The students
build upon each others’ knowledge and contribute their experiences, which in turn
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prompts other students to think o f more information to contribute. A t times this process
can become quite escalated because the students are enthusiastic about answering the
teacher’ s questions about what they know and how they know what they know.
This whole class instruction ranges from 20 to 30 minutes and includes the teacher
reading a book to the children. During the read aloud, the teacher w ill frequently pause
and ask more questions about what the students think w ill happen next or why they think
something is happening or even why someone is doing something.
When the instruction is over, the children participate in a round-robin format o f
centers that include dramatic play, art, snack, manipulatives, and computer. The theme o f
the week is the central focus o f the activities w ithin the classroom and therefore it
became the central theme o f all individual interviews and focus groups.
Participants
Clhldren-Participants
Participants are six preschool children; their ages range from three years ten months
to four years four months. The gender was balanced evenly between girls and boys. The
students were enrolled in the Cricket classroom at a diverse public elementary school.
Demographic information was collected on the child-participants regarding their cultural
background, socioeconomic status, and parents’ educational history (See Table 5).
Teacher
The teacher in the Cricket classroom is male. His nationality is Hawaiian/ Asian;
however, he was bom in the United States. He is openly homosexual and is highly active
in gay rights and culturally diverse programs in education. He is 22-years-old, s a firstyear teacher, and at the time o f the study was currently enrolled in the teacher education
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program at a local university but had not completed his Bachelor o f Arts degree in
Elementary Education. He has attempted to adapt his teaching style to conform to the
characteristics o f the teacher who led the classroom during the p ilo t study. More
complete information regarding the teacher w ill be discussed at the end o f this chapter.

T A B L E S : Child-Participants’ Demographics

Economic
Status
$62K

F

Cultural
Background
African-Am erican
Caucasian
Caucasian

3 yrs., 11 mos.

F

Caucasian

$45K

C-P # Four

4 yrs., 1 mos.

M

Caucasian

$52K

C-P # Five

3 yrs., 11 mos.

M

Caucasian

$80K

C-P # Six

4 yrs., 1 mos.

F

Caucasian

$70K

Participant
C-P # One

Age
Years & Months
3 yrs., 10 mos.

Gender
M

C-P # Two

4 yrs., 4 mos.

C-P # Three

$75K

Parent
Education
M=H.S.
F=H.S.
M =B.A.
F=H.S
M=H.S
F-H.S.
M -H .S .
F=M.A.
M =M .A .
F=B.A.
M =M .A .
F=B.A.

Data Sources
Child-Participants ’ Prescreening
There were 28 students enrolled in the Cricket classroom at the time o f the current
study. Parent permission forms were required for all 28 students to proceed w ith the
study. The parent permission allowed the researcher to: (a) observe and assess each
child in the classroom, and (b) continue to observe the classroom fo r the duration o f the
study after the six child-participants were identified. There were three phases o f
prescreening for this study: (a) one week o f classroom observation, which included the
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whole class instruction and the informal center activities, (b) a battery o f cognitive
achievement assessments, and (c) a standard theory o f mind task (W im iner & Perner,
1983). The fo llow ing three sections describe the procedure and materials used fo r each
phase o f prescreening.
Prescreening Phase One. Phase 1 o f the prescreening lasted fo r a week and included
the researcher passively observing the daily routines w ithin the Cricket classroom. This
observation included the formal whole class instruction and the infonnal center activities.
The whole class instruction began each day, and every child enrolled in the classroom
attended this gathering in the center o f the room where the teacher would read a book
which was selected based on the theme o f the week. D uring the whole class instruction
the teacher would frequently interact w ith the children by listening to their comments and
addressing their questions; also he would engage the children in a b rie f inquiry session
pertaining to the details o f the story. The whole class instruction usually lasted 15 to 20
minutes. The purpose o f observing the whole class instruction was to: (a) observe the
teacher’ s instructional technique and become fam iliar w ith the types o f questions he
would typically ask the children; (b) observe the interactions o f each child w ith the
teacher in a structured learning situation; (c) observe and assess social, affective, and
cognitive abilities o f the children in a structured learning environment to better
understand their level o f functioning; and (d) begin to build a rapport w ith the students
and the teacher through consistent presence in the classroom.
Materials. The materials used for the whole class instruction included a notebook
and pen to take notes about student engagement. Examples o f student engagement
include which children were able to fo llo w classroom rules such as raising a hand to be
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called on in order to participate, their a b ility to maintain attention and sit still during the
instruction, and how relevant a ch ild ’ s comments or questions were to the content being
presented. Another reason for note-taking was to begin to learn the names o f the students
and make notes regarding the disposition and particular characteristics o f each child.
The researcher designed a checklist o f age appropriate personality traits/dispositions,
cognitive abilities, and social characteristics commonly present in well-adjusted
preschool-age children. This checklist was used during each whole class instruction
observation during the prescreening week. The purpose o f the checklist was to
systematically observe and assess social, affective, and cognitive abilities o f the children
in a structured learning environment to better understand their level o f functioning.
Everyday a new checklist was used. The checklist was dated, and each child had his own
checklist. Therefore at the end o f the first week o f prescreening each child in the Cricket
classroom had a checklist for each day he had attended the preschool. Some children had
only two checklists w hile others had five; it depended on the number o f days they were
enrolled and present in the classroom.
The informal center activities frequently aligned w ith the theme o f the week and
consisted o f dramatic play, art, table games, and computer. Immediately fo llo w ing the
whole class instruction, the children were given the option to choose w hich center they
wanted to attend. The center activity time was typically one-and-a-half hours. Other
routines in the classroom were exercise, snack, nap time, and playtime (inside or outside,
depending on the weather). The purpose for observing the informal center activities was
to: (a) formulate a presence in the classroom and to begin to build relationships w ith all
o f the children during unstructured interactions prompted by the children; (b) observe and
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assess the children’s social interactions with their peers; and (c) become acquainted with
how the structured whole class instruction transferred into unstructured learning
activities. The goal was to observe the students engaging in their daily routines and
provide another modality o f assessment as a means to strategically evaluate all 28
students and gather information for the selection o f the six child-participants.
Materials. The materials utilized by the researcher during the informal center
activities included any o f the props, objects, and games currently present in the classroom
which the children used at their designated center. A ll o f the items that were used by the
researcher to interact with the children were items they were familiar with and invited
interaction with the researcher. During observation o f the center activities i f no child
engaged the researcher, a notebook and pen were used by the researcher to take notes
regarding the activities in the classroom. Again, more notes pertaining to individual
students were taken including: which students interacted frequently, which students did
not interact with their peers, and which students chose to be at which centers.
The researcher designed a checklist of age-appropriate peer social behavioral
characteristics for preschool age children. It was utilized in the same manner as the
checklist for the whole class instruction, in that a new checklist was used daily and each
child had his own checklist. Often it was difficult to complete this checklist for each
student during the observation because o f note-taking or interaction with the children.
Therefore, each day when the center activities concluded and the students were involved
in one o f the other activities, the researcher would take the time to complete the checklist
while the experience was still clear and easily recollected.
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Prescreening Phase Two. The next phase o f prescreening the Cricket students
consisted o f standardized measures used w ith presehool-age children; this took one week
and occurred the week fo llow ing phase one o f the prescreening process. Each childparticipant was individually administered all three screening measures consecutively in a
single session, and all o f the children received the assessments in the same order. The
order o f administration was as follows: (a) The Peabody Picture Vocabiilaiy Test (PPVTIII), (b) Phonological Awareness Literacy Screening Pre-K (PALS), and (c) Get It Got It
Go (GGG). Collectively, all three assessments took approximately 20 minutes per ehildparticipant, and six to eight children were assessed daily.
The screening process consists o f visual and verbal assessments fo r cognitive
functioning o f preschool children. A battery o f cognitive ability tests were administered
to each child individually. Phonological Awareness Literacy Screening P re-K (PALS)
measures knowledge o f factors essential in emergent literacy (See Appendix A on CDROM (Curry, U niversity o f V irginia, 1991). The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test
(P P V T-III) is an assessment o f receptive (hearing) vocabulary and is a test o f listening
comprehension fo r the English language (See Appendix B on C D -R O M (EC R I/M G D ,
1983).

Get It Got It Go measures the developmental growth o f young children through

skills sueh as picture naming, alliteration, and rhyming (See Appendix C on CD-ROM
(EC RI/M G D , 1994). It is typieal for académie achievement, ability, and intelligence tests
to be used as tools fo r research participants o f all ages (Flavell, 1983.) In schools these
types o f assessments are used fo r placing students w ithin a school, determining learning
disabilities and developmental delays, identifying giftedness, and tracking development
(Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 2005).
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The purpose o f the cognitive screening was to ascertain the child-participants’
cognitive a b ility level w ith standardized measures o f mental functioning. Achievement
and ability tests are designed to measure the a b ility level o f the child-partieipants’
intellectual level and cognitive a b ility (Sternberg, 2004). It is recommended that they
never be used as the sole basis o f any investigation (Greig & Taylor, 1999). These
cognitive a b ility assessments are w idely aceepted as more objective measurement tools
and provide another element o f investigation. It is heavily suggested that these types o f
assessments be complemented w ith an in-depth personal history, aeademie performance,
and observation (Greig & Taylor, 1999). In addition, three variables need to be
considered w ith standardized measures: (a) cultural background, (b) language ability, and
(c) motivation to complete the tasks (Poole & Lamb, 2002; Wood, 1988). These factors
were taken into consideration when all o f the data was collectively evaluated.
As a courtesy, the parents were invited to observe the cognitive screening o f their
child, but it was not a requirement o f the study. This strategy was to alleviate child and
parent anxiety regarding the assessments as children at this level are not accustomed to
standardized testing, and it was believed that optimum results could be achieved i f the
children felt comfortable and relaxed. Out o f the 28 children in the classroom, 11
children had parents present for the assessments. Two o f the children who had parents
present for the cognitive screening were ultim ately chosen as ehild-partieipants for this
study.
Materials. The PALS test includes a photocopy o f a box containing all 26 letters
(capital letters) o f the English alphabet. This test requires that the researcher point to
each letter saying, “ Can you tell me what this letter is?” I f the child gets the letter
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correct, the researcher circles the letter; however, i f the ehild provides the incorrect
response for the letter, a line is drawn through the letter. A fte r all o f the assessments
were administered, the test was scored using the standardized scoring criteria.
The PPVT-III has a picture plate chart that consists o f several different age-level
sections, beginning at two years six months up to age 11. The picture plates show four
different pictures, and the child points to one o f the pictures when asked. For example,
the researcher asks, “ Can you point to the picture o f the broom?” , and the child points at
the picture o f the broom. The test has a scoring form where the child’ s answers are
recorded and later scored. The scoring form includes the follow ing: (a) the age-level set,
(b) the picture item that the child is asked to point to, and (c) a space fo r marking the item
i f it is inconect. The test continues until the child has missed eight items at a single agelevel. A total o f all correct responses is tallied. There is a norm-reference manual which
is used to convert the scores.
The GGG assessment has three sections that are administered in the follow ing order:
(a) rhyming, (b) picture naming, and (c) alliteration. Each section has a separate set o f
pictures, and each card in the set has three different pictures. The assessment is timed,
and the child is informed about the time restriction and is encouraged to respond as
quickly as possible. In addition, each section has sample cards that are reviewed w ith the
child until he understands the procedure. (For an example from each section, see
Appendix C on CD-ROM ).
Prescreening Phase Three. The third and final task fo r the prescreening process was
a false-belief task or theory o f m ind task. A theory o f mind task was used as another
screening tool prim arily because recent research in children’ s epistemological
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development has been linked to children’ s theory o f mind development. In addition to
this reeent link, theory o f mind has been strongly emphasized in the research literature
(Wellman, 1990). Including theory o f m ind tasks as a prescreening tool may provide
valuable information in terms o f prospective methodologies for future research. The
prescreening theory o f mind task was administered to all students in the Cricket
classroom during phase two o f the prescreening process; however, it was given separately
from the cognitive assessments and took approximately ten minutes per ehild. The
puq-)ose o f the false-belief task was to identify six students that were able to successfully
complete the false-belief task.
Each child was told a story to see i f he was able to understand another person’ s wrong
belief, which requires explicit representation o f the wrongness o f the person’ s b e lie f in
relationship to one’ s own knowledge (W im m er & Perner, 1983). The child listened and
watched as a protagonist put an object in location .v and then left. W hile the protagonist
was gone, the object that was placed in location .v was subsequently moved to a second
location y, unbeknownst to the protagonist. The child was asked a series o f questions that
have different purposes: (a) a b e lie f question, (b) an utterance question, (c) a reality
question, and (d) a memory question. The follow ing questions form the set o f questions
that screened for theory o f mind ability:
1. Where w ill the individual look fo r the item?
2.

Where w ill the individual say the item is?

3. Where is the item really?
4.

Do you remember where the individual put the item in the beginning?
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In order to pass the false-belief task, the child had to correctly predict that the
individual would look for the item in location x and that the individual w ill be able to
demonstrate deception by saying that the item is in location x while at the same time
realizing the item is really in location y.
Materials. The materials for the false belief task included two puppets and a candy
bar. The story involved one puppet, which was the main character o f the story, and the
other puppet that acted as the protagonist. The candy bar was the item that was displaced
from the main character. The questions were predetermined and based on the child’s
responses. The child’ s responses were reported in the researcher’s notebook. Scoring for
the false-belief task was recorded as pass or fail.
Child-Participants ’ Persona! Epistemology
Assessing the child’s personal epistemology in the present study entailed the
following: (a) whole class instruction observations, (b) child interviews, and (c) peer
focus groups. These three components signify the heart o f the current study and occurred
for the four weeks o f the study following pre-screening with the six child-participants
whom were selected from the Cricket classroom.
Whole class instruction. This section deals with the emphasis on the whole class
instruction. There were four weeks o f this technique that were observed and w ill be
referred to as: Week One, Week Two, Week Three, and Week Four. The parents o f the
six children selected for the study were contacted, the details o f the study were explained,
and they were asked to sign informed consent releases which signified their approval for
their child to participate in the rest o f the study.
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Table 6: Protocol Overview

Week One
A ll
students
Week Two
A ll
students

Week
Three
Six ChildParticipants

Week Four
Six ChildParticipants

Week Five
Six ChildPartieipants

Week Six
Six ChildParticipants

Week
Seven
Six ChildParticipants

♦Î* Presereening Phase 1
• Observation o f Whole Class Instruction (structured)
• Observation o f Center Activities (unstructured)
*î‘ Prescreening Phase 2
* Cognitive A b ility Assessments
• Theory o f M ind Task
> Identify six child-participants
! Sign Informed Consent
<* Conduct Introductory Peer Focus Group
(2 groups o f 3 children)
❖ Theme-of-the-Week: Monsters
*t* Pre-Instruction Peer Focus Group
♦Î* Whole Class Instruction Obseiwation x 5 days
*> Center A ctivities Observation x 5 days
❖ Individual Interviews 2-to-5 per ehild
< Post-Instructional Peer Focus Group
*1* Constant Comparative Data Analysis (daily)
Theme-of-the-Week: W inter
Pre-Instruction Peer Focus Group
<* Whole Class Instruction Observation x 5 days
Center A ctivities Observation x 5 days
I Individual Interviews 2-to-5 per child
Post-Instructional Peer Focus Group
*> Constant Comparative Data Analysis (daily)
<* Theme-of-the-Week: Buildings & Construction
<* Whole Class Instruction Observation x 5 days
*1* Center A ctivities Observation x 5 days
*1* Individual Interviews 2-to-5 per child
*1* Post-Instructional Peer Focus Group
*> Constant Cc'Tiparative Data Analysis (daily)
<♦ Theme-of-the-Week: Airports & Airplanes
<♦ Whole Class Instruction Observation x 5 days
*t* Center A ctivities Observation x 5 days
*> Individual Interviews 2-to-5 per child
<♦ Post-Instructional Peer Focus Group
❖ Constant Comparative Data Analysis (daily)
Wrap-up Peer Focus Group
< Begin data analysis (Triangulation)
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Forma! observations refer to the whole class instruction led by the teacher. As was
discussed, the whole class instruction is what drives the theme o f the week and is the
foundation from which all future child-participant questions were derived. In other
words, the informal center activities, individual interviews, and peer foeus groups
incorporate the theme from the whole class instruction and utilize specific details that
originate during whole class instruction using specific quotes or behaviors from the childparticipants that are observed during the whole class instruction. A ll questions posed to
the children during the study probed and prompted personal epistemological reasoning
and beliefs. The focus was to m onitor the cognitive ability in connection w ith developing
epistemological theories.
Week one-Whole class inslniction observation. The whole class instruction began
each week on Monday morning from 8:30am to 9:00am and is held every day at the same
time. This instructional observation took place on the third week o f the study. This first
week focused on the six child-participants; the theme-of-the-week was “ Monsters.” The
whole class instruction acted as the catalyst for the child-participant interviews and the
focus group as a way o f tapping into the ehild-partieipants’ understanding o f the current
theme.
The researcher and the teacher met each morning before the school day for 15-30
minutes to discuss the plan for the day. This daily meeting time was spent having b rie f
conversation about each o f the child-participants’ performance in the whole class
instruction. It is estimated that the amount o f time spent on eaeh ehild-participant was
approximately four minutes. This time served as a member cheek; it was a chance to
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compare the investigator’ s impressions, observations, and perceptions w ith those o f the
teacher.
Week two-Whole class instfiiction observation. Week two o f whole elass instruction
was identical to Week One in terms o f purpose and goals. It took place under all o f the
same conditions as Week One. The single difference is that the theme o f the week was
different from the first week; the theme o f the week fo r Week Two was “ W inter.” The
investigator and teacher resumed the m orning meetings for scheduling, review o f the
daily lesson plan, and member checking. The second week o f collaborative inquiry
observations took place during the fourth week o f the study.
Week three-Whole class instruction observation. Week Three o f whole elass
instruction was identical to Weeks One and Two in terms o f the procedure and took place
under all o f the same conditions as Week One and Two. There were two main
differences: (a) The theme o f the week was “ Buildings and Construction;” and (b) due to
the constant comparative data analysis, the focus became more narrow in the sense that
themes and patterns had started to emerge; therefore, the target (i.e. epistemological)
information was generally different for eaeh o f the six ehild-partieipants. The differences
among the children prompted the concentration away from the peer focus groups and
required follow -up sessions w ith the ehild-partieipants to be more centered on the
individual interviews. However, at the end o f the week, there was a post-instructional
peer focus group as an attempt to maintain the fid e lity o f the design fo r the study. The
investigator and teacher continued the m orning meetings for scheduling, review o f the
daily lesson plan, and member checking. The third week o f collaborative inquiry
observations took place during the fifth week o f the study.
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Weekfour-W ho le class instruct ion observation. Week Four o f whole class instruction
was identical to Weeks One, Two, and Three in terms o f the procedure and took place
under all o f the same conditions as Week One, Two, and Three; however. Week Four was
more in-line w ith the puqoose and goals o f Week Three. Using the constant comparative
method o f data analysis provided prelim inary results that urged the researcher to alter the
focus o f follow -up investigations. The design o f the study was more individualized in
order to target specific epistemological information. The theme o f the week was
“ Airports and Airplanes.”
Child-Participant Interviews
Procedure. D uring each o f the four separate weeks o f whole class instruction, the
child-participants were involved in individual interviews (See Table 6). The interviews
were semi-structured and did not exceed 15 minutes per child at one time. Each childparticipant was interviewed a m inim um o f two times in each week but could be
interviewed up to five times per week. The number o f times a child-participant was
interviewed in one week had no bearing on how many times they were interviewed
during other weeks. For example, an individual could be involved in four individual
interviews in Week One but only be interviewed two times during Week Two, then three
times during Week Three and Week Four. The number o f times a child-participant was
targeted fo r an individual interview was dependent on the context and their participation
in the whole class instruction. The more engaged a child was or the more frequently he
participated provided more infonuation to follow -up on in an individual interview;
therefore, it was more likely that he was interviewed more frequently. Interestingly, the
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six child-participants involved in the study typically were more involved in the whole
class instruction than the other students.
The interviews consisted o f questions or activities that came directly from the
follow ing: (a) the whole class instruction, (b) a previous peer focus group, and/or (c)
investigator observations.
The purpose was to get more individualized information and also to gain a deeper
understanding o f the child-participants’ epistemological understanding and beliefs.
Materials. The individual interviews were conducted in a small conference room
which was attached to the classroom. The individual interviews were videotaped, which
involved a small hard disk video-eamera and a tripod. It was common to bring the
storybook which was read in the whole class instruction earlier that day in order to
prompt the sim ilar cognitive processes that occurred during the whole elass instruction.
Occasionally the researcher would bring other props such as pictures o f monsters for the
child-participant to color w hile talking about the theme o f the week, play-dough to
construct a building, or puppets fo r pretend-play scenarios in which the child-partieipant
could respond to “ what i f ’ questions w ith more ease. In addition, there were individual
interview sessions that required a laptop computer in order to show the child-participant a
video-clip o f themselves during a whole class instruction or an infom ial center activity
that the researcher wanted to inquire more about from the child-participant.
C hild-P articipant Peer Focus Groups
The focus group activities were facilitated by the investigator and corresponded w ith
the four weeks o f whole class instruction observation (See table 6). There were eight
total peer focus group sessions; however, the six ehild-partieipants were separated into
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two groups o f three. It was a goal o f this study to identify subjeetive and objective
perceptions o f the children using their own words during the whole class instruction and
the focus group activities. In addition, the study was conducted in an authentic
environment that was fam iliar to the children. There were eight peer focus groups. This
section details the systematic organization o f the focus groups: (a) an introduction; (b)
during week one/theme one there was a pre/and post-instruction focus group; (c) week
two/theme two there was another pre/and post-instructional focus; (d) a wrap-up, (e)
week three/theme three had a post-instruction focus group, and (f)) week four/theme four
had a post-instruction focus group.
Intvoductoiy peer focus group.

This group was to fam iliarize the children w ith the

study and explain the format for the peer focus groups.
Pre-instruction peer focus group. There were two pre-instruction focus groups. They
took place at the beginning o f Week One (Monster Theme) and Week Tw o (W inter
Theme). These pre-instruetional focus groups centered on the theme o f the week and
occurred prior to the whole class instruction. The purpose was to gain understanding
about the child-participants’ background knowledge o f the theme.
Post-instruction peer focus group. There were four post-instruction focus groups.
They took place after all four weeks o f class instruction observation (one at the end o f
each week). Each week the post-instajction focus group centered on the theme o f the
week. The post-instruction focus groups attributed more meaning o f the range o f
knowledge gained during the week o f instruction both on an individual and group level.
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Wrap-up peer focus group. This group was to bring closure to the study. The
researcher answered child-participants’ questions and asked them to share their
experience about reviewing the themes o f the week and o f being asked questions.
Each focus group took approximately 20 minutes and took place in the small activity
room attached to the classroom in order to alleviate confusion in the classroom and
provide an atmosphere that was less stimulating for the child-participants.
The two groups maintained the same child-participants fo r peer focus group sessions
1 to 6. For focus group sessions 1 to 6, Group 1 had two females and one male, and
Group 2 had two males and one female. As mentioned earlier, some o f the whole class
instruction follow -up procedure had changed due to the constant comparative method o f
data analysis that had been consistently used throughout the study. W hile reviewing the
prelim inary results o f the constant comparative data analysis, it was elear that each childparticipant had started to demonstrate specific patterns that may or may not have
corresponded w ith other child-participants. Peer focus groups had been benefieial up to
this point, but it was deeided to target more individual information as a means o f
capturing more in-depth epistemological perspectives. Faced w ith the opportunity to
make some changes to the format o f the peer focus groups, it was decided to make a
participant change between the two groups. It was the small matter o f taking one o f the
females from Group 1 and swapping her w ith the female in Group 2. This change kept
the gender balanced between the two groups; however, it clearly made Group 1 a much
stronger functioning epistemological group as compared to Group 2.
Focus group activities were an extension o f the whole-class instruction because the
format and the content were sim ilar to what has been previously introduced by the
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teacher. The primary difference o f the foeus groups is that the groups are considerably
smaller, whieh provides the children w ith the opportunity to be more interactive and
diseuss their knowledge in more depth. The smaller group size provides them w ith a
more structured setting to listen and respond to their peers. Finally, the focus groups
provide the researcher with the opportunity to design in-depth epistemological questions
based on the whole class instruction and identify contributing factors to the ch ild ’s
developing personal epistemology.
Questions were directly related to the content o f the particular lesson as a way to
better understand the child-participants’ beliefs about the nature o f knowledge and
process o f knowing. Specifically, the questions were related to four dimensions o f
epistemology: sim plicity and certainty o f knowledge in reference to the nature o f
knowledge and source and justification o f knowledge relating to the process o f knowing
(Hofer, 2001.) For example, after an instructional lesson, the teacher may pose the
question, “ Do you think Max was afraid o f the w ild things?” A student may respond,
“ N o silly, the w ild things are M a x’ s friends.” Because o f the multitude o f students
participating at once, this particular student doesn’t get to elaborate in the context o f the
whole elass instruction. The questions that w ill be asked individually w ill be follow -up
questions such as, “ What makes you think the w ild things are M ax’ s friends?” or “ What
do the w ild things do that makes you think they are friendly?”
The purpose o f the focus groups was to gain an understanding o f the childparticipants’ prelim inary knowledge and experiences as they relate to the theme o f the
week. The focus group provided the child-participants with a platform for the
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investigator to capture the essence o f their knowledge and how it is impacted by the
affect and environment.
The pre-instruction and post-instruction focus groups were compared to each other
and then later analyzed collectively for similarities and differences. There are several
purposes for comparing the pre-instruction focus group with the post-instruction focus
group. First, children arc uninhibited with their peers, and they speak the same naïve
language (in adult cognitive terms.) Second, young children arc eager to convey their
knowledge and experiences. Third, the group interactions allow for finding transitions or
changes in each child’s affect, language, and environment. This process captured and
identified interactions between child-participants, as well as, transitions in language and
affect that occur as peers at this age interact closely but in much smaller exchanges. This
made it possible to maximize the observations and focus on possible dimensions o f
episfemie thinking, affect, and peer interactions.
Teacher
The role o f the teacher was another component o f identifying children’s beliefs and
influenced the nature and level o f questions which occurred during the individual
interviews and the peer focus groups. This section w ill talk about the methods used to
obtain information from the teacher and understand his beliefs about the nature o f
knowledge and the process o f knowing. The protocol for the teacher was as follows; (a)
the Epistemological Belief Inventory (EBI), (b) three teacher interviews, and (c) a
teaching style questionnaire.
Teacher EBI. The teacher completed a revised version o f the EBI (Schraw,
Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002), during the first week o f pre-study screening for child-
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participant selection. It took 10-15 minutes to complete. The results o f the EBI were
compiled and served as the foundation for teacher interview #1; this meeting took place
during the first week o f prescreening.
Teacher interview 1. The interview took place in the conference room in the
administration building o f the preschool during scheduled teacher prep time by choice o f
the teacher; it lasted approximately 90 minutes and was audio-tapped. The purpose o f
interview #1 was to acquire as much information about the teacher’ s epistemological
beliefs. Further, it was important to identify any impact that his beliefs had on his
approaches toward curriculum and instruction. Lastly, the interview aimed to collect
infonnation about the teacher’ s perspective regarding the child-participants’
understanding o f knowledge. Investigating teacher beliefs can provide insight on
instructional strategies that may impact child cpistemologies. Asking the teacher about
each child served as a way o f member checking the researcher’s observations.
Teaching sty’le survey. Prior to teacher interview 2, the teacher completed a teaching
style survey designed by the researcher. The suiwey included topics such as: (a) teacherstudent relationship, (b) instructional goals, and (c) teacher expectations. It is a 40-item
self-report instalment and is measured on a five-point Likert Scale. The purpose for
administering the survey was to help the teacher become more cognizant about his
teaching style. Raising his metacognitive awareness about his area o f expertise allowed
fo r a richer interview and provided opportunities to draw connections between his beliefs
about knowledge and his classroom strategies. The questionnaire was reviewed prior to
the second interview and a set o f semi-structured questions were developed.
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Teacher interview 2. This interview took place in the classroom prior to the start o f
the school day and was lim ited to one hour, at which time the children were supervised
by the teacher aides on the playground. The teaching style survey was the focus o f the
inter\dew as a way to identify his beliefs about curriculum and instruction and how it is
impacted by his epistemological beliefs. The purpose o f teacher interview #2 was to
focus more intricately on beliefs about teaching, specifically the whole class instruction.
Questions were construeted prio r to the interview based on the teaching style survey, but
the interview was not lim ited to those questions.
Teacher interview 3. This interview took place during the final week o f the study. It
was in the conference room during teacher prep time and lasted 90 minutes. The purpose
o f teacher inteiwiew #3 was to bring closure to the study; it also served as a debriefing
session to ask questions that had surfaced during the study that required clarification or
elaboration. Another function o f the interview was to conduct final member checking for
re lia b ility and validity.
Videotaping
The entire classroom experience was overtly video-taped; intentionally selected
pieces o f the recording were used as a catalyst fo r individual interviews w ith the childparticipants and during the child-participant focus groups.
Equipment
A hard-drive digital video camera was used to record all participant interviews, the
focus groups, the whole class instruction, and selected classroom centers in whieh the
child-participant was engaged in an activity. A ll video footage was downloaded to D V D
daily. Complete transcription was done fo r the individual interviews and the focus
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groups, and partial transcription was completed for the classroom center activities and the
whole class instruction.
In order to use the video camera in the classroom, all parents who have students in the
classroom needed to sign a general consent form and a separate videotaping consent form
according the O ffice for the Protection o f Research Subjects.
A laptop computer was used during some o f the individual intendews and the focus
groups in order for the participants to m onitor video-clips.
Constant Comparative Method
This section discusses the use o f the constant comparative method o f data analysis
that took place in conjunction w ith data collection. The constant comparative method
(Bogdan & Biklen, 2003) is used w ith research designs that incorporate m ultiple data
sources (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003) and is consistent w ith analyzing case study data
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This is a complex method o f data analysis and requires
persistent, consistent, and simultaneous ongoing data collection and data analysis, so that
the researcher can identify prelim inary characteristics o f the individual child or group.
Using the constant comparative method assists w ith the process o f classifying
words/behaviors into prelim inary categories and sub-categories as well as assists w ith
documenting particular strengths and weaknesses o f individuals and groups (See Figure
2). Over time as new and existing information emerges, reoccurring data analysis allows
for more in-depth investigations.
In this study, the constant comparative method allowed for many accommodations
which reflected the purpose o f the study: (a) It assisted the researcher in identifying
prelim inary individual and group traits throughout the data collection phase; (b) it
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provided opportunities to construct specific in-depth questions for each o f the childparticipants; (c) it made prelim inary patterns in the data visible so that gaps could be
easily identified, targeted, and probed during future data collection; and (d) because o f
the recursive nature in the design o f the study, comparing the data continually maximized
the researcher’s a b ility to build strength and richness to the questioning (i.e., use the
child’ s own words to get him or her to elaborate about a specific topic), compare
individual and group data (i.e., probe a topic more deeply when patterns or themes were
identified for and individual or group interaction), and lin k theory to individual and group
cpistemologies as patterns and themes began to emerge (i.e., preparing a line o f
questioning according to current developmental and epistemological theories).

Figure 2: Constant Comparative Data Analysis Method

W hole Class
&
Center
A ctivities

Peer Focus
Groups

Individual
Interviews
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Reviewing the data daily enhanced the researcher’s a b ility to investigate specific
child-participants in certain topic areas and in particular, at a level that was consistent
w ith their individual psychosocial developmental level and w ithin their cognitive range
o f ability. Using the constant comparative method accentuated the focus o f the study as
categories; (a) became more developed and visible, (b) new categories began to emerge,
(c) sub-categories were unpacked, and (d) some sim ply diminished. Over time,
categories and subcategories became more apparent from an individual and a group
perspective and across individuals and groups. This constant integration o f information
ultim ately informed the researcher about possible areas that would be beneficial to tap
into for each individual and group epistemology. The fo llo w ing explains how the
constant comparative method was applied to the current study. Each step is explained,
and an example is provided.
This study spans four weeks o f whole class instruction, and data was reviewed daily
as a function o f the constant comparative method (See Figure 3). Whole class instruction
and center activity data were collected daily, and peer focus groups occurred on Monday
and Friday each week. Individual interviews fo r each child-participant occurred at least
one time per week but could have occurred as many as five times per week. The number
o f individual interviews depended on three main issues: (a) the child-participant’s level o f
engagement in the whole class instruction, (b) the researcher’ s subjective nature o f
inquiry based on the research question (more so during initial data collection), and (c)
characteristic and traits identified in previously analyzed data (progressively dominant as
more data was collected).
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Each subsequent week followed the same format, for each o f the six participants, as a
means to inform the researcher how to proceed in terms of: (a) individual interviews, (b)
concentrating on a specific method o f data collection, and (c) fonnulating more in-depth
epistemological questions.

Figure 3: Steps o f Constant Comparative Method

Step 6:
Constant Comparative Weekly
Looking across groups
Step 5:
Comparing group characteristics to
Epistemic Levels & Dimensions o f Knowledge
Step 4
Comparing Individual Characteristics to
Epistemic Levels and Dimensions o f Knowledge
Step 3:
Constant Comparative weekly
Looking across individual characteristics
Step 2:
Constant Comparative Daily
Individual Characteristics for next day questioning
Step 1:
Collecting Data Daily
Whole class Instruction, Center Activities, Individual Interviews, Focus Groups

There are six steps that Bogdan & Biklen (1998) recommend for use in constant
comparative data analysis. Using this as a guideline, the preliminary data analysis steps
during data collection adhered to in the current study are described next in more general
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terms, follow ed by specific examples. There were four weeks o f data collection; each
week was exactly the same format w ith two exceptions: (a) The topic o f instruction was
different each week; therefore, the center activities were changed to reflect the nature o f
the instruction, and (b) the number o f individual interviews was different because it was
based on the ch ild ’ s level o f engagement or contributions.
Step 1
W hole class instruction was generally 30 minutes each day and was video-recorded.
During the whole class instruction the researcher was observing and taking notes on the
six child-participants who were present during the instruction. Immediately fo llo w ing the
instruction, a checklist was completed for each child-participant w hile the class was
preparing fo r the center activities. Center activities lasted one hour, and video was taken
o f each o f the six participants during his/her involvement in the center activity o f choice.
During this time the researcher was observing, taking field notes, and moving the camera
around the classroom. Later a checklist was completed fo r each participant. Individual
interviews were generally 10-20 minutes each and included the researcher and one child.
The interviews took place in a private area eonnected to the classroom, and they were
video-recorded. The peer foeus groups were also video-reeorded and took place in the
same location as the interviews; each group was approximately 20 minutes. The prefoeus groups occurred on the Monday or Tuesday morning prior to the instruction, and
the post-instruction groups were on Friday afternoons.
Step 2
Each day the video was reviewed, and field notes were amended to reflect
observations that were not fu lly addressed during the observation in real-time. Field
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notes and checklists from the whole elass instruction and center activities were
transcribed. Individual interview videos were reviewed on the same day as the inter\dew
occurred; however, the number o f interviews fluctuated from partieipant to participant
and varied from week to week. Peer focus groups were video-reeorded and immediately
reviewed by the researcher; notes were taken and transcribed by the researcher for
planning the next week’ s focus groups. This immediate preview o f the data helped
prepare for the next day o f data eollection in terms of: (a) identifying specific language
the children used most spontaneously and w ith ease, (b) identifying the types o f
associations that were made to the instructional topic, (c) identifying which context eaeh
child seemed to provide the most interest and productivity, and (d) identifying which
peers were drawn together and observing their social interactions.
The questions pertained to contributions or interactions during the whole class
instruction or center activities’ observations as a way o f probing the child-participant to
elaborate on his/her statements. This ineluded reminding the child o f his/her own words
using one o f two methods: (a) verbally reminding the child-participant what was said and
asking specific follow -up questions or (b) visually reminding them by showing a video
clip o f the specific instance that was being referred to and asking a series o f related
questions. For example, during whole elass instruetion, a ehild-participant says the
follow ing statements:
“ 1 had to go to the doctor and get a shot, and 1 still feel sick.”
“ We go to the doctor to make us better so we can feel better.”
He also knows that one o f his friends’ mother is sick, saying, “ Joe’ s mother was sick
so his dad had to bring him to school.”
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A peer says something about medieine and he says, “ M edicine is not good for
ehildren.” {Tone o f Voice Change} “ O nly when mommy and daddy tell us too.”
To demonstrate how the constant comparative analysis assisted the researcher in
identifying areas o f strength and pinpoint reoccurring characteristics that may exist, the
transcripts were reviewed and specific questions were later used in an individual
inter\dew format w ith this child-participant. In this case the researeher verbally reiterated
the statements the child had made separately; the fo llo w in g are some o f the researcher’ s
questions. “ You said that you had to go to the doctor and get a shot but that you still feel
sick. Can you tell me more about how you feel sick?” “ What was it like fo r you to go to
the doctor?” “ What was the best part, and why?” “ What was the worst part, and why?”
“ You said that we go to the doctor so we can feel better. How do you know that the
doctor makes us feel better?” “ You are very observant. You noticed that Joe’s dad
brought him to school. How did you know his mother was sick?” “ What happens when
your mother is sick?” “ What changes for you when your mother is sick?” “ You said that
medicine is not good for children. W hy do you think medicine is not good for children?”
“ Do you think that is always true?” “ Can you think o f times when it is good fo r ehildren
to take medicine?” “ You said that it was okay to take medicine when your mommy and
daddy tell you to take it. When do they tell you it is okay to take medicine?” “ You
seemed very sure when you said it was okay to take medicine when your mommy and
daddy said it was okay. Do you think they are always right?” For this particular question
the researcher showed the child a b rie f video-clip o f the whole class instruction when he
made the comment. The question was to tap into the cognitive as w ell as the affective
aspects o f the response. Then a series o f questions continued, “ W ho is usually more
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right, your mom or your dad?” “ What other things do your parents tell you it is okay to
do?” “ Do you always listen to what your parents say?” “ What happens when you
do/don’t listen to your parents?” “ Why do you think you do/don’t listen to your
parents?”
Also, because the children related Where the Wild Things Are to their knowledge
about rules and discipline, this opened the door for moral questioning that was
appropriate for their developmental level. For example, it became possible to ask what
they know about the difference in the rules at home versus their rules in school and
“ getting in trouble” at home versus at school. Evaluating their response to such questions
lead to hypothetical questions such as giving a scenario about a boy who does not listen
to his parents regarding a bedtime and is tired the next day at school, then asking “ what
do you think his parents should do?” or “ what do you think his teacher should do?” This
type of question requires complex thinking skills and evolved from preliminary analysis
o f previous data. It definitely was not an initial question but instead was constructed by
knowing infonnation about the ehild’s current epistemic ability.
Questions like this may not always be appropriate for all preschool-age children;
however, given the content o f the lesson and the subsequent questioning o f individuals
and groups in the current context it was constructed and proved to be an appropriate
question tailored for the purpose o f the research question. There is no agreed upon
fonnat o f questioning for preschool epistemology, so it was imperative to identify how
children associate new information to their prior knowledge to ask appropriate age level
question in a manner that they can relate to and answer in a way that demonstrates their
cpistemologies. The exploratory nature o f the study required constantly evaluating the
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data and assessing the trustworthiness o f the statements and going back to the source and
asking more questions that would allow the child to elaborate upon his/her knowledge.
The process o f reviewing the field note transcripts and watching the videos facilitated
the constant comparative method. In this step the individuals and groups were compared
prim arily to themselves more in isolation.

This allowed the researcher to collect data

each day and review the data to inform the next day’ s data collection and so on.
Step 3
A t the end o f each week, field notes and checklists were updated, and/or videos had
been transcribed. A closer more in-depth review o f the data occurred at this time in
which notes and prelim inary traits were compared across individuals to obtain a more
general perspective about the preschoolers’ epistemologies. Looking across the
individuals at this point allowed fo r pre-planning activities for the next week. The main
idea here was to look at the range among the child-participants to be able to coordinate
individual and group tasks that corresponded to the theme o f the week but also to work
w ithin the individual and group ability level. A t this point many things had to be
considered: (a) language ability, (b) cognitive ability, (c) social skills, (d) behavior, and
(e) interests. This process continued to be in-line w ith the constant comparative method
in terms o f previewing the growing data in order to target specific characteristics, plan
appropriate activities, and construct questioning pertaining to the theme and the activity
that would tap into the individuals’ and groups’ epistemologies. This provided a glimpse
into potential areas to probe the children’ s epistemologies in more depth and to identify
strong and weak areas; it also directly influenced the semi-structured interviews and the
focus groups.
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In itia lly , the prelim inary analysis set up a broad foundation and over time
distinctively separate hierarchical characteristics such as: (a) areas o f interest (i.e.,
cartoons, toys, movie characters), (b) levels o f attention or engagement, (c) amount o f
detail and associations (i.e. drawing comparisons to fam ily, personal experiences, peers),
(d) problem-solving and decision-making (i.e. strategies, understanding, need for
redirection), (e) patterns o f behavior (i.e., m im icking, facial expressions, non-verbal
gestures, animation, coping skills), (I) social behaviors (i.e., eye contact, cooperativeness,
sharing, influence of/on peers, curiosity), (g) use o f language (i.e., ability to answer
questions, ability to answer questions, spontaneity and relevance o f responses to topic).
Ultim ately, over the course o f the study certain characteristics became targets that
influenced what type o f activities worked best, whom to question, what to question,
which method to use, and how frequently to question. Responses to these questions
during an individual interview were later compared to other statements from the same
child, as w ell as other child-participant’ s responses, and i f there were even vague
categorical sim ilarities (i.e., fam ily, peers, associations, interests, imagination) then the
researcher developed a set o f questions to be discussed among the three child-participants
in the peer focus group activity at the end o f the week.
Step 4
The constant comparative method allows fo r the design o f the study to be somewhat
malleable. The researcher has the ability to adapt the study and questioning to address the
research question. Therefore, once specific characteristics have been identified and
questions that address these characteristics have been implemented, this step begins to
look at these identified characteristics in relationship to the epistemological
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developmental levels (i.e. absolutist, m ultiplist, evaluativist) and the dimensions o f
knowledge (i.e. simple, certain, source, justification). Characteristics that are apparent
during the data collection are prelim inarily assessed in two ways: (a) i f they are
epistemologically meaningful, and (b) how they could be labeled epistemologically. This
allowed the researcher to develop specific epistemological questions that are modeled
after adult epistemological surveys but that address the interests and abilities o f
preschool-aged children. This approach contributed to tapping into their epistemologies
in more depth by scaffolding previous actions/responses w ith their own words and
interests to more clearly identify epistemological strengths and weaknesses. For
example, a child-participant frequently talks about Transformers; therefore, questions are
tailored around what he already has disclosed that he knows or takes interest in. This
more direct line o f questioning provided a more visible link to his m ultiplistic
perspectives and captured simple, certain, and source o f knowledge dimensions. He was
able to make associations independently between the W ild Things (monsters) and
Transformers (toys). However, after direct questioning, he was able to elaborate upon his
knowledge and understanding to Power Rangers (cartoon characters), then further
compared the “ powers” o f each to determine that some o f the Transformers and some o f
the power rangers are “ bad guys” and fall more in-line w ith monsters than others. This
led to another line o f questioning regarding which ones they like/dislike and why. Using
his affective responses, he demonstrated his knowledge regarding fear and his knowledge
o f follow ing rules and being a “ good person.” Detailed questions which integrated their
individual characteristics w ith an epistemological focus demonstrated a deeper level o f
intellectual power.
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Step 5
This step is sim ilar to step 4. The difference is that rather than prepare
epistemological questions for an individual interview, this step addresses the
characteristics o f the group and allows the researcher to design even more direct and indepth epistemological questioning for the post-instruction focus group. Taking
prelim inary findings from classroom instruction, center activities, and individual
interviews and transferring them to the focus groups provided further reliability and
va lid ity to the interpretations. The recycling o f child-participant knowledge provided
insights into the follow ing areas: (a) the consistency o f each c h ild ’ s epistemological
thinking o f the instructional content or according to an identified theme or pattern, (b)
comparisons o f the individual child-participants epistemic ability, (c) assessment o f peer
group ability, (d) identification o f the hierarchy w ith in the group to see which individual
characteristics led to more sophisticated epistemologies, and (e) the social dynamics o f
epistemological thinking. By using constant comparative analysis, comparing
individual’ s responses was beneficial for tapping into areas o f knowledge that were
pertinent to the children and connected w ith their experiences. This allowed the
researcher to identify the strongest characteristics and epistemological levels and
dimensions o f knowledge from the week and incorporate them into the post-instructional
focus groups for each group. Using the constant comparative method it was possible to
look across the individual child-participants to scaffold their strengths so that
theoretically all members o f the group had an equal vantage point. This proved to be a
beneficial collaborative activity that yielded a greater amount o f knowledge from their
personal experiences and prior knowledge. For example, taking a consistent response
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that reoccurred w ith each individual throughout the week such as (for the fa m ily theme),
“ I love m y mommy and daddy” (or some form o f the same). Every child demonstrated a
non-verbal gesture (hugging themselves) in conjunction w ith the statement. This same
behavior was addressed in an individual interview context, but each response varied
slightly; therefore, it was introduced again in the focus group to see how they w ould
respond collaborativcly. This technique yielded several interesting observations
regarding the importance o f personal experiences, prior knowledge, and social
interactions.
Step 6
This step is very sim ilar to step 3. The difference is that comparisons were made
across groups rather that across individuals. Looking across the groups provided fo r
more reliable and valid interpretations because it allowed the researcher to double check
on identified characteristics, investigate new characteristics, and continue to search for
embedded developmental levels or dimensions o f knowledge. This filtering o f group
data occurred fo r the focus groups weekly.
N arrow ing the data in such a manner made it possible to characterize each childparticipanf s epistemic thinking in relationship to previously identified traits (i.e., fam ily,
peers, affective dispositions, creativity, good/bad decision-making, ability to fo llo w
direction, on/off-task) and behaviors (ability to change, role as leader, autonomous,
animated, eye contact) as a means o f constantly using the children’ s words and actions to
investigate their epistemologies more deeply and more clearly.
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C o n fid e n tia lity

Confidentiality o f all participants was a priority; Bogdan and Biklen (2003) urge
researchers to “ be discreet” (p. 181). A ll names and identifying information were
removed from the documents and properly coded to ensure the participants confidence
(Berg, 2001); some o f the information that is shared may be o f a personal and sensitive
manner (Bogdan and Biklen, 2003). Since confidentiality is o f utmost importance and is
indicative o f professionalism, all documents w ill be turned over to the Lynn Bennett
Early Childhood Education Center and stored in a safe and secure locked cabinet.
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CHAPTER FOUR

D A T A A N A L Y S IS & RESULTS
The research question addressed in this study was as follow s: what are the personal
epistemologies o f preschool children? The research in children’ s personal epistemology
is sparse, but, according to the literature, very young ehildren are either incapable o f
demonstrating epistemological beliefs or they are merely capable o f functioning at an
objective (i.e. absolutist) perspective. Based on the literature and expectations from the
pilot study, there were two hypotheses. First, preschool children can and do individually
demonstrate personal epistemologies; that is, that three- and four-year-old children
express their beliefs about knowledge and knowing. Second, preschool children’ s
personal epistemologies vary in regard to developmental levels and dimensions o f
knowledge; in other words, preschooler’ s epistemologies range in sophistication or
com plexity and d iffe r in scope o f knowledge.
This chapter has three sections: (a) content analysis and A T L A S -T I, (b) levels o f data
analysis and (c) results. First, based on the prelim inary constant comparative analysis that
accompanied the data collection procedure, it was neeessary to eontinue to organize and
reduee the data still further to identify individual and group epistemologies. Content
analysis describes how the codes were assigned to generate categories and subcategories.
Follow ing Level 1 (Coding), the use o f A T L A S -T I, a qualitative software tool, is
discussed. Second, using content analysis, 12 levels o f data analysis are outlined and
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described.

Third, the results section o f the chapter is divided into three parts: (a)

individual results, (b) group results, and (c) overall preschooler’ s personal
epistemologies. The individual results w ill be presented as six case study formats, and
individual’s epistemic profiles are provided to demonstrate how final individual personal
epistemological results emerged. The group findings arc discussed. One group’s profiles
are provided as a means o f understanding the process o f identifying patterns and themes.
The overall preschooler’s personal epistemological results are reported and are derived
from ;he individual and group results.
This study investigates six child-participants and triangulates four methods o f data
collection: (a) observation o f the whole class instruction, (b) center activities’
observation, (c) individual interviews, and (d) focus group data. There were four weeks
o f data collection, and each week had a different instruetional topie. There were four
primai-y tasks during the data analysis: (a) to identify individual epistemological profiles
fo r each o f the child-partieipants; (b) to identify relationships among the individual
epistemological profiles, (c) to identify epistemologies that were generated between focus
groups (here the focus was on peer interactions and collaboration), and (d) to draw final
conclusions regarding preschooler’ s epistemologies based on individual and group
epistemological themes.

Content Analysis Proeedure
This section describes the content analysis procedures utilized using levels o f analysis
that were rigorously executed in order to zero in on prelim inary categories and
subcategories that had been identified and probed during the data collection steps (i.e..
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dimensions o f knowledge, cognitive and social behaviors, verbal and nonverbal
characteristics). There were two distinctive types o f content analysis used including: (a)
Conceptual Analysis and (b) Relational Analysis.
Content analysis is a method used regularly in the social sciences for investigating the
content o f communications and relationships. The foundation o f content analysis is
attributed to Harold Lasswell who introduced the core questions o f content analysis:
“ Who said what, to whom, how, to what extent and w ith what effect?” (Flick, 2006, p.
56). One goal o f content analysis is to reduce large amounts o f data by compressing the
data into categories. These categories can be derived from a theoretical model or emerge
from the data. In this study, the categories are drawn from the personal epistemology
literature, from emerging categories using constant comparative analysis, and from
observation. Many o f the observational categories that surfaced are consistent w ith early
childhood theories but were not in itia lly sought out at the onset o f data collection. In this
study content analysis was used as a researeh tool to investigate the area o f personal
epistemology from an individual perspective as well as a group perspeetive. Therefore
the data were analyzed in two sections, individual and group, and the results o f each
section were combined in the final results to answer the research question: what are the
personal epistemologies o f preschool children? .
The individual and group analysis followed the same format; in itia lly the conceptual
approach was used follow ed by the relational approaeh. Conceptual Content Analysis
involves first establishing the presence and frequency o f concepts in the text. In this case
the text data were the transcriptions from the individual interviews and the focus groups.
Other text included researcher notes taken from the actual observations o f the whole class
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instruction and center activities as w ell as notes that were made by the researcher as the
videos were reviewed later. The researcher notes included observations o f cognitive,
affective, and social behaviors that coincided with the individual’ s statements. Since the
eategories could be im plicit and explicit, to avoid subjectivity, all codes and emerging
eategories were defined in advance for consistency and thought out in comparison to the
research. The process o f coding and categorizing is basically one o f selective reduction,
that is breaking down the content o f all the information into meaningful and pertinent
units o f information and certain characteristics for later interpretation, which is the
central idea o f content analysis (M erriam , 2002).
Relational Content Analysis builds on conceptual analysis by examining the
relationships among the concepts in the text. The idea o f relational analysis is to be able
to map networks or interrelated ideas, beliefs, attitudes, and other information available
to the researcher when making decisions or inferences about the text, coding, or
categorization. In this study the relational analysis is represented in mental models or
networks using A T L A S -T I. These networks demonstrate the strengths and weakness o f
the interrelatedness between the categories.
ATLAS-TI.
A ll o f the data was transcribed and uploaded and stored into A T L A S -T I, a powerful
qualitative software program that assists the researcher to uncover and systematically
analyze complex phenomena w ithin rich text or multi-media data (Lewins & Silver,
2007). The program provides tools that allow the researcher to locate, sort, code, and
annotate prelim inary data material; to weigh and evaluate their importance; and to
visualize complex relationships among them (Lewins & Silver, 2007). This study is
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comprised o f a large amount o f transcribed documents, field notes, and codes which
A T L A S -T I was able to keep track o f for prelim inary analysis and retrieve upon request.
In addition, A T L A S -T I provided analytie and visualization tools designed to lead the
researcher to a variety o f unique interpretive views o f the information. A T L A S -T I
(qualitative software) was used to organize the coded data.
In order to attribute specific characteristics and traits into categories and
subcategories, A T L A S -T I has a code manager to retrieve certain categories and run a
code forest seareh to find out which o f the highest ranked categories originated from
which context (i.e. classroom instruction, center activities, individual inteiwiews, or focus
groups). For example, there were 1439 units coded fo r the subcategory o f m ultiplist.
When asked, A T L A S -T I was able to sort these units and identify that: 531 units were
derived from the classroom instruction, 83 units derived from the eenter aetivities, 611
were a result o f the individual interviews, and 214 derived from the peer focus groups.
The A T L A S -T I software was also able to run another code forest search for the content
o f each context in this case. For example, o f the 531 m ultiplist units found resulting from
the classroom instruction, 209 were pertaining to monsters, 79 were identified when the
instructional topic was winter, 111 were present during the week when construction was
the topic, and 132 were present during the week o f instruction about airplanes.
Using A T L A S -T I’s Code, Family, and Network Managers and the Memo Board,
epistemological subcategories (absolutist, m ultiplist, evaluativist, simple, certain, source,
justification, and the integrated levels and dimensions) were combined w ith each
component o f the network profile. This “ epistemic wash coupled the children’ s own
words and behaviors to produced a direct connection between their epistemic
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development and the developmental components representative o f their performance and
a b ility in the network profile.
Levels o f D ata Analysis
There are 12 levels o f data analysis in the present study, and these w ill be outlined in
this section (See Figure 4). Although it is illustrated as a single proeess it depicts the
individual participants and the group analysis. U ltim ately the results from the individual
profiles were combined w ith the group profiles, so that the study technically has three
sets o f results: (a) an individual epistemic profile (See Figure 11), (b) a group epistemic
profile (See Figure 33), and (c) an overall preschooler epistemic profile (See Figure 35).
As w ith all hierarchical representations the levels o f analysis begin at the bottom and
w ork to the top, all along the way data is being condensed in such a way that themes and
patterns become more visible and consistent. W ith in each level o f analysis there are
m ultiple sub-levels, a miniature graphie w ill assist in identifying the actual
epistemological construct (i.e., developmental level, dimension o f knowledge, matrix
cell) that is being analyzed at each level o f analysis.
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Figure 4: Levels o f Data Analysis
Level 12
Preschoolers’ Personal Epistemologies
Level 11
Across Group Epistemic Profile Results
Level 10
Group Epistemic Profiles
Level 9
Focus Group Theme-Based Epistemic Profiles
Level 8
Focus Group Themes Prc/Post-lnstruction
Level 7
Across Individuals’ Epistemic Profiles
Level 6
Individual Epistemic Profiles
Level 5
Individual M atrix: Integrated Dimensions
Level 4
Individual Matrix: 12 Cells
Level 3
Individual Dimensions o f Knowledge
Level 2
Individual Developmental Levels
Level 1
Coding

Level I : Coding
This section conveys details regarding the coding o f the data using A T L A S -T I.
Coding is the process o f organizing data according to ideas, units, or sentenees in a way
that collapses the data so that meaning can be made based on relationships that are
identified w ithin the data (Creswell, 2003).

The data were coded inductively and
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deductively during the data colleetion and after data collection was completed leading up
to the findings o f the research question; what are the epistemologies o f preschool-age
children w ithin a classroom context? This section discusses the initial coding scheme
(inductive, based on observation and inferences) and the epistemological coding scheme
(deductive based on developmental levels and dimensions o f knowledge). This first
section is divided into three parts: inductive coding, deductive coding, and A T L A S -T I.
The coding for this study was developed using inductive and deductive reasoning.
Inductive reasoning is more open-ended and exploratory, especially at the beginning o f
research such as the current study. It pertains to methods that begin w ith specific
observations and w ork toward broader generalizations and theories. Deductive reasoning
assumes a more naiTOw perspective in that it is concerned w ith testing or confinning
hypothesis. It begins w ith existing theories and works toward more specific observations.
Most social or authentically approached research tends to utilize both inductive and
deductive reasoning processes at the same time (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003). Due to the
exploratory nature o f the eurrent study, a more inductive approach was predominant in
that initia lly nearly every idea was given a code but at the same time as data was being
evaluated according to the research question (i.e. what are the epistemologies o f
preschool children), it was imperative to keep in mind theories o f development and
current theories o f personal epistemology which called for more deduetive reasoning
skills. In itia lly all data was coded by idea units; a unit o f data is any meaningful or
potentially meaningful segment o f data (Merriam, 1998). The coding scheme was
developed by reviewing the transeripts and field notes to see what types o f information
had been eollected.
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Jnduclive coding scheme. The data was coded based on verbal and nonverbal units,
and then items were coded based on a particular idea (See Table 7). Many o f these eodes
emerged during the constant comparative method o f analysis that oecuiTcd during data
collection. The codes developed as a starting point due to obseiwations o f the oceurrence
in the elassroom. Later many o f the eodes began absorbed into the epistemic categories.
Verbal information was coded based on an individual’s a b ility to demonstrate an idea; in
some cases an idea was represented by a complete sentence, but often it was a portion o f
a thought (i.e., a single word or phrase). Nonverbal behaviors required more
interpretation and needed to be considered w ithin the content o f the responses; therefore,
it was more challenging but pertinent to the study. Due to the age o f the participants,
their verbal ability to articulate certain information was lim ited, but it was thought that
they made conscious attempts to communicate information through their behaviors.
Therefore, individual verbal and nonverbal ideas that were believed to be relevant were
coded.
M u ltip le units o f data were used, ranging from a single word that a child-participant
used consistently to a complete thought. The child-participants’ complete thoughts varied
among the ehildren in terms o f the number o f sentences and included repetitive behaviors
such as, using their body or voice to explain what happened (e.g., standing up from a
sitting position and falling to the ground; stretching their arms out to show emphasis o f
size or proportion; displaying approval or disapproval w ith facial expressions; making
sound effects such as, boom, crash, bang; and fluctuating the tone o f their voice).
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Table 7: Inductive Coding Scheme
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
lOA
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

49
50

51

1=M
JUST/AB
AB
AHLP
AFP
AG
ACT
AGR
AN
APP
AFHLP
ASS
AS
ATT
A
AV

B
BC
BR
C
COL
CC
CMPT
cx

CNFD
CF
cs
CON

CO
CP
CT
CU

DCB
DCE
DCG
DCFl
DEP
DTE
DIFF
DIF
DP
DGR
DSA
DENG
DRL
DRPT
DTR
ECO
ELE
E
ENG
EVAL

“ 1 don't know” UC
“ WHY?”
Absolute
Accept Help
Affect
Aggressive
Agitated
Agree
Animated
Appropriate
Ask for help
Association
Attention Seeking
Attentive
Authority
Avoidant
Behavior
Behavior Change
Bored
Cognitive
Collaborative
Compare/Contrast
Competitive
Complex
Confident
Confused
Consistent
Contradictory
Cooperative
Correct Peer
Correct Teacher
Curious
Decision Bad
Decision Easy
Decision Good
Decision Hard
Dependent
Detail
Differentiate
D ifficulty
Direct Peers
Disagree
Disagreement
Disengaged
Disregard Rules
Disruptive
Distracted
Ecolahlia
Elaborate
Emotion
Engaged
Evaluativist

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

81
82
83
84

85
86

87
88

87
88
89

90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
120
121
122
123

LA
MMC
NEG
NIWP
NPl
NV
OBS
FT
NT
OPIN
0
PART
PTT
P
PM
PT
POS
PIP
PT
PSB
PSG
PR
OU
OA
0

RDRT
RFHLP
RL
R
RTA
RTP
S
SEN
SH
SH
SM
SE
SPB
SPV
SO

STR
TLK
T
TOM
TH
UC
UC
U
UPR
V
VB
VC

Looking for Approval
M imic
Negative
NeglnterWPeers
NcgPeerlnteract
Nonverbal
Observing
Off-Task
On-Task
Opinion
Other
Participates
Patient
Peers
Psychomotor
Pointing
Positive
Positive Peer Interaction
Pretend
Problem Solving Bad
Problem Solving Good
Prompted
Ouestion
Ouestion Authority
Oui et
Redirect
Refuse Help
Relevant
Repetitive
Response To Authority
Response To Peer
Self
Sensory
Shake Head
Sharing
Smiling
Sound Effects
Spontaneous Behavior
Spontaneous Verbal
Squealing
Strategy
Talking
Teacher
Theory o f Mind
Thinking
Uncertain
Uncertain
Understanding
Unprompted
Verbal
Verbal + Behavior
Voice
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52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

EXC
EXP
ECB
EGG
FE
FA M
FLR L
FR
G U LP
HO
IBC

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

M P TT
IN A P
NCS
IN D
IBO
IR L
J
LD
I.ST
L

Excited
Experience
Eye Contact Bad
Eye Contact Good
Facial Expression
Fam ily
F ollow Rules
Frustrated
Gives Help
Hands-on
Immediate Behavior
Change
Im patient
Inappropriate
Inconsistent
Independent
Influenced By Others
Irrelevant
.ludgment
Leader
Listening
Looking

124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

VOL
W
A
M
E
SIM
CER
SRC
JST
A S IM
AC ER

Volunteer
Watching
Absolutist
M u ltip lis t
Evaluativist
Simple
Certain
SoLiree
Justification
Absolutist Simple
Absolutist Certain

135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

ASRC
AJST
M S IM
M CER
M SRC
MJST
ESIM
ECER
ESRC
EJST

Absolutist Source
Absolutist Justification
M u ltip lis t Simple
M u ltip lis t Certain
M u ltip lis t Source
M u ltip lis t Justification
Evaluativist Simple
Evaluativist Certain
Evaluativist Source
Evaluativist Justification

Deductive coding scheme. Merriam (1998) states that identifying categories and
distributing codes can come from the literature and the researcher; however, Glaser and
Strauss (1967) caution researchers about using categories that are “ borrowed” (p. 183)
from other research unless they are compatible w ith the purpose and the theoretical
framework o f the study. The epistemological categories used in this study are present in
the research literature and are concurrent w ith the purpose and the theoretical framework
o f this study. The unique part o f the epistemological categories is that, in the literature,
personal epistemology is viewed as either levels o f development (i.e., absolutist,
m ultiplist, evaluativist) or dimensions o f knowledge (i.e., simple, certain, source,
justification) and are viewed more as contrasting perspectives. In the cunent study each
level and each dimension were coded separately (first as developmental levels, then as
dimensions o f knowledge); and then the developmental levels and dimensions o f
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knowledge are combined in a m atrix (i.e., absolute simple knowledge, m ultiplist
justification o f knowledge) (See Table 8).
To thoroughly grasp the epistemological matrix it is necessary to review how
personal epistemology is defined in the current study. Personal epistemology is generally
accepted as being comprised o f tw o dimensions concerning beliefs about the nature o f
knowledge and the process o f knowing (Burr & Mofer, 2002). The nature o f knowledge
includes (a) the sim plicity o f knowledge (i.e., the relative connectedness o f knowledge);
and (b) the certainty o f knowledge (i.e., the perceived stability o f knowledge). The
process o f knowing includes (a) the source o f knowledge (i.e., where knowledge resides,
internally or externally); and (b) the justification o f knowledge (i.e., how individuals
evaluate and warrant knowledge claims). In addition to the dimensions o f beliefs just
described, the current study also examines epistemic development in the fonn o f three
levels: (a) absolutism (i.e., simple, dichotomous views o f knowledge), (b) m ultiplism
(i.e., reasoning is more complex and relativistic), and (c) evaluatism (i.e., views o f
knowledge focus on evaluation and decision-making among differing views) (Kuhn &
Weinstock, 2002). Units o f data that had been previously coded using the inductive
coding scheme were also coded using the deductive coding scheme in order to identify
overlapping characteristics.
The purpose o f coding the data in all three ways was to allow a unit to be one or two
dimensional. This distinction is important fo r this study and the research literature
because little is known about preschool children’s epistemologies; using the epistemic
matrix demonstrates the com plexity o f preschooler’ s thinking. Identifying preschoolers’
ways o f interpreting knowledge in the epistemic matrix achieved three main goals: (a) It
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helped illustrate the varying a b ility o f the individual child-participants, (b) each cell o f
the matrix made the preschoolers’ thinking more visible in terms o f an individual’s
strength in specific content areas and context, and (c) it illustrated the advantages o f peer
social interaction and collaboration in learning environments.
Identifying cells in the epistemic matrix was more deductive reasoning in nature
because the two theories (developmental levels and dimensions o f knowledge) exist in
the literature although they are not typically integrated in this manner and particularly not
w ith participants as young as in the current study. In this sense identifying
epistemological thinking w ithin the matrix was more o f an inductive reasoning task
because o f the exploratory objective o f the study. Table 8 provides general examples o f
each cell o f the matrix as a category. The columns across the top o f the matrix are the
dimensions o f knowledge and the rows down the left-hand side are the developmental
levels, so that each cell identifies characteristics or features o f one developmental level
and one dimension o f knowledge (i.e., absolute simple knowledge, m ultiplist source,
evaluativist certain). W ithin each cell o f the matrix, an example is provided to illustrate a
more general description. More specific examples related to this study w ill be reported in
the next section o f this chapter fo r each case study.
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Table 8: Epistemological Matrix Examples
Simple

Certain

Source

Justification

Absolutist

1 think teachers
should focus on
facts rather than
theories.

I think children
should always
listen to their
parents.

M u ltip list

Some basics
require basic
factual knowledge,
but other times we
need to have a
deeper
understanding o f
concepts.

I f two students are
arguing about
something, at least
one o f them must
be wrong.
Every student has
equally valuable
contributions and
their opinions
should be heard.

Evaluativist

The more you
know about a topic
the more there is to
know.

1 am going to do
what I want to do
because 1 know
what is best for
me.
In some situations
ignoring a
student’s behavior
is more productive,
but other situations
require tim eout
because it is
necessary to get
them under control
more quickly.
Being an effective
teacher means that
you consider the
individual students
needs and apply
what you have
learned from
books, experience,
& others.

The best way to
leam about global
w arm ing to present
several theories &
allow the student
to decide which is
best based on their
knowledge &
experience.

A t home I listen to
my parents, but
when 1am at
school I listen to
my teachers
because they know
what is best for me
at that time.

I think children
should be able to
question their
parent’ s authority.

Level 2: In d ividual Developmental Levels
Level 2 o f the analysis is comprised o f organizing the data into individual
developmental levels (i.e., absolutist, m u ltip lis t, evaluativist). In-line w ith Piaget’s
developmental stage theory, epistemological development is thought to occur in the same
general trajectory, that is from more naïve to more sophisticated. In addition, individuals
are thought to advance from lower levels to higher levels; absolutism is an objective view
o f knowledge, m ultiplism is a subjective view o f knowledge, and evaluativism allows the
individual to move betv/een and coordinate objective and subjective perspectives while
using valid warrants for their knowledge claims. The identifying feature o f this level o f
analysis is that it seeks to find the specific characteristics that might define and
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distinguish one level from the others in a qualitatively distinct manner. Also, it provides
an opportunity to identify sequences o f epistemological development and shifts in
epistemological understanding
Level 3: Individual Dimensions o f Knowledge
Level 3 o f the data analysis is comprised o f organizing the data into categories based
on the dimensions o f knowledge. There are four epistemological dimensions o f
knowledge (i.e., simple, certain, source, justification). The four dimensions are divided
into two central themes, the nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing. The nature
o f knowledge is represented by simple and certain knowledge, and the process o f
knowing incorporates the source and justification o f knowledge. The identifying feature
o f analyzing the dimensions o f knowledge is to unpack what the participants know and
how they know the infonnation. A nalyzing the data according to the dimensions o f
knowledge provided a better perspective about each dimension; fo r example, whether the
dimensions are separate constructs or more integrated. Also, it allowed a clearer account
o f which dimensions or themes (nature o f knowledge, process o f knowing) are more
potent in preschooler’ s developing epistemologies. Analyzing the dimensions o f
knowledge can also lead to evidence involving issues o f domain-generality and domainspecificity. In addition, breaking epistemological thinking into potential dimensions
provides an opportunity to identify i f sim ilar dimensions are characteristic o f each
developmental level.
Level 4: Individual M a trix: 12 Cells
Level 4 integrates the developmental levels (absolutist, m ultiplist, evaluativist) and
the dimensions o f knowledge (simple, certain, source, justification) into twelve cells.
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The idea o f a matrix is to show the relationship between the two categories
(developmental level and dimensions o f knowledge).
Level 5: Individual M atrix: Integrated Dimensions
Level 5 summarizes each developmental level individually (absolutist, multiplist,
evaluativist); however, each developmental level integrates the dimensions o f knowledge
into two larger categories: the nature o f knowledge (simple and certain) and the process
o f knowing (source and justification). Each developmental level conveys the strengths
and weakness at that level in terms o f the nature o f knowledge and the process o f
knowing. This provided a closer glimpse o f reoccurring themes and patterns (i.e., family,
peers, nonverbal) and how they related to epistemological themes and patterns that were
beginning to emerge. Examples include overlapping characters between simple and
certain knowledge, links between certain knowledge and justification o f knowledge, and
inability to identify sources o f knowledge. This level had three sublevels: (a) Absolutist
+ Nature o f Knowledge/Process o f Knowing, (b) M u ltip lis t + Nature o f
Knowledge/Process o f Knowing, and (c) Evaluativist + Nature o f Knowledge/Process o f
Knowing.
Level 6: Individual Epistemic Profile
Level 6 is an individual epistemological profile fo r each o f the six child-participants;
therefore, there are six epistemic profiles. This epistemic profile represents the four
strongest epistemological themes that consistently resurfaced throughout the in-depth
analysis. Included in the epistemological themes are general patterns that were
associated with the ch ild ’ s epistemic perspective (i.e., using background knowledge,
personal experiences, association to fam ily, m im icking peers). Included in the epistemic
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profile are specific examples from the data that portray the ch ild ’ s words. These
examples are embedded in the epistemic matrix as a way to illustrate how words, phrases,
sentences, and behaviors were coded w ithin the integrated description o f the
developmental levels and the dimensions o f knowledge. In addition, the individual
examples that represent each cell w ithin the matrix provided an authentic perspective o f
how each child demonstrated his/her personal epistemologies w ithin the classroom
environment.
Level 7: Across Individuals ’ Epistemic P rofile
Level 7 is the final individual level o f analysis in the current study. Here all six o f the
individual’s epistemic profiles were analyzed fo r consistent epistemological themes and
corresponding patterns that occurred across all six o f the child-participants. Level 7
represents a single epistemic profile for preschooler’ s w ithin a classroom context. These
results are reported in the next section o f this chapter.
Level 8: Focus Group Themes Pre-Post-Instruction
Level 8 begins the group analysis. A t this level the data were divided into themes.
There were four weeks in which each week had a different theme o f the week (i.e.,
monsters, winter, construction, fam ily). Each theme had two focus groups (i.e., pre
instruction and post-instruction). The six child-participants were divided into two groups
o f three for the initial two themes (monsters and winter). Therefore, the data were
analyzed according to the follow ing sublevels: (a) Group 1 Monster Pre/Post-lnstruction,
(b) Group 2 Monster Pre/Post-lnstruction, (c) Group 1 W inter Pre/Post-lnstruction, and
(d) Group 2 W inter Pre/Post-lnstruction. For the final two themes (construction and
fam ily), the researcher selected the three child-participants who demonstrated the
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strongest epistemological ability using the individual results and results from the first two
theme-based focus groups. These three child-participants made up Group 3; the format
for the final two themes followed the same format as the others, in that there was a preinstructional focus group and a post-instructional focus group for each o f the two themes
(construction and fam ily). However, rather than two groups doing the same themes there
was only one (Group 3). The sublevel analysis included the follow ing: (a) Group 3
Construction Pre/Post-lnstruction and (b) Group 3 Fam ily Pre/Post-lnstruction. Group
data was coded according to developmental levels (sim ilar to Level 2), dimensions o f
knowledge (sim ilar to Level 3), and epistemic matrix (sim ilar to Level 4).
Level 9: Focus Group Theme Based Epistemic Profiles
Level 9 continues to further analyze the focus groups, but at this level the focus
groups are collapsed into theme-based profiles for each o f the three groups. The sublevel
analyses at this level are as follows: (a) Group 1 Monster, (b) Group 1W inter, (c) Group
2 Monster, (d) Group 2 W inter, (e) Group 3 Construction, and (f) Group 3 Family. In
contrast to looking at the type o f group that it was (pre-instruction or post-instruction),
this level o f analysis considers the content o f the themes being discussed. Here
epistemological themes and behavioral patterns were identified between the groups based
on the topic. This allowed a clearer perspective o f the significance that the topic might
have on how the individuals demonstrate their epistemologies as w ell as how that might
impact the group epistemic climate. This level o f analysis also sought out individual
epistemological contributions, group interactions, and changes in themes or patterns
among the different topics.
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Level 10: Focus Group Epistemic P rofile
Level 10 reduced existing epistemological themes and patterns further to identify a
group profile fo r each o f the three groups; therefore, this level has three sublevels: (a)
Group 1, (b) Group 2, and (c) Group 3. This level accomplishes the same general task as
Level 6 (Individual Epistemic Profiles).
Level 11: Across Group Epistemic P rofile Results
Level 11 is the final level o f focus group data analysis, and it is similar to Level 7
(Across Individual Epistemic Profiles). Here the analysis looks across the epistemic
group profiles to identify the results o f preschooler’ s personal epistemologies w ithin a
focus group setting. There are four main results that w ill be reported in the next section
o f this chapter.
Level 12: Preschoolers ’ Personal Epistemologies
Level 12 is the final level o f data analysis fo r the current study. In this level o f
analysis the individual epistemological results and the group epistemological results are
compared to identify overall preschooler’s personal epistemologies. There are four
themes and patterns that make-up the overall results fo r the current study, and they w ill
be reported in the next section.
This section has described the twelve levels o f data analysis fo r the current study.
These levels o f analysis have garnered three sets o f results for preschooler’ s personal
epistemologies w ithin an authentic classroom environment: (a) individual results, (b)
group results, and (c) overall study results. The next section reports these results
according to the fo llo w ing format. First, six individual case studies are presented; each
case study gives a description o f the child-participant as viewed by the researcher w ithin
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the classroom environment, followed by a discussion o f that child-participant’ s
individual epistemological results. Preceding the discussion o f the results, the childparticipants epistemic profile is presented. Second, a discussion o f each o f the three
group epistemic profiles is follow ed by the network model o f their group epistemic
profile and the preschool epistemological group results. Third, a discussion o f overall
results from the current study.

Case Studies
In this section the results o f the six case studies are presented in a case-by-case
format. Each case study w ill fo llo w the same outline: (a) a description o f the child w ithin
the classroom including behavioral, social, and affective characteristics as a way to
become fam iliar w ith the child-participant as an individual in his/her environment; (b) a
network profile created in A T L A S -T l which illustrates the hierarchy o f the strongest
identified categories, the corresponding subcategories, and the epistemic cell that was
coupled most frequently from each the categorical and subcategorical frame o f reference;
(c) an epistemological matrix that summarizes the individual results from the study w ith
specific quotes (i.e. the child’ s words) in each cell o f the matrix that the child-participant
was capable o f fonnulating w ith or without probing; and (d) a report o f individual results
regarding major epistemological patterns and themes. In the final section, results from
each case w ill be reported in terms o f connecting the themes and patterns across the
child-participants, as w ell as report focus group themes. The case studies w ill be
presented in order according to the child-participant’ s number in descending order which
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were coded in alphabetical order: (a) Adam (IM ), (b) A m y (2F), (c) Carl (3M ), (d) GiGi
(4F), (e) Trudy (5F), and (f) Jeremy (6M).
Case Study: Adam
Description
Child-Participant #1 is a 3yr-10 month-old African-Am erican (father) and Caucasian
(mother) male. He attends the preschool five days per week for the fu ll day. His mother
or grandmother usually drops him off, and their relationship is a close one. It is standard
to get a kiss good-bye, but he does not seem to mind being left. Adam explains, “ 1 really
like coming to school, 1 get to play w ith my friends, I learn new things all o f the time, and
my mommy misses me when I am here.”
During the whole class instruction, Adam is very articulate, frequently raising his
hand to volunteer his experiences or to answer questions; however, he is easily excitable
and w ill frequently disregard the classroom rule o f raising his hand to be called on before
contributing. Adam ’s pattern fo r raising his hand is consistent; he raises his hand when
there arc only a few other students who are sharing, but when peer contributions are high
he talks out more regularly. He has an intuitive sense for d iffic u lt questions that he
understands his peers w ill not be able to answer. Often, it is common for him to mumble
the correct (i.e. declarative knowledge) answers to himself, in a way that confirms to
him self that he knows the answer but is less interested in making the effort to raise his
hand and tell the teacher or the class. For example, the teacher asked, “ What do we call
the person who writes the story?” He put his head down and quietly said, “ The author.”
Or the teacher asked, “ What do we call the person who draws the pictures?” Again, he
turned away and quietly said, “ The illustrator.” Adam is more inclined to tell others
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about his experiences or how he knows something. He is forthright about making his
knowledge associations verbal. For example, when the teacher asked, “ What is it like
when it is cold?” , he responded, “ The wind blows and my ears get cold. I have to get my
jacket because I w ill get sick and have to go to the doctor and take medicine. I hate
taking medicine so I wear my hat when it is cold outside.” It is very common for him to
ask several questions before, during, and after the story. For example, he asked, “ W hy is
the bear sad?” or “ W hy do you think they are not friends?” I f the teacher does not
im mediately announce the author, he w ill ask, “ W ho wrote it?” His questions and
comments are always relevant to the topic.
Adam ’ s behavior during whole class instruction is to be applauded. He comes in from
the playground and knows to wash his hands and go to the circle for instruction without
direction. He prom ptly sits “ criss-cross applesauce” and patiently waits for the
instruction to begin. He typically sits very close to the teacher and makes sure he can see
the pictures during the story. I f he chooses a place to sit that impairs his vision, he w ill
always move to a spot he is able to see. When other children are behaving
inappropriately during whole class instruction, he does not pay attention to them and
remains focused on the stoiy. Adam is attentive, engaged, and enthusiastic about the
topics that are chosen as the theme o f the week.
Center activities are more unstructured, and the children get to choose which center
they want to go to. Adam never has trouble making a decision as he always has a center
in mind. He likes to go to the reading center and look at the books. He also enjoys the
block center where he builds things or does puzzles. This is a time when the children get
to interact freely w ith their peers. During this time he generally w ill interact w ith one
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other male friend. Interestingly, Adam’s friend is not as socially well-adjusted nor is he
as inquisitive, but they have many o f the same interests and have talked about spending
time together outside o f school. When it is an instance where there are several peers at
one center, he is socially well-adjusted. He is conscientious about taking turns, keeps his
hands to himself, and has a good concept o f right and wrong behavior. I f the center holds
his attention, such as the treasure hunt bin, he w ill stay at the center. However, i f there
are several children and he has to compete for space, he w ill wander to a center that is
less occupied.
During the individual interviews Adam was initially quiet and uncertain about what to
expect, but he quickly became adjusted and would request to have an individual
inter\'iew. He appeared to enjoy the individual attention and was eager to please the
researcher by answering questions or completing a task. Adam particularly liked to
watch himself on the videos that had been taken o f him in whole class instruction or
center activity. When asked to elaborate on his comments or behaviors, he was always
able to provide more details about what he was thinking or doing. Adam was cooperative
and attentive, but when the interview was over, he would invent things to do or things to
talk about to make it last longer. For example, anything in sight would prompt him to
encourage the researcher to reengage in a one-on-one interaction; there was a book Give
a Pig a Party and he said, “ I w ill read this to you (he cannot read) and ask you questions
now.” Adam would want to look in the researcher’s bag to see i f there was anything we
could use to talk about; often he was creative about how he approached it. For example,
one day there was play dough and the theme was construction, he said, “ We can use this
to build the big bridge that was in the story today.” He required frequent redirection to
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bring the session to a close. Interestingly, he did have a concept that the goal was to talk
about topics related to the theme o f the week. The theme o f the fourth week was
airplanes and airports. When time was up he said, “ D id you see that airplane (there was
no airplane)?It was green and yellow . I was on an orange and blue airplane once, but I
fell asleep and didn’t get a drink.” He asked, “ What color o f airplanes have you been on
before?”
During the peer focus groups, Adam was in group 1 w ith two female peers. He was
easy to engage and interacted w ell w ith the others. They had very dissim ilar interests,
and it was sometimes d iffic u lt to keep him on the topic. Adam frequently wanted to run
the group and would correct the other child-participants i f he thought they were incorrect.
However, i f he believed they ju st had a different experience, he would appropriately
share his experience. He was an initiator o f ideas and asked many questions o f the
researcher and his peers on several o f the topics discussed. He demonstrated excellent
listening skills and was able to elaborate often on what others had said.
Adam ’s affect and disposition was consistent from day-to-day throughout the study.
He was pleasant, cheerful, bright, and energetic. Adam appeared w ell rested, and his
hygiene was good, although his hair was prim arily unkempt. He is potty trained and had
no accidents during the course o f the study. He is animated but can be shy and quiet at
times when he seems uncertain o f him self or his knowledge. Adam is one o f the highest
functioning students in the class despite that he is one o f the youngest in the class and the
youngest o f the six child-participants.
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Epistemic Themes

Table 9: Adam ’s Epistemological M atrix
A BSO LU TIST:
Objective view o f
knowledge

M U LT IP L IS T
Subjective view
o f knowledge

E V A L U A T IV IS T
Shift o f objective &
subjeetive stanee when
claims are evaluated &
warranted.
1 think that dog is sleeping
because his eyes are
closed, but m y dog sleeps
w ith one eye sometimes
openfgesture w ith eye).
1 like my food hot but 1
don’ t like Chinese food
because it spices me. M y
m ommy and daddy like it a
lot. When we have
Chinese food 1 have a
peanut butter and je lly
sandwich.
1 think it was Megatron
who saved Jack. Do you
know who it was? He
knows more about them
than me.

Nature o f
Knowledge
S IM P L IC IT Y

Megatron is the
baddest, but remember
Megatron got Optimus
& knocked him down.

1 think the baby is
trying to get in the
water. T hat’ s what 1
see in the picture.

Nature o f
Knowledge
C E R T A IN T Y

The picture shows when
a monster attacked a
bear. That was in the
story and that is how it
was.

I ’ m m aking a dotted
monster, not like his.
1 know how to make
it, watch me do it.

Nature o f
Know ing
SOURCE

Row, row, row your
boat gently down the
stream. M e rrily,
m errily, m errily life is
but a dream, (singing)

When I ’ m sick my
head hurts. M y dad
said he gets the same
way as me.

Nature o f
K nowing
JU STIFIC A TIO N

Optimus is most
popular because
everyone likes him and
he beats Blackout.

1ju s t know it
because 1just do.

We go to the doctor when
we are sick in the w inter
because he w ill make us
feel better or else we get
sicker and 1 can’ t come to
school.

Theme 1: M iiltip lis tic level o f development. Adam demonstrated perspectives
regarding his knowledge at each o f the three developmental levels (absolutism,
m ultiplism , evaluativism) and in all four dimensions o f knowledge (simple, certain,
source, justification) during the course o f the study. The developmental levels and
dimensions o f knowledge did fluctuate depending on the content that was being discussed
(i.e. monsters, winter, construction, fam ily) and the context that the discussion took place
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(i.e. whole elass instruction, center aetivities, individual interviews, focus groups). Table
9 provides a glimpse at some o f his statements out o f the context o f the discussions;
however, they reflect how the researcher interpreted them w ithin a specific context. Each
cell in the matrix identifies a statement that was viewed as tapping into a developmental
level as w ell as a dimension o f knowledge.
Overwhelm ingly, Adam presented him self at a m ultiplistic developmental level. That
is, he portrays his knowledge on most topics from a subjective point-of-view , sometimes
in an egocentric way but more often speaking from his personal experiences.

The

egocentric subjectivity (i.e., “ 1 want,” “ I have,” “ I need.” ) appeared more in group
settings such as whole elass instruction and the focus groups and seemed to be o f a
competitive nature. He has a good memory and conveys his personal experiences with a
great deal o f affect, not as matter-of-facts.

For example, he acknowledges that his

experiences are different from others and makes statements such as “ I know because 1
feel and got my knee hurt, maybe that didn’t happen to you but it did to me.”

In

conjunction w ith this verbal statement he points to him self and then to his peer and holds
his up his arms and shrugs his shoulders.

This type o f behavior was interpreted as

affectively communicating that they have a different understanding because they have
had different experiences. Adam generally accepts others’ points-of-view and listens to
his peers. He often w ill build on what others say. He is also accepting that others have
different ways o f thinking. For example, he was coloring w ith a peer and asked for the
blue crayon. The peer gave him a shade o f blue but not the one he wanted. He said,
“ That’ s not the one 1 want.” The peer responded, “ But you are making Optimus right?”
Adam said, “ Yes, but I think he is closer to this blue.” The other boy said, “ You should

217

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

make it more like this color.” Adam said, “ He eould be either eolor but i f you think he
should be that eolor then you should make Optimus cuz I want him to be w ith this eolor,
it doesn’t matter they w ill both be Optimus.”

He made the statement, “ we are all

different” several times throughout the study.
His m ultiplistic perspectives are more spontaneous, but when his knowledge is
probed slightly, he leans toward evaluativistic statements but gets confused by what he is
saying.

He does catch him self off-topic or not making sense and constructs his

knowledge from an absolutist perspective.

For example, he confused the words

construction and destruction; “ there is destruction all over the place and that makes
people get to work a lot, w ait what is that word again?”

When he heard the word

construction he immediately referenced the story that was read in the whole class
instruction by saying, “ You need to have really big truck to make construction, that
building things like skyscrapers and bridges.” Once he feels stable in his understanding
he shifts to a m ultiplist perspective by elaborating on his experience. For example, he
said, “ I have been on a big bridge over the water when we went to California. It was
scary being so high but bridges are strong so lots o f ears can be on it and it w on’ t fa ll.”
Although this is a common pattern, he often uses a variety o f strategies that distract the
process as he moves between developmental levels. In addition, he relies heavily on his
charm and animation as coping skills which deflect the attention o ff o f him. This was
observed in all formats throughout the data collection.

Adam ’ s m ultiplistic knowledge

revolves around his past experiences and p rio r knowledge prim arily in relationship to pop
culture, his fam ily, and interactions w ith his peers.
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Theme 2: Strength o f the nature o f knowledge. The nature o f knowledge (simple and
certain) is more potent than his understanding through the process o f knowing (source
and justification).

He conveys his knowledge through simple and certain knowledge

more often and w ith more ease. For example, “ 1 know wintertim e is eold, and summer is
really really hot.” He does use justification o f knowledge (“ because in the w inter I have
to wear my hat and mittens to stay warm and not get sick” ) but far less and source o f
knowledge rarely.

Even when probed for the source o f knowledge, he has d ifficu lty

understanding what is being asked and responds using his internal source o f knowledge.
For example, “ 1 think it is that way so we feel clean and get ready for school” (in
responding to why they have to wash their hands when they come in from outside).
A t times it is d iffic u lt to assess his simple knowledge from his certain knowledge;
they seem to have a great deal o f overlap, and there is a tendency to link them together.
He begins w ith simple and certain views o f knowledge, but when probed his knowledge
appears more complex and uncertain.

However, when his knowledge is simple and

certain, he is more affectively and behaviorally stable in his performance.

When

knowledge shifts to more complex and uncertain, he becomes curious and engages the
teacher in a line o f questioning. For example, he does not understand w hy he cannot see
him self in the camera during videotaping and asks, “ Why am I not in there? The red light
is on so I know it is running but I am not there.” When he makes connections to prior
knowledge or past experiences he remains engaged and on-task, but i f his questions do
not yield advancement in his understanding, he becomes disengaged and disruptive. For
example, he eould not make sense about the camera so he began to run in front and
behind the camera quickly trying to see him self in the camera. The researcher allowed
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him to look through the camera at the others and had them walk out o f view, and he
began to understand and became more engaged.

He said, “ I w ill be able to watch me

later when you show it to me, right?”
He does appear to contemplate his responses for a moment, but once he begins he is
quite spontaneous.

He makes strong associations between the classroom topic and

instances o f play w ith his friends and interactions based on rules with his family (mainly
his father and grandmother). When he discusses his mother, it deals w ith associations
that are affective in nature. He regularly compares him self to characters in the stories in
terms o f their emotional disposition and w ill incorporate experiences he has had w ith his
mother. For example, “ When I ’m bad like Max, my m ommy makes me eat away from
the table by myself; then we talk about what I did. I feel sad and she hugs me and 1 feel
better, 1 think that is w hy M ax left the W ild Things.”
Theme 3:

Interaction with other Jink the nature o f knowledge and process o f

knowing. This result is in direct relationship to result two, his understanding o f the nature
o f knowledge is strongest in an individual setting, but when he is in a group, his pattern
shifts to incorporating the nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing. Specifically,
he shifts from linking simple and certain knowledge to linking either simple or certain
knowledge w ith justification o f knowledge. He excels w ith the unintentional probing o f
his peers in a structured setting. By relying on his prior knowledge and interacting w ith
his peers, he combines ideas and experiences to develop reasoning for his knowledge;
that is he chooses what others say i f it coincides w ith his present understanding and
applies it as justification for his current knowledge.

For example, one o f his peers is

telling how he went hiking in the woods w ith his fam ily. Adam said, “ 1 think you have to
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stay w ith your mommy and daddy so you don’ t get lost because then you w ill be scared
and need water and animals might get you, it ’ s the same in the desert too, right?” This is
particularly noticeable when his knowledge is followed-up on at the end o f the week, and
he is consistent w ith his knowledge and associations made earlier in the week or even the
previous week. He was asked, “ W hy is it important to stay w ith other people when you
are in an unfam iliar place?”

He responded, “ You should always be w ith a grown-up

because they w ill keep you safe and you w on’t get hurt, like hiking. I f you get lost from
your fa m ily you could get hurt bad and be a scared and be lost.”
Taking into consideration that he is generally outgoing and confident in his
knowledge, he is more so when he is on the verge o f more complex and uncertain
knowledge. He is aware that questions posed to him by the teacher, researcher, or peers
probe his knowledge and understanding; he has a developing sense o f being motivated to
learn from others. However, he demonstrates signs o f cognitive overload and becomes
quite frustrated when he is unable to make sense between his present knowledge and new
knowledge, whether it is subjective or objective knowledge.

His breaking point is

observable by his confused facial expressions, the increase in questions that are not
coherent, and deterioration o f behavior (psychomotor agitation, laughter, disengagement).
However, when he conveys knowledge as simple and certain, he can be lethargic and
uninterested. He w ill intentionally attempt to challenge himself.
pose hypothetical scenarios,

For example, he w ill

contribute an affective response, or ask questions to the

researcher that scaffold w ith his knowledge. These types o f behaviors (i.e. strategies to
acquire knowledge) seem indicative o f self-regulated learning and a naïve evaluativistic
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developmental level although he is not eonsciously aware that he is engaging in a
sophisticated manner.
Theme 4: Lim ited a b ility f o r source o f knowledge.

Source o f knowledge is the

weakest dimension o f knowledge for Adam. Because he demonstrates more m ultiplistic
ways o f thinking, source o f knowledge is accounted for most often internally.

He

watches others and listens; he reflects on his personal experiences and generates his
knowledge internally. However, he is unable to articulate how he filters knowledge and
because this internal process is not observable, the researcher probed his source o f
knowledge continually. The patterns surrounding his source o f knowledge were similar
throughout the study.

In itia lly his responses are m ultiplistic and are constructed

internally and filtered in a way that relate to things he knows or has experienced (i.e.,
characters, consequences).

He makes attempts at evaluativism, but he has d ifficu lty

making sense o f his internal filtration process (most like ly because o f a lack o f
experience) and cannot coordinate internal and external sources o f knowledge in a
coherent way. He then shifts to an absolutist perspective and w ith probing can articulate
the external sources o f knowledge in his associations. For example, he w ill identify rules
and reasons for the rules that originate from interactions w ith his father or grandmother.
He clearly links him self to characters in a story and makes comparisons to experiences
that are highly emotionally charged between him self and his mother.
He links much o f his knowledge to television characters and toys; therefore, another
external source o f knowledge that he defers to is his peers. It is a common bond that
he has w ith his peers that contribute to his understanding o f knowledge; he perceives
his peers as being knowledgeable and uses them as a tool to demonstrate how he
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constructs his knowledge.

He frequently asks his peers about behaviors and

eharacteristies o f animated characters or storylines that can contribute to his
knowledge and understanding. It is common fo r him to evaluate what his peers say;
he w ill accept some aspects and discard other aspects o f their contributions, just as he
does from other aspects o f authority.
Case Study: Amy
Description.
Child-Participant #2 is a four-year-and-four-month-old Caucasian female. A m y is
tiny fo r her age and has long blond hair that is typically not brushed and falls in her face;
however, on the rare occasion that it is pulled back, she always removes the tie. She
attends the preschool five days per week fo r the fu ll day. Her mother brings her to
school, and the routine is the same each time. A m y carries all o f her daily materials (i.e.,
blanket, lunch, change o f clothes). She places them in the appropriate places in the
classroom (i.e., cubby, refrigerator), gives her mom a hug, and joins the group on the
playground. Her mother leaves immediately. It is common fo r her mother to arrive early
for pick-up to observe what is going on in the classroom, and she corresponds regularly
w ith the teacher about A m y ’ s behavior during the day. M other and daughter appear to
have a good relationship; however, neither has any d iffic u lty leaving the other.
When asked what she likes best about coming to preschool she replied, “ Because one
day 1 am going to be beautiful and smart just like my m om m y.” A m y added, “ 1 like
when my mommy puts all o f my pretty pictures on the refrigerator fo r my daddy to see.”
Her father travels fo r w ork and is typically away from home for extended periods o f time.
She has a two-year-old brother who she describes as “ bad.” She is aware o f the routines
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surrounding the daily activities (i.e., washing her hands, sitting on the earpet, choosing a
center, singing the welcome song).
Although she is eager to play w ith her peers in the morning, she is a slow starter for
the structured routines o f the classroom. A m y appears tired and sluggish and rarely
smiles. Her affect is flat early in the day, but she seems to brighten after the whole class
instruction when the activity is not so structured. During the whole class instruction, she
typically sits in the middle o f the group or in the back. Her disposition fluctuates daily
between paying attention to the stoiy and being preoccupied w ith what is going on
around her. A m y is highly distractible and rarely raises her hand to answer questions
posed by the teacher although she frequently interjects comments about her experiences.
She can be disruptive during whole class instruction and requires frequent redirection
from the teacher because she makes noises or repeats a word or phrase accompanied by
laughing and restless nonverbal behavior (i.e. rolling on the floor, touching a peer’ s hair,
playing w ith her shoes).
A m y ’ s verbal and nonverbal behavior is spontaneous, and i f she is receiving attention
fo r her inappropriate behaviors, they seem to escalate. She can become quite silly and at
times it negatively impacts the behavior o f her peers. She enjoys looking at the pictures
in the book, but never asks any questions. I f she cannot see the pictures, she is even more
detached from the activities and her behavior deteriorates. I f she is engaged in the story,
she is not affected by any negative influences o f her peers; however, when not engaged in
the story, she w ill pick-up on the behavior o f peers and jo in in causing a greater
disruption to the activity. On the occasion that she requires redirection from the teacher
or an aide, A m y is able to change her behavior independently, that is she does not require
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any physical assistance and never needs to be removed from the activity for a time-out to
regain control o f her behavior.
She is very adept at choosing her desired center activity; she w ill generally go to the
art center or the journal center. When she chooses the journal center, she is resistant to
fo llo w ing the format o f the center. They have to interact w ith the teacher to complete a
sentence and then draw a picture and tell the teacher about what they have drawn.
Generally, her sentence completion portion o f the activity does not make sense in the
context o f the sentence. Her drawing is not consistent w ith her sentences, and she refuses
to discuss the drawing afterward. It appears that her only reason for choosing the journal
center is to draw the picture. Whether she is at the art center or the journal center, she
very rarely interacts w ith her peers, and i f she does, it is in a pretend or animated manner.
A m y is able to w ork side-by-side w ith her peers and fo llo w directions; she shares the
materials but w ill become agitated i f a peer forces her to interact. Her tolerance for peer
interaction in a structured activity is low; she w ill typically leave the center and move to a
less busy center. For example, A m y w ill move to the dramatic play area i f there is one
other person there, but i f two or more peers attempt to jo in and try to pretend-play, she
w ill immediately leave that center.

It is not uncommon for her to leave her initial center

activity and ju st wander around the room watching her peers but not really participating
in any center because there is simply too much activity.
When she does interact w ith her peers, she has a good sense o f social nonns, and the
other children seem to like her; however, she does not initiate any positive interactions
w ith her peers. In fact, it is common for her to be a lead in negative and disruptive
behaviors. The one thing that she does consistently is watch and listen to her peers and
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then piek-up on a word or phrase that she becomes focused on. She w ill repeat the word
or phrase even i f it is not relevant to what is going on. It is not uncommon fo r her peers
to fo llo w this behavior which results in a lot o f laughter and other silly behaviors. For
example, i f a peer is talking about snow, she w ill say, “ snow buggers” repeatedly and
laugh uncontrollably. Another time a peer was talking about standing on a ladder, and
she began to repeat “ ladder badder poopy badoopy.”
During the individual interviews, she immediately was receptive to the individual
attention and was able to be more focused and serious in her responses as compared to
her irrelevant comments during whole class and center aetivities. Her affect was much
brighter, and her animated personality persisted. A m y did continue to have d iffic u lty
staying on topic but resorted to baby-type talking when her comments did not make
sense. The feeling was that this was due to the fact that a lot o f her interactions at home
were w ith her baby brother, and she was m im icking his language. Contrary to other
interactions w ith authority, during her individual interviews she asked many questions o f
the researcher in relationship to the story or the theme as w ell as taking many o f the
questions that were directed to her and turning them around and asking the researcher.
For example, when asked “ What is your favorite type o f weather?” , she responded, “ 1
like hot and sunny weather. What is your favorite type o f weather?” When asked, “ What
do you think it means to fo llo w the rules?” , A m y responded, “ When you fo llo w what
your mommy and daddy tell you it is so you don’ t get hurt and you don’t get in trouble
like Max did. What rules do you like?”
During the individual interviews she proved that she can be extremely motivated by
rewards. Her attention span was much greater than in any other context and needed ver)'

226

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

little redirection to stay on task; she excelled particularly w ell w ith the individual
aetivities such as sequencing o f activities cards, making objects w ith play-dough,
coloring and discussing her monster, and making the fam ily tree. She takes great pride
and enthusiasm in her projects, and she was not as stubborn about discussing them w ith
the researcher. A m y never wanted the researcher to keep her work; she always wanted to
take it home to show her parents.
Her participation in the focus group activities was more consistent w ith her behavior
in the whole class instruction and center activities but a little toned down because o f the
fewer number o f peers. A m y was in group 1 and appeared to be less advanced (i.e.,
language, cognitive, behavior) than the other two members o f the group. A m y is more o f
a negative behavioral influence to her peers, and she tends to m im ic her peers’ verbal
contributions. It appears that her idea o f interacting w ith peers involves playing and
being silly. One main difference is that she tends to be more engaged in the focus group
than many o f the other contexts, and she continues to pay very close attention to what her
peers are saying and doing. A m y adapts w ell to the rules o f the focus groups and had a
knack fo r surprising the researcher. Just when it was thought that she was missing the
main idea o f a question or a discussion, she would come up w ith a unique or creative
thought that would move the discussion along.
Epistemic Themes
Theme 1: Absolutist level o f development. A m y demonstrates absolutist and
m ultiplist levels o f development (See Table 10). She never successfully constructs
evaluativistic perspectives, even when probed specifically at all four dimensions o f
knowledge. However, when unprompted, she has prim arily an absolutist perspective o f
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knowledge and knowing. A m y ’ s knowledge is objectively eonstructed on all four
dimensions o f knowledge (i.e., simple, certain, source, justification).
A m y ’s absolutist point-of-view is most frequently demonstrated through her
associations to her knowledge o f classroom rules and procedures and her fam ily. She
spontaneously engages her peers by directing them on the appropriate behavior during
di fferent parts o f the day. For example, “ Hey you guys, you need to be sitting criss-cross
applesauce.” When linking her prior knowledge w ith new information, she refers to
experiences w ith her fam ily. For example, “ You need to use a tissue. I f I do that (picking
her nose), m y mommy tells me, it ’s not polite and gives me a tissue to get the creatures
out o f my nose.”
Despite the developmental level, her attention span is extremely lim ited. She can
become distracted easily. For example, she is prone to giggling and jo k in g around. I f
someone moves around a lot or gets off-topic, she uses that as an opportunity to jo in in
the disruption. She is typically a follow er in her ways o f knowing and play; in addition to
her high distraetibility, she mimics her peers. In terms o f knowledge, her m im icking is
lim ited to absolutist and m ultiplist levels o f development. Interestingly, i f a peer makes
an evaluativistic statement, she w ill not m imic these types o f statements. She
immediately becomes distracted or disruptive.
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Table 10: Amy’ s Epistemological Matrix
A BS O LU TIS T
Objective view o f
knowledge

M U L T IP L IS T
Subjeetive view o f
knowledge

Nature o f
Knowledge
S IM P L IC IT Y

Slihhh, you need to be
quiet now, it is tim e to
listen to the story.

Nature o f
Knowledge
C E R T A IN T Y

You could make
either one. It ju s t
depends on what kind
o f s tu ff you have to
make it.

Nature o f
Knowing
SOURCE

M ax want to go home,
that is what is in the
story and that’ s what 1
think, he goes back
home.

Nature o f
Know ing
JU STIFIC A TIO N

1 know plants and
trees grow outside and
not in the room
because they don’ t
grow on the carpet.
They grow outside
and outside o f the
carpet.

In that story (pointing)
M ax misses his
mom my. 1 miss my
m om m y, but 1 know
she comes to get me.
O n ly 1 know what this
is. I ’m drawing it for
m y daddy to show him
what book 1 read
today, (pointing and
facial gestures).
I f 1 would b uild a
snowman 1 w ould do it
like the one in the
story. 1 w ould make a
big snowman and a
little reindeer. 1 w ould
give it eyes, nose,
forehead, and hair.
1 don’ t think the forest
really grew in M a x ’ s
room and that could
not happen in my
room because 1 have
bunk-beds, and 1 am
on the top because 1
am the biggest
between me and m y
sister.

E V A L U A T IV IS T
Shift o f objective &
subjective stance when
claims are evaluated &
warranted.

Theme 2: Simple and certain knowledge are more independent. A m y is able to
independently construet absolutist perspectives o f simple and certain knowledge. For
example, “ Families do things together, like hug and that’ s how you know they love you.’
When probed, she shifts to m ultiplistic levels in her knowledge related to simple and
certain knowledge. When asked, “ What does your fa m ily do that makes you know they
love you?” She replied, “ 1 think we do a lot o f things. 1 always give my mommy and
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daddy hugs and kisses in the morning but mostly when 1 go to bed, I ask my mommy to
read me stories and she does. I always miss my daddy but talk to him lots on the phone. I
tell him I love him lots too.”
As Am y’s absolutistic perspective becomes increasingly more complex, her ways of
knowing become increasingly less independent and become more dependent on authority
(i.e., books, teacher, peers). The most noticeable pattern here is that she begins to repeat
single words and phrases from a character in the story or echoes things that her peers say.
For example, when she is asked to compare her family with her friend’s family, she
begins to repeat a line from the stor>' that day: “ one bear, two bears, three bears
(laughing).” At this point, she does not appear to have a conscious understanding o f the
meaning o f what she has said and is unable to elaborate upon any o f her prior knowledge
or experiences. Due to her limited understanding and lack o f coherent contributions, she
becomes animated and disruptive.
Another characteristic presented commonly when Amy conveys simple and certain
knowledge is her tendency to combine verbal and nonverbal behaviors to emphasize
meaning. The more simple and certain her knowledge, the more she relies on her verbal
skills, but as her knowledge becomes more complex and uncertain the amount o f
nonverbal behaviors increase (i.e., facial expressions to emphasize emotions o f others,
use o f amis to draw attention to sizes and shapes, behaviors that correspond to her words,
such as marching in place, acting out climbing, running). When she is no longer
successful at describing her knowledge using verbal and nonverbal communication, she
resorts to mimicking her peers.

230

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

When knowledge is complex, she can remain engaged but is dependent on others to
stay on-topic. However, when knowledge is uncertain, she quickly becomes
uninterested, disengaged, and disruptive. For example, during a discussion w ith her peers
regarding monsters, the discussion shifted to pop culture characters (i.e., transformers and
ninja turtles) which she is unfam iliar with. She did not even make an attempt to
participate. She became frustrated and withdrawn from the group to the point she
requested to leave the activity. Although she is highly motivated by reinforcement,
attempts to reengage her failed.
Theme 3: Strong peer influence. Her knowledge and understanding is strongly
influenced by her peers; therefore, she is able to articulate more sound absolutist and
m ultiplist perspectives in the whole class instruction and the focus group activities. She
is less productive and less motivated during individual interviews and center activities
because these activities require her to be an independent thinker. A m y has d ifficu lty
concentrating and making associations between prior knowledge and personal experience
and new information.
Due to the dependence on her peers, her overriding source o f knowledge comes from
her peers and other external sources (i.e., teacher, parents, books). In a group setting she
verbalizes her sources o f knowledge more readily w ithout probing than many o f the other
child-participants. She equates peers as an authority equal to that o f the teacher or her
parents. A m y frequently asks peers questions about ideas from the story or their
experiences, and mimics their language and behavior. A m y follow s their lead and their
way o f thinking and making associations. W ith this peer scaffolding she is able to
construct knowledge that is consistent w ith the process o f knowing (i.e., source and
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justification). For example, she may correct a peer or build on something one o f her
peers says by saying; “ my mommy says...,” “ my teacher d id ...,” or “ the picture o f the
three bears in the story had...” These types o f statements were not typically initiated by
A m y in an individual or less structured setting.
Although there were source and justification o f knowledge demonstrated during
individual inter\dews, the source o f knowledge appeared to be internally constructed and
included pretend associations that were transferred from another peer. For example, “ 1
want to be just like a princess and wear pretty clothes and walk in high shoes.” The
justifications were tangential or unrelated to the topic. For example, when asked about
the theme winter, she stated, “ I could tell you what my mommy tells be to do in the cold
but 1 don’t want to.” “ I think summer is more fun than winter because 1just do and I am
not telling you w hy.” These attempts at source and justification during individual
interviews could indicate a transition in developmental ability, or it could be more social
in nature. Perhaps the researcher did not provide adequate scaffolding or the relationship
between A m y and the researcher does not meet her emotional needs thus inhibiting her
ability or m otivation to demonstrate her epistemic ability.
Regardless o f the developmental level or the dimension o f knowledge, she has more
interest and m otivation to continue a discussion when there are others involved. When
she is alone interacting one-on-one w ith authority (including peers), she disengages more
rapidly and demonstrates signs o f frustration and cognitive overload. Her coping
strategies include the follow ing: to become silly, to use echolalia to disrupt the activity,
and to begin pretending. Her pretend play is egocentric but modeled after things she has
seen her peers do or say. This pattern is the same in a group or individual setting.
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Theme 4: Dimension o f knowledge associations linked to the stories. Another
significant influence on Am y’s dimensions o f knowledge are the stories that are read to
her primarily during whole class instruction, but also she references stories that she
reports her mother reads to her at home. Amy makes connections between herself and
characters in the stories she has heard. For example, “ I want to be like Max and be the
kings o f the wild things.” She w ill also repeat lines from the story to explain her actions.
For example, “ I w ill run and leap and have a rumpus.”
When she references excerpts from the book or a character, she is more confident
about her knowledge and therefore is more interested and engaged. Simple knowledge
becomes more complex; rather than single words, mimicking peers, or making irrelevant
phrases, she demonstrates complete thoughts that pertain to the question or part of the
discussion. For example, she constructs a more complex thought process by saying, “ I
know why we have a family. It’s like the tree in the story. It’s our roots.” Amy

acknowledges that some knowledge is certain but other knowledge can be more
uncertain. For example, ” My mommy teach me it is not good to take things that aren’t
mine but that girl (pointing) took the bear’ s shoes and didn’t get in trouble, I don’t know
why she didn’t. Maybe she was allowed.” She is more explicit in stating her source of
knowledge when it is something that she associates with a story. She usually w ill refer to
the “ story” or the “ book” in her responses; for example, “ that bridge in the story looks
like the bridge I was on a long time ago and it was really big.” Her justification of
knowledge is more advanced and coherent when she relates new information to a story.
For example, “ I think Max did the right thing by coming back home and his mommy was
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glad he did because she is sm iling in the picture and that means they made up and she
wasn’t mad at Max no more.”
In terms o f the developmental levels in relationship to her associations toward books,
there is no observable pattern. She continues to shift from absolutist to m ultiplist ways o f
knowing. The identifiable feature is that she starts o ff more from an objective
peispective and probing her knowledge assists her toward more m ultiplistic thinking.
This is sim ilar to the pattern that is seen when she uses peers as a means o f scaffolding
her knowledge. The main difference that is observed when she uses the books as
scaffolds is behavioral. For example, she remains on-task w ith little need for redirection,
is less disruptive w ith her language and her behavior, and directs quality questions to the
teacher or researcher as the authority, rather than her peers.
Case Study: C arl
Description
Child-Participant #3 is a three-year-and-11-month old Caucasian male. He is a
“ boy’s boy” as his mother describes him. Carl is an unkempt and untidy boy. His hair is
never combed, and his clothes are typically dirty. He wears them inside-out or
backwards. He spends a lot o f his time in his pretend or imagined world. Although he
can respond using his p rior knowledge and past experiences, he really chooses to talk
from his pretend world. This usually revolves around his girlfriend (a cartoon character)
or embellishing an outrageous event (from a movie or T ’V show) as i f it had happened to
him or he was directly involved.
Carl is quiet and shy and keeps to himself. He is not a trouble-maker and follow s the
rules o f the classroom. He does not generally volunteer any information, but i f he is
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asked a question, he w ill respond in a very soft voice. A ffe ctively Carl is a bit different
from his peers. He rarely smiles. His demeanor is serious (uncharacteristically so), and he
does not have the capacity or tolerance for the s illy animation o f his peers. His responses
are direct and intense. For example, there are a few girls in the classroom who can
become quite playful and giggly in the dramatic play area where he likes to pretend in the
kitchen. A t one point, his play was interrupted by the girls, and he left the area. When
questioned why he left, he responded, “ They make me mad, I am really ti-ying to make
something and all they want to do is make noise. They don’t do things that matter, they
just making noise.”
Carl attends the preschool three days per week for the fu ll day. When asked what he
likes best about preschool he replied, “ I t ’s a fun time. We just do s tu ff and then I go
home and do more stuff.” Since his response was on the vague side, some probing about
his preschool experiences provided comments such as the follow ing: “ These kids are
crazy, they are always yelling and screaming,” “ I think it is boring a lot, I want to go
outside and be doing stuff,” and “ I don’ t learn nothing I can know from home stuff.” His
mother brings him to school, and their separation is interesting. M om blows him a kiss,
and he just runs o ff to the playground w hile mom brings his belongings (i.e. lunch,
change o f clothes, blanket) into the classroom.
Carl gets along w ell w ith all o f his peers but usually plays w ith the boys. His
behavior outside on the playground is very different from his inside behavior. Outside he
is a “ w ild man,” again as his mother describes him. Carl is active, energetic, and vibrant
(i.e., running around, interacting verbally w ith his peers, pretending). On the playground
he is a leader, and his peers are receptive to his pretend playing. In the classroom he is the
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opposite. He barely moves (i.e. sits very still in one place fo r a long period o f time), and
he is calm and quiet. His play inside the classroom is strictly nonverbal (i.e., sound
effects, body and facial gestures). His only verbal interaction is demonstrated when the
teacher or an aide asks him a direct question. He w ill share materials and toys w ith his
peers but never makes an attempt to engage in verbal exchanges. He sim ply goes on
about his playing as i f no one is around.
During the whole class instruction, Carl sits “ criss-cross applesauce” and claps w ith
the welcome song but does not sing. When it is his turn to say good morning, he does not
know his classmates’ names; however, he does accept the help from the teacher and
echoes the name fo r that day. He sits in the back o f the group and o ff to the comer so
that he is away from his peers. Carl is always well behaved during the whole class
instruction. His attention and eye contact are excellent. Once the story begins he is
engaged and oblivious to anything else that m ight be happening (i.e. people coming
in/out, peers not fo llo w ing rules or being disruptive, the camera). Although he does not
volunteer responses or ask questions, he does indicate understanding o f the story by
shaking his head or tapping his nose (a technique used by the teacher to cut-down on
interruptions during the story). In addition, he participates by using several types o f
nonverbal gesturing (i.e., pointing, motioning w ith his arms, affective facial expressions)
that effectively indicate his interest and understanding.
Carl regularly chooses the dramatic play area, manipulatives, or the computer. His
attitude toward the center activities is consistent w ith how he manages him self in the
whole class instruction; he is compliant w ith the rules and procedures, noneommunicative, and avoidant o f his peers unless they are w illin g to play w ithout verbal
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interactions. For example, he w ill play alongside his peers in the treasure box (a box of
sand with coins and other small toys) because it is a quiet activity in which eveiyone is
sifting through the sand, and he can observe what others are finding. He w ill also play in
the dramatic play center if his peers follow along with his pretend play or i f his play is
not changed by what his peers are doing. The duration o f his time at a center is directly
related to the amount o f stimulation at the center; the more stimulation the less likely he
is to stay at the center. Carl can be found for the longest stretch of time at the computer
because he is able to work independently; it is not uncommon to see him talking to
himself while his is engaged in one o f the activities on the computer. The interesting
thing about Carl is when he exhausts one center he w ill quickly find another center to
occupy himself. Whereas many o f his peers w ill wander around the room to see what
others are doing, he rarely is interested in what his peers are doing.
The individual interviews were a great opportunity to understand Carl’s way o f
thinking (i.e., how he makes associations, his sources o f knowledge, preference for
solitude, serious intensity o f his demeanor). He is quite creative and ingenuous in the
way he combines his internal imaginary understanding of the external world. He is an
only child and does not have access to many friends outside o f school. Unlike many of
the other children who eome to the preschool because at least one o f their parents is
employed or attends the university, Carl comes to the preschool because he is in the local
area. His family rents in the local vicinity which is not a typical neighborhood
environment; there are many college students and transient people who come to the city
to work. He spends a lot o f time alone playing or watching television. His father works
10-14 hours a day, and his mother works from home. On the weekends they spend
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quality fa m ily time doing outdoor types o f activities (riding motorcycles, four-wheeling,
camping, hiking) w ith friends, but these friends have children that are older than Carl.
The individual interviews provided a quiet time to probe his often d iffic u lt to
understand responses during the whole class instruction. Come to find out he is a
sensitive and passionate individual who is driven by his emotions. Many o f his
seemingly detached imaginary experiences that he links to the stories evolve from very
real expectations modeled by his fam ily. Carl is in touch w ith adult-like behaviors and
concerns (i.e., marriage and relationships, the idea o f w orking hard to earn money,
fo llo w ing rules and consequences). For example, he says, “ I am going to m any Ariel.
She is my girlfriend, I love her. Just like my daddy loves m y mommy, he makes her feel
special.” When asked how he knows this he replied, “ 1just can tell. She smiles, and she
puts special things in his lunch. 1 am going to do that for A rie l because she is special.” It
is never clear i f he is aware that A rie l is a character from a cartoon, but the point is that
he uses his imagination to understand other adult-like behaviors, especially in
relationship to other emotional constructs, such as anger and fear, and adult-like
characteristics, such as responsibility and expectations. Arguably, he is not fu lly
cognizant o f the types o f things that he says in a mature adult-like manner, but the
important point is that the associations he makes are relevant and appropriate.
Carl was in group 2, he was not a big contributor, but he did put forth an effort to
participate and when he did his ideas were accepted by the group. When he seemed to
lack understanding o f what was being asked, he w ould repeat what his peers had said.
Focus groups were the only context during the study that it was visibly clear that Carl
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was somewhat influenced by his peers. In this format he was a follower, and his
insecurities surrounding his knowledge were identified.

Table 11: C arl’s Epistemological M atrix
A B S O LU TIS T
Objective view o f
knowledge

Nature o f
Knowledge
S IM P L IC IT Y
Nature o f
Knowledge
C E R T A IN T Y

Nature o f
Know ing
SOURCE

Nature o f
Knowing
JU S TIFIC ATIO N

M U L T IP L IS T
Subjective view o f
knowledge

That was like the
monkey in Dora the
Explorer.

1 seen a real bear once.

W ell, they said 1 had a
nightmare, but I ’ m not
sure. It was kind o f
funny, and I had to
wake-up w hile 1 was
sleeping, (confused
facial expressions).
A rie l said she w ill
m arry me, and we can
have our own fam ily.

1 know that a lot o f cars
can drive on a bridge or
else m y daddy w ould
take us on a bridge.

It is bad to take that
bear’ s shoes. I f they
knew someone would
take them then they
w ould have locked their
doors so no one could
get in.

1 think me and A rie l
could go to the forest
and play w ith the w ild
things, but we w ould
bring presents and they
w ould like us better
than Max.
1 am going to b uild big
buildings like this
(pointing) because 1 am
going to make a lot o f
money and have a
house and car and dirt
bike. That w ill make
me rich!

E V A L U A T IV IS T
Shift o f objective &
subjective stance
when claims are
evaluated &
warranted.

When we were outside
and it was hot, 1 watered
the tomato plants, but
they still died because
the sun is too hot for
them to bake.

There is no way a tree
forest can grow in his
bedroom like that
(pointing) because look
(pointing) they have to
grow outside in the dirt.

Epistemic Themes
Theme 1: Fluctuates between absolutist and multiplist. Carl demonstrates the ability
to move liberally between absolutist and m ultiplist perspectives o f knowledge.
Occasionally, he constructs evaluativistic knowledge but not w ith much consistency (See
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Table 11). His knowledge is faeilitated by his capacity for imagination and pretend;
therefore, many o f his evaluativistic thinking were dismissed because they did not pertain
to the topic. Unprompted, Carl spontaneously constniets his absolutist and m ultiplist
knowledge as simple and certain; however, when he is probed about his knowledge from
authority or peers, he demonstrates more complex and uncertain dimensions to his
knowledge. His absolutist views tend to deal w ith the external world, whereas his
m ultiplistic perspectives are typically pretend or imaginaiy ideas. An absolutist certain
view, for example, relates to his personal experiences, “ snow is freezing eold, once I put
my face in it.” A m u ltip list certain view includes a pretend experience, “ I have my own
ear that me and A rie l drive in and I take her on the bridge and we have to pay to drive on
it, that’ s to pay for the people who run it.”
When asked a question, it was common for Carl to reply w ith one or two words. For
example, “ M y m om m y;” “ I t ’s w rong;” or “ Like him (pointing).” He almost always
needs probing from authority or peers to elaborate. However, once he is asked a fo llo w up question he responses appropriately and in some detail. His simple knowledge
responses are generally associated w ith the book, classroom rules, or personal
experiences (real and imagined). For example, “ Blaekout is black. I am him and he’ s
blaek;” or “ when we come inside we have to first wash our hands and then sit in eircle
time.” C arl’ s responses are quick and confident. He does not appear to eontemplate his
thoughts prior to his responses, and once probed he provides a good amount o f detail.
For example, “ I think it beeause one time me and my daddy were fishing and we had
three poles so then we had to thread them but we didn’ t cateh anything w ith the one pole
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so we used the last pole and the fish really like it and we caught them and cleaned them
and ate them. We did it all ourself.”
Theme 2: Nature o f knowledge and source o f knowledge impacted by others. When
he is in an individual setting, his way o f knowing is prim arily absolutist, and he generally
constructs his knowledge using simple and certain dimensions o f knowledge. His
responses are sometimes so b rie f they arc d iffic u lt to distinguish simple from certain
knowledge. When his knowledge is probed in an individual setting, he moves to a
m ultiplist perspective and accesses all four dimensions o f knowledge (i.e. simple, certain,
souree, justification) w ith ease. However, he can become verbose by incorporating a
large amount o f imaginary and pretend knowledge w ithin his m ultiplistie views. Carl
does not appear his most comfortable in a one-to-one situation; he does not take a great
deal o f pleasure in relaying his understanding independently. For example, he remains
serious w ith a flat affect, his animated side is inhibited, and he waits for the researcher or
the teacher to initiate the activity or discussion.
Conversely, when he is in a group environment (i.e. whole class instruction, centers,
focus group), there is less absolutist thinking and far more m ultiplistic thinking. Again it
appears to be in a somewhat competitive nature w ith his peers (i.e. he seems to enjoy
telling his stories). Also, the m ultiplistic perspectives appear to be less restricted to the
nature o f knowledge and more integrated among the four dimensions o f knowledge. For
example, his eomfort level includes m oving between the dimensions o f knowledge
w ithout much intentional probing. Also, in peer group situations, he is more inclined to
ask questions o f his peers that also prompt responses from all four dimensions o f
knowledge. A dditionally, there are hints o f his pretend w orld but considerably less than
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during individual interview time. There is a sense that he understands that it is less
socially accepted, and his peers do challenge him on his pretend stories. This peer
eonfrontation leads him to contribute more authentic experiences that are sim ilar to his
peers. Therefore, his contributions and associations are realistic and coherent regarding
his personal experiences w ith fam ily and situations that occur w ith peers in the
classroom.
Theme 3: Combining verbal and nonverbal epistemologies. C arl’ s initial responses
are always verbal only but typieally quite b rie f and require some probing from the
researcher or the teacher. When he addresses the questions posed to him, he begins an
elaboration process in whieh he eombines his verbal language w ith nonverbal gestures
when describing his knowledge. For example, he uses his words but w ill regularly point
toward whatever he is discussing. He also w ill aet out behaviors and emotions to
demonstrate meaning in a visual manner. For example, he was describing how he and
A riel would go to see the w ild things and have a party. He jum ped up and did a dance
and pretended to have a w ild thing on his back. He tw irled around and said “ Hooray!”
Although he has good verbal skills, he communicates his way o f knowing by using a
combination o f verbal and nonverbal skills. For example, his affect is norm ally flat and
serious, but often when his knowledge is questioned or probed, he has a way o f using
faeial expressions that add an affective component to his way o f knowing information.
Also, he uses body gestures to emphasize specific components o f his knowledge.
Interestingly, he seems to use this type o f communication to construct knowledge when
he is elaborating about his personal experiences and pretend situations and w hile talking
about his fam ily.
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Theme 4: Justification o f knowledge at an absolute level versus a multiplist level.
Carl’s justifications for knowledge, at the absolutist level o f development, include
responses that are more linked to the story or the theme o f the week (from a peer). For
example, he w ill use what he hears during whole class instruction or the focus groups to
clarify his thinking;

. .because it was in the story. Max did a bad thing and got into

trouble by his mommy;” or “ ...because it’s like we talked about getting dressed right for
the cold weather, i f we don’t has hats and mittens we can get a cold and sick.”
When Carl demonstrates justification o f knowledge at a multiplist level o f
development, he references his own experiences or conceptions related to his family.
Both domains (i.e. his experience or family) include more animation and affect from him
during his descriptions. For example he stands up from the sitting position and says, “ I
think we don’t touch other people’s food because when I take the food out o f my dog’s
dish it can make me sick and throw-up.” He goes on to describe how he feels when he
gets sick to his stomach; the whole time he is telling this scenario he is using a variety o f
facial expressions and body gestures. At the end he says, “ I think I w ill only eat the food
on my plates because 1 can’t play when I am sick and I don’t want to either.”
Case Study: GiGi
Description
Child-Participant #4 is a four-year-one-month-old Caucasian female. She attends the
preschool five days per week for a full day. GiGi is dropped o ff at school by her father
and, on a rare occasion, her mother. She is a light-hearted individual who makes
everything about the chore o f coming to school appear easy. She is bright and cheerful,
and she is always smiling. The interesting observation about GiGi is that she is not
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drawn to one or two o f her peers; she plays w ell w ith all o f her peers. Her behavior and
her disposition are extremely consistent from day-to-day and context-to-context. When
her father drops her o ff at preschool, she knows just what to do and directs her father on
what he needs to do, what she is doing, and where she is going (i.e., “ Daddy you put the
bag in my cubby and I am going to see M r. I.” or “ I am going potty, you wait for me
here and we can walk to the playground together.” ).
GiG i always appears w ell rested and alert. She is resilient and adapts to change well.
For example, the preschool classroom can be unpredictable, and she is cognitively and
emotionally equipped and prepared for whatever is going on that day. She is dressed
nicely in colorful clothes that are clean and neatly pressed. Her hair is combed and
pulled back away from her face. When she has barrettes in her hair, they match her outfit.
When others comment on her appearance, she appropriately thanks them and reciprocates
the compliment. GiGi is compassionate and genuine in her interactions w ith others.
When asked what she likes most about coming to preschool, she replied, “ 1 get to play
w ith my friend, I love M r. 1, and we do lots o f fun things when we learn.”
W hile observing her interactions w ith both o f her parents, they appear to be very
affectionate (i.e. always saying, “ I love you” or “ how was your day?” ) and attentive to
her needs. She has a gentle way about her, but she is very articulate and straightforward
w ith her language. G iG i is aware o f her suiToundings and oriented to the rules around
her. She has a good moral compass in which she can confront her peers about their
inappropriate behaviors. For example she says, “ Y ou’ re not being very nice, i t ’s not hard
to share.” “ We are supposed to be quiet and wait for M r. I to get started.” Her peers are
receptive to her direction and her ideas. She has the a b ility to interact and respond in a

244

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

pretend manner but typically approaches things as they appear to her external reality
according to the rules. She was never a behavior problem. She raises her hand to talk and
uses her prior knowledge and past experiences to contribute in a relevant manner.
D uring whole elass instaiction, she independently prepares herself for the story. GiGi
is very proud o f her knowledge about the rules and procedures o f the classroom. She has
good eye contact; her affect and disposition are vibrant and receptive to listening and
watching. She regularly participates in the welcome song and the question and answer
session led by the teacher. She avoids any negative behavior from her peers and, in fact,
is a positive influence on her peers. When she participates during the whole class
instruction, she uses her words to articulate her thoughts and ideas rather than nonverbal
gestures as a way to convey meaning.
The center activities allow her more freedom; however, she continues to fo llo w the
rules and procedures. Most days she w ill choose her own center, but on some occasions
she waits until everyone has chosen and allows the teacher to place her in a center. GiGi
likes all o f the centers and does not appear to have a favorite; her behavior is consistent
no matter what center she is in. She is quiet and works independently; her only
interaction w ith her peers during this time is to give them direction about their behavior
or the details o f the task. For the most part she is engaged in her center, but i f she is has
to wait fo r her turn or wait for the teacher, she w ill discretely observe the activities o f her
peers in a close proxim ity to where she is located. She can get back to focusing on her
activity whereas many o f the children are easily distracted by their peers.
D uring the individual interviews she was eager to please the researcher (i.e., leaving
her center voluntarily, attempting to answer all the questions, never needing any rewards
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for her participation). GiGi was easy to engage in the activities and/or questions; she was
inquisitive about the project and asked excellent questions about her involvement in the
projeet. She made insightful eomparison between her behavior and the behavior o f her
peers. For example, “ I bet I am the best one. I never cry or run out.” “ I like doing this
because we talk more about the story and I get to see the pictures again.” “ We are doing
this because you want to see how much we know about what we are learning.”
The individual interviews allowed another side o f her to shine; she showed more o f
her ability to tap into a pretend world. GiGi demonstrated a child-like animated
disposition, and her favorite phrase was, “ 1 am so silly.” When she was not completely
sure what was being asked or how she needed to answer, she would make tangential
statements about television shows, toys, and her personal experiences, but they were not
always relevant to the question or the topic. She appeared to be relaxed and laughed at
her comments, particularly when she was aware they were not relevant. In addition, she
demonstrated more nonverbal body gestures to assist her verbal descriptions; this
prompted a bit more psychomotor activity (i.e., moving around the room, flailing her
arms and legs) and confused expressions (scowling, poor eye contact, talking more
softly).
GiGi’s behavior and contributions in the focus groups mirrored the individual
interviews much more than the whole class instruction and the center activities. Again,
she was more animated, still engaged and articulate but sometimes silly and off-topic.
She seemed to enjoy this interaction with her peers more than the other contexts. She
was still a bit authoritative but not with the consistency or intensity observed in the other
contexts. Here she was more affected by peer’s negativity, primarily when the
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researcher’s questions required more cognitive a b ility or were more cognitively
demanding. She continued to be well-behaved and on-task but certainly more animated
and playful w ith her peers.
G iG i was in Group 1; her involvement w ith this group was interesting in that she was
frequently tom between matching her ability w ith the more articulate boy or dim inishing
her behavioral capacity to match the more disruptive g irl in the group. The more
consistent pattern regarding her decisions about the group involvement revolved around
her prior knowledge and past experiences that she could associate w ith the different
topics. Her cognitive, affective, and behavior contributions during the focus groups are
thought to also be related to her a b ility to understand what the researcher was asking and
the ease w ith which she could understand what her peers were contributing. Therefore,
the greater her associations were fo r the topic or relating to her peers, the more she
demonstrated her cognitive abilities; however, when she failed to make meaning from her
peers or could not interpret the researcher’s questions, she opted to demonstrate
inconsistent behaviors that bordered on disruptive at times.
Epistemic Themes
Theme I : M u ltip list level o f development. G iG i demonstrated her knowledge
according the epistemological m atrix at all three developmental levels and all four
dimensions o f knowledge (See Table 12).
Overall G iG i’s views o f knowledge appear to be at a m ultiplistic level o f
development. Her ability to communicate her knowledge was more content specific than
dependent on the context. Specifieally, she demonstrated more versatility in her ability to
shift between dimensions and levels o f development i f she had more prior knowledge or
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personal experiences regarding the topic (i.e. monsters, winter, construction, fam ily). For
example, she was able to demonstrate the complexities o f her knowledge w hile talking
about the monsters and fam ily themes o f the week as compared to her inability to show
the same levels and dimensions during the weeks when winter and construction were
covered.
Her knowledge was much less affected by the type o f setting she was in (i.e., whole
class instruction, individual interview, focus group). For example, on the topics that she
conveyed her knowledge more thoroughly (i.e., monsters and fam ily), there was little
difference between how she responded in a group setting versus how she responded
individually. When she had a greater understanding o f the content, the context did not
negatively or positively impact her ability. When she was unfam iliar about the topic (i.e.,
winter and construction), it was clear in her contributions that she had lim ited background
knowledge and personal experience. When this was the case, G iG i functioned better
w ithin a group environment (i.e., whole class instruction, focus groups). For example,
during an individual interview about construction, she did not independently reference
the story that had been read earlier; she quickly gave up and said, “ I don’ t know.” Once
the researcher prompted her w ith a picture in the story, she attempted to make
associations but due to the lack o f prior knowledge she responded, “ W ell looks like that
big truck is making the building fall down. I ’ m not sure, I don’t know, I don’t know.”
On the same topic (construction) in the focus group she was not as inclined to give up
and she shared her knowledge and understanding. For example, she listened to her peers
talk about how the “ big machines” are used to “ help men make the building bigger.”
Then the same question that was asked in the individual interview, “ Look at this picture.
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Can you tell me what is happening that makes this construction?” G iG i replied, “ I am
not so sure about astruction, it ’ s a weird word but A said the big trucks put the building
together and up (pointing), so I would say astruction here is that (pointing to the machine)
helping them (pointing to the men).” It appears that more self-efficacy to build
knowledge exists in group formats for GiGi.
Another obseiwation that began to emerge as a developmental pattern was more
noticeable as she shifted between developmental levels rather than between dimensions
o f knowledge. There was however a pattern for the dimensions o f knowledge at the
m ultiplist level. There were two characteristics that were identified as she communicated
her knowledge: (a) her choice o f communication (i.e., verbal, nonverbal, combination),
and (b) the amount o f affect used to demonstrate her knowledge. A t the absolutist level
o f development, she only used her words to show her knowledge and used less affect and
emotion (i.e., animation, facial expression, body gestures). A t the m ultiplist level, she
integrated verbal and nonverbal expressions in which her affect and emotions
corresponded appropriately with what she was saying and doing. There was an affective
pattern that became clear throughout the study (reported in the next paragraph). A t the
evaluativist level, she combined her verbal description w ith less eonsistent nonverbal
behaviors, and the combination o f words and gestures appeared to be fragmented and not
necessarily in-line (i.e., inappropriate or naïve understanding).
The m ultiplist level o f development was where G iG i functioned from most
frequently. There was a distinctive affective pattern that developed at the m ultiplist level
in relationship to the nature o f knowledge (simple, certain) and the process o f knowing
(source, justification). M u ltip list simple and certain knowledge and m ultiplist
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justification o f knowledge were affectively consistent; that is her words matched her
disposition. For example, “ 1 am excited that we are going to talk about this story. 1 really
liked it. The pictures are colored nice and 1 like the w ild things. They don’t scare me
because I know it is just pretend.” Her affect was bright and cheerful; she was sm iling
and confident w ith good eye contact. She demonstrated many body gestures consistent
w ith a positive accepting attitude and excitement. However, at a m ultiplist source o f
knowledge, she was seemingly more confused about the questions, as w ell as her
answers. It appeared to be a struggle between internal and external sources o f knowledge
and, regardless o f the source, her affective disposition was inconsistent w ith her
responses. For example, when the question was, “ H ow do you know the dogs in the story
are mean?” , she made eye contact w ith the researcher, paused for about 15 seconds, then
looked at the flo o r during her response, “ I have tw o dogs and I think they are nicer than
those dogs (pointing). I have B & L and I love them and they love me back.” Typically
when bringing up “ love” she would hug herself or smile; in the case o f m ultiplist source
o f knowledge her affect and emotional gestures were completely inconsistent. Her voice
became softer, she did not appear confident or enthusiastie, and she demonstrated a
neiwous psychomotor agitation (i.e., picking at her shoelaces, tw isting her hair), rather
than behaviors that complemented her knowledge.
Theme 2: Knowledge is complex and uncertain. Regardless o f the level o f
development, G iG i expressed her knowledge most commonly in terms o f the nature o f
knowledge (simple and certain). This theme appeared to be strongly conneeted to her
fa m ilia rity w ith a topic. When she had lim ited knowledge and experience (as discussed
in theme 1 w ith group versus individual), she demonstrated knowledge as simple and
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uncertain. However, the more background knowledge and past experience she seemed to
have about a topic, her knowledge was interpreted as more complex and certain.
Although the more her knowledge was probed, she maintained the complexities o f her
knowledge but shifted to a more uncertain perspective o f knowledge. Interestingly, when
the simple and certain dimensions were questioned in more depth to uncover the process
o f knowing dimensions, she was able to link simple and certain knowledge w ith
justification but rarely source o f knowledge, The example about the dogs used above to
demonstrate inconsistencies w ith affect would demonstrate this well too.
Theme 3: Source o f knowledge weakness. Source o f knowledge appears as a
weakness in every visible pattern that emerged fo r G iG i; therefore, it is a theme all o f its
own. Her lack o f a b ility to demonstrate source o f knowledge related to the follow ing
areas: background knowledge and personal experience (theme 1 and 2), affective patterns
(theme 1), and absence o f links to the nature o f knowledge (theme 2). Her responses to
source o f knowledge probing met w ith many negative cognitive features that are
consistent w ith overload, such as confused expressions, decrease o f interest and
motivation, disengagement leading to disruptive behaviors, visible frustration (i.e., hands
over face, poking the pencil into her leg, walking away), and nervous/anxious behaviors
(i.e., biting her hand, tw isting hair, darting eyes).
I f a source o f knowledge question was related to a story that was read in whole class
instruction, she was able to identify it as the source o f her knowledge. However, when
follow -up questions that targeted source o f knowledge specifically and were in
relationship to a previous statement, she was prim arily nonverbal (i.e., shrugging
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shoulders, closed eyes, made some s illy facial expression). On occasion she m ight say “ I
don’t know ” , but that was not a standard answer.

Table 12: G iG i’s Epistemological M atrix
A B S O LU TIS T
Objective view o f
knowledge

M U LT IP L IS T
Subjective view o f
knowledge

E V A L U A T IV IS T
Shift o f objective &
subjective stance
when claims are
evaluated &
warranted.

Nature o f
Knowledge
S IM P L IC IT Y

N o, you can only wear
your bathing suit when
you go sw im m ing, and
you don’t go sw im m ing
in the winter.

1 am not your friend, 1
am friends w ith Robin, 1
like her.

Nature o f
Knowledge
C E R T A IN T Y

They are hiding from
their mommy and they
are hiding in the snow
(pointing).

1 wear a hat and mittens
when it is w inter so 1
stay warm and 1 don’t
get sick. I f 1 get sick
then 1 don’ t want to take
m y medicine, Y U C K !
1 have tw o dogs and 1
think they are nicer than
those dogs (pointing). 1
have B and L and 1 love
them and they love me
back.

I f you go away from your
m om my and daddy,
strangers can come and get
you. But sometimes 1 get
scared because 1 think 1
don’ t want to be taken
away from my m om m y
and daddy. They make me
safe.
No s illy , flowers and trees
can’ t grow inside because
they need to grow big and
tall like me. See 1 am big
and tall (compares herself
to a sm aller peer).
M ax had a boat outside his
w indow in his im agination;
he wanted it so he made it
up. He wanted it because
he wanted it to go to see
his friends, the W T ’s .
L ike 1 have friends but 1
don’ t want to take a boat to
sec them, 1 pretend 1 drive
my car.
1 am m aking a monster to
look like the W T ’s and 1
am going to name it J like
m y sister and it is going to
be so scary but you w o n ’ t
even know it is scary
because then you w o n ’ t
like it.

Nature o f
Knowing
SOURCE

In the story his m om my
said ‘ go to sleep M a x .’
(Adds affect in tone and
body.)

Nature o f
Know ing
JU STIFIC A TIO N

Sometimes you have to
wear your coat because
it is cold, like in the
w inter it is cold and 1
wear my coat.

1 like to sing the hello
song because 1 know all
o f the k id ’ s names. You
have to watch me do it,
sometime 1 want you to
see how 1 know all the
names.
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Theme 4: Linking the nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing. GiGi is an
independent thinker and a leader o f her peers. Many o f the themes presented included
responses that were eonstructed due to follow-up questions and probing by the
researcher. This theme deals with patterns that GiGi presented independently within the
daily activities o f the classroom and spontaneous interactions with the teacher, peers, or
the researcher. Her spontaneous statements followed the same general pattern as the
probed responses; that is she automatically linked the nature o f knowledge and the
process o f knowing in similar ways whether her knowledge was probed or not. The most
common links between G iG i’s understanding of knowledge from a dimensions
perspective were between the following: (a) simple and certain, (b) simple and
justification, and (c) certain and justification. Again, the source o f knowledge is absent
even when her knowledge is not intentionally probed. Perhaps her interactions with peers
automatically prompt her knowledge in much the same way as with the researcher’s
probing questions. It is important to note that the amount of interactions and statements
for the automatic connections are much less than the probing exchanges, however the
trend was the same. She continually demonstrated that she linked new information to her
prior knowledge and past experience by making associations. The associations she relies
on are the same despite the setting (i.e. constructed probe or spontaneous interaction).
They are family, classroom rules, peers, and characters in the story. These areas are her
most common connections to new information and are more accentuated in a group
setting.
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Case Study: Trudy

Description
Child-Participant # 5 is a three-year-eleven-month-old Caucasian female. Trudy
attends the preschool three days per week and is escorted by her mother, who is very
involved in what is going on in the Cricket classroom. Their relationship and routine
appears to very business-like. Trudy’s mother talks with the teacher daily when she
drops Trudy o ff and again when she picks her up. Trudy’s mother helps the teacher with
organizing parties and special events at the school and regularly brings supplies for the
children to work and play with during their center activities. Trudy is an empowered
young lady who speaks clearly and directly in a matter-of-fact manner. When asked what
her favorite thing about preschool is, she replied; “ 1 think it’ s getting ready to go and
wearing my pretty clothes and listening to the stories.”
Trudy is alert and well prepared for the day. She is always dressed impeccably in a
nice dress and matching shoes. Her hair is always curled and pulled back with matching
ribbons. She is very dainty and likes to compare herself to a “ princess.” She has a good
balance between her pretend and real worlds. She has a knack for integrating the two
(i.e. real and pretend) in her interactions with others. Her statements are generally
relevant and on-task, but she makes associations to pretend situations, mainly in
conjunction with what a princess would do. Trudy is eager to please authority and peers;
she is not confrontational and plays well with all o f her peers. When there is a disruption
or someone is behaving inappropriately, she quietly removes herself from the situation.
She is never a behavior problem and does not require redirection; she knows the rules and
procedures and acts accordingly. She is proud o f her good behavior and ability to follow
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rules. For example, she frequently makes statements such as “ Look, I am being good. I ’ m
sitting here waiting for my turn.” “ They are not being good, look at me, I am being good,
1 washed my hands before snack.” “ I am just like a princess and I know what to do to be
good and fo llo w what M r. I said.”
During whole class instruction Trudy participates appropriately in the welcome song.
She knows all o f her peer’ s names and helps others by telling them the names. She sits
right next to the teacher fo r the story; she clings to every word and focuses on every
picture. Sometimes she w ill stop the teacher and ask a question, but she raises her hand
first. When the teacher asks questions before, during, or after the story, she volunteers
spontaneously. Her responses are relevant, but she incorporates her imaginary
associations w ith being a princess. For example, “ I know a princess doesn’ t want to take
those bear’s shoes and I w ouldn’t take them because they aren’t mine and you should do
that.” She is excited about her responses, sm iling and using m inimal nonverbal gestures
to get her meaning across.
During the center activities Trudy chooses art or journal. She is conscientious about
her w ork and handles it w ith care as she shows the teacher. She is enthusiastic about
telling her projects and promptly places them in her cubby to take home. She has no
d iffic u lty engaging in a variety o f activities and seldom is distracted by her peers. In fact,
she appears to be in her own w orld and w ill sing and dance while she is working. Trudy
talks to the characters she is drawing and has pretend conversations. When asked about
her pretend play, she is happy to explain the details from an affective point-of-view . For
example, “ I am drawing cuddly bear and he said he wants to wear a blue shirt because
princesses like blue. They are going to a festival and have a nice time eating and
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playing.” She does not engage in spontaneous interactions w ith her peers during this
time unless it is to share materials. She is respectful o f others’ space and their work.
When she chooses to switch centers, she tells the teacher where she is moving to and
what she w ill be doing there. She is patient w ith her peers. When she changes centers,
she is careful not to disrupt the activity and w ill observe fo r a minute to figure out what is
happening and how she can blend in.
Trudy’s participation in the individual interviews was sim ilar to other contexts; she
was quiet but compliant w ith the researcher. She is w illin g to please and frequently
would confirm “ I am going to be good today.” She is able to fo llo w rules and listens
carefully to what is being asked; it is common for her to pause to think before she
responds to a question. When she does not understand, she either asks a question or uses
a standard “ princess” response. She is bright and cheerful although not nearly as
animated as many o f her peers. She leans more to a serious disposition. Her defense
mechanism for not understanding is her pretend scenarios rather than laughing, getting
agitated, or being disruptive. Trudy is somewhat motivated by rewards but more often
just seeks praise for her work. During the interviews, she demonstrated her curious
nature by asking questions and talking about her personal experiences, prim arily
involving her fam ily.
Trudy was in group 2 for the focus groups; she was the most articulate child in her
group and regularly demonstrated her ability to be a leader. The interesting dynamic
about her involvement in the group was that there was a boy who could match her
tendency fo r the imagined world, and they developed a unique way o f interacting w hile at
the same time staying close to the topic in terms o f generalities. They both seemed to
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have a passion for seeing things through fairytales, some o f which they had heard or
some they created. They interacted from an emotional perspective (i.e., love, fear, anger)
and had a good understanding o f rules that they fall back on. This sense o f rules kept
them and their pretend w orld centered on the topic. She would try to engage the other
member o f their group; however, this was a d iffic u lt task and she often would give up
and proceed as i f he was not there even i f he was disruptive.
Trudy seemed to enjoy the focus groups, but perhaps the personalities and talents o f
the group never seemed to build a cohesive bond because o f the differences in their
language ability and interests. Despite the disconnectedness o f the group, Taidy still
managed to build on what others in the group said and tried very hard to make the group
a positive experience. Another interesting characteristic which she demonstrated
regularly after the focus groups was to offer a summary o f what they had discussed. She
appeared to always want to recap the discussion so she could evaluate i f it was “ good” or
“ bad.”
Epistemic Themes
Theme! : Fluctuates between absolutist and m ultiplist level o f development. This
developmental pattern is one that has been seen in other child-participants in this study.
Trudy fluctuates between absolutist and m ultiplist levels o f development and sporadically
constructs knowledge that is evaluativistic-like, in that the process o f integrating
objective and subjective knowledge is present but the content is at the cognitive
sophistication o f a preschool-age child (See Table 13). A t the absolute and m ultiplist
level, she is able to construct knowledge according to all four dimensions o f knowledge.
A t the evaluativist level o f development (like others in the study), she exhibited one
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dimension o f the nature o f knowledge (certain) and one dimension o f the process o f
knowing (justification). Again, there was an absence or weakness in the area o f source o f
knowledge.
Trudy was eager to express her knowledge and did so regardless o f the developmental
level or dimension o f knowledge. A t the absolutist level, she initiated her ideas more
independently and used a combination o f verbal and nonverbal behavior. She frequently
compared characters in the story to being a princess. For example she pointed out the
similarities and differences between the w ild things and a princess. She fluttered her eye,
gracefully held her arms extended, and flipped her hair back to assist her representation
o f a princess. On the other hand, when she was describing the w ild things, she crunched
her shoulders up to her chin, put a scowl on her face, and lowered the tone o f her voice.
This pattern was predominantly during individual interviews, in which she stayed close to
the topics and dealt more w ith objective knowledge.
She demonstrated sim ilar verbal/nonverbal patterns at the m ultiplist level o f
development. Although she did derive knowledge independently at a m ultiplist level, it
was more related to interactions w ith her peers during group situations. She was
observant and could shift w ith the flo w o f the discussion. It appeared that the m ajority o f
her m ultiplistic knowledge was in support o f a previous contribution, and she
incorporated her personal experiences w ith her imaginary experiences as she saw them
relating to the discussion. The content o f her imaginary understanding was different at
the m ultiplist level; she ventured away from external sources (i.e., fact, rules, procedures)
and placed herself in the experiences (i.e. internal source o f knowledge). However,
regardless o f her pretend ways, her knowledge was relevant to the topic, coherent, and
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creative. For example, ‘T know when I am a princess the constaiction people w ill build
me a big palace to live in and I w ill give them snacks so they have energy to keep
working and I w ill let them have music because I want them to do a good job and be safe
at my palace.”
Interestingly, Trudy used her imagination at the absolutist and m ultiplist levels o f
development. However, she never e xplicitly acknowledged real versus pretend at the
absolutist level but when she was functioning at the m ultiplist level she regularly pointed
out that she was aware the two realities are different. For example, “ 1 am making a
princess going to a big party. Like when I pretend I am a real princess and I dress-up.
That’s when I put on a pretend dress but it is a real dress and I pretend it is beautiful.”
This pattern has also been seen w ith other child-participants in this study and seems to be
an egocentric subjectivity laced w ith objective knowledge but not as refined as at an
evaluativistic perspective due to the internal and imaginary nature o f the knowledge.
Theme 2: Certainty o f knowledge and personal experience. Trudy demonstrated a
developed understanding from a certainty o f knowledge perspective which was seen at all
three developmental levels. She emphasized her certainty o f knowledge using her
personal experiences and never appeared to be at a loss for ways to verbally describe her
certainty or uncertainty (i.e., “ Sometimes,” “ 1 can’t be sure,” “ You never know,” “ I don’ t
know but my mommy does” ). She elaborated independently or w ith probing. It is a
dimension o f knowledge that she always seemed to understand what was being asked.
For example, from an absolutist level, she understood that there are classroom rules and
procedures that must be follow ed daily; however, she verbalized that these same rules
and procedures vary when there is a special occasion or a holiday.
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M u ltip lis tic certainty o f knowledge was demonstrated frequently as she described the
differences between what she does “ for real” and what she does “ fo r pretend.” Even
though she showed hints o f egocentrism at the m ultiplist level, her understanding o f
others, in relationship to herself, seemed to exceed the expectations o f classical
egocentrism. For example, “ 1 think 1 want to wear beautiful dresses and go see the w ild
things that way they w ill know I am special and they would not hurt me. I f 1 have a
beautiful dress 1 don’ t need to be a scared o f them but I know A w on’ t want to wear a
dress he w ould look s illy so he would have to think o f some way to make them not as
scary.”
Theme 3: Patterns f o r source o f knowledge. Trudy has some characteristic and not
so characteristic traits regarding the source o f knowledge. There were four dominant
qualities regarding T ru d y’s expressions fo r source o f knowledge: (a) Clearly her source
o f knowledge was internal, and she seemed to be in touch w ith the internal nature, at least
o f her imaginary knowledge; (b) she used the stories as a source and related characters
and events from the story to her personal experiences; (c) she did not refer to her peers as
any source o f authority, nor did she defer questions to her peers, and she docs not mimic
their language or behaviors that could be construed as peers as a source o f knowledge;
and (d) she used her knowledge o f the rules in the classroom and at home as her sources
but, when asked e xplicitly, she did not identify a source, such as the teacher.
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Table 13: Trudy’s Epistemological Matrix
A B S O LU TIS T
Objective view o f
knowledge

M U LT IP L IS T
Subjective view o f
knowledge

N ow , that's tw o
snails. They move
slow. And Crickets
tiiey move really slow
too. Not our class.
We move last but we
are really fast. We are
not real Crickets. We
they go really slow,
like this (gesture).
You get punished i f
yo u're bad.
Sometimes you can
get punished when
you don 't know.

1 learned that everyone
don’ t hit each other and
keep my body safe. M y
knowledge is 1 think in
m y head.

Nature o f
Knowing
SOURCE

M y m om my knows
how to dress in the
winter. She makes me
wear a coal and a hat
and mittens.

Nature o f
Knowing
JU STIFIC ATIO N

Those monsters
(points to book) are
scary because they are
scary and ugly. They
are g row ling their
teeth and they have
b ig bugging eyes.

1 know everything that’ s
about penguins. I
watched penguins at the
zoo, so I know they live
in the cold, like bears do
too.
1 like to dress-up like a
princess because my
m om m y and daddy
think I'm so pretty and
then 1 feel pretty and
beautiful.

Nature o f
Knowledge
S IM P LIC IT Y

Nature o f
Knowledge
C E R T A IN TY

1 am making a princess
going to a big party.
Like when 1 pretend !
am a real princess and I
dress-up. T h a t’ s when 1
put on a pretend dress,
but it is a real dress and
1 pretend it is beautiful
(gesture).

E V A L U A T IV IS T
Shift o f objective &
subjective stance
when claims are
evaluated &
warranted.

Sometimes the bears
should be in trouble for not
listening to the mom but
sometimes it is different.
Sometimes 1 have to listen
to my m om my and
sometimes I have to do my
daddy's way beeause 1
don 't want to get in trouble
but it is different.

1 think the mom should be
different beeause i f he’ s
(M ax) so bad and hurts her
ears then she could have
walked him rig ht up to his
room. T hat’ s what my
m om my w'ould do to me.

Theme 4: Absolute ju s tific a tio n o f knowledge requires probing. Another pattern that
developed throughout the course o f the study was Trudy’ s d iffic u lty w ith absolute
justification o f knowledge, both during individual and group situations. She was
typically quick to initiate a topic and put her knowledge front and center. However, a
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reoccurring deficit was in the lack o f spontaneity to be able to respond to intentional
follow -up questions designed to probe this cell o f the matrix. When probed repeatedly
w ith questions constructed specifically using her words to probe this type o f
understanding, she was able to demonstrate her a b ility to construct absolute justification
o f knowledge. For example, most o f her absolute simple knowledge was linked to rules
and procedures; she knows the rules etc. but had no immediate understanding o f why the
rules are good from an objective perspective; therefore she resorted to making subjective
claims about her knowledge (i.e. m ultiplist justification).
It was suspected that this pattern is a negative effect o f pretending beeause she has a
strategy where everything filters through her imaginary w orld in which things can be
manipulated. Since she was always interested in “ being good” and staying “ out o f
trouble,” she was able to manipulate the realities o f the objective nature o f the rules
because they did not apply to her. This rationale was tested during a focus group. There
was a hypothetical situation in which the child was resistant to fo llo w ing the rules in the
classroom. Then questions were asked as a means to scaffold absolute justification o f
knowledge responses. Questions were as follows: “ What are the rules in the classroom?”
“ What do you think should happen to the child?” and “ W hy are the rules so important?”
She adapted to the nature o f the questions, and what ultim ately resulted was that she
accommodated her understanding o f the information based on her existing knowledge.
The change was how she interpreted the rules as they became more subjective and
gradually honed in on a very specific way o f knowing.
Her overt lack o f understanding for the rules that she follow s each day was surprising
because tapping absolute justification was so prevalent w ith many o f the other children in
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the study. It was a puzzle at first and became a challenge. Looking at knowledge through
her ways o f knowing highlighted the importance o f the link between absolute simple
knowledge and absolute justification o f knowledge.

Due to the nature o f the study, it

was possible to attempt to identify potential reasons fo r the gap as w ell as some potential
solutions.
Case Study: Jeremy
Description
Child-Participant #6 is a four-year-one-month-old male who attends the preschool
three days per week for the fu ll day. Jeremy’ s parents are divorced, and he lives w ith his
father and two older brothers. He rarely visits his mother. His dad brings him to
preschool, and it is very rushed. He walks Jeremy to the corner o f the building and pats
him on the head and says, “ Be good.” Jeremy is quiet; he seems to play w ell w ith his
peers but does not communicate verbally. He is quite shy and has extremely poor eye
contact; he is usually looking down at the ground. When someone in authority interacts
w ith him, he w ill respond, but his voice is soft to the point that it is d iffic u lt to hear or
understand what he is saying. When he is asked to repeat what he said, he barely speaks;
he needs to be directed to look up and speak louder, which he does on occasion when
redirected.
When asked what he likes most about coming to preschool, he replied, “ I don’t! ”
Trying to make light o f his comment and attempting to give him a second chance, the
question was asked again; he replied, “ the toys.” When asked which toys he liked best,
his reply was nearly nonverbal, “ them” as he pointed to the dramatic play area. His
reaction to the individual attention was a surprise because he did very w ell on the
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prescreening assessments for receptive and expressive language and cognitive ability, and
he passed the false-belief task. Despite the conflicting impressions between the
observations o f him w ithin the classroom context and his assessment scores, Jeremy
seemed like a desirable candidate for the study.
During the whole class instruction, his behavior was always appropriate. Jeremy
would come in from outside, promptly wash his hands, and sit in the circle quietly
waiting fo r the story to begin. Although he was one to fo llo w all o f the social and
behavioral rules, he was not one to fo llo w the procedures. For example, Jeremy never
once participated on the good morning welcome song. W hile everyone else was clapping
and singing, he was pulling on his shoelace, staring outside, or lying on the floor
practically asleep. Interestingly, Jeremy was not a behavior problem, so neither the
teacher nor any o f the aides ever attempted to engage him during the course o f the study.
He would usually sit o f f to the side or in the very back o f the circle. He vacillated from
day-to-day in terms o f looking at the pictures during the story and actually sitting w ith his
back to the teachers and his peers. Again, when he had his back turned, no one ever
addressed his behavior. Occasionally, on days when Jeremy was paying attention and
appeared to be more alert, the teacher would ask him questions about the story; however,
he would speak so softly that no one could hear him, and the teacher would say, “ Thank
you Jeremy. That’ s ver>' interesting.”
During the individual interview activities, it was quickly noticeable that for the
purpose o f the study that these sessions would be for relationship building more so than
identifying epistemologies. First, he never made any contributions during the whole class
instruction, so there was no individual questioning to construct for him personally.
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However, some attempts were made to ask follow -up questions about what his peers or
the teacher had said.
Epistemic Themes

Table 14: Jeremy’ s Epistemological M atrix
A B S O LU TIS T
Objective view o f
knowledge

Nature o f
Knowledge
S IM P L IC IT Y

Yes, no w ild things.

Nature o f
Knowledge
C E R T A IN T Y

We have to get ready
for the story first and to
get ready for the story
you sit like this
(gesture).

Nature o f
K now ing
SOURCE

Some o f them are
purple and some o f
them are green but
some are black
(pointing). Look can
you see, they are like
Transformers.
Those bears w ill get in
trouble because they
ran from the momma
bear and she w ill be
mad and them bears
w ill be in big trouble
(gesture/emotion).

Nature o f
K now ing
JU S TIFIC A TIO N

M U L T IP L IS T
Subjective view o f
knowledge

Look, that momma bear
is hugging the baby
bears. I like hugs, my
daddy gives me hugs too.
1 am afraid o f monsters
but Max has them as
friend but not me. M y
m om m y keeps me not be
scared.

E V A L U A T IV IS T
Shift o f objective &
subjective stance
when claims are
evaluated &
warranted.

When you don’ t follow
the right way, you get
lost because once 1 go
lost and it was no fun.
The bears maybe have
fun getting lost because
they know about the
forest.

I like the w ild thing
monsters (pointing) but 1
am afraid o f monsters so
I w ould run real fast. M y
m om m y says there is no
monsters (emotion).
1 had it first so he can’ t
have it because 1 am still
needing it to color
Blackout, so it looks like
how 1 want it like on the
TV.

Theme 1: Absolutist and m ultiplist levels o f development. Jeremy’ s developmental
pattern shifted prim arily between absolutist and m ultiplist views o f knowledge (See
Table 14). M ost o f his knowledge came through in group settings where he needed to
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interact w ith others. V irtu a lly none o f his individual interviews yielded any tangible
information regarding his level o f development or dimensions o f knowledge. Therefore
all o f the themes that are reported come from group involvement (i.e. whole class
instruction and focus groups). In addition, w ithin the group contexts, he very rarely
interacted or communieated spontaneously, including during the less structured center
activities. He needed to be prompted to speak and when he did, his initia l responses were
objective and simple. For example, when asked, “ What do you think the w ild things are
doing in this picture?” , he responded “ Playing.” When asked, “ What makes them
scary?”, he said, “ W ild Things.” When the question was a yes/no question, he responded
only w ith a “ yes” or “ no” response and offered no elaboration. The outstanding
absolutist patterns that emerged are related to simple knowledge and source o f
knowledge. (For examples see Theme 3 below.)
Absolute certain knowledge and justification o f knowledge patterns were more
d iffic u lt to take hold o f beeause he demonstrated a great deal o f his knowledge in
fragments and nonverbal gestures (i.e., pointing, shaking his head, shrugging shoulders).
He would say a couple o f words and gesture; his meaning came across in his way o f
communicating but the lim ited language made inferences necessary. His knowledge was
strongly dependent on others (i.e. peers, teacher, researcher); Jeremy observed and
processed what others w cie saying, then he echoed the general idea but not the language.
For example, someone contributed the idea that monsters are scary; Jeremy grasped onto
the idea o f “ scary” and made fragment sentences and gestures.
He was more articulate and forthright w ith his m ultiplist perspectives and conveyed
his subjective knowledge by demonstrating much improved language skills; he still used
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a lot o f nonverbal behaviors, and he clearly had less dependency on others to make his
thinking explicit. His multiplist perspectives were more clearly noticeable in terms o f all
four dimensions o f knowledge (i.e. simple, certain, source, justification); that is they were
more identifiable with less reading between the lines. Similar to his absolute views, these
multiplistic ways o f thinking were only conveyed in group settings.
Throughout the course o f the study, every occasionally Jeremy constructed a
surprising evaluativistic-like statement that was piggy-backed on a statement made by
someone during a discussion. These rare but occasional excerpts o f his knowledge led to
Theme 4 because it appeared that he had the cognitive ability but not the motivation to
engage in the activities. This raises an important question that is not so obvious with the
other child-participants, which is, how important is emotional disposition in developing
knowledge?
Theme 2: New information is generally linked to the hooks andfam ily and is strongly
influenced by peers. When it came to linking new information to existing knowledge and
experience, Jeremy had a small repertoire o f associations; however, there were
identifiable behavior patterns that emerged throughout the study which distinctively
identified characteristics that separated each type o f connection. For example, his
absolutist views o f knowledge were primarily linked to the stories read during whole
class instruction. His multiplist views included references that link his knowledge to his
family, primarily his mother. This seemed a bit contradictory to what was observed and
what was known about his home life (i.e. very limited contact with his mother); therefore,
this again raised questions regarding sources o f knowledge and the emotional component
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to the knowledge o f preschooler’ s. Evaluativistic statements were generated and
prim arily influenced by others and related to the stories.
Jeremy did not interact verbally w ith his peers; however, he did appear to listen and
watch what his peers were saying and doing in the classroom and during playtime.
Although his verbal interactions with peers were restricted by choice rather than ability,
he did initiate play on the playground and during center activities. Otherwise, his
involvement was awkward and strained but effective because he was heavily influenced
by his peer’s knowledge.
Theme 3: Simple/ Source o f knowledge have distinct verbal/nonverbal patterns. This
theme was most prevalent in the analysis o f his absolutistic thinking. Besides being
strongly associated to his obser\'ations o f others, it deals w ith the ways in which he
conveyed his simple and source o f knowledge. Absolute simple knowledge ideas began
w ith independently derived nonverbal gestures (i.e., pointing, nodding his head, using
arms and legs to demonstrate his words). These gestures were followed by b rie f simple
verbalizations which occurred in a single word which he was able to generate
independently or repetitions o f the same word or phrase echoed from a peer. For
example, when asked “ ’What in the picture makes the monsters scary?” , he placed his
finger on their eyes and bulged his eyes. When direct probing about their eyes was in
progress he repeated, “ Eyes,” “ Eyes,” “ Eyes.” followed by, “ B ig,” “ B ig,” “ B ig.” This
was a naïve and gross misrepresentation o f his ability to convey his understanding o f
knowledge and the question. A n y attempt to identify depth to his absolute simple
knowledge resulted in visible frustration, disengagement, and disruption. A sim ilar
pattern exists in absolute source o f knowledge; he never explicitly verbalized sources o f
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knowledge although some sources were embedded in his responses (i.e., the book,
fam ily, television characters) or were internal generalized and verbalized (i.e., “ need,”
“ want,” “ have” ). Here the verbal/nonverbal pattern was opposite in that he used his
words first follow ed by the facial and body gestures. For example, when asked, “ Who
are you closest to in your fam ily?” , he responded, “ M y dad, my says.” He stopped
verbalizing the rest o f the thought and placed his hands to his mouth and moved them in
an up-and-down motion sim ilar to im itating a duck quacking. Again, i f the researcher
probed fo r more information about his source o f knowledge, his animated behaviors
escalated, he disengaged, and became disruptive.
The reasons fo r this consistent behavior for simple and source o f knowledge at the
absolutist level partially led to Jeremy’ s fourth theme. One reason for the pattern could
be related to cognitive or language ability, but this is not like ly based on his scores on the
prescreening assessments. It eould be indicative o f a type o f cognitive overload;
however, when compared to his peers, this could be the case fo r source o f knowledge (i.e.
this was a d iffic u lt dimension fo r all o f the child-participants) but not so fo r simple
knowledge (i.e. this dimension was not found to be highly challenging fo r his peers). The
other thought for the pattern is the role o f affect in developing epistemologies o f
preschoolers. This rationale seems to fit w ith the data. W ithin absolute certain and
justification and all dimensions o f m ultiplist levels o f development, he could either
construct knowledge independently, or he used his peers as scaffolds to aid his
knowledge. He did not do either o f these patterns for absolute simple or source o f
knowledge; therefore, these areas received the most amount o f follow -up questions from
the researcher.
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Theme 4. Negative impact o fa jfe ct on the nature and process o f knowing. As
reported in Theme 3, simple knowledge (w ithin the nature o f knowledge) and source o f
knowledge (w ithin process o f knowing) posed the most cognitive and behavioral
challenges for Jeremy as a direct result from probing. This included the negative
behaviors and other characteristics such as: lack o f independent thinking (individual
interviews and groups involvement), dependency on peers when in a group environment,
frequent repetition, and vast use o f nonverbal expressions. This prompted a closer look at
his affect and disposition.
What can be seen is that he was consistently sitting away from the group, seemingly
disengaged but picking-up infonnation through his observations o f others. He was
generally quiet and withdrawn w ith a flat affect. He did not smile or respond w ith much
emotion o f animation that was typical o f his peers. Jeremy did not spontaneously engage
peers or authority and was in itia lly resistant to attempts to engage him. He did not move
quickly (characteristic o f preschoolers) and lacked energy, interest, and motivation. For
example, he never selected center activities; rather he waited for the teacher to appoint a
center. A ll o f these behaviors seem to contribute to his epistemological development in
negative ways. Interestingly, the teacher never confronted his lethargy or his negative
attitude. Throughout the entire study, there was not documentation o f a single interaction
in which the teacher seemed to be in touch w ith his social or emotional well-being. In a
word, Jeremy appeared to be detached, cognitively, socially, and emotionally.
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Individual Epistemic Profile
In this section, the individual epistemic themes are reported as an individual
epistemic profile (See Figure 11). These are four o f the most common patterns that
consistently reoccurred across all six o f the child-partieipants. This is not to say that
every child-participant demonstrated the pattern w ith the same intensity or frequency, but
rather collectively these themes emerged contiguously.

Figure 11: Individual Epistemic Profile
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Individual Epistemic Themes
Theme I : Patterns o f Development
Individually the child-participants demonstrated variability in their developmental
levels. The m alleability o f their epistemologies seemed to be influenced by external
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factors such as the content, the context, and peer influences. Therefore, this theme deals
w ith the developmental patterns that emerged despite the external factors. There were 24
(6 participants x 4 themes) possible individual trajectories, from which three distinctive
patterns reoccurred across the participants. Two o f the patterns were identified multiple
times for each participant, and the third pattern was identified at least three times in all
but one o f the participants.
The first developmental pattern that was found and is the most common trajectory
found w ith this sample was beginning w ith unprompted m ultiplist assimilations about
their knowledge (See Figure 12). That is they began w ith observations regarding peers,
fam ily, or prior experiences, and follow -up questioning typically resulted in a transition
to an absolutist view as they searched fo r the “ right” answer. I f probed further, they
resorted back to the subjective or m ultiplistic references. The interesting observation
w ith this pattern was that, although they seemed to have an understanding that there is a
“ correct” answer, they tended to the urge to find it for a very b rie f time before they
retrieved more fam iliar knowledge. They were content w ith their m ultiplistic ideas and
were much less inhibited about integrating their opposing ideas w ith others. There was a
sense o f competition among the peers but it did not appear to be competition over the
“ correct” knowledge as much as competition fo r voice. They listened and contributed
their background knowledge and prior experience as i f one was just as good as the other.
They were respectful o f their peer’ s experiences and used them as a source o f objective
knowledge. This m ultiplist, absolutist, m ultiplist trajectory was comfortable for all o f the
participants and was visible in the way that they made meaning from new information.
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Figure 12: Individual Developmental Pattern #1
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Figure 13: Individual Developmental Pattern #2
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The second developmental pattern began w ith absolutist accommodations o f new
inform ation taken from the stories, peers, or classroom rules and procedures (See Figure
13). This infonnation was taken as fact and converted quickly to more m ultiplistic views,
in which the new information was linked to existing knowledge or experiences o f their
own. However, when questioned about their knowledge, they appeared to encounter
some doubt and searched for the “ right” response (i.e. absolutist). They responded w ith a
scenario from the story or mimicked a peer’ s statements. I f encouraged to elaborate in
terms o f certainty or justification, they immediately bailed on their objective sense and
fell back on m ultiplistic ways o f knowing. For example, a child-participant’s responses
progressed as follows; “ Max was bad, he was not nice to his mommy so he get into
trouble about his dinner.” “ L ittle kids should not be bad to their parents.” “ When 1 was
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bad once like that my daddy put soap in my mouth, not give me dinner but I know I was
wrong for say bad things.” “ When M a x’ s mother brought him food to his room they
made up and Max was not in trouble anymore.” “ 1 think that is good to do.” “ Once 1
couldn’t sleep when my daddy yelled at me and he had to come and tuck me in again but
then I sleeped right away and it was better.”
The interesting finding w ith these seemingly ritual or habitual patterns is that they
could be construed as linear (as seen in Figures 12 & 13) i f considered in isolation.
However, when looked at over the course o f one week or throughout the four week
duration o f the study, it becomes clear that these patterns are not linear; they repeated
time after time (See Figure 14). When these two linear patterns are thought o f in terms o f
circular processes, they appear to be similar. It became clear that the follow -up
questioning process, even though it was based on the c h ild ’s own words, was critical in
two ways: (a) how they viewed or understood their prior knowledge in relationship to
new information; and (b) how they conveyed their understanding o f their knowledge in
relationship to the type o f question being asked.
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Figure 14: Recursive Developmental Pattern 1 & 2
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The third developmental pattern was not as commonly tapped into as the previous
two patterns but occurred in most o f the participants when probed for specifically by the
researcher. The child began spontaneously with a multiplist perspective, then with
probing turned more absolutist, and then probed further the participants demonstrated the
ability to link their objective knowledge with their subjective knowledge and respond
naively evaluativistically. For example when asked, “ Where do you think you w ill find
the coins in the treasure box?” One participant answered, “ I think the coins are way deep
in the bottom under the sand. 1 found other things at the bottom o f my sandbox before
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(m ultiplist).” “ W hy do you think they are at the bottom?” “ Jamie (a peer) was reaching
way down, and he got some coins down there (absolutist).” “ Yes, he did but why do you
think they would be at the bottom?” “ Because he did and I did before and because things
fall to the bottom (evaluativist). Once my mommy dropped her earring in the toilet and
my daddy had to reach all the way to the bottom to get it back to her (m ultiplist).” A t this
point there is a return to a m ultiplistic vantage point. Once they began to lin k objective
and subjective ideas they appeared to be at a loss; this state appeared in conjunction w ith
several observable indicators sim ilar to when adults encounter doubt (i.e., facial
expressions for approval, shrugging shoulders, poor eye contact) or cognitive overload
(i.e., frustration, putting their hands over their face, wandering around, psychomotor
agitation) and they quickly returned to their personal experiences (See Figure 15).
Again, w ith this developmental pattern, a circular trajectory takes forni, in which the
participants begin with spontaneous m ultiplism and are probed through less unfam iliar
ways o f thinking about infonnation. A t a personal threshold that was different for each
child, they fell back into their comfort zone. Figure 16 represents this pattern o f
development in the recursive nature that more closely resembles how the childparticipants moved w ith the researcher through the different levels and helped shape
discussions and follow -up questions in a way that really pinpointed their individual zone
o f proximal development. W ithin this zone they appeared to be more engaged in the
activities, adapted to and demonstrated appropriate social conventions, and were
motivated learners.
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Figure 15: Developmental Pattern #3
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Figure 16: Recursive Pattern #3
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Theme 2: Dimensions o f Knowledge

Dimensions o f knowledge involve the nature o f knowledge, which pertains to the
simplicity and certainty o f knowledge, and the process o f knowing, which refers to the
source and justification o f knowledge. There are three patterns that emerged in terms o f
dimensions of knowledge throughout the study: (a) the way in which simple and certain
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knowledge were coordinated, (b) the alignment o f the nature o f knowledge (simple and
certain) w ith justification o f knowledge, and (c) the absence o f the child-participants o f
overt utilization o f sources o f knowledge.
The child-participants in this study demonstrated an obscure distinction between
simple and certain knowledge, so much so that often identical units were coded as both
simple and certain knowledge (See Figure 17). When their knowledge was conveyed as
simple (i.e., single word responses, such as, "yes"), it was also certain (i.e., " I know ",
confident dispositions, good eye contact, enthusiasm); conversely, when knowledge was
complex (i.e., integrating new information w ith prior knowledge or past experiences;
observations), they acknowledged that it was uncertain (i.e., “ I ’m not sure,” “ I don’t
know, maybe” ).

Figure 17: Nature o f Knowledge Pattern
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In this study the nature o f knowledge is the overwhelm ingly predominant way the
preschoolers constructed their knowledge. The successful integration o f new information
was seen as complex and uncertain. This harmony between sim plicity and certainty o f

278

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

knowledge was demonstrated regardless o f the developmental level; in addition, this was
the only pattern that did not have any bearing on the content o f the information or the
context o f the interactions. They continually synchronized these two dimensions o f
knowledge to the point that they could be considered one dimension that consists o f
interdependent parts in a definite pattern o f organization (i.e., perhaps unpacked too
much).
The second dimensional pattern that garnered attention was the integration between
simple and certain knowledge and justification o f knowledge (See Figure 18).

Figure 18: Dimensional Pattern #2
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The overlapping o f simple and certain knowledge from the previous dimensional
pattern remained a constant when probing knowledge and understanding for the process
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o f knowing (i.e. source and justification). This pattern involved the children linking one
or the o f simple or certain knowledge or both in alignment w ith justification o f
knowledge. For example when asked, “ What do you think fam ily means?” “ M y fam ily
is my mommy, and my daddy, and me, and my little brother, and we live in our house,
and do fun things, and we love each other, and they keep us safe.” “ W hy do you think
your fam ily is important?” “ M y mommy and daddy are important because they love me
and they help me grow bigger and smarter. Because I have to help my brother too, so he
don’ t get hurt i f he does things that w ill make him hurt. And you need your fam ily for
hugs and kisses and stuff.”
This idea o f aligning the nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing is another
pattern that happened liberally throughout the study and w ithout very much probing. In
many cases they spontaneously offered some justification for what they were verbalizing
and often it was accompanied by an increase in their nonverbal communication. Using
the example in the previous paragraph, this child used his arms to indicate to smaller size
o f his brother compared to himself; and when he said “ hugs and kisses,” he leaned over
to the researcher and gave a hug and kiss. When their thinking was more complex or
sophisticated, they had a tendency to be more active in their expressions (i.e., facial
expressions, body gestures, using items nearby as pretend objects, use o f emotional
energy to indicate meaning).
The third dimensional pattern that was identified on the individual level was the
diminished ability or absence o f the source o f knowledge. Source o f knowledge was the
least referenced o f the dimensions o f knowledge throughout the study by all o f the
participants. They were less inclined to overtly articulate their sources o f knowledge
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independently or when probed although they did regularly im p licitly reference sources o f
knowledge (i.e. internal and external) in their responses (i.e., “ mommy,” “ daddy,” “ the
book,” “ at school,” “ at home” ). They rarely answered a direct question related to the
source o f knowledge, for example, “ How do you know the rules in the classroom?” or
“ How do you know that the momma bear knows the baby bear is hiding in the snow?”
When faced w ith these types o f questions, they responded using a combination o f certain
and justification o f knowledge. For example, “ I know the mommy bear sees the baby in
the snow because look” and then pointed to the picture in the story where the mamma
bear is watching the baby bear hide in the snow, and the expression on the mamma bear’ s
face indicates she knows. Again, there was an increase in the nonverbal indicators o f
knowledge and understanding or a use o f the combination o f verbal and nonverbal
markers.
When these patterns began to emerge (cu ttin g -off their words and using more
nonverbal traits), the books were removed as an anchor to see i f they would identify the
source o f knowledge using their words rather than pointing or using other nonverbal
means o f identifying how they know. When anchors were removed, they continued to
struggle w ith source o f knowledge questions; signs o f frustration and cognitive overload
emerged and escalated. For example, “ How do you know Bob and Karen were friends at
the end o f the story?” or “ How do you know that your mommy and daddy love you?” In
both o f these instances, the child refused or was unable to respond verbally. There was
quick eye contact w ith a look o f confusion, and then no more eye contact, a couple o f
grunts, arms wrapped tightly around her chest, bottom lip protruding, and shaking her
head. In this case no more questions were asked; however, in other sim ilar scenarios
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further probing followed, which precipitated the conversation to veer off-task, a b rie f
period o f behavioral disruptions, follow ed by disengagement either physically or
emotionally.
ThemeS: Use o f Real and Pretend Knowledge
Preschooler’ s knowledge is highly malleable. They transition between real (i.e.
external) and pretend (i.e. internal) worlds w ith ease; oftentimes it can be d iffic u lt to keep
up w ith where they are mentally. W orking w ith small children one should be
knowledgeable about the pop culture o f the age group at the time. In this study the
children used that pop culture porthole as a link to their pretend world. U nlike adults,
children’ s pretend world, although internal, is uninhibited and becomes part o f the
external experiences as they integrate and transfer pretend knowledge to new infonnation
in the real world. There are two patterns that emerged from this study in terms o f their
real and pretend; (a) the nature o f knowledge experience and (b) the process o f knowing
experience (See Figure 19).
The first pattern is real versus pretend in the nature o f knowledge dimensions (i.e.
simple and certain). This pattern continued to identify the coordination between simple
and certain knowledge. In itia lly, the children tolerated the new information in the forniat
presented to them in the way o f the story, activities, their peers, or questions. In other
words it was tolerated as it appeared in the external world. In addition, it tended to be
developmentally absolutist. For example, “ When we are ready to listen to the story we
have to sit criss-cross applesauce, that way M r. 1 (teacher) knows we are ready fo r the
story to start.” However, when probed about the simple/certain knowledge they
explained the aile by elaborating into their pretend knowledge. Here they identified
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themselves with some pop culture character (i.e., Transfomiers, ninja turtle, princesses,
or a character from the story), but they eontinued to deal with the topic or question. For
example, “ Why do you sit criss-cross applesauce?” “ 1 want to be just like a princess and
be good like a princess so I can see the pictures and 1 don’t get into trouble but not
everyone is like a princess and they get into trouble with Mr. 1 (facial expressions and
body gestures).” This example illustrates the ability to answer the question in a
meaningful way by associating herself with a princess. In addition, it is representative
that as knowledge becomes more complex and sophisticated their ability to express their
knowledge is scaffolded by their nonverbal ability and the transfer o f pretend to real
world experiences (i.e., princesses are good and well-behaved and follow the rules).

Figure 19; Dimensions o f Knowledge - Real Versus Pretend
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The second pattern deals w ith how these children used real and pretend occasions
as a means o f expressing their process o f knowing, specifically the justification o f
knowledge (as the source o f knowledge was no different when using pretend knowledge).
When the topic was fam iliar to the child, meaning they had personal experience or
background knowledge o f the topic, they typically responded in a developmentally
m ultiplistic fashion and used real life scenarios or information. For example, “ W hy do
you think it takes all different types o f trucks to make a big building?” “ 1 would need
more trucks because they all do different s tu ff and 1 would build a enormous (arms)
building.” As his understanding was probed further, “ Yes, but why so many o f them?”
Adam said, “ W ell ummm (pause and expressions) it takes so many trucks for that
because it is a lot o f w ork and they share doing stuff, like when the Transformers fight,
they each have special powers like Blackout (a transformer) kicks good, and O ptim us...”
In this example, he transferred his knowledge about Transformers to the question about
the equipment; he remained on-topic and was able to answer the question in a meaningful
way but used pretend resources as a means o f making connections between background
knowledge and past experiences and new information.
When the children had less background knowledge/personal experiences or were
unfam iliar w ith the topics or did not understand the question (i.e., questions about the
source o f knowledge), they still attempted to respond. Typically it began using simple
and certain knowledge, follow ed by a way to ju s tify what they knew using some
associations or pretend knowledge. Usually this type o f response was less meaningful, in
that it was off-topic, lacked coherent sense, or was a complete behavior disruption (i.e.,
singing, dancing, repeating a word from the question). The example from Adam used
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above was said in whole class instruction. Later all o f the children were asked, “ Do you
think Adam was right that the trucks are like N inja Turtles, they all do different things?”
They responded, “ yes” or “ no” and were asked why. These were some o f the responses:
“ Trucks, trucks, trucks, turtles, turtles, turtles;” “ Like princesses too because they are
pretty and beautiful because they wear different clothes, and go to different parties;” “ I
think yes but (standing, jum ping, swinging his arms, sound effects) and (more gestures)
and because trucks w ill go in there and (sound effects) beat em up and tear em down and
(gestures and sounds effects) because they need a lot o f em.”
When the responses got to this level and probing justification o f knowledge persisted,
the characteristics were sim ilar across all o f the children. They were clearly beyond their
zone o f proxim al development; they became less motivated and cooperative, disengaged
to the point o f even w alking away from the situation, used strategies to distract the
researcher (i.e., engage in a different conversation, ask questions, tell a story), or became
behaviorally disruptive (i.e., jum ping, banging on the floor, yelling, repeating the same
words).
Theme 4: Positive Impact o j Peers in the Classroom
Peers could be a positive or a negative influence in the construction o f knowledge;
both scenarios were observed in this study. However, peers appeared to be positive
influence more frequently. They assisted one another in several ways: (a) cognitively, (b)
emotionally, and (c) behaviorally. There was a pattern o f peer scaffolding that unfolded
which appeared to assist the children individually construct knowledge developmentally
and dimensionally. The participants did not overtly identify their peers as a source o f
knowledge; however, they demonstrated various observable ways in which peers
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positively influenced their knowledge and knowing. For example, they watehed and
listened to each other respeetfully; this was more apparent in structured (whole class
instniction) and semi-structured (focus group) settings as opposed to the less structured
settings (center aetivities and playtime).
Cognitive peer scaffolding was identified when an individuals would build on one o f
their peer’ s statements or experiences. For example, in the whole class instruction, one
student said, “ Max had to go to his room for his dinner, and he pretended to go to see the
w ild things.” A participant who rarely contributed during whole class instruction replied,
“ Me too, sometimes 1 am bad and I have to go to my room but I pretend to be a race car
driver and I w in the race w ith a trophy and I get lots o f money.” In this case, the boy
never responded spontaneously to something that the teacher said and rarely responded
when the teacher posed a direct question; however, he frequently expressed his
understanding follow ing a peer statement. Peers seemed to provide inform ation that led
others to make associations or tap into their background knowledge that the teacher did
not seem to promote. For example, during a story about winter in which bears were ice
skating (most children had a d iffic u lt time w ith the theme o f winter because they lacked
experience w ith snow etc.), a student (Caren) said, “ They are skating on the lake, that is
ice, once my dad went ice fishing in the cold and got all wet and cold and sick.” Later
during an individual inter\'iew a participant unfam iliar w ith winter said, “ I don’t know
about making a snowman cuz I never did.” Asked, “ Can you tell me anything that you
know about wintertime?” He responded, “ W ell, I know Caren’ s dad went fishing on ice
but I only went fishing in the water, do you think the fish in the w inter are freezing?”
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This instance demonstrates how the child tried to incorporate knowledge from a peer into
their existing knowledge.
The ehildren in this study were able to tap into their own emotional place and that of
their peers. In other words they frequently made attempts to feel success and
accomplishment by helping others, whether it was to keep them engaged/interested, to
give instruction, or help them remember a person’ s name. They were in touch with the
frustrations o f their peers and tried to positively promote success in others. For example,
“ Let me show you a better way, it is easier i f you hold the paper this way and you don’ t
get the stuff all over (smiling, proud)” or “ It’ s okay i f you don’t know. I w ill help you.
See wateh me 1 did this before.” Also, on an individual basis, they wanted to share how
they helped someone. One example was, “ Did you see .leremy fall? 1 fell bad so I showed
him where the band-aids are and 1 told Mr. 1 he fell and got hurt and because he needed
help so I showed him so he would know.”
Children in this study used peer scaffolding as a behavioral tool in order to stay ontask. Often in whole class instruction, center activities, and focus groups, individual
participants both gave and received behavioral support from their peers which in turn
positively impacted their ability to demonstrate their knowledge and understanding. For
example, child-participants would direct others regarding the rules o f the classroom,
“ You have to get ready for the story, look sit like this criss-cross applesauce;” or “ It’s
your turn, now you try to do it and we w ill watch;” or “ You’re acting like a baby, stop
yelling and jumping we are trying to make our journals now,”
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Focus Group Epistemic Profiles
Focus Group 1 Epistemic Profiles

Figure 20: Focus Group 1 Epistemic Profile
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Epistemic Themes
Theme 1: Three developmental levels, patterns vary based on the content. Group 1
demonstrated all three levels o f development (i.e. absolutist, m ultiplist, evaluativist) (See
Figure 21). There was a trend that was identified in how they collectively constructed
their knowledge between the pre-instructional and the post-instructional focus groups
(regarding the themes monsters and w inter) that could be attributed to the content o f the
focus group. The main difference was that the monster theme tapped into their a b ility to
construct knowledge based on their background knowledge and past experiences. In these
instances they resorted to connecting real and pretend scenarios. W ith the w inter theme
participants had far less background knowledge, and many had no experiences sim ilar to
the stories that were discussed (i.e., snow, shoveling snow, building snowmen, ice
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skating). Therefore, the pre-and post-instruction focus groups for w inter had the same
patterns which mirrored the pattern o f the post-instruction monster focus group
The monster theme pre-instruction focus group began developmentally w ith a
m ultiplistic perspective; they immediately commanded the group w ith their knowledge
and experiences based on associations o f being “ afraid” or “ scared.” They then moved
toward an absolutist view, in which they discussed the differences between real and
pretend experiences. They had several ideas that were agreed upon as a group such as;
“ monsters are just pretend, like in your m ind;” “ monsters come into your head at
nighttim e” and “ in the dark;” “ mommy and daddy keep you safe from monsters but still
they are scary;” and “ monsters can be nice sometimes i f you want them to be.” To this
point they were able to be autonomous; they had shifted from m ultiplism to absolutism
meanwhile demonstrating various dimensions o f knowledge, prim arily simple and certain
knowledge. From individual patterns that had been emerging through the week, the
researeher probed fo r process o f knowing and evaluativistic thinking. The group was
versatile and responded to both frames o f questioning (i.e. justification only and
evaluativist).
Probing fo r process o f knowing w ithin the pre-instruction focus group context posed
many o f the same challenges in terms o f source o f knowledge as seen in the individual
settings. However, justification was again actively accommodated through personal
experiences, and interestingly the im p licit sources used to emphasize their justifieation
for knowing revolved around fam ily, peers, and pop culture (i.e. appropriate use o f
pretend). For example, “ 1 think that monsters can be nice sometimes because they are
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ugly and gross but I have Leonardo and 1 make him nice because he is a good guy in the
cartoon.”
Probing evaluativism again was met w ith knowledge from their personal experiences
and incorporated fam ily, peers, and pop culture associations. For example, “ 1 don’t think
that monsters are like turtles, they are like more scarier, and cuz they are nice, they keep
people safe from the bad guys, they beat them bad guys up and they smile and do lots o f
nice things, monsters try to hurt me.” Evaluativistic thinking occurred by individuals in
the focus group but more commonly then was generated in individual settings.
Evaluativistic thinking was generated from m ultiple contributions by members o f the
group in which they built on each other’ s experiences and constructed group
evaluativistic thinking, again at a naïve level o f development based on their associations.
This transcript from the pre-instructional focus group demonstrates group evaluativism:
Adam: “ 1 like monsters; I don’t think they are scary.”
G iG i: “ No, 1 think they can be but not all the time.”
Adam: “ Maybe they can be both scary sometimes and not scary sometimes. 1 think
ya, that’ s right (gestures).”
A m y: “ W ell, i f 1 am by m yself in the dark, then 1 think they could be scaring me but
then my mommy comes to make me not scared no more (gestures).”
G iG i: “ Me too (facial expressions), my mommy tells me they are not real and 1 feel
better but sometimes 1 can still be afraid o f them, unless they are good monsters.
Adam, when don’t you get afraid by monsters (body gestures)?”
Adam: “ M y mommy and daddy say they not real so 1 am not afraid and turtles are
monsters and they I ’ m not afraid o f them but 1 know my little brother is sometimes
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and I help him but I am not afraid because sometimes yes and sometimes no (voice
and gestures).”
GiG i: “ I know they are pretend and that’ s not real but I can be frightened (face/body
gestures) sometimes (laughing).
This example illustrates how they build on each other’ s point o f view and knowledge,
constantly moving from objective knowledge and understanding about monsters to their
more subjective ideas. They acknowledged the other’ s ideas and used fam ily and pop
culture; also the amount o f nonverbal (i.e., facial expressions, animation, body gestures)
communications increased.

Figure 21 : Group 1 Pre-Instruction Monster Focus Group
Developmental Pattern

M u ltip list
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Evaluativist
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In the post-instruction monster focus group the children’s spontaneity persisted. They
were energetic and eager to engage in the focus group activity. This focus group took a
slightly different course because there seemed to be two different processes occurring
based on the semi-structured questions; therefore, two pattems emerged as follow s: (a)
the nature o f knowledge (i.e. sim plicity and certainty) and (b) the process o f knowing (i.e.
justification).
The simple and certain knowledge pattern circulates through all three developmental
levels; however, the children actively take an absolutist perspective rather than the
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m ultiplistic view they demonstrated prior to instruction (See Figure 22). As identified in
the individual and pre-instruetion focus group, the child-participants systematically
linked their simple and certain knowledge.
They tolerated a fair amount o f probing at the absolutist level before they became
bored and uninterested. For example, they were asked a question, and each child
participated in the discussion based on a single question. B y the fourth absolutist question
their affective disposition began to deteriorate (i.e., rolling around on the floor, grabbing
for toys in the comer, daydreaming).

,j

To maintain organization o f the activity, they quickly reengaged in m ultiplist attitudes
and attempts to revisit absolutist perspectives were met w ith group resistance as
identified through their affect and behavior. For example, they were weary o f questions
such as “ What did M ax do?” , “ Where did Max go?” , and “ What were the W ild Things!”
They continued to link their knowledge (i.e. simple/certain) and understanding in a
m ultiplist manner but rather than use personal experiences (internal) they made personal
connections between characters in the story and fa m ily or peers as a way o f making
meaning o f new information. For example, “ Max was bad to his mother, I was bad and
my m other...”
However, they were open and competent at engaging in evaluativistic (i.e. simple
and certain) types o f questions. For example, “ What do you think about what M ax’s
mother did to Max?” , and “ What do you think Max thought about his punishment?”
They responded hesitantly w ith their evaluativistic responses. One example is “ I think his
mommy did that so he would have time to think about what he said but Max felt bad (an
idea from a peer in the focus group) but I know he could, she could o f let him just eat at
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the other table away from everyone instead o f him going to his room (his idea), like a
time out (an idea from a peer in the focus group). I f she did that. Max would still know
he did a wrong thing and not do it again.” Evaluativistic statements like this one were
constructed by one child in the group but after everyone had contributed their own
individual ideas; additionally, there was always a child-participant who would come up
with a statement that summarized everyone’s ideas in a group evaluativistic-like fashion.
This group evaluativistic process was not guided in any way other than probing for
deeper understanding. They began to become frustrated with the complexity o f the
questions; using their words to formulate follow-up questions gave them less words to
use in their responses. The frustration that was observed before the transition away from
evaluativistic thinking was not one of boredom or a lack o f interest; rather it was more
•signs o f cognitive overload (i.e., facial confusion, long pauses in speech, shrugging
shoulders) and did not have the inappropriate or disruptive behaviors (i.e., wandering
around, singing, laughing).They made attempts to respond, but the content o f their
responses began not to make sense. For example, “ Lalala, maxy waxy, mommy wammy,
no no no no, be good be good.” Once the group took on this type o f ambivalence, they
resorted to their multiplistic subjectivity o f personal experiences.

Figure 22: Group 1 Post-Instruction Monster Focus Group
Developmental Trajectory #1 (Nature o f Knowledge)
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The second pattern that was identified in the post-instructional monster focus group
emerged primarily when probing for the process o f knowing. The source o f knowledge
continued to evade the child-participants, even when probing occurred; therefore, this
pattern revolves around the justification o f knowledge and is identical to the pattern seen
in the pre-instruction monster focus group (See Figure 21).
There are some outstanding characteristics regarding the post-instruction pattern for
justification o f knowledge for both the monsters and winter groups. First, the childparticipants did not require much probing for justification at the absolutist or multiplist
level o f development. They were actively engaged and worked individually and
collectively as they collaborated on various ways to respond to questions. For example,
they asked each other questions, redirected one another on inappropriate behaviors to
keep them on task, and shared their experiences by associating characters from the story
and applying them to themselves. Probing justification allowed for the complexity of
their knowledge to be highlighted in terms o f the depth o f associations that they possess
regarding a fairly limited foundation o f information (i.e. family, peers, pop-culture) that
appears to be a repertoire o f interconnected events and experiences that was seen in this
group only while probing for justification of knowledge. For example, “ The monsters in
the story have big eyes (eyes bulge), and big scary teeth (show teeth), and big claws
(show hands) but when we drawed them we didn’t make them so ugly, see (points to the
pictures), because we made them nice (gestures) like princesses and princes so they won’t
be so scaiy when new mommies and daddies come to the Cricket classroom. Like
sometimes i f it’s too scary (facial) then we won’t sleep and have bad dreams and
nightmares and w ill be so tired but if they are beautiful then when new people who don’t
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know w ill look at our pretty pictures and want to read about the w ild things because it
looks like fun and funny.”
The second characteristic was that evaluativistic justification required far more
probing questions and posed individual and group challenges. For example, repeating
each other’ s, ideas, repeating the teacher or researcher’ s ideas, and repeating the text from
the story were common responses. Although the group did generate evaluativistic-like
justifie d responses, they were generally mimicked from the story, the teacher, or the
researcher, and there was not enough evidence to indicate that they had complete
understanding about what they said. On the other hand, this was an interesting finding
because they could at least understand the question and respond appropriately whereas
w ith source o f knowledge questioning they rarely were able to e xp licitly identify their
sources o f knowledge, even i f it was modeled for them in the whole class instruction (by
the teacher) or the focus group (by the researeher). This indicated that they could not
process the source o f knowledge questions.
The third characteristic that is associated w ith justifieation o f knowledge is the
obvious inclusion o f nonverbal traits, such as facial expressions, body language, and
pointing. This appeared to be symbolie o f higher order and more complex organization
o f knowledge. For example, the more challenging the questions, the more they
incorporated nonverbal communication. Rather than sim ply disengaging as was seen in
retrieval o f the nature o f knowledge, they were motivated to continue to convey their
understanding. It is as i f justification o f knowledge takes them to a place that they
regressed in their communication skills, but the use o f nonverbal cues acted as a scaffold
that held their attention longer, or the increase in psychomotor activity allowed them to
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stay motivated and engaged to keep trying to make sense. This was seen over and over in
examples like the one used above where the child continued adding and adding; this was
particularly the case with justification questions because they appeared to be invested and
emotionally engaged in what they were saying. They didn’t want to let it go.

Figure 23: Group 1 Post-Instruction Monster Focus Group
Developmental Trajectory # 2 (Process o f Knowing)
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Theme 2: Cornent matters how they integrate the dimensions o f knowledge. Just as the
content mattered in their developmental ability, it appeared to be similar in how they
demonstrated their dimensions o f knowledge. As reported in Theme 1 for this group,
their ability and inability to tap into specific dimensions o f knowledge advanced or
inhibited, but nonetheless guided, their developmental level. For example, in the monster
focus groups, they were more inclined to connect simple and certain knowledge
independently without probing. In addition, they automatically linked the nature of
knowledge and the process o f knowing by linking a combination of the following
dimensions: simple and justification, certain and justification, or simple/certain and
justification. Linking these dimensions together means that in the same response or
within the same idea unit they elaborated upon their knowledge independently. These
examples are reflected in the patterns for the developmental levels (Theme 1). This
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section talks about how the content o f the themes varied their ability to lin k specific
dimensions o f knowledge between the monster and winter groups.
The developmental patterns o f the pre-and post-instruction group were completely
reversed in the winter groups (See Figures 24 and 25). In the pre-instructional group they
demonstrated significantly less prior knowledge and background experience. They
articulated this deficit, as in the example, “ I don’t know anything about snow.”
Therefore, their capacity to generate independent knowledge and associations was
diminished in three ways: (a) The relevance o f their responses to the topic was lessened,
(b) they were dependent on others for assimilating and accommodating their construction
o f knowledge, and (c) they activated knowledge construction from an objective
perspective. Conversely, the post-instructional focus group lacks the dual pattems seen
in the monster group fo r the nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing. Also, it
was consistent with the pre-instructional pattern seen in the monster focus group. Again,
when looking at the characteristics w ithin the content o f their responses, their knowledge
construction was restricted in two ways: (a) Experiences were distantly connected, and
(b) the negative affective and behavioral indicators seen in the monster groups were
exacerbated. It appeared that the opposite pattems occurred due to the subject being
discussed (in this case the theme was winter).
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Figure 24: Group 1 Pre-Instruction Winter Focus Group
Developmental Trajectory (Nature o f Knowledge
and Process o f Knowing)
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Figure 25: Group 1 Post-Inslruction Winter Focus Group
Developmental Trajectory (Nature o f Knowledge
and Process o f Knowing)
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The relevance o f the responses, primarily to simple and certain knowledge were more
distant to the topic or question when the child-participants lacked the prior knowledge
and past experiences to draw upon similar associations. Once they make the associations
their nature o f knowledge and process o f knowing are aligned, so that they used the
simple and certain dimensions o f knowledge to advance their justification. Without the
nature o f knowledge foundation, they did not demonstrate justification o f knowledge.
Therefore, the children in this group identified a topic they thought to be correlated. In
this case the tendency was to make connections to the opposite o f winter, which was
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summer, a topic they know and have experienced w ell. For example, they changed the
topic o f the discussion from winter to summer by saying, “ I don’t like winter, I like
summer, it is nice and I get to play outside;” o r ‘T like what G iG i said, monsters don’t
have to be ugly and they could play w ith us in the summertime because sometimes you
need more people to play w ith.” This latter example demonstrates how they continued to
lin k dimensions o f knowledge but in terms o f relevance to the topic, they strayed o fftopic.
The off-topic pattern does not appear to be an effect o f their lack o f epistemological
thinking but rather a cue that they lack other necessary cognitive constructs that lim ited
their ability to convey their epistemologies. Therefore, they resorted to a pattern o f
pretend reality; in which they took ideas that are fam iliar to them, such as monsters (the
topic one week prior to winter) and summer, and attempted to make meaningful
responses. This type o f compensation made their knowledge often less coherent or less
relevant, which resulted in disruptive behaviors.
The content matters because when there was a lack o f p rior knowledge and past
experiences the child-participants were prevented from being active contributors w ithin
the group. In this way they were removed or detached cognitively and emotionally. In
this group the cognitive and emotional disconnect fostered two pattems: (a) behavior
disruption and disengagement; and (b) dependence on others as a means o f constructing
knowledge. The former produced no epistemological pattern; however, the latter was a
productive technique that was utilized by the group in both the monster and the winter
themes. In both themes, when this pattern emerged, it revolved around one or more o f
the children not having adequate background knowledge or prior experiences; therefore.
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the knowledge was fragmented or absent. A child-participant would build on a statement
that activated associations by using the story or peers. This pattern was more prominent
when a justification was provided, so that the justification was used by others to
formulate a simple/certain understanding that they did not possess or could not verbalize
prior. For example, the researeher asked, “ Okay so we know that in the winter we wear
our hats and coats. Why do you have to wear a hat and coat in the winter?” A child that
might ordinarily respond gave nonverbal indications that she was unsure how to respond.
Adam responded saying, “ Sometimes in the winter you can get sick and get a bad cold, if
that happens to me my mommy makes me go to the doctor.” This prompted the quiet and
uncertain child to contribute because she had made an association. She said, “ Ya, like i f 1
get sick then 1 have to go to the doctor and get some medicine; that can happen in the
winter if I don’t dress in my winter clothes.” This is a simple/certain dimension o f
knowledge that the child had not had, and she had clearly integrated contributions from
her peers. Being able to make the connection among being sick, going to the doctor, and
winter gave her the ability to articulate simple/certain and justifications. For example she
later said, “ That’ s why my mommy and daddy make me dress warm to go outside,
because they know it is cold and 1 would catch a cold, they love me so they want to keep
me (hugs herself). That’s why that mommy bear was trying to find her babies because
they needed to come inside, it was cold, and windy, and snowing outside; they would get
sick and sicker.” This pattern o f moving away from the topic to formulate a stable
foundation provided an opportunity to demonstrate multiple dimensions o f knowledge
that may not have been tapped due to the unfamiliar topic.
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When the children had lim ited knowledge and understanding o f the theme or
question, they usually reflected their knowledge first through absolutist attitudes dealing
w ith the story or rules. They naturally touched on the simple, certain, and justification
dimensions at the absolutist level before feeling confident to talk about their experiences,
perhaps because they did not relate directly. Once they demonstrated competence (i.e. an
internal comfort level that was judged by them), they would move on to more m ultiplistic
comments. Regardless, they always seemed to be striving to get to their comfort point
whether it was m ultiplistic, pretend, or disengagement.
Theme 3: There are positives and negatives when p ro b in g in and around Zone o f
P roxim al Development. There were positive and negative pattems surrounding this
group’ s nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing that can be identified in
relationship to the theory o f the Zone o f Proximal Development. Many o f the examples
used thus far indicate some o f the positive areas that w ill be reported in this section.
However, there are unarticulated and unforeseen boundaries surrounding the children’ s
knowledge and understanding that seem a bit counterintuitive.
First, they were capable and productive at conveying past experiences and prior
knowledge (i.e. what they know and understand now w ithout assistance or below their
zone o f proximal development). For example, despite their practical experiences with
snow and the winter theme, they associated the idea o f w inter to what they do know but
not w ith as much ease and confidence as what they have actually experienced that is
close to the topic. For example when asked, “ What do you know about winter?” One
child responded, “ W ell, 1 know that it is cold and w indy and I can’t wear my shorts, I like
the summer and wearing my shorts and swim m ing.” In this case she made associations to
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personal preferences (i.e. what she knows and likes) rather than knowledge related
closely to the w inter theme. It just so happened that w ith many o f the children in the
group the associations occurred in the same manner, in which they drew comparisons to
the opposite when they lacked prior knowledge and experience. They demonstrated their
command over absolutist and m ultiplist ways o f knowing and the ease w ith which they
linked the dimensions o f knowledge.
However, the negative aspect o f continued probing the sim plicity and certainty o f
knowledge at all three developmental levels despite their fam iliarity, or lack thereof,
beyond a specific point yielded greater and greater resistance from the group. One might
think that because a theme was fam iliar or interesting that their attention and motivation
would endure prolonged investigations o f deeper and deeper understanding and
associations, but quite the contrary was the case. A fte r a sequence o f questions that were
below their zone o f proximal development the children became bored w ith the
discussion; it seemed no longer interesting or challenging. It became mundane, and their
behavior and ability or willingness to convey their knowledge deteriorated dramatically.
For example, they would refuse to respond, became disruptive (i.e., laughing, yelling,
dancing, jum ping), or they disengaged (i.e., playing w ith other books and toys in the
room). This negative impact o f belaboring an area that was developmentally below what
they found to be challenging did not ju st impact an individual in the group; it had the
potential to take the whole group down. This finding spiked curiosity about the strength
o f the peers as scaffolds versus continuity o f a b ility between individuals in the groups.
Therefore, an idea to formulate a group that had all o f the highest performing children to
see the follow ing; i f they continued to scaffold one another even when pushed to
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boredom (as w ith simple and certain probing) and frustration (as w ith evaluativistic
justification) or i f the first child to fold would be able to bring down the momentum o f
the entire group. These themes w ill be presented in Group 3.
Second, they were efficient at w orking collaboratively w ith others who were assisting
them w ith new information which they could effectively relate to their prior knowledge
and past experiences when given an anchor or a scaffold that actively expanded their
knowledge and understanding w ithin their zone o f proxim al development. They listened
and observed the teacher, researcher, and their peers to identify information that could be
linked to or overlapped w ith their existing knowledge. They latched on to that
information as a tool in their expressive and receptive abilities. For example, one child
sat quietly when the discussion about w inter began. When asked a couple o f simple and
certain knowledge questions regarding winter, Adam replied, “ 1 don’ t know about snow.”
The researcher said, “ We are talking about winter and that doesn’ t always mean that it
has to snow. We live in Las Vegas and we don’t see snow but it is still w inter here. What
is w inter like in Las Vegas?” Adam did not respond, and another child said, “ M y
mommy makes me wear m y mittens because it is cold and 1 have to wear my big coat and
sometimes my boots.” A fter a couple o f the children shared their experiences, Adam
said, “ W ell ya, I wear my hat, and coat, and scarf when it is cold but 1 don’ t play in no
snow cuz there is no snow in Las Vegas but I think it gets snowy like when the bears
played and hided in the snow away from their mommy.”
In itia lly he was uncertain about how to connect new information w ith existing
infom iation, and his nonverbal communication was consistent w ith his uncertainty (i.e.,
hung his head but listened attentively to the discussion, shrugged his shoulder hopelessly.
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partially smiling, speaking quietly). After some assistance from others, he coordinated
his knowledge with information from others that he could make sense from and
personalized it in his own way o f making sense and responding to the question. He was
persistent and motivated; therefore, he remained appropriately engaged in the activity
without frustration or disruption. As long as they believed they were still understanding
or fell they had the ability to eventually be successful, they remained engaged and kept
trying.
At the peak o f their zone o f proximal development was where they began to
demonstrate a dramatic blow to their level o f confidence. Doubt began to appear in their
nonverbal demeanor and began to present in their verbal jargon. What seemed
counterintuitive about this pattern at the peak o f their zone o f proximal development was
the absence o f disruptive behaviors as an indicator that they had reached a threshold.
Rather there emerged control that their affective dispositions appeared to have over their
cognitive ability. For example, internally they had an emotional sense that was
observable (i.e., looks o f confusion, shame, doubt, poor eye contact) but at the same time
they remained physically part o f the activity minus the behavioral distractions seen as a
result o f boredom when they were being successful (i.e., yelling, squealing, dancing,
wandering around).
Third, this pattern involves characteristics from both o f the previous two patterns by
linking them together. They demonstrated a positive but brief range of engagement in
areas that were above their cognitive ability (above their zone o f proximal development).
Here they demonstrated partial understanding o f what was being asked (i.e. having
command o f receptive language), but they were unable to organize their knowledge or
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make appropriate associations in a relevant and coherent manner (i.e. demonstrating
understanding using expressive language) w ith or without assistance. They would remain
attentive and engaged insomuch as they would listen to the question, pause to
contemplate a response, and make an attempt to respond but would quickly realize that
what they were saying did not make sense. This was sim ilar to when they were w orking
w ithin their zone o f proxim al development. Follow ing this b rie f attempt to successfully
respond, the emotional impact o f their failure to understand escalated into behavioral
disruption. This was consistent w ith that seen when functioning for extended periods o f
time below their zone o f proximal development, which seemed to evoke boredom.
Theme 4: Associations related to personal experiences and lim ited pretend. The
child-participants in this group demonstrated a clear pattern that is woven through the
previous three themes; that is they were most confident and competent when they could
relate new information to their personal experiences or use pretend as a means o f taking
risks and remaining safe. Many o f the examples used to clarify the other themes for
group 1 demonstrate clearly this pattern. This theme can be elaborated upon by
mentioning that they seemed to have an instinctive characteristic that helped them
monitor what they w ill and w ill not engage in; they were very savvy about staying w ithin
a level and dimension o f knowledge that they felt most comfortable. Sometimes it
appeared to be a conscious and deliberate manipulation, but other times it appeared to be
an innate and unconscious response to feeling vulnerable. Regardless, they repeatedly
retreated to m ultiplistic responses that reflected their personal experiences or their own
individualistic pretend realities. For example, when they talked about monsters, they
made associations to things that they know about (i.e.. Transformers, ninja turtles).
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“ Monsters are like the same as Blackout, and Optimus Prime, Bumblebee, Megatron, and
Cybertron, some people think they are scary but I think they are cool.” Then they took
their fam iliar connections and advanced their knowledge from simple and certain to how
they know it, sometimes using pretend. For example, “ 1 make Blackout and Leonardo
fight and the loser is scary, he looks like this (facial gestures).” In cartoons these two
characters (Blackout the Transformer and Leonardo the ninja turtle) would never be in
the same cartoon, let alone fighting. Fie completely made up a pretend scenario to
convey what he thought would be scary.
Focus Group 2 Epistemic Profiles

Figure 26; Focus Group 2 Epistemic Profile

Epistemic Profile
GROUP 2

Theme 1
Developmental
Pattern
M u ltip lis t to Absolutist
Content not a factor

Theme 3
Pretend knowledge is
dominant

Theme 2
When dimensions are
not integrated
associations relate to
fam ily, book, and
personal experience

Theme 4
Lack o f peer
scalTolding had a
negative impact on
group epistemological
a b ility

Epistemic Themes
Theme 1: Developmental patterns are consistent and not injhienced by content.
Group 2 had less m alleability in the way they conveyed their epistemologies from a
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developmental perspective. They transitioned between absolutist and multiplist points of
view. There were two patterns that emerged from this group; they were different
between pre-and post-instruction groups but were consistent week-to-week. More
specifically the pre-instruction groups for monsters and winter were the same (see Figure
27) and the post-instruction groups had the same pattern (see Figure 28), Therefore, it
was thought that the content that was being discussed had no positive or negative impact
on their epistemological development.

Figure 27: Group 2 Pre-Instruction
Developmental Trajectory

Absolutist

M ultiplist

Multiplist

Figure 28: Group 2 Post-Instruction
Developmental Trajectory

Absolutist

Multiplist

Absolutist

In the pre-instruction focus groups the child-participants began with an objectively
constructed knowledge. For example, when asked “ What can you tell me about winter?” ,
they responded, “ Winter is now, when it’s cold” , “ cold” , or “ rainy.” They demonstrated
their knowledge in brief fragtuented words or phrases, which were indicative o f simple
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and certain knowledge. They were slow to respond, and often their words appeared to be
labored (i.e d iffic u lt to find) and hesitant. Onee they were comfortable w ith the
foundation they had construeted, more m ultiplistic ways o f knowing were produced. For
example, “ I like w inter time; 1 ean be more like a princess and wear my pretty hats and
my scarf matches, sometimes when 1 get dressed-up I feel like a princess and 1just walk
around but 1 stay warm .” These m ultiplistic associations were constructed w ith more
ease; their affect was more relaxed, and they used more animation (i.e. facial expressions
and body gestures) to express eonfidenee. Onee they had gotten to this level o f knowing,
it was impossible to get them to move to evaluativistic or absolutist perspectives.
When probing deeper for evaluativistie outlooks, they did not attempt to respond. For
example when they were asked questions using their own words, such as; “ You said you
like w inter time. W hy do you think you like it better in the winter?” or “ Carl said he
thinks w inter is bad. W hy is w inter bad?” These types o f questions appeared to be too
d iffie u lt for the group to proeess, which resulted in behaviors eonsistent w ith eonfusion
(i.e., looking away, shrugging shoulders, facial distress). The behavior was not disruptive
in any way; they seemed eurious and attentive. However, their responses eontinued to be
m ultiplistie and reflected personal experienees and prior knowledge. For example, their
responses to the previous questions were as follows: “ I like it better in the winter, it is a
good time and 1 have fun playing,” and “ 1 like winter.”
Attempts to transition baek to absolutist attitudes eontinued to yield m ultiplistic
statements. They wanted to diseuss topics that were closely associated w ith their
preferenees and eould do so at all four dimensions o f knowledge in both the monster and
w inter focus groups. For example when asked, “ What happens in the w inter that is
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different from summer?” a response was, “ I know I can jum p through the water in the
yard. I do it in my bare feet and jum p and play and my mommy watches me beeause no
water eomes out when it ’s eold outside. I ’ m not allowed when it is eold.” Onee they
began to share their experienees, any movement away from m ultiplistie perspeetives
resulted in resistance from the group in the way o f behavior disruptions. For example,
they began to ro ll around on the floor, touch each other, and talk about what they were
going to do when they got home.
The post-instructional focus groups took on a slightly different developmental
pattern. They s till did not demonstrate any type o f evaluativistic-like characteristies and
maintained the ability to eonvey knowledge in both absolute and m ultiplist ways. Again,
they initiated the group w ith absolutist ways o f knowing and moved to m ultiplist pointsof-view ; however, this appeared to bore them. They were not as content discussing their
personal experiences as in the pre-instruetion groups. For example, when questioned
about their experiences using their own words and seenarios, they began to demonstrate
inappropriate behaviors and verbalizations sueh as repeating words from a story over and
over, wandering around the room, jum ping, and squealing. Typieally, they would
respond positively from redirection from the researeher but would want to discuss a story.
For example an exehange between two o f the children went like this;
Carl: “ I don’ t want to talk about her stuff. Let’s look at the rumpus in that book.”
Jeremy: “ Me either, I want to look too.”
Carl: “ That rumpus was fun and they made Max the king o f them beeause they like
him and we don’t like to hear about eold stuff.”
Jeremy: “ Ya, this is no fun.” He grabbed the book from the table and opened it.
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Another instance o f this type o f behavior oecurred the seeond week, was when a
child-partieipant, wandering around the room, picked up one o f the books that had been
read during the week and said, “ Look, that baby bear liked the cold because remember he
sneaked away from his mommy and got in the snow h ill so she eould not find him .”
The return to absolutist perspeetives and wanting to focus on the eontent o f the stories
was a curious pattern sinee they had been so persistent in their need to remain m ultiplistic
in the pre-instructional groups.

When analyzed more closely, there eould be several

reasons fo r their developmental trajeetory: (a) The topie o f w inter was less fam iliar or
interesting, (b) they had less new information to link to prior knowledge in the preinstruetion group and did not generate it, (e) the members o f the group were at
significantly different developmental levels and the m ajority overpowered the group
dynamic, or (d) the redundancy o f reviewing the storyline helped them lin k the new
information to their existing knowledge so it was more ehallenging, so they were seeking
the more challenging way o f knowing. These ideas are important and w ill be touehed on
in the overall group results.
Theme 2: Integrating dimensions o f knowledge. Integrating the dimensions o f
knowledge in Group 2 oeeurred in much the same way as was deseribed fo r Group 1 (See
Figures 14 & 15). There are three distinetive pattems that emerged; (a) the nature o f
knowledge (linking simple/certain knowledge), (b) the process o f knowing (linking
simple/justification, certain justification), and (c) the absence o f source o f knowledge.
There are two primary differences that presented w ith Group 2, neither having to do w ith
the aetual patterns, but rather the manner in which the patterns occurred. First, there was
a much more prominent pattern among the associations that they made to books, fam ily.
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and personal experiences. It was more clearly mainstreamed between the dimensions and
the developmental levels. Second, the simple and certain dimensions o f knowledge
in itia lly were presented as more simple and certain rather than complex and uncertain (as
in Group 1). A n important characteristic appeared in Group 2 that was sim ilar to Group
1, which was the increase o f nonverbal communication as their knowledge became
apparently more complex and uncertain in nature.
When the patterns for the dimensions o f knowledge are looked at for Group 2, there is
a precise organization between the dimensions o f knowledge and the associations that are
linked to each dimension w ithin specific developmental perspectives. When these childparticipants contributed their understanding o f knowledge from an absolutist point o f
view, which they did more spontaneously yet w ith d iffic u lty , they tended to include a
combination o f associations between the book and their fam ily. For example, “ You
should never go way from your mommy and daddy, see the mommy bear is worried
about her babies. M y mommy watches me when I play so she don’ t w orry,’’ or “ Them
monsters are scaiy but my daddy says they are not real monsters.” They made this same
combination o f book-fam ily association at the absolutist level for simple, certain, and
justification o f knowledge. However, when they shifted to a m ultiplist perspective, the
combination o f associations dramatically converted to personal experiences and fam ily
and was carried out through all o f the dimensions at the m ultiplist level o f development.
For example, “ 1 know parties are fun, I like parties because one time my mommy and
daddy gave me a party and we went to bowling and ate pizza. It was a lot o f fun and we
played a lot (facial and body gestures). I was not ascared.” These examples show how
they coordinated the contextual meanings to convey the understanding o f their
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knowledge. The next characteristic that was identified has to do w ith how they shifted
through the dimensions o f knowledge.
Although the pattern o f linking their knowledge was consistent, the structure and
stability o f their knowledge varied from Group 1, in that this group gradually progressed
from simple to complex knowledge and from certain to uncertain knowledge. Also when
simple and certain knowledge were linked to justification, they seemed to convert to
simple and certain dynamics. It was w ith probing questions that their knowledge
appeared to advance. For example, when asked, “ What could monsters do to have fun?” ,
“ Piggy-back rides” was the response. Then w ith probing, “ Yes, piggy-back rides. Tell
me about how monsters can have fun doing piggy-back rides,” the responses became
more elaborate, in that their knowledge came across as more complex and that there was
uncertainty in knowledge. For example, “ Sometimes, i f monsters play and have fun, I
think they would put the girl monsters on their back and spin around real fast like this
(spinning) and some o f the monsters could do this (jum ping and falling) and some other
monsters could do this (falling backwards) but i f I was a monster 1 would put A rie l high
(arms) on my shoulders, up here (looks up and anns) and we would have fun and laugh
because we would be being like monsters having a party because it would be a birthday.”
The same type o f progression was seen w ith justification o f knowledge as w ell; initially,
their construction o f justifications for knowledge lacked evidence and was simple. For
example, “ W hy do monsters have parties?” A n immediate response was, “ Because.”
Persistent probing resulted in this sequence o f responses from one o f the participants in
the group; “ Because” “ Because, they just do.” “ Monsters just have parties because.” “ I
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think they have a party because they are happy and they want to celebrate, like me I have
a party at my birthday and my brother’s birthday too and my mommy and daddy’s too.”
Another important characteristic that developed during analysis o f the patterns that
were presented for the dimensions o f knowledge was the children’s use o f tools to
communicate their knowledge and understanding. This group demonstrated verbal
means o f conveying their knowledge when their knowledge was simple and certain;
however, as their knowledge and understanding became more complex and uncertain,
they began to incorporate verbal and nonverbal means o f communicating. Very similar
to the previous group, they complemented their words with the use o f facial expressions,
body gestures, and pointing. They never jointly nor individually generated evaluativistic
ways o f knowing, but this coordination o f verbal and nonverbal communication presented
itself more in the process o f knowing (i.e. justification) in both the absolutist and
multiplist. A great example of this communication process can be seen in Carl’ s
statement above about piggy-back rides.
Theme 3: Use o f p re te n d knowledge is dominant. There was less group cohesiveness
within this group; they appeared to be functioning from different levels o f interest and
personal experiences. However one similarity among the children was their inclination
for relying heavily on pretend realities. For the most part they did not have a smooth
discourse pattern and took turns talking and answering questions and occasionally
responded to one another. Typically, when they were responding to one another, it was
based on pretend associations that were made. The following exchanges are examples of
how the group excelled when identifying with each other’s use o f pretend as a way o f
making meaning:
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Trudy: “ When I am having a party I am only inviting princesses. I don’ t want to have
no monsters or scary people and we w ill dance beautiful-like (demonstrates).”
Carl: “ Ya, that’ s a girl party, me and Ariel danced before but not at a party but 1
would have them Www Things at my party because we would have more fun and 1
am not afraid so they could be invited too.”
Trudy: “ 1 don’t think that princesses would like to have monsters at my party. We
are going to eat little sandwiches and have a tea party (pretending to drink tea).
Jeremy: “ No, no, no!!” “ Monsters, monsters we want the Wild Things.”
Carl: “ Sometimes my mommy and daddy have some parties, and they swing from
the trees and give piggy-back rides, and all o f their friends laugh but they don’t the
monsters come to it because they aren’t real and only me and Ariel know about
them.”
Jeremy: “ The wild things aren’ t real.”
Trudy: “ My mommy and daddy have princesses at their parties because they want to
and they know the monsters are not real but the princesses can be if they want. 1
think they have real parties sometimes, and they make big messes and have to clean
up. The princesses don’t clean their messes and the wild things made a big mess to.”
They were able to identify with each others’ ways o f incorporating the new
information with their pretend world. This was an area where they found success and
mutuality which was observed in their affective dispositions (i.e., affect became bright,
more enthusiastic, more animated, laughing) and level o f engagement (i.e., better eye
contact, improved listening and observing their group members, asking questions).
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Theme 4: Lack o f peer scaffolding had a negative impact o f the group
epistemological ability. The group dynamic present in Group 2; that is, their individual
differenees (affective ability, gender, interests, social skills, and individual
epistemological levels); appeared to have a negative impact on characteristics that might
promote their level o f group epistemologieal funetioning. The primary deficit appears to
be in the way that the group interacted together; they failed to identify w ith each other on
a cognitive, affcetive, or behavioral level. These peer seaffolding qualities have been
identified in the individual epistemic profiles and strongly influenced the productivity o f
Group 1. Interestingly, these three child-participants demonstrated these very same traits
during other group activities such as whole class instruction, center activities, and
playtime, so it is curious why they failed to engage in sim ilar characteristics fo r the focus
groups, making it seemingly uncharacteristic that they would not reconstruct a sim ilar
pattern w ithin the focus groups. In all four o f the focus group activities, they did not
meet nor exceed many o f the traits that could showcase the fle x ib ility o f epistemological
development or versatility to access multiple dimensions o f knowledge independently
w ithout probing questions.
This group was eognitively inefficient in that they did not demonstrate the a b ility to
expand their knowledge and understanding by building on their peer’ s contributions or
experiences. They utilized the use o f pretend far more than they demonstrated the ability
to tap into constructing knowledge based on mutual collaborative efforts; therefore, it
inhibited their opportunity to retrieve baekground knowledge and elaborate upon that
knowledge. The focus group interaction was fragmented. For instance, a child said, “ I
like the sunny weather beeause 1 ean wear my bathing suit and go swim m ing and not in
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the winter.” Immediately following this response, another member of the group said,
“ The bears have lots o f fur to keep them warm in the winter, so they like to play in the
snow, we don’t have fur on us.” This example demonstrates how the child-participants in
this group were somehow detached from each other; they lacked the spontaneity and
mutual interests that may be needed in order to cognitively extrapolate or elaborate upon
another’s knowledge. The only attempt that was made to combine their knowledge was
when they discussed pretend scenarios and, even with this trait in place, it did not expand
nor contribute to their individual or collective epistemologies.
Another mode o f peer scaffolding that did not appear in this group was the ability to
connect on an affective level. The child-participants were as disconnected emotionally
from one another as they could be; however, individually they were so different, from an
affective standpoint, that it could have been an unrealistic goal. There was no group
motivation nor joining o f enthusiasm for each other’s experiences that would suggest
their epistemological development or their dimensional knowledge was supported by
their peers. In fact, in this group, there was negative affective support. For example, at
one point the two young boys in the group teamed up against the girl. They talked apart
from one another and on occasion demonstrated inappropriate behaviors such as telling
someone to “ shut up,” putting their hand over one o f their peer’s mouth, sticking out their
tongue, and covering their ears while a peer was talking.
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Focus Group 3 Epistemic Profiles

Figure 29: Focus Group 3 Epistemic Profile
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Focus Group 3 was methodologically organized in the same way as Group 1 and
Group 2 and included three o f the original child-participants. The difference was the
participants were selected by the researcher from the previous two groups based on their
individual and group epistemological thinking and behavior. Therefore, Group 3
consisted o f Adam and GiGi (from Group 1) and Trudy (from Group 2). Everything
about these two weeks o f instruction and activities was the same, except the themes were
construction and family, and there was no other group to compare to Group 3. The
purpose o f coordinating a third group in this way was threefold: (a) methodologically, to
preserve the relationships that had formed between the researcher and the child-
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participants and maintain children who were already fam iliar w ith the procedures o f the
current study, in partieular the focus group activity; (b) epistemologically, to attempt to
probe in more depth their knowledge and understanding from a developmental and
dimensional perspeetive; and (c) socially, to investigate more vigorously the potential
influenees o f positive group interactions on epistemological thinking (i.e., peer
scaffolding o f cognitive, emotional, and behavioral eharacteristics).
Epistemic Themes
Theme 1: Three levels o f developmental (group evaluativism). Group 3 demonstrated
their knowledge and understanding at all three developmental levels; the patterns nearly
mirrored Group 1 in many ways. The main difference was that rather than two patterns
in the post-instruction group, they had only one for both themes. In this section the
themes from Group 3 are presented, along w ith some charaeteristics that are noteworthy
as compared w ith the previous two groups.
The first week’ s theme was construetion. In terms o f the child-participant’ s
fam iliarity this theme compared more closely to the w inter theme and likewise in the
developmental patterns (See Figure 30). It was apparent from the pre-instruction focus
group that the partieipants had some understanding o f the idea o f construetion, but the
aetual word was somewhat foreign. In itia lly, they were very slow to start; the question
was “ What do you know about construction?” A ll eyes were on the researcher; their
interest was piqued, but the expressions on their faces noted contusion, curiosity, and
hesitation. The same child-participant who had taken a leader role in Group 1 maintained
his leader status in Group 3. He began saying, “ It’ s when people (agitated gestures) and
then they (more gestures) and I would (gestures) and karate kiek them, like this.” The
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two girls follow ed in this string o f theatrical demonstrations that appeared to be
meaningless. This type o f scenario had been antieipated due to the laek o f background
knowledge and experience in the winter focus group; therefore, the researcher had
pietures o f eonstruction. The researeher presented the pictures to the group w ithout an
explanation o f them but said, “ These are some pietures that I think show construetion.
Take a look. Do they help you talk about construction?” Although still unfam iliar w ith
the term (i.e. they had d iffie u lty saying the word), they were now w illin g and more able
to talk about their knowledge o f eonstruction. Does the content matter to the
developmental o f preschooler’s epistemologies? Three eharaeteristics standout about the
way this focus group began that may be important later: (a) their willingness to attempt to
eonstruct understanding despite their confusion, (b) their behavior was more constructive
rather than disruptive, and (c) their epistemological level o f development and the parallel
charaeteristies that seemed to promote their ability.
In the pre-instruction focus group, they had some reservations about their knowledge;
therefore, they began from an absolutist perspective. Their associations were linked to
their personal experienees and peers. Immediately, they began to scaffold one another’ s
knowledge, both eognitively and affectively. A fter the pietures were shown and the
question was repeated, the group began w ith the follow ing:
Trudy: “ I think Adam showed instruction good like (sim ilar gestures).” “ What is
going on in the pietures is that these (pointing) big trucks are helping these (pointing)
boys in making some house or something. I see trucks like them by where we live
and that’ s what my daddy says they are doing.”
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Adam: “ Ya, it ’ s when big trucks go (sound effects) and they make a really big
building like really big (arms out), like a, like a, like W al-M art is a huge store. I
don’t like when we have to walk all over that store it takes too long and 1 get tired.”
Trudy: Do you have big trucks where you live?”
G iG i: “ Yes, we have all o f them; they are same like yellow like them ones (pointing).
Sometimes they make too much noise and it is loud and they make dirt all over
(gestures). One time I was outside and I got d irt in my mouth, Y U C K ! I had to cover
my mouth and my eyes to keep away from the dirt.
This example demonstrates information about the developmental patterns. It shows
the initial absolutist way o f knowing, and it also begins to show the transition to
m ultiplist views. Going back to Adam ’ s initial demonstration, this example shows how
the source o f knowledge moved from internal to external although the source o f
knowledge was never fu lly acknowledged. Also, this example shows many o f the
characteristics o f how peers scaffold each other w ithin the grouping, such as using their
peer’ s words to help him/her find his/her own words (i.e., “ big truck” ) and building on
the general ideas o f peers. Also, they provided emotional support fo r each other. Also,
the use o f body gestures and facial expressions surfaced during discussions o f more
complex cognitive infonnation. In this case the topic was more challenging fo r them
because they were unfam iliar w ith the actual word construction; however, they did have
an understanding o f what construction is in an activity sense. Nonetheless they were quite
guarded.
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Group 3 demonstrated a group-evaluativistic way o f constructing knowledge with
very little probing. They did so in a relevant and coherent manner. For example the
following transcript shows how this unfolded;
Researcher: “ When I look at the picture, 1 see a bunch o f different kinds o f trucks;
can you tell they are different?”
A ll: “ Yes”
Researeher: “ How arc they different?”
GiGi: “ (pointing at the front loader) This one has this thing, I think it goes up and
down but this one has this in the back (pointing at the dump truck) and it goes up and
down too but only different like, like, like (shrugs, head down).
Adam: “ This one (pointing) is a dump truck and 1 don’ t know what that one is but
they both carry dirt and dump dirt like on Dora the Explorer. 1 saw them filling in a
hole with dirt and it was like that truck they had it in.”
Trudy: “ 1 watched Dora the Explorer; 1 didn’t see them trucks with Dora. 1 see them
by where I live all o f the time! They are big and heavy and they are way up high.”
Adam: “ Well, I think you see the real big trucks, Dora’ s are not real trucks but they
are suppose to be; they still maked a lot o f noises and runned over somebody, 1 don’t
think that could happen. I f a real truck runned you over I would be (sound and
gesture).
GiGi: “ Yes, 1 think you would be (sound and gestures). 1 think on TV it is only play
not for real, 1 wouldn’t want to get squeezed by them big trucks because then I would
miss my mommy and daddy, I don’t want to go to the hospital.”
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Trudy; “ I f you get (sound and noise) I w ill come to visit you and bring you some
stu ff that would make you feel better but I w on’ t bring you a big truek because you
w on’t want that. Only guys making houses and schools need to have a big truck like
them euz they need it to help and they need money.”
In this example the child-participants collectively introduce the idea o f objective facts
and subjective thinking in a single thought process and in terms o f sim plicity o f
knowledge, certainty, and justification. They also have demonstrated many o f the group
characteristics that seem to promote this type thinking through group cohesiveness.
Ultim ately, they returned to a form o f m ultiplistic organization o f information. A t this
point, the m ultiplistic view was where they chose to continue after a b rie f length o f
probing questions. It was the perspective that they referred to most frequently in this and
other groups and the developmental level that they articulated w ith the most confidence
and meaning. Also, m ultiplism was a level that the least amount o f pretend information
is referenced.
The post-instruetion developmental pattern for the construction theme was sim ilar to
the pattern seen in the pre-instruetion focus group (See Figure 31). There are two
charaeteristics that make this pattern distinctly different from the pre-instruction focus
group: (a) The associations are more reflective o f the stories that were read throughout
the week, peers, and background knowledge; and 2) the amount o f statements at the
absolutist and evaluativist levels were doubled. M u ltip lis tic perspectives continued to
dominate their ways o f thinking and understanding but w ith much less intensity as they
seemed eager to engage in more challenging exchanges o f information.
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Figure 30; Group 3 Pre-Instruction Construction
Developmental Pattern
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Figure 31 : Group 3 Post Instruction Construction
Developmental Pattern
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As w ith the developmental pattern theme, there was one additional but distantly
related point; the length o f time they continued to remain engaged even when challenged
by higher order thinking tasks was far greater than had been seen at the individual or
group level. The amount o f tolerance they demonstrated fo r probing questions and
inquiry about their experiences was noticeably longer; they seemed to be engaged for
more extended periods o f time, and the disruptive behaviors due to boredom were almost
extinct. The verbal and nonverbal behaviors seemed to be more consistent w ith requiring
too much cognitive effort as seen when w orking in the exterior o f their zone o f proximal
development.
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The developmental pattern for the fam ily theme was the same at the pre-instruction
and post-instruction focus group (See Figure 32). They demonstrated the ability to
function at all three developmental levels and did so w ithout much probing. When
probing questions were presented, they were able to respond appropriately. The
m otivation and emotion that was presented im plied that they had a certain amount o f
competence in their knowledge and confidence in their understanding. This was
demonstrated in the persistent positive facial expressions (i.e., sm iling, good eye contact,
expressions consistent w ith their words), communication (i.e., more frequent use o f their
words, less redundancy o f what others said, no eeholalia), appropriate behaviors (i.e.,
attentive, curious, sitting still, listening to others), and cognitive indicators (i.e., staying
on-topic, relevant to topic, coherent responses).

Figure 32: Group 3 Pre-and Post Instruction
Family Developmental Pattern
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The most important point to make about the developmental pattern that emerged from
the fa m ily theme was the increase in absolutist and evaluativist ways o f knowing. This
was identified in the construction theme post-instruction focus group. However, in the
fa m ily theme this trait was present in both the pre-and post-instruction focus groups.
They allowed and tolerated extended probing and, as a result, produced richer and deeper
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knowledge. For example, the follow ing question, which was based on one o f their
statements, “ W hy do you think we have a mommy and a daddy in our families?” initated
the discussion below.
Adam: “ We have both mommies and daddies because it takes two people to make a
baby, and they don’t have to be the same color. Like me, my mommy is real white
and my daddy is real brown but me 1 am just a little brown.”
GiG i: “ Ya, God made us have mommies and daddies so we would have them to love
us and keep us safe and not get hurt. So we would have parents, like mommies and
daddies.”
Adam: “ Ya like Adam and Eve had a baby boy like me.”
Trudy: “ I have a mommy and a daddy because they wanted me and m y sister so we
would be a fam ily. That was we could go places and do things together like a fam ily.
A fam ily can have a small amount (hand) or a big amount (arms). It’s doesn’t matter
how many babies you’ ll be a fam ily w ith a mommy and a daddy.”
Adam: “ Do you think God makes babies?”
Trudy: “ M y mommy and daddy made me. I know because they said that is w hy 1 am
here.”
G iG i: “ God makes everything happen that is good. Sometimes some kids don’ t have
a mommy and daddy that stays w ith them and that is bad to be away from them
sometimes but you would get more toys at Christmas I think.”
Researcher: “ Do you know what it is called when kids don’t live w ith their mommy
and daddy all the time?”
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This example illustrates the developmental pattern as well as a much deeper level o f
understanding than in many o f the other groups. There could be a number o f reasons to
support their epistemological perfomiance; these w ill be discussed in chapter 5.
Theme 2: Patterns o f Unking nature o f knowledge and process o f knowing. The
dimensions o f knowledge appear to fall into a pattern in Group 3 that is identical to the
patterns identified in the other two groups. They linked sim plicity and certainty o f
knowledge; then they linked justification o f knowledge w ith either or both simple and
certain knowledge. For example in this group; “ Sometimes when my fam ily does things
together we have fun but sometimes we have to be serious, like when we go to the store
we can’ t touch things or laugh; and we have to stay w ith my mommy because we w ill get
lost and not find her and someone bad could take us.” This example reflects a
combination o f simple and certain knowledge w ith justification o f knowledge.
In Group 3, their knowledge appeared to be more complex and uncertain (as in Group
1). They rarely initiated a thought or responded to a question or someone else’ s
contributions w ith a simple or certain way o f knowing (as seen in Group 2). I f they did
respond in a simple or certain manner, it was at an absolutist level and revolved around a
classroom nile/procedure or some objective fact that was in the story or related to the
story. For example, “ Miss M ary was their mother.” During times when they
spontaneously constnicted knowledge evaluativistically or used justifications for their
knowledge (or were probed in that direction), there were no signs o f simple or certain
knowledge but rather the nature o f knowledge in conjunction w ith the process o f
knowing appeared to be predominantly complex and uncertain. In other words, they
perceived knowledge as complex and integrated w ith their personal experiences, peers.
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the story, and fam ily. (In this case this may not have been significant since the topic was
‘ fa m ily ’ .) In addition, they acknowledged that knowledge is changing and can be
different based on the person, place, and time; they associated knowledge w ith rules and
procedures.
Source o f knowledge was a dimension that had been challenging in the other groups
and was no different in Group 3. They regularly referred to their fam ily, the book, and
their peers in im plicit ways and explicitly in their responses. However, when asked a
specific source o f knowledge question, they did not understand the meaning o f the
question. For example, “ How do you know that your m om m y and daddy love you?” No
verbal response was given by any o f the child-participants in the group; one child
responded by wrapping her arms around herself. Others in the group followed her lead,
but no could verbalize an internal or external source fo r their knowledge. Later in a
comment the same g irl responded to the question, “ What does your mommy or daddy do
that makes you think they love you?” “ I know m y mommy and daddy love me because
they always give me hugs and kisses; and they tell me they love me all the time.
Especially at when I go to bed at nighttime.” Another interesting response that was
typical: “ How do you know that your mommy and daddy love you?” “ Because they do.”
Starting a sentence w ith “ because” was common when source o f knowledge questions
were asked; this indicated to the researcher that they needed or wanted to give a
justification for their understanding. This indicated that they had a sense that the answer
needed to come from a dimension or way o f knowing that would be consistent w ith the
process o f knowing. Since they had command o f justification o f knowledge, in that they
could provide evidence o f their knowledge and understanding, this was where they felt
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most comfortable and competent; therefore, their answers to source o f knowledge were
confused with justification o f knowledge.
Theme 3: Peer scaffolding had a positive influence on epistemological thinking. The
child-participants in this group were intentionally chosen from the six child-participants
because o f their individual and group epistemological and behavioral productivity. It was
thought that, by selecting the children that had demonstrated the greatest capacity to
convey their epistemologies and do so within a group using appropriate social skills and
positive affective traits, a deeper level o f epistemological thinking could be uncovered.
This group relied heavily on their peers as scaffolds for their knowledge and
understanding. Many o f the same characteristics that have been previously mentioned
are again mentioned in this section with specific examples unique to this group.
Cognitively peers were utilized as scaffolds when they listened and observed others.
These contributions from their peers prompted background knowledge. For example,
“ Ya, Dora, I have a truck like the one in the book, it doesn’t move up and down though
but it’s yellow too and has a place to put the dirt and take it to another place.” They used
other’s experiences and elaborated upon what had already been said, as in the following
“ My mommy makes me breakfast too, like Trudy’s mom. 1have to eat it or I can’t play
with the dog. Sometime I give some o f my food to my dog because 1 don’t want to eat it.
My mommy doesn’t know or I would be in big trouble.” They sometimes did not agree
on their knowledge and engaged in a form o f argumentation or debate. For example:
Adam: “ They build bridges the same as a house. I think with them trucks but a
bridge is bigger.”
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Trudy: “ No, they don’t because a bridge is made in the water, like over water
(gestures). How would the big trucks get into the water to make it go across?”
Adam: “ But that’ s when it’s all done and the trucks are on the ground. Bridges stop
people from getting in the water.”
GiGi; “ I don’t know, probably you need to have the trucks but maybe other trucks
are special. Miss Denise do they have special trucks to make a bridge? Maybe they
walk on the water trucks.”
Adam: “ I never seen trucks walk on the water. Have you seen them Miss Denise?”
An interesting point about this example is that they conversed a short period before
they sought authority, but they were willing and motivated to figure it out. When they
couldn’t, they asked questions. This was a characteristic not terribly prominent in the
focus groups but was seen in the individual epistemologies profile.
As just illustrated in the previous example, there was a high degree o f motivation and
self-efficacy for the challenge o f discovering new information. A ll o f the childparticipants seemed to be equally weighted in their ability to stay interested in the topics
and motivated to engage in the task. They did this primarily independently and required
no redirections from the researcher. This level o f engagement allowed them to generate a
positive group disposition in which they laughed and smiled appropriately during
discussions and were respectful o f their peers by taking turns and making each other feel
they had important things to say and encouraging them. The high level o f affective
engagement deterred the children from veering off-topic. They were focused on the task.
In addition, they were mutually invested in the focus group activity which may have
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accounted for the extended amount o f probing that was tolerated and the increase in other
developmental thinking outside o f their m ultiplistic com fort zone.
Theme 4: Increase in background knowledge and personal experience disrupt
pretend knowledge. This theme has to do w ith the absenee o f pretend knowledge. In the
other group themes and the individual epistemic profile, it has been identified that a large
part o f preschooler’ s repertoire o f construeting knowledge and making associations
involves the integration o f their pretend world. Group 3 demonstrated quite the contrary
experiences; they remained on-task, as attributed to peer seaffolding above, and required
no behavior nor cognitive redirection to stay on-task. There was m inim al redirection in
that the researeh did interject probing questions which were not resisted by the group as
seen in Group 1. Rather their pattern appeared to utilize their background knowledge and
past personal experiences to proceed through the focus group. This intensity practically
eliminated the pretend associations that might have been thought typical.
On the rare instanee that a member o f the group contributed a pretend scenario; for
example, “ Dora the Explorer;” Adam was very quick to say, “ That’ s not real.” GiGi was
another keeper o f what was real and what was pretend. For example, she said, “ I don’ t
think mommies wear aprons; I think that is just in the pieture. I think when my mommy
bakes pies she wears her old sweat pants so i f they get dirty then i t ’ s okay.”
As an observation, one o f the things that also appeared to keep the partieipants
focused on real-world scenarios (i.e. background knowledge and past experiences) was a
degree o f non-threatening competition that presented its e lf in this group. This
eompetition was seen m inim ally in an earlier group and in the individual profiles but has
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not emerged through the participants. It could be a competition o f knowledge or due to
gender (Both Group 1 & 3 had one boy and two girls).
Across Focus Group Epistemic Profile

Figure 33: Focus Group Epistemic Profile
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Across Focus Groups Epistemic Themes
Theme 1: Epistemologies are Multidimensional.
Preschooler’s group epistemologies are multidimensional as seen prim arily in Groups
1 and 3. M u ltip list ways o f knowing were the most common; however, they
demonstrated the ability to shift among absolutist, m ultiplist, and evaluativist w ith and
w ithout probing from the researcher. In addition, they demonstrated a shift between
developmental levels when prompted by peer influences. The most reoccurring
developmental pattern begins and ends w ith m ultiplistic ways o f knowing and includes
absolutist and evaluativist viewpoints (See Figure 34). Out o f nine developmental
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patterns, this developmental sequence appears in five group themes (See Figures 21, 23,
25, and 32). A portion of this trajectory was identified in the post-instruction focus
groups (monster and winter) for Group 2, that is the transition between multiplist and
absolutist perspectives (See Figure 28).

Figure 34: Group Epistemic Developmental Pattern
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There are distinctive patterns o f development that appear within the same theme o f
the week but between pre-and post-instructional groups. The most consistent
developmental pattern that was identified between pre-and post-instruction focus groups
was onset o f conveying their knowledge. For example, in the pre-instruction group, their
knowledge was activated at the multiplist level; however, in the post-instruction focus
groups their knowledge was activated at the absolutist level (See Figure 22, 28, 31). This
pattern appears to have taken form in the lower epistemological group (i.e., Group 2) and
in the groups in which the theme o f the week was more unfamiliar to the childparticipants (i.e. winter and construction).
A final developmental trend that can be identified in the group themes is the influence
that background knowledge and personal experiences played in maintaining the
children’s interest or motivation to attend to a topic. This allowed them more time and
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patience to investigate their alternative ways o f knowing, such as absolutist and
evaluativist points o f view. This was prim arily seen in Group 3, but when comparing
Group 1 and Group 2 the same pattern emerges, in which Group 1 had longer duration o f
time-on-task and greater absolutist and evaluativist substance w ithin their group.
Theme 2: Linking Nature o f Knowledge and Process o f Knowing.
A ll three groups demonstrated identical patterns for linking the nature o f knowledge
and the process o f knowing. This pattern existed so strongly that despite the
developmental level, the pattern persisted. When associating new information w ith prior
knowledge and past experiences, they linked the nature o f knowledge together
simultaneously and seemingly automatically. Here they joined the sim plicity o f
knowledge and the certainty o f knowledge as i f they were one dimension o f knowledge.
For example, “ I know; its M ax;” In this example the knowledge is simple and certain.
However, they also integrate knowledge dimensions when the knowledge was complex
and uncertain; fo r example, “ Sometime I think i t ’ s good to fo llo w the rule, like in the
Cricket classroom, but sometimes at home 1 don’ t always fo llo w my m om m y’ s rules.” In
this example the simple and certain dimensions are integrated, but the knowledge appears
to show com plexity and uncertainty. The structure and the stability o f their knowledge
appear to be operating in unison.
This same simple-certain pattern gets carried over to the process o f knowing, or at
least w ith the justification o f knowledge, because source o f knowledge consistently
eluded all o f the child-partieipants in this study. Looking at the process o f knowing
pattern, whether the knowledge is simple and certain or complex and uncertain childparticipants activated their justification o f knowledge w ith the nature o f knowledge
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almost as a prerequisite or as a means o f arriving at a justification o f knowledge. For
example, “ I have two trucks, one looks like this one (points) and the other one is like that
(points). W ell, I have lots o f trucks but they are all different, mostly I play w ith the ones
like them because they are the biggest and they have parts that move because sometimes
when I play I have to have the trucks carry some stu ff fo r me.” This example
demonstrates how they linked the three dimensions; simple, certain, and justification;
however, there were instances in which they may have used the dimensions in other
combinations, such as simple and justification (“ Max because that is what his mommy
called him .” ) or certain and justification (Yes, because that’s what mommies and daddies
do because they like to have fun sometimes.” ).
Theme 3: Peers Scaffold Alternative IVays o f Knowing.
This was a theme that was cultivated by the researcher when specific characteristics
emerged early on in the study between Group 1 and Group 2. Peer interactions and
relationships needed to be investigated closely when there were dramatically different
findings in the focus groups, specifically their epistemological capabilities. This was
particularly o f interest because Group 2 actually functioned better (epistemologically) on
an individual basis, but even w ith that impression, when they were investigated
individually, it was based on interactions in group settings such as whole class instruction
and center activities, so it did not make complete sense that they would regress (so to
speak) w ithin the focus groups. Therefore, the group dynamic became an area o f interest.
W hy would they demonstrate weaker potential w ithin the focus group?
What emerged from this question was the foundation o f this theme. The interaetions
among peers w ithin a group could be positive or negative influences on their capability or
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willingness to report their knowledge and understanding. There were m ultiple activities
that peers engaged in that contributed to epistemological diversity and depth o f
understanding. This was thought to be a form o f scaffolding or peer scaffolding. In this
scaffolding, peers assisted others in their group cognitively, affectively, and behaviorally
by using appropriate social skills or social conventions. Group 1 demonstrated positive
peer influence in all three categories (i.e., cognitive, affective, behavioral). Alternatively,
Group 2 did not engage in several o f the characteristics available in any o f the eategories,
and the lack o f peer scaffolding created a negative impact on the group’s epistemological
functioning. Group 3 was purposely arranged to test the strength o f positive peer
scaffolding and did show some positive impact. Specifically, the cohesiveness o f the
group and subsequent peer scaffolding produced a closer glimpse at the absolutist and
evaluativist developmental levels and allowed for greater depth o f understanding
regarding their epistemologies.
In this study three categories o f peers scalTolding developed; cognitive, affective, and
behavioral; and an example o f each follows. Cognitive peer scaffolding occurred most in
terms o f the children being able to relate to or make associations based on what another
child had contributed. This occurred most eommonly when the associations could be
made to fam ily, peers, personal experiences, rules, and books. Their ability to form
associations tended to vary depending on the children’ s fa m ilia rity w ith the topic, their
personal experiences, or, even in some cases, the m utuality or overlap o f their pretend
world. When the child-participants were able to identify w ith their peers they would
build on what was previously contributed. They would draw similarities and differences,
challenge their peer’ s knowledge, offer help in the form o f creative ideas, or discuss how
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they reasoned about an idea or decision. For example, “ I think I am going to make my
monster like this because I want it to look like Blackout, he is big and strong and I want
to be like him but 1 think it is good that the girls don’t want to make it like mine because
that would be silly because it’s not a girl toy. What are you going to make your monster
like?” This example could also be viewed as a form o f affective peer scaffolding. He
explained his reasoning for designing his monster in a certain way. but he also was
positive and supportive o f his peer’s lack o f interest in wanting to make it similar to his
and showed a curiosity about what they w ill make. Later, during the activity, he did
question them about why they chose the colors and template that they chose.
Affective peer scaffolding included constructs such as motivation and interest which,
when positively generated, promoted longer engagement in a task, more relevant on-task
potential, and more coherent and meaningful exchanges. The child-participants, when
positively charged, demonstrated bright, cheerful affect (i.e., smiling, laughing
appropriately not out o f control or disruptive), and they were relaxed, active, and willing
participants.
Behavioral peer scaffolding occurred when the child-participants would gently
redirect their peers i f they were behaving inappropriately or distracting from the
experience. For example, “ GiGi you need to come and sit down so we can finish and go
to snack.” Also, “ I f you slide down then he won’t be touching you.” While leaning
forward making eye contact with her peer she said, “ Stop touching her, you aren’t
suppose to touch anyone. You’re being bad.”
The key to behavioral peer scaffolding (more so than the other ways o f scaffolding)
was that the peer had to be willing to redirect their behavior based on the feedback from
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another peer. There were several instances that this behavioral scaffolding backfired due
to uncooperative participants. This was the case frequently in Group 2. However, the
preschoolers were generally receptive to this technique. In fact there were often times
when a redirect from authority (i.e., teacher, researcher, aides) was ineffective, but the
children’ s redirecting o f their peers was acceptable and effective. There is more o f a
social hierarchy that, although it includes authority, it also includes peers so it works w ith
the preschoolers. (This might be questionable w ith older children.)
Theme 4: Relevance and Real-W orld Experience
The more relevant the topics are to the group, the more they associate new
information to real-world personal experiences and bypass the am biguity and solitude o f
their internal pretend knowledge. The themes o f the week were designed by the group o f
preschool teachers at the preschool; on what basis they decided on the topics o f monsters,
winter, construction, and fam ily is unknown. However, it became apparent throughout
the study and the focus groups in particular that the subject matter used in preschool
classrooms is more effective at generating epistemologieal understanding when it is
closely related to knowledge or experiences that the children already possess. In this way
it gives the child-participants a foundation to w ork w ith, as opposed to having to create
that foundation.
When a foundation is already in place, such as w ith the themes o f monsters and
fam ily, they tended to draw associations fa irly quickly, took the initiative in constructing
knowledge, and linked new information to prior knowledge to perpetuate understanding.
For example, “ Maybe i f some kids don’t have both mommies and daddies, they eould
borrow somebody’ s. I know kids who have lots o f mommies and daddies. 1 have two
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mommies and one daddy. The one mommy is m y step mommy and I share her w ith a
bunch o f her other kids. Sometimes they stay w ith us but sometimes they go see their
other daddy. Their other daddy is mine too.” This is a complex situation that this child
has a good understanding of, and her peers listen attentively to her because they have
experience and understanding o f a fam ily. Whereas, when a child goes on about
something that the peers don’ t grasp themselves and have no interest in, both sides
become disengaged. For example, “ I don’ t know about winter.” It is d iffic u lt for the
children to become enthusiastic about w inter when their experience is completely
different from what is being presented in the stories (i.e., snow). It was seen in the focus
groups; it was too cognitively and affectively demanding to try to absorb new
information and identify associations w ithout foundational knowledge.
Tw o scenarios were identified as a result o f content not being relevant to the childparticipants’ needs in order to be able to successfully convey their knowledge and
understanding. First, they attempted to formulate a foundation based on what they know.
They know that their pretend knowledge can be anything that they want it to be even i f it
does not make sense. The problem was not sim ply an individual problem. In this study it
was identified in Group 2 how perpetuating pretend knowledge can evoke frustration
among members o f a group.
The second scenario is a behavioral perforation o f the members o f the group and was
identified as being facilitated by two types o f frustration. One was a bit m ilder and more
controllable, in which the children became ovei-whelmed or frustrated seemingly as in
cognitive overload scenarios; The other scenario was where the children were probed
beyond their zone o f proximal development.

In these type o f instances the behavioral
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consequences that emerged from the group could be m odified by adjusting the type o f
questioning or the degree o f d iffic u lty o f an activity. I f the cognitive load was alleviated,
the activity survived w ith all members still interested and engaged (as seen in portions o f
Group 1 and Group 2). However, i f the situation surpassed the challenge o f the
participants, then the result was often just disengagement, but other times complete
disruption o f the group could result. The other more uncontrollable behavioral outbursts
were activated by boredom due to lack o f interest or failure to challenge the participants.
In this situation the group was foreclosed on and could not be salvaged easily (as seen in
portions o f Group 1 and Group 2). When the child-participants were bored and felling
unchallenged, they became completely disruptive.
Therefore, having information relevant to the interests, background knowledge, and
personal experiences was the most effective and efficient way to identify the childparticipants’ knowledge w ithin a focus group setting. They had a zone o f comfort about
conveying their knowledge and knowing that was more thoroughly and generously
conveyed when the information was relevant to them. In this way it reduced the pretend
knowledge they were inclined to resort to for a level o f comfort and diminished the
potential for them to rely on inappropriate behaviors as a means o f distraction and to
retrieve their safety net.
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Preschoolers’ Epistemic Profile

Figure 35; Preschoolers’ Epistemic Profile
Preschoolers’
E P IS T E M IC
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in other ways
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*N onverbal symbols

Preschoolers ' Epistemic Themes
Theme 1: Predominantly M u ltip list Level o f Development.
Preschool children demonstrate their epistemologies predominantly at a m ultiplist
level o f development. This was found in the individual and group setting. They are
confident and competent at these levels when the information is relevant to them and they
can make connections between new information and existing information based on
personal experience or pretend scenarios. However, there are distinctive patterns that
emerge based on the content o f the new information and the context o f the setting in
which the knowledge is activated or cultivated.
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Them e 2 : D is tin c tiv e P a tte rn s o f L in k in g D im e n sio n s o f K now ledge.

This was the most consistent pattern identified in this study. Individuals and groups
o f preschool children lin k the dimensions o f knowledge into the nature o f knowledge and
the process o f knowing; they do not appear to do this in an intentional or conscious
manner. The most identified patterns o f linking the dimensions o f knowledge were as
follows; (a) sim plicity and certainty o f knowledge, (b) sim plicity and justification o f
knowledge; (c) certainty and justification; and (d) simple/certain and justification o f
knowledge. The context o f the situation did not seem to have relevance in this study for
linking the dimensions o f knowledge. However, the content o f the infoiTnation appeared
to play an important role; that is, the more fam iliar or comfortable the child was w ith the
content, the more they used the nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing.
Whereas, the less relevant the topic was, so that they had very lim ited resources (i.e.,
background knowledge, personal experience), the more confined they were to the nature
o f knowledge, and the more cognitively demanding it was to tap into justification o f
knowledge. In this study the source o f knowledge went virtually unattainable in an
explicit manner but did appear to exist in guiding preschoolers im plicitly.
Theme 3: Indicators o f Cognitive Overload When Probing Outside Their ZPD.
The impact o f cognitive overload appears to negatively influence preschooler’s
epistemologies. In this study, while investigating knowledge below their ZPD, it was
recognized that the children can become bored and insufficiently challenged in their
knowledge ability. When they were probed beyond a point o f discomfort to them (i.e.
presumably emotionally), they began to lose interest; that is, they maintained a physical
presence, but mentally and emotionally they were elsewhere. A fter a b rie f period, they
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began a course o f disruptive behaviors (i.e., jum ping, yelling, screeching) followed by
complete disengagement, in which they physically removed themselves from the activity.
Once in motion this sequence was d iffic u lt to salvage.
Probing beyond a preschooler’s zone o f proximal development can be
epistemologically costly but can be diffused i f identified quickly and efficiently. In this
case, probing higher than the ch ild ’s ZPD identified specific cues that the children
exhibited to indicate their frustration, confusion, doubt, and anxiety. One thing for sure
was clear; preschoolers want to be successful in their knowledge. When they have a sense
that they cannot be successful, they become ovenvhelmed (i.e., cognitive overload).
There were many indicators, both verbal and nonverbal, as it was emerging. For example
nonverbal cues identified included the follow ing: poor eye contact, facial expressions o f
shame and doubt, increased tapping any part o f their body, restlessness, anxiety, less
attention span, putting their hands over their face, deep breathing. The verbal cues
identified included the follow ing: repeating the same word or phrase, coming up with
nonsense words or sounds, yelling, squealing, saying “ I don’t know,” “ I don’t care,” and
other articulations that emphasized their dissatisfaction.
I f these cues o f distress were acknowledged and the cognitive load was neutralized,
then the child regained productivity on the task. However, i f the cues were not respected,
then the child skipped the uninterested scenario. When the children in this study arrived
at this point, two courses dominated as follows: (a) The child became disruptive and then
disengaged, or (b) the child skipped the disruptive episodes and sim ply removed him or
herself from the activity. On the occasions when the latter was the case, it was extremely
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d iffic u lt to reengage those children in a future activity. This was particularly the case
w ith Carl and Jeremy on an individual and group situation.
Theme 4: Epistemologies Are Promoted Through Peer Interactions.
This overall theme impacted the individuals’ as w ell as the group profiles.
Preschooler’ s epistemologies are portrayed most thoroughly at the developmental level
and dimensions o f knowledge when they are scaffolded by their peers. This emerged as a
consistent theme and surprisingly more so than any other authority in the classroom (i.e.,
teacher, aides, researcher, books). Peers scaffold the epistemologies o f preschoolers
prim arily in positive ways; cognitively, affectively, and behaviorally.
This theme has been reported in great detail in this chapter, but to reiterate, these
categories o f peer scaffolding were more powerful in being able to understand the
breadth and depth o f the child-participants in this study. Cognitively, preschoolers
depended on their peers to assist in the sharing o f the their personal experiences and the
activation o f their prior knowledge; also they utilized them as a resource to test higher
order thinking skills such as decision-making, reasoning, critical thinking (i.e., drawing
similarities and differenees, arguing their point o f view ). When preschoolers cannot
relate to their peers as source o f knowledge, epistemic potential is inhibited.
A sim ilar pattern existed in this study in terms o f the process o f listening and
observing their peers. The positive or negative energy that preschoolers produced fo r a
topic or an activity seriously predicted the nature o f the individuals w ithin the classroom.
For example, when a child was motivated and interested, he/she was inclined to exert that
motivation onto their peers. Often w ith this age group and in this study, the children are
receptive to this type o f emotional guidance.
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Behavioral scaffolding was also identified as a tool that the preschoolers used to help
their peers notice their inappropriate or unacceptable behavior. This characteristic was
less predictable than the affective or cognitive scaffolding because the child had to be
willing and able to change his/her behavior and get back on-task. Although it was less
predictable, it was a common denominator in the successful productivity o f the focus
group activities in this study.
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CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION
This study includes case studies for six participants and provides a glimpse into the
developing epistemologies o f preschool children individually and through interactions
with their peers. The themes that are identified come from individual interviews and
focus group activities that were precipitated by observing the children’s engagement with
others in an authentic classroom environment (i.e., whole class instruction and center
activities). This chapter discusses the preeminent themes that emerged from this study as
they relate to personal epistemology and child development research. The chapter is
divided into four parts: Part 1 includes the most consistent themes; Part 2 discusses the
limitations of the study; Part 3 includes implications (i.e., theoretical, methodological,
and educational); and Part 4 brings in ideas for future research in children’s personal
epistemology.

Part 1 - Themes
The most reoccurring and consistent themes in the current study are discussed in Part
1. There are three individual themes: peers, affect, and pretense. In addition, there are
four themes that were characteristic o f the children throughout the entire study:
multiplism, group evaluativistic-like traits, linking dimensions o f knowledge, and
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nonverbal epistemologies. Remember, the eurrent study is exploratory in nature; this
type o f investigation is necessary for the purpose o f tapping into an entirely uncharted
field o f personal epistemology research w ith a focus on preschool children. Exploring
preschooler’s developing epistemologies is d iffic u lt because we know virtually nothing
about this area o f child development. Therefore, the themes that emerged from the
eurrent study are viewed as being somewhat sim ilar in the broadest sense o f subjective
and objective perspectives. Also, the perspectives that the children demonstrate are not
intended to reflect perspectives regarding knowledge as described in the research in adult
personal epistemology. However, they are meant to represent the children’s knowledge
and understanding about a specific theme and their beliefs about the themes. This
investigation is intended to document epistemic patterns in preschoolers. The themes
discussed in Part 1 appeared more vehemently throughout the study and are thought to
have considerable influence in preschooler’ s epistemic development.
Peers arid the Personal Epistemology’ Literature.
Peers are present in the classroom and have personal epistemologies that impact each
other. Peers collaborate and use each other as a way to scaffold their knowledge and
understanding o f what they currently know (i.e. assimilate) and what they do not yet
understand (i.e. accommodate) until they reach some equilibrium that satisfies their need
and desire to know and understand. The influence o f peers on personal epistemology
development has been proposed in the literature. Bendixen and Rule (2004) included
peers as part o f an individual’s epistemologieal environment in accordance w ith Piaget’s
notion that peers are relatively at the same level o f power. Alexander et al. (2002)
included a comparison o f science lessons and found the student-led groups were more
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effective in achieving a deeper level o f understanding because the instruction was divided
into small peer groups. The peers were able to present the information in terms that those
students who may have been unlikely to grasp the concepts in a traditional lecture could
understand. In the current study, peers used each other to accomplish focus group tasks.
This use o f peers as scaffolding was identified when an individual would build on one o f
his/her peer’ s statements or experiences. Peers seem to provide information that leads
others to make associations or tap into their background knowledge that the teacher does
not seem to promote.
The children in this study were able to tap into their own emotional place and that o f
their peers. In other words, they frequently made attempts to feel success and
accomplishment by helping others, whether it was to keep them engaged or interested, to
give instruction, or to help them remember a person’ s name. They were in touch w ith the
frustrations o f their peers and tried to positively promote success in others. Often, the
children would doubt their own and other’ s knowledge and were faced w ith the dilemma
to accept or reject their own knowledge or the knowledge o f others that required them to
change their perspective. Bendixen (2000) found that reflection and social interactions
are mechanisms o f change in college student’ s epistemologieal beliefs. Using much
different content but sim ilar processes, the children in the current study sought to change
and be changed through their interactions w ith each other. What strategies do
preschoolers rely on to help the process o f epistemic doubt that peers instill in one
another? H ow do they acquire these characteristics? How might epistemic doubt and
epistemic change promote preschooler’ s epistemic development among peers?
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Children in this study used peer scaffolding as a behavioral tool in order to stay ontask, which is consistent w ith Vygotskian theory. Often, in whole-class instruction,
center activities, and focus groups, individual participants both gave and received
behavioral support from their peers, which in turn positively impacted their ability to
demonstrate their knowledge and understanding.
In recent epistemologieal research, Valanides and Angeli (2008) found that college
students excelled in a group over individual performances. The idea o f peer mentoring
has become popular w ithin social learning theory. Fair, Vandermaas, Beaudry, & Dew
(2005) also used peer scaffolding to examine the context o f an ongoing community
outreach program in which third-grade children are paired w ith preschool-aged children
once a month to do crafts and other activities. The pairs were observed, and the third
graders wrote reflective journals on their mentoring experiences and were interviewed at
the end. The results indicated that the children did provide age-appropriate and taskappropriate scaffolding in the craft activities. Also, the reflective journals indicated that
the third graders’ metacognition was strengthened by their mentor experiences. In the
current study, the focus groups were not arranged to be mentor relationships, however,
these characteristics emerged in the data analysis from open-coding procedures.
Therefore, all o f the children were equal but possessing different strengths and weakness,
which they appeared to be aware o f and utilized to their benefit. It is in each student’s
strengths and weaknesses that the collaborative nature o f their knowledge sharing and
building was able to profit in the end. They conducted themselves naturally in a way
dissim ilar to the way they interacted w ith their peers in an unstructured play setting.
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The positive characteristics that may be supporting their personal epistemologies are
at an advantage w ithin a semi-structured setting in which peer interactions promote more
advanced ways o f thinking and knowing. This is an important area fo r future
investigations in the field o f personal epistemology at all age groups.
Ajfect and the Personal Epistemology Literature.
Bendixen and Rule (2004) introduce the idea o f an affective component being
present in epistemologieal development o f college students; and evidence from this study
strongly supports their notion. Their model con esponds w ith many o f the components o f
conceptual change, in which Pintrich et al. (1993) proposed that characteristics o f
m otivation be more elaborately investigated. A ffective characteristics being so explicit in
the current study suggests that researching young children’ s role o f affect in
epistemologieal development eould use further exploration. There seem to be different
categories o f affective contributions from the children in this study and perhaps this is an
area that needs some weeding out or disentangling and more fine tuning. A place to
begin would be to distinguish between what is affective as being that which can be
observed or extrinsically conveyed (i.e., facial expressions, level o f engagement,
positive/negative interactions, body gestures) versus that which is emotive or more
intrinsic by nature and unobservable (i.e., motivation, mood, interest). In the current
study these traits are sim ply identified as affective characteristics; however, it should not
go unnoted that they appeared to be o f very different origins.
Decorte, Eynde, and Verschaffel (2002) recognized a trend that has occurred in the
epistemologieal research. Despite the fact that student’ s attitudes about math could
predict their beliefs about math, as research in educational psychology became more
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cognitively foeused, there was a parting o f the sea. Attitudes about math were viewed as
an affective construct, and beliefs became a cognitive construct. They further and report
that there was a tension in the field, as some considered beliefs about math as affective
while others viewed it as more metacognitive. Regardless, the point is that affective roles
continue to be a much needed area o f investigation in the field o f personal epistemology.
Beginning some investigations o f this sort in the early years o f development may
contribute to identifying how affective characteristics relate to our beliefs, perhaps
assisting w ith the debate in the beliefs about math.
In a study o f student’ s epistemologieal beliefs Schommer (1993) identified beliefs
about simple and certain knowledge, quick learning, and innate a b ility as being strong
predictors of, not only cognitive ability, but also, affective responses. Also, Pintrich
(2002) points out that research in the field o f personal epistemology has shown that more
advanced beliefs are related to student’ s ability to adapt or change their motivational
tendencies although he does not refer to them as affective tendencies. Is this too close to
the math debate? I f m otivation is an affective construct is it less like ly to be linked to
epistemologieal beliefs? Does affect have multiple dimensions, one being emotions and
another being motivation? How does the field o f personal epistemology categorize these
constructs? Perhaps, this is an area that should stand on its own, which provides another
suggestion for research in young children’ s developing epistemologies; what motivates
young children to choose some inform ation or knowledge beliefs over others?
Seemingly, affect versus emotion versus motivation could be an epistemic debate all
on its own. Valanides and Angeli (2008) define emotion as, “ knowledge, experience,
event, or activity that is either directly or indirectly emotionally charged, defined by the
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learner’ s ehoice o f a word, phrase or clause, and/or the presence o f a punctuation o f unit”
( p. 207).

The construct o f motivation has been applied in various ways to children in

terms o f learning; for example, some researchers conceptualize m otivation in terms o f
intrapsychic mechanisms, incentives, self-efficacy beliefs, attribution, locus o f control,
achievement, and goals (Reeve, 1996). However, few o f these theoretical approaches
have shed light on how young children integrate learning experiences into their own set
o f values and how this integration facilitates learning and achievement (Pintrich, 2003).
Pintrich and Anderman (1994) explain their conceptual model for student motivation as
follow s: expectancy components (self-efficacy and attributions), value components
(intrinsic goal orientation), and affective components (anxiety). The point here is that
affect is an important factor, as evidenced in the current study, to the personal
epistemologieal development o f young children.
Theory o f mind researchers extrapolated the belief-desire reasoning to the area o f
children’ s emotions and found that emotions could predict belief-outcomes versus desireoutcomes (W ellman 1990). In a multi-experiment study, W ellman & Bartsch, 1988)
found that in one experiment four-year-old children have some understanding o f desiredependent emotional reactions (i.e., happiness) and belief-dependent emotional reactions
(i.e., surprise). However, a comparison experiment showed that four-year-old children
used their belief-desire reasoning not only as a way to predict appropriate actions from
beliefs and desires but to predict the emotional reactions o f other individuals. The
difference in the methods was that in the comparison study the protagonist’s reactions
could not be easily predicted because the scenarios were constructed so that they eould be
construed as happy or sad, depending o f the context o f the scenario. W ith specific
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emotional components linked to children’s understanding o f belief-desire and that threeyear-olds demonstrate very similarly (i.e. they can explain actions and emotional
reactions by falling back on their belief-desire mechanism), it seems a likely avenue to
pursue from and epistemic stance, especially, since work in the connection between
theory o f mind and personal epistemology has broken ground (Burr & Hofer, 2002).
Moving a bit further from the personal epistemologieal perspective but nonetheless an
interesting study with children and emotions, Ambert (1994) drew conclusions about the
affective nature o f the responses young children gave to a question and answer session
about family issues based on their level o f attachment to their family members,
specifically their parents. She claimed that the reason that the children communicated in
such an emotionally charged manner had a direct relationship with how close they were
to their parents. Also age was significant; the younger they were, the more their
attachment to their parents and the more animated, expressive, and engaged they were in
the discussion. The age o f the children in this study was two years younger than the
children in Ambert’s (1994) study, but similar findings resulted. GiGi, for example, had
one o f the strongest relationships with her parents, and she was also the most expressive
o f the group.
Pretense and the Personal Epistemology’ Literature.
Pretend is a construct from early childhood development literature and does not exist
anywhere in the personal epistemology research, mainly because there is practically no
research in this area. However, in the theory o f mind literature, pretend (i.e. pretense) is
rampant (Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Astington & Jenkins, 1995; German &
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Leslie, 2001; Leslie, 1987; Sobel & L illa rd , 2001; Sharon & W oolley, 2004; Wellman,
1990) and has been for the past 40 years.
Leslie (1987) asserts that the intricate task o f having “ beliefs about beliefs” (p. 368)
places an information-processing overload on a young child; therefore, they retreat to a
less cognitively demanding task, which is pretending (which a child begins to do at
between one- to one-and-a-half-years o f age). An example is a child pretending that an
abstract object is more concrete, like a banana is a telephone. This strategy allows the
child to then perform more complex and systematic tasks. This is possible, according to
Wellman (1990), because very young children are developing a representational system,
and it is this system that allows a theory o f mind; they are not one in the same. I f this is
true and the a b ility to pretend is scaffolding the ch ild ’ s ability to have theory o f mind,
then perhaps pretending contributes to a c h ild ’s developing epistemologies in the same
complementary fashion.
C hildren’s nature o f pretend is closely linked to aspects o f social learning theory.
Research w ith autistic children, fo r example, can demonstrate the significance o f pretend
play and interactions w ith peers. Using pretend play and peer engagement are commonly
used as intervention techniques to teach autistic children communication skills. Liber,
Frea, & Symon (2008) did case studies on three autistic boys in a public school setting.
They found that combining play w ith the assistance o f peer mentoring increased the
boys’ ability to engage in pretend play independently and among other peers. The boys
also demonstrated a generalization o f social skills that were learned during the study.
Some researchers (Kuhn, Seigler, Damon, & Lerner, 2006) believe that it is d iffic u lt to
deny that sensitivity to individual differences is part o f children’ s early social cognition;
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others agree by claiming that it is social cognition that distinguished humans from
animals (Tomasello, 2007).
A good deal o f childhood pretense research is done in connection to theory o f mind
(Astington, 1993; Bruell & Woolley, 1998; Flavell & M iller, 1998; Harris, Lillard, &
Perner, 1994). Therefore the question that arises as a result o f the many instanees o f
pretend that were identified in the current study is as follows; what does children’s ability
to pretend tell us about understanding their beliefs about knowledge and knowing? This
is an area that is, again, virgin to the field o f personal epistemology and desperately in
need o f further research.
Musatti (1993) found a specific type o f symmetry among young children’s social
knowledge and pretending. The common thread, the socially constructed meaning that
underlies all pretend activities, is that all children have a need to make pretending
explicit. It is not strictly an internal cognitive phenomenon. Is pretending really some
form o f practice?
Leslie (1988) argued that children’s pretend is the first sign o f a system in action and
is an innate cognitive mechanism in which “ 1 am pretending” becomes “ 1 think.” An
example is the difference between “ I am pretending to be a cow” versus “ 1 think that is a
cow.” This is where another potential link between personal epistemology and theory o f
mind may exist, or maybe it is just that we can learn from theory o f mind research.
Moving from “ I am pretending” to “ 1 think” , Leslie says, is metarepresentational because
it is a secondary representation. Meta implies that it is recursive in nature, just like
metacognition is thinking about thinking. I f young children are capable to demonstrate
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metarepresentational thinking, whether innate or socially developed, it is worth
investigating from an epistemologieal perspective.
In this next seetion more specific epistemologieal themes are discussed in relationship
to the personal epistemology literature and then some o f the broader areas that are
influenced by the overall themes that emerged through the study as a whole. This
includes themes that were present individually and in the focus groups. Themes are
discussed as follows: (a) m ultiplism , (b) group evaluativism, (c) linking dimensions o f
knowledge, and (d) nonverbal epistemologies.
M ultiplism
Most o f the child-participants in the current study were dominantly m ultiplistic
thinkers in that they demonstrated subjective orientations o f knowledge and knowing.
Olson and Astington (1986) found that children by three-years-old demonstrate signs o f
epistemologieal thinking; they make references to their own knowledge. For example
they say, “ I think” and ” 1 know.” Further, Flavell, M iimme, Green, and Flavell (1992)
demonstrated that three and four-year-olds do not always attribute false knowledge to
others, and that it goes beyond factual knowledge to values, social conventions, and
moral rules, which children perceive to be true. For example, the children are told a
story about a g irl who believes it is acceptable to put her feet on the table. Then, they are
asked i f the girl thought it was okay to put her feet on the table. The children responded,
“ N o” in most eases, and the four-year-olds did better than the three-year-olds in the
study.
Kuhn and Weinstoek (2002) claim that four-year-olds begin to recognize assertions as
the expression o f someone’ s beliefs. This, they say, “ is a milestone in their cognitive
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development” that opens the doors for further achievement in epistemologieal thinking (
p. 126). I f this is true, then the current study and other research w ith preschool children’s
personal epistemology can be effective for gaining deeper insights into the cognitive
developmental phase and the connection to their epistemic awareness o f the nature o f
knowledge and the process o f knowing.
Kuhn and Weinstoek (2002) label the assertions o f expressions that four-year-olds
have as a realist phase o f epistemologieal understanding because they are copies o f an
external reality. However, the children in this study presented assertions o f facts
(absolutist); copies o f opinions (m ultiplist); and copies o f judgments (evaluativist). In the
current study, some o f the children did demonstrate the ability, on m ultiple occurrences,
to shift their thinking across all three developmental levels. Often some probing was
required, but this was not always the case. Their knowledge was more malleable w ithin a
small group environment rather than individually. Kuhn and Weinstoek (2002) describe
a m ultiplist perspective o f knowledge as being generated by human minds and uncertain.
This would characterize the m ajority o f the responses provided from the children in the
current study. They talk about the information coming from their mind, particularly
when they explain the differenees between what they know in reality and what they know
for pretend.
When the child-participants demonstrated their m ultiplistic perspective o f
epistemologieal awareness, they demonstrated knowledge at a factual level. This factual
level was associated w ith fictional stories that are read to them during a whole class
instruction, and many o f these facts are true in reality such as the uses o f a dump truck
versus a front loading machine, that your father’s mother is your grandmother, and that it
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snows in the w inter as opposed to the summer. However, they also demonstrated
charaeteristies that apply to the classroom rules and procedures; they were partieularly
connected to moral rules such as kindness and fairness, guidelines that they fo llo w for
safety, and values that they bring w ith them from home.
There is much about preschooler’ s m ultiplistic epistemology that is o f importance.
For example, in the current study, although the child-participants appear to be
predominantly m ultiplistic, identifying source o f knowledge at all developmental levels
(even m ultiplism ) was especially challenging. Olson and Astington (1986) also found
that very young children had d iffic u lty in this area. The findings in the current study
support this; however, there are some differenees o f opinion in the literature. Kuhn and
Weinstoek (2002) indicate that young children are realists and that their understanding o f
knowledge comes from external sources and is certain. There were instances o f inferred
external sources o f knowledge in the current study; however, these sources were not
e xp licitly indicated by the children themselves, and this raises the question o f the
children’s use o f pretend and m im icking. What is the reason for the pretend and
m im icking behaviors o f young children? Is it really related to the source o f knowledge?
B urr and Hofer (2002) looked at the process o f knowing (i.e. source and justification)
and found that young children developmentally progress from a pre-dualistie phase to a
dualistic phase, which demonstrates their ability to provide justifications for their
responses and a lack o f theory o f mind development. Overall Kuhn and Weinstoek agree
w ith Burr and Hofer that there is a phase o f pre-dualistie development; these findings
support Chandler & Carpendale (1998).
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This study had a bit different findings because all o f the children were prescreened
and found to have theory o f mind ability, and the m ultiplism in the current study varied
from the pre-dualism found by B urr and Hofer (2002); however, sim plicity o f knowledge
and certainty o f knowledge were also investigated in the present study. There needs to be
more research to understand the developmental coordination o f objectivity and
subjectivity.
There is another finding from the current study that applies to the children’ s
m ultiplistic perspectives: egocentricity and egocentric speech. This seems to apply most
closely to m ultiplism because o f the subjective way that the children identified w ith new
and existing knowledge. Piaget defined egocentricity and egocentric speech as indicators
o f cognitive im m aturity and indicated that it was a ch ild ’ s inability to account fo r the
perspective o f others (Smith, Dockrell & Tomlinson, 1997). However, it was not in this
type o f context that it emerged in this study and is not described w ith the same likeness;
in fact it is quite the opposite. When egocentric speech or behavior was identified in this
study, the children were typically in the midst o f collaborating w ith peers and
acknowledging m ultiple perspectives. The egocentrism observed in this study was
demonstrated as behavior that was motivating the children to compete w ith their peers in
a productive manner or speech that assisted the children during their thought process and
made some o f their thinking visible as they thought about d iffic u lt topics. This is more
representative o f what Vygotsky viewed as private speech (Smith et al. 1997). Vygotsky
(1987) emphatically opposed Piaget’ s notion o f egocentric speech, proposing that private
speech was not egocentric because it occurred when young children are presented with
cognitive obstacles and is representative o f their attempt to be self-guiding. Today and in

358

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

this study it was related to self-regulation or self-regulated learning. Vygotsky believed
that private speech helped ehildren reflect on their own behaviors and played an
important role in cognitive development (See review o f studies, Bivens & Berk, 1990).
Group Evaluativism
One o f the overall themes in the eurrent study was group evaluativism. This study
used focus groups consisting o f three children, and the topics were integrated with the
classroom theme o f the week. The combination o f these two methods seemed to aid the
children’s thinking in that they were topics that the children were familiar with and
because the theme was consistently repeated in different activities throughout the week.
Thus, the children became more confident in their knowledge and understanding o f the
topics. The focus groups were made up o f their peers; therefore, the setting was familiar
to them and building trust within the group was not as complex as it was in an individual
inteiwiew. Although some o f the ehildren demonstrated the ability to construct knowledge
from all three developmental levels and all four dimensions o f knowledge, this was not a
reoccurring theme in the study; however, their ability to demonstrate group evaluativism
within the focus groups did reoccur. This epistemologieal perspective occurred most
frequently in the pre-instruetional groups in which the topics were familiar to the children
outside o f the classroom, such as, monsters and family, and in the post-instructional focus
groups when the topics were monsters, family, and construction. Remember, that Group
3 was intentionally chosen by the researcher and included the three ehildren that
demonstrated the most epistemic potential during the first two weeks o f the study.
These three children were those whose individual themes were discussed earlier in
this chapter. Also, it is characteristics and themes that they consistently demonstrated
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throughout the study that may have contributed to the advanced epistemologieal
perspectives that were generated by all three o f the ehildren drawing on their prior
knowledge and past experiences. One o f the characteristics that may have contributed
includes the ability to use peers as a scaffold in every facet o f development (i.e.,
cognitively, emotionally, and behaviorally). These areas were emphasized by these three
children repeatedly. They continually b u ilt on each other’s knowledge and experience
almost in a competitive nature. They listened to each other, often agreeing and
disagreeing; they were emotionally supportive, in that they motivated and prompted one
another. They all had positive attitudes toward the activities and wanted to learn, and they
did not tolerate inappropriate behaviors from their peers, often redirecting negative
behaviors and attitudes.
W insor (2005) found a comparable theme w ith preschoolers using a sim ilar
methodology and a systems approach that w ill be discussed in greater detail in the future
research section o f this chapter. Kuhn and Weinstoek (2002) address the importance o f
epistemologieal understanding in young children and claim that we need to be concerned
with the very lim ited amount o f evaluativistic thinking in adults. Perhaps looking closely
at how small groups o f preschool children interact and communicate their knowledge
could be compared to how groups o f adolescents might respond in a group environment
using a sim ilar methodology. W ould we see the same group evaluativism in adoleseents
and in adults?
Maturation, educational experiences, and life experiences are thought to aid
epistemologieal development, but evaluativistic thinking is rarely identified in adults.
This study is not suggesting that a group o f preschoolers are more epistemologically
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advanced than adults (H ofer & Pintrich, 1997), but that group evaluatisitic-like thinking
did emerge in the current study in the children’ s language and behavior. This was
possible because they were using knowledge that was developmentaliy appropriate, and
they demonstrated the a b ility to construct knowledge that links subjectivity w ith
objectivity.
The preschoolers in this study generated evaluativistic perspectives that dealt
prim arily w ith their certainty o f knowledge and justifications o f knowledge. What is it
about certainty o f knowledge and justification processes o f knowing that could make
evaluativistic thinking even imaginable in preschool-age children? Perhaps the window
o f opportunity for evaluativistic thinking is quite small and includes educational
experiences more so than life experience or maturation. What is meant by this is that,
perhaps it is the demands made upon students in structured classrooms or learning
environments (rather than the duration o f education) that promotes this way o f thinking,
and in the unstructured daily routines o f life we are pigeon-holed. This would mean that
our inability to think evaluativistically goes deeper than the amount o f education and is
more a result o f societal or cultural ways o f life (i.e., how we teach individuals how to
think, learn, and solve problems).
Linking Dimensions o f Knowledge
The lack o f research w ith young children has made way for researchers to speculate
conceptually regarding the beginnings o f personal epistemological development.
Chandler, Hallet, and Sokol (2002) point out that, regardless o f the age, the participants
studied thus far demonstrate sim ilar patterns o f thinking and seem to have sim ilar starting
points. There are five arguments for this phenomenon, and Chandler, Hallet, and Sokol,

361

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

(2002) propose three o f the five: (a) Early onset suggests that young children have more
sophisticated epistemologies than can be predicted based on studies o f college students;
(b) recursion is conceptualized as a spiral-like development in which epistemological
stages continue to occur and reoccur in a cyclic process, rather than in a linear motion;
and (c) suppression suggests that prior to entering school and during school children’ s
advancing beliefs are discouraged which prompts them to suppress their epistemological
development until adulthood.
Two other arguments can be identified in the literature: (d) late onset supports the
idea that true epistemological development does not begin until students reach higher
academic environments, and researchers have been overestimating the ability o f young
children (Perry, 1970; K ing & Kitchener, 1994), and (e) domain dependence suggests
that early epistemic thinking is dependent on the domain in question. For example,
young children may demonstrate m ultiplistic epistemological perspectives about
subjective knowledge (i.e., personal judgments or procedural knowledge), and, on the
other hand, not demonstrate objective-type-knowledge (declarative knowledge) until
much later (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002; Mansfield & Clinchy, unpublished). One o f these
alternatives may be more valid than another, but it is much too premature to make this
judgment.
Dimensions o f knowledge involve the follow ing: the nature o f knowledge, which
pertains to the sim plicity and certainty o f knowledge; and the process o f knowing, which
pertains to the source and justification o f knowledge. There are three patterns that
emerged in terms o f dimensions o f knowledge throughout this study: (a) the way in
which simple and certain knowledge are coordinated, (b) the alignment o f the nature o f
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knowledge (simple and certain) w ith justification o f knowledge, and (c) the absence o f
the child-participants overt utilization o f sources o f knowledge.
In this study the nature o f knowledge is the oveiw helm ingly predominant way the
preschoolers constructed their knowledge; the successful integration o f new information
was seen as complex and uncertain. This harmony between sim plicity and certainty o f
knowledge was demonstrated regardless o f the developmental level; in addition, this was
the only pattern that did not have any bearing on the content o f the information or the
context o f the interactions. They continually synchronized these two dimensions o f
knowledge to the point that they could be considered one dimension that consists o f
interdependent parts in a definite pattern o f organization (i.e., perhaps unpacked too
much). When their knowledge was eonveyed as simple (i.e., single word responses, such
as, “ yes” ), it was also certain (i.e., “ I know” , confident dispositions, good eye contact,
enthusiasm); conversely, when knowledge was complex (i.e., integrating new
information w ith prior knowledge or past experiences; observations) they acknowledged
that it was uncertain (i.e., “ I ’ m not sure,” “ I don’ t know, maybe” ).
The child-participants in this study demonstrated an obseure distinction between
simple and certain knowledge, so much so that often identical units were coded as both
simple and certain knowledge. For example, at times it was d iffic u lt to assess Adam ’s
simple knowledge from his certain knowledge; they seemed to have a great deal o f
overlap, and there was a tendency to link them together. He began w ith simple and
certain views o f knowledge, but, when probed, his knowledge appeared more complex
and uncertain. However, when his knowledge was simple and certain, he was more
affectively and behaviorally stable in his performance. When knowledge shifted to more
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complex and uncertain, he became curious and engaged the teacher in a line o f
questioning. When he made connections to prior knowledge or past experiences, he
remained engaged and on-task, but i f his questions did not yield advancement in his
understanding he became disengaged and disruptive. He did appear to contemplate his
responses for a moment, but once beginning he was quite spontaneous. He mades strong
associations among the classroom topic and instances o f play w ith his friends and
interactions based on rules w ith his fam ily. When he discussed his mother, it dealt w ith
associations that were affective in nature. He regularly compared him self to characters in
the stories in terms o f their emotional disposition and incorporated experiences he has
had w ith his mother.
G iG i was another good example o f linking sim plicity and certainty o f knowledge.
Dimensionally her knowledge was characteristically more complex and uncertain.
Regardless o f the level o f development, G iG i expressed her knowledge most commonly
in tenns o f the nature o f knowledge (i.e. simple and certain). This theme appeared to be
strongly connected to her fam iliarity w ith a topic. When she had limited knowledge and
experience, she demonstrated knowledge as simple and uncertain. However, the more
background knowledge and past experience she seemed to have about a topic, the more
her knowledge was interpreted as more complex and certain. The more her knowledge
was probed, she maintained the complexities o f her knowledge but shifted to a more
uncertain perspective o f knowledge. Interestingly, when the simple and certain
dimensions were questioned in more depth to uncover the process o f knowing
dimensions, she was able to link simple and certain knowledge w ith justification but
rarely source o f knowledge.
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The second dimensional pattern that garnered attention was the integration between
simple and certain knowledge and justification o f knowledge. The overlapping o f simple
and certain knowledge from the previous dimensional pattern remained a constant when
probing knowledge and understanding for the process o f knowing (i.e. source and
justification). This pattern involved the children linking one or the other, simple or
certain knowledge, or both in alignment w ith justification o f knowledge. This idea o f
aligning the nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing is another pattern that
happened liberally throughout the study and w ithout very mueh probing. In many cases
they spontaneously offered some justification for what they were verbalizing and often it
was accompanied by an increase in their nonverbal communication. When their thinking
was more complex or sophisticated, they had a tendency to be more active in their
expressions (i.e., facial expressions, body gestures, using items nearby as pretend objects,
use o f emotional energy to indicate meaning).
The third dimensional pattern that was identified on the individual level was the
diminished ability or absence o f the source o f knowledge. Source o f knowledge was the
least referenced o f the dimensions o f knowledge throughout the study by all o f the
participants. They were less inclined to overtly articulate their sources o f knowledge
independently or when probed although they did regularly im p lic itly reference internal
and external sources o f knowledge in their responses (i.e., “ mommy,” “ daddy,” “ the
book,” “ at school,” “ at home” ). They rarely eould answer a direct question related to the
source o f knowledge such as “ How do you know the rules in the classroom?” or “ H ow do
you know that the momma bear knows the baby bear is hiding in the snow?” When faced
w ith these types o f questions, they responded using a combination o f certain and
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justification o f knowledge. There was an increase in the nonverbal indicators o f
knowledge and understanding or a use o f the combination o f verbal and nonverbal
markers. When these patterns began to emerge (i.e c u ttin g -o ff their words and using
more nonverbal traits), the books were removed as an anchor to see i f they would identify
the souree o f knowledge using their words rather than pointing or using other nonverbal
means o f identifying how they know. When anchors were removed, they continued to
struggle w ith souree o f knowledge questions; signs o f frustration and cognitive overload
emerged and escalated.
There is very lim ited research in preschoolers’ personal epistemology to compare
these findings w ith, and the ones that are in the literature do not have the same amount o f
in-depth detail to compare adequately. Bun- and Hofer (2002) did have a sim ilar finding,
that preschoolers do transition between subjective and objective understanding o f
knowledge; however, the eurrent study details the social and emotional characteristics
that support the developmental patterns. The laek o f this research is a good reason to
pursue it in more depth.
Verbal and Nonverbal Epistemologies
So far, there has been discussion about patterns related to developmental levels and
dimension o f knowledge; however, there is another pattern that, in the end, appears in the
developmental patterns and the dimensional patterns and has been alluded to thus far.
Throughout the study observations o f verbal and nonverbal ways o f communication
began to take shape; in itia lly it was noticeable as indicative o f developmental shifts but
later was observed in the transitions between dimensions o f knowledge as well. The
three patterns were as follows: (a) verbal only, (b) nonverbal only, and (e) a eombination
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o f verbal and nonverbal communication. Is this pattern in communicating learned? Is it
an early childhood development trait that is somehow connected to early language
development? Is it linked to affective dispositions (i.e., interest, attachment)? Is it a
characteristic that is a result o f excitement and increased psychomotor activity? Could it
be that children incorporate this as a tool to assist them in conveying their knowledge and
understanding? These are all compelling questions that make this area fertile for
investigation because it is right on the surface, so not much digging is required; however,
it is an impression that it may very well be a complex trait to decipher.
As a case specific example, and by no means was this identified in all o f the
participants, GiGi was the child who was the most intrinsically affective while
demonstrating her knowledge. At an absolutist level she was primarily verbal in the way
she conveyed epistemological thinking. When communicating multiplistically, she
maintained a large part o f her verbal ability and incorporated appropriate levels o f
nonverbal expressions, and animated perspectives. At an evaluativistic level the
nonverbal had overridden the verbal; and at times she was even completely nonverbal.
The nonverbal instances typically occurred when the cognitive load o f the questions or
the information was far above her ability level, with or without assistance. GiGi
demonstrated more nonverbal body gestures to assist her verbal descriptions; this
prompted a bit more psychomotor activity (i.e., moving around the room, flailing her
arms and legs) and confused expressions (scowling, poor eye contact, talking more
softly).
There is no investigation o f the ways in which children, adolescents, or adults
communicate their epistemologies or investigations o f how individuals behave when they
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report their epistemological beliefs. This was an interesting realization, considering that
one o f the central components o f most researchers’ recommendations for future research
indicates that we still do not know how individuals know what they know. It seems that
our behavior is, in many ways, how we wear our thoughts on our sleeve. For example,
often we do not have to ask someone i f they like asparagus; we can just tell by their
behavior.
Although behaviorism is not the paradigm o f the time, it once was held in the highest
regard in this country; portions o f the theories continue to be recognized in certain fields.
However, we fail to watch what people are not saying. One o f the perspectives in fam ily
therapy is to ask questions, not for the purpose o f hearing what the individual says but,
rather, to watch how they behave and listen to what they tell you w ith their body. This
perspective seems to apply to research in young children because they say a lot w ith their
nonverbal communication. Surely the argument is that the inferences would be purely
subjective and not proven as true', however, one o f the methodologies that w ill be
discussed later is observation. W ith sound observation skills, reliable methods, and
rigorous data analysis, perhaps legitimate and useful information could be used to
generate more empirically-based research, but it must begin somewhere.
Doherty-Sneddon’ s (2003) book. C h ild re n ’s Unspoken Language, magnifies a topic
that has been largely underestimated or overshadowed by child development’ s
preoccupation w ith language development. This book goes from infancy to middle
childhood, well after early language development. The central focus o f the book is to
present nonverbal behavior as a critical part o f children’ s communication skills. She
provides a portal w ith which to more clearly see many o f the social, emotional, and
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cognitive development that was present through the current study and is referenced
throughout this discussion. The important part o f the book is that it makes a practical
attempt to teach adults how to interpret and respond appropriately to hidden meanings in
children’ s nonverbal behaviors that are commonly overlooked or misinterpreted. She
describes four nonverbal channels: hand gestures, eye gaze, facial expressions, and touch.
Doherty-Sheldon’ s own w ork is in how gaze aversion can be used as a reliable index o f
children’ s readiness to learn something new w ith in their zone o f proximal development.
This would be a good reference to assist researchers w ith a starting point.
An account o f the children’ s communication patterns was acknowledged; however, as
was the case w ith the affective characteristics, in-depth systematic analysis o f possible
underlying meanings was conducted. In the future it may be that the data is reanalyzed to
include more in-depth looks at both the communication themes and the affective themes.
There were a few ideas that came to mind during the data collection as the children
continued to demonstrate the combination o f verbal and nonverbal behaviors. I w ill share
them as things to think about in future research o f nonverbal communication specifically:
(a) Nonverbal behaviors seemed to label, make, or punctuate their words; this seemed to
be a way to gain acceptance from their peers; (b) when they received acceptance from
their peers, the child has more like ly to make a claim, to “ know ;” (c) the more a child
claimed, “ I know,” the more children listened and watched that individual; generally,
these children were the leaders in the group; and (d) in terms o f the patterns o f
communications, peers were active as judge and ju ry or organized an epistemic court as
to the right or wrongness o f the individuals knowledge or experience.
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Part 2 - Lim itations

Methodology
Qualitative Research Considered Too Subjective
The current study is a qualitative research study, and some w ould argue that it is a
purely subjective account o f the researcher’ s point o f view, rather than empirically-based
evidence (Boyd, 2001; Denzin & Lincoln, 1998; M unhall, 2001). Thomas Kuhn (1962)
introduced the term “ paradigm” and the social sciences have debated quantitative versus
qualitative research for decades. Nevertheless, many other psychological researchers
questioned statistically-based research in favor o f qualitative research (M erriam , 2002).
They argue that statistically-based research is invalid because it ignores context and
concentrates on tin y parts o f phenomena rather than on the phenomena as a whole. They
also argue that quantitative research assumes a unitary reality, w hich does not exist, since
researchers’ perceptions o f reality are influenced by their individual perceptions and
predispositions.
These criteria, however, are based on debatable assumptions. For example, the
traditional scientific method concept o f re lia b ility has been rejected by many qualitative
researchers in part because some types o f re lia b ility require repeated observation;
qualitative researchers say this “ is impossible” (Lincoln & Cuba, 1985, p. 186). They
have proposed a qualitative analog to re lia b ility in the fo llo w in g terms: “ dependability,”
“ trustworthiness,” “ cre d ib ility,” “ transferability,” and “ co n firm a b ility” (Lincoln & Guba,
1985, p. 193).

This requires researchers explain how changes in context produced

changes in observations. However, claim ing that repeated observation is impossible does
not demonstrate that the traditional psychometric concept lacks u tility , even i f repeated
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observation is in fact impossible. Furthermore, requiring researchers to explain how
changes in context produced changes in observations raises the psychometric issues o f
reliability and validity. The eurrent study attempted to address these issues in the design,
data collection, and analysis phases o f the project.
Lincoln and Guba (1985) assert that distinctive qualitative and quantitative research
paradigms do not exist because there are many research methodologies defined as
qualitative which d iffe r in underlying perspectives. However, qualitative research still is
equated as being a “ naturalistic and interpretive” research paradigm (Lincoln & Guba,
1985, p.21). Qualitative researchers have developed major paradigmatic research
positions that reflect the com plexity and rigor o f qualitative research: positivism,
postpostitivism, critical theory, constructivism, and participatory (Denzin & Lincoln,
2005).
The current study is a ease-study design which is depicted as congruent w ith one o f
the paradigms w ith specific philosophical underpinnings and is associated w ith distinct
research methodologies that have been developed by scholars (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).
However, despite the evidence resulting from qualitative research, it continues to be
criticized fo r lack o f rigor (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). Silverman (2000) discusses
approaches to evaluating the rigor o f qualitative research (i.e., field notes, interrater
coding, deviant case analysis, eontextualizing data). This research adhered closely to the
guidelines o f qualitative research from the research design through the data analysis
procedures.
Creswell (1998) defines a ease study as, “ A n exploration o f a bounded system or a
ease over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving m ultiple sources o f
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inform ation rich context” (Creswell, 1998 p. 61). This study involves m ultiple cases and
m ultiple sources o f data.

Creswell (1998) and M erriam (1998) also recommend using

m ultiple instances or events as a means o f gaining a more in-depth perspective,
particularly w ith young children. Using case study analysis in terms o f individuals and
groups provided a systematic way o f looking at specific phenomena, collecting data,
analyzing inform ation, and reporting the results (E llet, 2007). As a result, the researcher
gains a sharper understanding o f why and how the instance/s have oeeurred and what
m ight become more important or w orthw hile to research in the future. Case studies lend
themselves to both generating and testing hypotheses (M en iam, 1998). This was
especially important to the current study because research into very young children’ s
personal epistemologies is new and still exploratory; therefore, the case study design
assisted in keeping the individuals and characteristics about them independent and
organized until it was time to integrate them fo r analysis.

Methodology Considered Leading
Another benefit o f the case study design was that it allowed fo r data collection to
occur in an authentic learning environment. None o f the daily activities were altered but
rather were elaborated upon to get a more in-depth perspective o f the thinking patterns o f
the children.
The constant comparative method is recommended in case study research. Bogdan &
B iklen (2003) provide steps fo r using this method, and they were slightly adapted to
account for the m ultiple levels o f analysis that were required to thoroughly use the
epistemic m atrix and also to account for the m ultiple data sources. Using the constant
comparative method contributed incredibly to the rigor o f this research. It required that
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data was reviewed m ultiple times during data collection and again during data analysis.
During data analysis, the data was analyzed at m ultiple times, according to m ultiple
processes (according to the epistemic m atrix), and fo r multiple weeks. During data
collection the data was evaluated to construct more specific inquiry fo r follow -up
interviews and peer focus groups (Corbin & Strauss, 2007).
Case studies arc socially-constructed research approaches situated between concrete
data collecting techniques and methodological paradigms and function as a tool that can
assist in theoretical development as is necessary for investigating children’ s
epistemological development (Charmaz, 2006; Hancock & Algozzine, 2006). In
hindsight, this was the best possible method fo r this type o f research. One o f the major
themes that resulted from this research was that preschooler’s personal epistemologies
appear to flourish when they are socially-constructed. According to Bogdan & Biklen
(2003), “ I f you want to understand the way people think about their w orld and how
knowledge is formed, you need to get close to them, to hear them talk, and observe them
in their day-to-day lives” (p. 32).
Conducting a case study provides an opportunity to utilize the researcher’s
background knowledge and previous experience to capture the “ essence” (van Maanen,
1988, p. 78) o f the c h ild ’ s subjective voice. The role o f the researcher in the current
study was to become involved in the children’ s “ conceptual w orld” (Bogdan & Biklen,
2003, p. 55) and to gain a deeper understanding o f their experiences and the meaning o f
these experiences.
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P a rtic ip a n ts a n d M easurem ent

Small Sample Size
The current study had six child-participants and three focus groups. This small
number o f participants makes gencralizability d iffic u lt (Creswell, 2003). There are
several reasons for having such a small sample size. Probably, the biggest reason is that
gencralizability was not the purpose o f the study. Researehing very young children’ s
personal epistemologies has not been done in-depth; prim arily this research is based on
speculation w ith only a couple o f published research studies (Burr & Hofer, 2002;
Moschner, Ansehuetz, Wernke, & Wagener, 2008). Therefore, this research w ith
children is exploratory. Bogdan & B iklin , (2003) recommends qualitative case studies to
accomplish in-depth investigations o f this nature. Another reason a small sample size
was chosen was due to the delicate nature o f researching very young children. B uilding a
relationship as a priority (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995) takes individual time and a
focus on the needs o f the children. A pilot study was conducted (Winsor, 2005) to assist
in perfecting the design fo r the current study. The pilot used 28 students in the Cricket
classroom, and it was sim ply too many children to conduct such a detailed and complex
investigation.
Participants ’ Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status
Although the study was conducted in a public preschool that included children from
diverse cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds, the child-participants in the study are
prim arily from white middle-class backgrounds. This was not an intentional choice, but
very sim ply a decision based on prescreening assessment results, children whose parents
would consent to the research study, and children who were consistent about attending
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the preschool on a regular basis. For reliability and validity o f the study, it was important
to have w illin g and consenting children and parents. In addition, it is important to have
all o f the participants exposed to the same procedures (Creswell, 2003). For example, i f a
child is not present for a day during whole class instruction, he/she misses the story, plus
an individual interview to follow -up w ith the story and his/her peer’s contributions;
therefore, the child misses a critical piece o f the study going into the Friday focus group.
This makes the data less reliable and valid because o f the gaps created from when he/she
was not present in the classroom.
C hild-Participanis ’ Age
Lim ited research. As mentioned earlier, researehing very young children’ s personal
epistemology is strongly supported in the field (Burr & Hofer, 2002; Haerle, 2005; Kuhn,
1991); however, it is not a staple in personal epistemology research to date. This alone
makes this type o f research quite d iffic u lt and challenging. In contrast, child
development researchers have been investigating children for centuries and have a
significant amount o f guidance (Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Flavell, Green, &
Flavel, 1995).
Lim ited cognitive ability’. Despite the tremendous support in the field, there are
skeptics who question the cognitive ability o f three- and four-year-old children in terms
o f having or being capable o f communicating personal epistemologies. Perry (1970) and
Kitchener (1994) concur w ith this perspective, believing that true epistemological
development begins during the college years. This epistemological perspective is known
as “ late onset” (Burr & Hofer, 2002, p. 206) and claims that researchers have incorrectly
assumed that other cognitive constructs that develop in early childhood can predict
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epistemological development, thereby under estimating the epistemic ability o f very
young children.
Preschoolers may have lim ited cognitive a b ility as compared to adult cognitive
ability, but they demonstrate distinct characteristics that perhaps foreshadow adult
thinking in a number o f cognitive developmental areas. K now ing more about children’ s
cognitive and metacognitive abilities as they relate to their developing epistemologies can
be useful i f they are perceived as contributing factors to their beliefs about knowledge
and knowing. For this to be cultivated, their behaviors and interactions need to be
investigated in-depth.
Q uestionin g w hat is being measured. There may be a question in the minds o f some

scholars as to whether what is being measured is really beliefs about knowledge and
know ing or rather their knowledge about a specific topic (i.e., monsters, winter,
construction, fam ily). This study looked closely at the children’ s words and behaviors to
identify the underpinnings o f their knowledge; these topics were used as tools to identify
how they construct their knowledge from an epistemological perspective. It is true that
preschoolers do not demonstrate verbal ability to identify their b e lie f about knowledge
although they do attempt it; however, they can and do demonstrate overt language and
behavior that conveys an im p licit b e lie f about their knowledge and ways o f knowing.
For example, they are compelled to try to provide inform ation even when they do not
know. This can be viewed as the b e lie f that successful knowledge comes from hard w ork
and effort. They constantly lin k new inform ation to p rio r knowledge and past
experiences which is consistent w ith thinking or know ing that successful knowledge is
complex. This study has provided numerable instances o f evidence that support how
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very young children demonstrate at least the use o f beliefs about knowledge and knowing
even i f not the ability to articulate it overtly.

Part 3 - Implications
Theoretical Im plications
The findings from this study offer new and innovative theoretical significance;
themes that emerged throughout the study suggest that preschoolers demonstrate
identifiable epistemological patterns aeeording to developmental levels and dimensions
o f knowledge. However, there need to be further investigations o f this type to make
elearer distinetions between adults’ and children’s epistemic development. This may
require adapting the cunent term inology w ithin the adult personal epistemology literature
to be more fittin g fo r the epistemic experiences o f presehoolers. These themes are
discussed now: (a) Future research w ith very young children can be produetive and
informative fo r the direction o f gaining knowledge about early onset o f personal
epistemology; (b) it serves as a beginning look into aspeets o f epistemological growth
and may help us understand developmental issues such as recursion (Chandler, Hallett &
Sokol, 2002); (c) combining developmental levels and dimensions o f knowledge provides
a more detailed perspective o f epistemological development; (d) the epistemic impact o f
social and behavior indicators o f children’ s Zone o f Proxim al Development can be
understood; (e) the moral development and social conventions may parallel preschooler’s
epistemology; (f) it supports how a systems approach can impact epistemic ability; and
(g) knowing more about early onset o f personal epistemology can assist in cla rifyin g the
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role o f epistemology in other cognitive constructs such as metacognition, motivation,
self-regulation, and self-efficacy.

Insights into Early Onset
Maybe young children are more epistemologically gifted in their reasoning a bility
than has been assumed by the researchers in the past (Baxter Magolda; 1992; K in g &
Kitchener, 1994; Peri-y, 1970). Chandler et al. (2002) and B urr and H ofer (2002) show
that perhaps there is a m u ltip list-like epistemic stage p rio r to absolutist perspectives.
K ing and Kitchener (1994) looked at students from high school to college and determined
that the cognitive measures used w ith adults to identify epistemological beliefs are too
complex, causing younger participants to struggle to understand them. L ittle -b y -little the
age that researehers are id e ntifyin g epistemological beliefs in is decreasing (B urr &
Hofer, 2002; Carpendale & Chandler, 1996; Chandler & Lalonde, 1996; Kuhn, Cheney,
& Weinstock, 2000; M ansfield & C linchy, 2002; Moschner, Ansehuetz, Wernke, &
Wagener, 2008). There is much to be learned about the early onset o f epistemological
development, and we need to get clear about the underlying cognitive mechanisms that
differentiate an epistemic stance (Chandler et ah, 2002). Even i f researchers in the field
o f personal epistemology or early childhood cognitive development have their doubts
about whether the findings w ith very young children are tru ly epistemological, given the
recent trends in the adolescent epistemic research, it is necessary to be actively pursuing
research w ith younger children as a way to get more breadth and depth in our
understanding o f cognitive mechanisms.
The current study suggests that researching preschooler’ s personal epistemologies is
productive and inform ative fo r gaining knowledge, w hich supports the early onset
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argument. It supports findings that young children have the capacity to demonstrate
epistemologies at a developmental level and a variety o f dimensions o f knowledge. They
demonstrate individual epistemologies that shift between absolutist and m ultiplist
perspectives o f knowledge. The m ultiplistic phase could be consistent with Burr and
H ofer’s (2002) o f a new pre-dualistic phase. However, further research is needed in this
area to clearly identify it in either direction. Another finding that seems to overlap
between the current study and Burr and Hofer (2002) is the essence o f egocentric
subjectivity that the children presented, and more research is needed in this area to more
clearly identify the origin o f this characteristic. B urr and Hofer (2002) identify
egocentric subjectivity as paralleling Piaget’ s notion in that it corresponds to a lack o f
cognitive maturity; however, in the current study, it was viewed as more matching w ith
V ygotsky’s developmental theories and appeared to contribute to advancing the
children’ s ability to think epistemologically.
In the cLiiTcnt study one o f the gro up fin d in g s that stands out in the research o f
c h ild re n ’ s e pistem ologies and co ntributes to e arly an e arly onset argum ent is the idea o f
gro up e va lu a tivism . P re -in stru ctio n and p o st-in s tru c tio n focus groups w ere conducted
based on the w h o le class in s tru c tio n as a w a y to sim u la te m ore in -d ep th discussions. W ith
a s m a lle r n um be r o f c h ild re n , everyone was able to speak, and the researcher could ask
m ore p ro b in g questions. Because o f the fe w e r b e h a vio ral d is a ip tio n s , there was m ore o f a
focus on a sp e cific e p iste m o lo g ica l area sp e cific to the in d iv id u a ls . M o re im p o rta n tly ,
the focus gro up a c tiv itie s a llo w e d fo r a closer in ve stig a tio n o f the interactions between
the in d iv id u a ls and th e ir peers. T h is resulted in evidence that, c o lle c tiv e ly , supports that
preschool c h ild re n w ere able to construct an e p iste m o lo g ica l stance consistent w ith
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evaluativism or naïve evaluativtistic-like. In other words, as a group, they were able to
stay on the same topic and shift between the objective and subjective w hile contributing
justifications o f their understanding.
Inform ation on Recursion
Recursion is a developmental pattern that suggests individuals are exposed and re
exposed to the same epistemic issues at different milestones in their development (Boyes
& Chandler, 1992; Chandler, 1987). This type o f pattern represents a trajectory that is
more spiral in that sim ilar patterns are repeated numerous times throughout lifespan
development. This is opposed to a linear trajectory in which a specific epistemological
course is taken from start to finish and not repeated as in P iaget’s Stages o f Cognitive
Development. In a linear trajectory an individual must satisfy the requirements o f one
stage before being able to successfully move to the next stage o f development. This
would not be the first time that a recursive pattern in cognitive development has
presented itself. Several researchers (Boyes & Chandler, 1992; Chandler, 1987;
Eckensberger, 1983; Overton, 1998; Zelazo, 1999) have found that children construct and
revise “ mental models” several times (Overton, 1998, p .l 11), and Kuhn (1989) compares
children to scientists in her explanation (p. 678).
K nowing more about the early onset o f children’s personal epistemology can
contribute to a recursive trajectoiy theory. There are other developmental patterns and
trajectories that can be informed or argued against w ith more information from children’ s
epistemological development such as late onset, suppression, or domain-specific versus
domain-general trends in epistemological thinking. This is an area that the entire field
eould benefit from in terms o f lifespan development.
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In te g ra tin g D im e n sio n s a n d D e ve lop m e n t to Im p ro ve M o d e ls

U n til recently there have been two separate ways o f looking at personal
epistemology; one way is through developmental levels (i.e., absolutist, m ultiplist,
evaluativist) (Baxter Magolda, 1986; Belenky et al., 1986; K ing & Kitchener, 1994;
Kuhn, 1991; Perry, 1970), and the other is through dimensions o f knowledge (i.e., simple,
certain, source, justification) (Hofer, 2004; Schommer, 2002; Schraw, Bendixen, &
Dunkle, 2002). There is a variety o f research that has begun to disentangle the
dimensions o f knowledge including epistemic cognition (Kitchener (1983), epistemic
reflections (Baxter Magolda, 1992), simple ways o f knowing (Belenky et al., 1986),
personal epistemology as theories (H ofer & Pintrieh, 1997), as resources (Hammer &
Elby, 2002, 2003), adding beliefs about learning (Schommer, 1990, 1991, 1993),
argumentative reasoning (Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000), and epistemic doubt
(Bendixen & Rule, 2004).
Integrating the levels and dimensions o f knowledge in the form o f a matrix (i.e., three
developmental levels and four dimensions o f knowledge resulting in twelve very specific
cells) allows fo r more fine-grained perspectives. On the other hand the matrix could
provide infonnation that suggests that some o f the dimensions are more sim ilar to one
another. For example, the children investigated in this study appear to use simple and
certain knowledge together, rather than as two separate dimensions o f the nature o f
knowledge. When they are asked simple knowledge questions, they respond w ith simple
and certain knowledge responses and vice versa.
Another interesting finding in this study is that, regardless o f the developmental level
o f the question, the children have d iffic u lty explicitly stating their source o f knowledge.
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Gopnik & G raf (1986) found that three-year-olds have d iffic u lty in identifying and
remembering their sources o f knowledge even when given explieit training in identifying
sources o f knowledge. W immer, Hogrefe, and Pemer (1988) found sim ilar results but
further found that the children had d iffic u lty stating the sources o f their beliefs, whether
they were their own beliefs or someone else’s beliefs.
Researching young children’ s personal epistemologies from a developmental
perspective as well as considering the dimensionality o f their knowledge and knowing
w ill eontribute to the depth and breadth o f the literature regarding the nature o f
knowledge and the process o f knowing overall. This line o f research could also be useful
to researchers in ehild development and eognitive development as well.
The epistemie impact o f indicators o f children’ s Zone o f Proximal Development.\
The zone o f proximal development (ZPD) is a sociocultural perspective from
V ygotsky’ s theory o f cognitive development, commonly referred to as sociocultural
theory (W ink & Putney, 2002) because it maintains that how we think is a function o f
both social and cultural influences. In this theory, there is a difference between what
ehildren can do on their own and what they ean do w ith assistance. What the child can
do w ith assistance from others is refen ed to as the zone o f proximal development.
According to Vygotsky (1969), children w ith greater zones o f proximal development can
usually experience more cognitive development when information or instruction is aimed
just above the lower lim its o f their zone o f proxim al development.
The zone o f proximal development was clearly identifiable in the current study
through the children’ s verbal responses and nonverbal behaviors. The children in this
study e xp licitly guided the researcher to their appropriate zones. This may be best
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explained w ith an example. When a question was asked that was below their zone o f
proxim al development (what they can do independently), they could easily respond and
did so spontaneously and appropriately. When questions remained below their zone o f
proxim al development fo r extended periods o f time, or i f questions o f the same caliber
were repeated but in a different way; the children would begin to show boredom and
eventually cause behavior disruptions. When the questions or the discussion was just
w ithin the lower lim it o f their ZPD, they were interested and engaged, which meant the
data was rich w ith epistemological perspectives, and the activity was epistemically
productive. However, i f the line o f questioning was at the top o f the ZPD, the children
demonstrated completely different behaviors that were more consistent w ith eognitive
overload. They would attempt to respond, but often their responses did not make sense,
or the child retreated to a form o f pretend knowledge that might or might not be coherent
but not relevant to the question. They would demonstrate many signs o f cognitive
overload such as, facial expressions o f confusion and frustration, and body gestures like
putting their hands over their face, banging on the floor, and nervousness and shame.
However, they would continue to be actively engaged and motivated until the breaking
point. The peak o f this experience did not, however, end in disruptive behavior, but
rather ju st disengagement, wherein the child would ju st w alk away or begin to daydream.
On the other hand, when the questioning was above their ZPD, there was a b rie f instance
o f confusion w ith no attempt to engage, follow ed by the disruptive behaviors. In this
way the ehildren were aware and communicative regarding what they could do alone,
what they could and would do w ith assistance from their peers or the researcher; and
what they eould not and would not attempt w ith or without assistance.
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V ygotsky’ s sociocultural theories o f cognitive development are making their way into
the field o f personal epistemology. Bendixen & Rule (2004) propose support for
personal epistemology to investigate more social and cultural domains that may relate to
an ind ividu a l’s developing epistemologies. Baxter Magolda (2008) calls it a Learning
Partnership Model that portrays knowledge as complex and socially constructed. Muis,
Bendixen, & Haerle (2006) developed a culturally inclusive model o f epistemic beliefs
w hile others are exploring additional sociocultural aspects o f epistemological beliefs
(Tabak & Weinstoek, 2008).
Cognitive change takes place in the zone o f proximal development. Newman et al.,
(1989) liken it to a “ construetion zone” (p.304). Adults are most commonly thought o f as
the developing child’ s support system, but some o f the findings in the cument study
suggest that peers can also provide a support network for w ork w ithin the zone o f
proximal development. H ow do the roles o f adults and peers resemble one another, and
how are they different? This w ill be discussed in future research in terms o f the
student/child-teaeher relationships involved in learning. It is w ithin these relationships
that the cognitive processes o f children develop and change. Many o f the sociocultural
themes that were identified in the current study and the application o f Vygotsky’ s
theories begin to be consistent w ith the Process Model o f Epistemic B e lie f Change
(Bendixen, 2002).
Preschool children experience a large amount o f social development, going from
home to a learning environment for the first time, making friends, follow ing new rules,
and generally discovering a world away from their fam ily. Due to the recent trend in
personal epistemology research to embrace and apply V ygotsky’ s theories, researching
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preschooler’s developing epistemologies is fertile ground. Therefore, centering young
ehildren’ s developing epistemological perspectives around the ZPD is an inviting link.
M o ra l development and social conventions. M oral development is the process
through which children develop proper attitudes and behaviors toward other people in
small (classroom) or large (society) environments, based on social and cultural norms,
rules, and laws (Snowman, M cCown, & Biehler, 2009). Research suggests that moral
judgm ent and reasoning is impacted by social characteristics (Turiel, 1994) and peer
relationships (Kruger, 1992; Tudge & Rodgoff, 1989).
Bendixen, Schraw, & Dunkle (1998), Schommer (1993), and King & Kitchener
(1994) using different methodologies found that moral reasoning and moral judgments
are related to college student’ s epistemological beliefs independent o f social and cultural
processes, but recommend further researcher in this area.
Hoffman (1987) links social and moral awareness to the influence o f parents. This
relates to this study in that Adam and the other child-participants (despite levels o f
development and dimension o f knowledge) consistently and frequently made associations
between new information and their parents and/or fam ily in relationship to rules or
personal experiences. In addition, they verbally demonstrated their knowledge o f rules in
relationship to making decisions and solving problems. The lim ited research w ith young
children has not made a connection between moral development and epistemological
development
Kohlberg & Hoffman (2003) explored the nature o f moral development, social
behavior, and human interconnectedness. Piaget (1932) wrote about the potential
productivity o f peer interactions in relationship to cognitive and moral development.
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Specifically during concrete operations in very young children, he said it was their
egocentrism that posed the most challenging hurdle to advance to an operational mode o f
thinking and knowing. Thinking at the operational level requires decentration, which is
the ability to take into account m ultiple points o f view. In terms o f epistemological
thought, Chandler et al. (2002) sides w ith Piaget’ s perspeetive, partieularly on the topie
o f rceursion. They liken it to “ wholesale” versus “ retail” epistemie development ( p.
162), in whieh, during formal operations (adoleseenee or even as young as 6 or 8),
epistemie ability is possible beeause they experienee the disturbing awakening that
mutual knowledge or epistemie eommunity (Reseller, 1980) no longer exists; Chandler
(1975) ealls it “ epistemie loneliness” ( p. 229).
Smith (2004) proposes a “ developmental epistemology” ( p. 176), in whieh eausal
psyehology (CP, or for the purpose o f applying it to personal epistemology, objeetive
perspeetives) and nom iative epistemology (NE, or subjeetive perspeetives) beeome parts
o f the same phenomenon. In that, CP is an empirieal aeeount o f faets, and NE is the study
o f norms. Developmental epistemology maintains the empirieal, observable, and
measurable faets, but views norms as “ normative faets” ( p. 176). In this way there is a
human (i.e. qualitative or normative) eomponent to an individual’s thinking that ean be
eausal or non-eausal in terms o f values and beliefs based on their experienees and eultural
roots. In this study, eulture is not lim ited to ethnieity, but, rather, it is used broadly to
inelude the ehildren’ s areas o f interest, sueh as pop eulture. For example, when a ehildpartieipant in the eurrent study made an assoeiation w ith another individual due to a
mutual personal experienee or expounded their knowledge, this is, aeeording to Leslie
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(2004), a normative fact and not necessarily eausal in nature; in that their experienee is a
subjeetive one but a statement o f fact nonetheless.
Smith (2004) says, and 1 concur w ith this line o f thinking, that these individual
convictions are “ central to human minds in action in social worlds” ( p. 177). This means
that an individual’ s subjective knowledge is critical because we are eontinually absorbing
information as we interact with objects and other individuals. It is these normative
experienees by whieh we determine how we w ill link or file new information (i.e.
construct a schema). By engaging in this proeess, our objeetive and subjeetive realities
beeome enmeshed or, maybe, dependent on one another. Perhaps it is much later, in
early adulthood, that we begin to unpack the knowledge and make decisions about
knowledge based on a different set o f criteria as our needs, desires, and motivations in
life change. This way o f thinking about ehildren’ s developing epistemologies makes
perfeet sense; Chandler et al. (2002) talks about clearly stating epistemie criteria and the
cognitive mechanisms that underlie epistemologieal beliefs. In w orking w ith young
children, it may be essential to consider the broadest facets o f their experiences to
effectively investigate their epistemie development.
In this study there are several eausal and normative oeeurrenees o f knowledge. In
Adam ’ s ease, the momentum o f soeial interaction perpetuated his engagement and
adaptation to m ultiple soeial conventions.

Soeial conventions are eongruent to soeial

norms or socially accepted rules or proeedures (Piaget, 1932). Knowing and abiding by
the soeial conventions o f his peer group provided him a foundation o f knowledge and
confidence to be the leader o f his peers. For example, he often was direetive w ith his
peers; “ Hey, you need to sit down and get ready for the story, go wash your hands and
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come sit in the circle;” or “ It’ s easier i f you do it like me, watch me. You have to put the
paper seraps in this eontainer and the markers go in here.” This example conveys his
knowledge o f soeial conventions that do not get interjected voluntarily on an individual
basis. Further, Adam seemed to take pride in his knowledge o f the soeial conventions
w ithin the classroom, and this feeling o f empowerment in a peer setting began a wave
like proeess, in whieh his knowledge was more explicit and linked to his prior
knowledge. For example, there were distinct differences in the way that he thinks about
soeial conventions as opposed to moral judgment in the classroom. For example, he
understood the instability o f soeial conventions as being more situational and eontextspeeifie (Nueci, 1982); “ Sometimes we have to be quiet, that’s the rule but sometimes we
don’t have to be quiet beeause i t ’s a party or playtime, so then it ’s okay to not use our
inside voices.” On the other hand, he demonstrated the stability o f other rules that exist
because o f safety or fairness (Turiel, 1983); “ Hey, don’t touch her; I w ill tell M r. I. You
know we shouldn’t touch our friends like that;” “ W hy not?” “ Because it is never
allowed unless we ask to give somebody a hug because it could bother the person and
they don’t like it or i f we hit too hard then we could hurt them and they would feel bad
and cry. Once I hit Kyle on the playground and he fell down and bleeded, he cried and I
got into trouble. So, I never touch people, they don’t like it.”
The themes identified in this study suggest that young children do have a strong sense
o f communal knowledge, but at the same time, the themes would strongly contrast the
beliefs o f Chandler et al. (2002) that young children are ineapable o f having epistemie
isolation or that the criteria for their knowledge cannot be viewed or understood in
advance or cannot be viewed in from m ultiple perspeetives. Young children demonstrate
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various facets o f a pretend nature that speaks to Chandler et al.’ s (2002) epistemie
loneliness, and they do demonstrate m ultiple ways o f knowing what they know and how
they know it based on the content and context o f the environment. Perhaps the biggest
argument that may not be demonstrated by the investigations o f this study is the
children’ s a b ility to know the criteria fo r their knowledge in advance; however, this study
should raise some doubt about the accuracy o f such thinking, prim arily because the
children do appear to demonstrate criteria for their knowledge by use o f justifications o f
knowledge and retreating to a way o f pretend knowing in which they practice their
criteria in a non-threatening manner, as an epistemie shield o f sorts.
This study focuses on what is in the minds o f preschoolers and does so by observing
their interactions w ith their peers and listening to their words. W ithout considering the
empirical in conjunction w ith the normative aspects o f their knowledge, they would
appear epistemologically obtuse. Vygotsky ( 1994) likened this way o f thinking to
biology and culture; he believed that knowledge starts w ith external experiences that
individuals are exposed to w ithin their cultural context. In this study the cultural context
is the elassroom environment. Kant (1933) believed the same way; knowledge is due to
experiences but not necessarily derived from an individual’ s experiences. In fact, this
perspective about knowledge ean be traced to A ristotle’ s theories o f knowledge.
Aristotle's theory enumerates the possible causes whieh fall into several wide groups,
amounting to the ways the question w hy may be answered. Aristotle had his own
approach to the scientific method in terms o f understanding knowledge; he factored in
what he called “ the essence” (Audi, 2001, p.648) o f a person. He thought that there were
particular qualities about individuals that were also universal. This was in direct contrast
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to his teacher, Plato, who thought that the universal and the particulars were polar
opposites. This study looks at how preschoolers convey their epistemologies and draws
some inferences about w hy preschoolers demonstrate their epistemologies in the way that
they do.

Systems Approach and Epistemie Ability
The current study also helps explain the Dynamic Systems Framework fo r Personal

Epistemolog)’ Development (W insor, 2005) that was constructed based on p ilo t research
as discussed previously (See Figure I). It incorporates a system that may impact young
ch ild re n ’ s epistemologieal development during the in itia l exposure to fonnal learning that
occurs at preschool age. The fram ework integrates relationships between the child and
the ir peers, parents, and teacher. In addition, it considers the relationships among the
parent/teacher, the parent/child’ s peers, and the relationship between the teacher and the
c h ild ’ s peers. The framework includes cognitive, social, and environmental
characteristics. The current study is an attempt to begin looking at the relationship
between the child and their peers. In addition, there were several themes that emerged
fro m this study that support the presence o f cognitive, social, and emotional
characteristics that influence preschooler’ s epistemological thinking.
The Dynamic Systems Framework fo r Persona! Epistemolog}’ Development addresses
the child as the center o f the system. First, the fram ework considers the cognitive
processes o f the child as he/she develops a theory o f mind. According to current research
a child develops a theory o f mind, but there is ongoing debate regarding the early onset o f
personal epistemological development perhaps being in process prior to theory o f mind;
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however, more research is needed. The framework also incorporates the child’ s
language, affeetive dispositions, social behaviors and interactions, and the environment.
Preschoolers ' Personal Epistemology Connecting with Other Cognitive Constructs
The idea o f children engaging in private speech as a .self-regulating technique (a
finding in this study) brings up the topic o f children’ s ability to think metacognitively.
Sclf-rcgulating behavior is a characteristic that is guided by metaeognitive a b ility (Butler
& Winne, 1995; Perry, Phillips & Hutchinson, 2006; W innc & Perry, 2000; Zimmerman,
1990), and includes planning, m onitoring, and evaluating personal progress as well as the
motivation to learn. Winne & Perry (2000) demonstrated that self-regulated learners are
cognizant o f their academic strengths and weaknesses, and they have a repertoire o f
strategies they appropriately apply to tackle day-to-day challenges.
This type o f behavior was identified in the child-participants during this study. For
example, this was shown in the repetition o f words they were unfam iliar with, repeating
other ehildren’s words/phrases, converting to pretend knowledge, and using strategies to
stay on a topic or shift to another topic. Dweck (2000) found that self-regulated learners
attribute their successes and failure to effort expended on a task or effective use o f
strategies. N ow , this is not to say that these children articulated these types o f
characteristic; however, their behavior would indicate that their decision-making was
based on their attention to a topic and their use o f strategies to obtain a position w ithin
their comfort level. Both o f these behaviors resulted in their success or failure, which
they are in-tune w ith as observed by their external behavior and what might be inferred
about their internal awareness through observing their external behavior (i.e., eye contact,
facial expressions, body language).
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Further, Perry et al. (2006) claimed that self-regulated learners believe that
opportunities which are challenging or allow them to practice their learning and develop
an understanding o f the topic w ill afford them success. It could be argued that this study
helps identify similar characteristics in young children, in that there is a distinction in
their behavior when they are bored compared to when they are challenged. When they
are challenged within their zone o f proximal development, they are more engaged and
motivated to be successful. These children wanted to be successful matching a link made
in the research between s e lf regulation and self-efficacy (Pintrich, 2000; Winne & Perry,
2000).

Knowing more broadly and deeply about the developmental process o f children’s
epistemology w ill inevitably contribute to the current literature in the field and perhaps
provide new and innovative ways to measure personal epistemology. It appears that very
young children have the propensity to develop epistemologically; however, we may not
set them up for successfully reaching their potential until decades later.
M e th o d o lo g ica l Im p lica tio n s

One o f the problems with measuring adult or even adolescent epistemological beliefs
is that there often end up being some discrepancies about what they think, what they
know, and how they behave. For example, teachers w ill often ask their students
questions about a topic, only to have the students parrot or copy a response that contains
key words from the text because they think that is what they are expected to say. This
same phenomenon occurs during epistemological investigations; participants have a
notion about how they think they should respond or what the researcher wants them to
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say. Even as adults, the instructions or questions may mislead or are misinterpreted by
the participants.
One o f the benefits o f researching young children is that it can assist in the wording
o f questions for adolescents and adults in tenus o f how to design specific developmental
questions that do not misguide the participants. Children are far less inhibited in their
responses even though they have a sense o f wanting to please the researcher and o f
correct and incorrect responses. They do not have a greater understanding o f the
consequences o f their responses to the researcher. In addition, they do not have an
excessive amount o f knowledge to reference even i f they do want to give the researchers
the answer they may be looking for. Having the limited knowledge and experience plus
the naivety o f the larger significance may just work in the favor o f researchers because
there is less useless information. Children can either answer the questions or they cannot;
therefore, some information can be quickly discarded.
This study opens the door fo r more innovative methods o f measuring personal
epistemology, prim arily because researching young children requires researchers to be
creative and think outside o f the box. It may just be that controlled experimental studies
are not completely successful in research w ith young children because o f children’s needs
for fam iliar situations and building relationships o f trust are not incorporated into many
controlled experiments. The methods that are used in the cuirent study are discussed in
this section as well as additional methodological issues and implications.
Focus Groups as a New and Innovative Methodology
Using focus groups is a novel and uncharacteristic methodology for researching
young children; however, it was used in the current study and proved to be useful and
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effective in tapping into children’ s epistemologies. Focus groups are used more w ith
adults in clinical and marketing research and, more recently, have proven to be beneficial
w ith adolescents’ mental health issues (W orrall & M arino, 2008), teen birth (Herman,
2008), and computer game play (C olw ell, 2007). Foeus groups are also an effective way
to address d iffic u lt issues and hard to reach populations (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003). Using
focus groups in the current study in itia lly came from the pilot research in that the small
groups had six to eight participants and mirrored some o f the problems that were present
in the whole class instruction (i.e., not everyone got a chance to talk, children talked over
one another, and controlling their active behavior was d iffic u lt); therefore, it was clear
that the number o f children in a group needed to be less. Three participants could be
considered a focus group, so the number was reduced to three and the idea o f a central
focus was integrated. Three participants o f the preschool age in a focus group are
conducive to accomplishing the goal w ithout having to be concerned about behavioral
issues.
Perhaps focus groups that are directly linked to classroom instruction and individual
interviews provide very young children w ith a scaffold to be able to pinpoint early
epistemological characteristics and evidence for the early onset o f personal
epistemological development. Qualitative methodologies such as focus groups can help
elaborate on the m ultidim ensionality o f the human experience, including personal
epistemology.
Videotaping
Videotaping is another methodology that was utilized in the current study that was
beneficial in several ways: (a) It allowed for review o f the data m ultiple times, (b) it was
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possible to make an individual file fo r each child by copy/pasting the clips for each
individual together so they could be viewed together, (c) it was possible to choose a b rie f
clip o f a child and show him /her the responses as an anchor to a line o f probing questions
(in this way the ch ild ’ s memory is refreshed about a certain way o f thinking), and (d) the
children were attentive to the video; it was engaging and fun for them. Another huge
asset o f videotaping is that the researcher can be observing other activities or other
children simultaneously, and this leaves time to take field notes and complete
observational checklists and still have the opportunity later to review activities that may
have been overlooked in real time.
Use o f Constant Comparative Analysis as a Methodology’
The constant comparative method is used w ith research designs that incorporate
m ultiple data sources (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003) and is consistent with analyzing case
study data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This is a complex method o f data analysis and
requires persistent, consistent, and simultaneous on-going data collection and data
analysis, so that the researcher can identify prelim inary characteristics o f the individual
child or group.
Using the constant comparative method assists w ith the process o f classifying words
and behaviors into prelim inary categories and subcategories, as w ell as assists with
documenting particular strengths and weaknesses o f individuals and groups. The
constant comparative approach was used to prelim inarily analyze the data. This method
involves analyzing data as it is collected and using preliminai-y findings to shape future
interviews. The intent o f this process is to build a conceptual framework that reflects
participants’ experiences and perceptions regarding the research question. Although there

395

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

were some preexisting ideas about what some o f the participants' experiences might be,
there was a deliberate attempt to be objective and allow the children to guide the
direction o f the questions and the discussion in order to avoid using solely those
preexisting ideas. However, the epistemie matrix cells and the developmental theories o f
child development continued to be guides fo r the study as well. Therefore, open coding
methods (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) to discover the factors, ideas, and experiences that the
children perceived to have been important in their lives were a key in the current study
(Lindsey, Kurtz, Jarvis, W illiam s, & Nackerud, 2000).
The constant comparative method is strict enough to be helpful to the researcher in
exploring the content and meaning in the data, but it is not saddled w ith so many strict
rules to be too rigid. Glaser and Strauss (1967) talk about guidelines rather than about
fixed and constant rules for doing qualitative research, which indicates that guidelines
can be used in a flexible and creative way,; as in the current study. Using this approach
provided a foundation to explore the words and actions o f young children and was found
to be a useful tool to identify areas o f the investigation that may have otherwise been
overlooked. W ith all o f the complexities o f researching young children and the
exploratory nature o f young children’ s personal epistemologies, researching young
children needs to be thorough and rise to the expectations o f quality research
methodologies in the most scientific manner possible.
Case Study Research in Personal Epistemology’
Case study research is one method that can be helpful in allow ing us to understand
the complex issue o f personal epistemology and add strength to what we already know.
Case studies provide elaborate detail and contextual analysis but only o f a lim ited number
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o f individual, events, or conditions. A case study does not lend itse lf w ell to
generalizations or predictions but is quite useful in theory building (Classer & Strauss,
196TX
Personal epistemology research has historically engaged in interviews or used
quantitative methods. More and more researchers in the field are seeing the advantages
that qualitative and mixed-methodologies research can make in the field. These
methodologies may help answer many o f the more challenging questions which plague
the field (Hofer, 2000, Kuhn & Weinstock, 2003; Schraw & Olafson, 2003) regarding the
how and why o f individual’ s beliefs about knowledge and knowing. Using case studies
in personal epistemology and w ith children can assist in finding new measures that
capture the questions we still need to answer and identify areas o f children’ s personal
epistemology that can be the most productive fo r future research.
Longitudinal Research in Personal Epistemology Research
The possibility o f informative research with very young children allows fo r more
longitudinal research in the field o f personal epistemology. Starting at such a young age
can provide a broader perspective on lifespan development and personal epistemology
trajectories. Many researchers in the field o f personal epistemology recommend the field
engage in more longitudinal work, but up to this point, longitudinal studies are still very
rare (Hofer, 2000, Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; K ing & Kitchener, 1986; Perry, 1970; Schraw,

2001X
Educational Im plications
The themes found in the cun ent study indicate that preschool children have the ability
to move between subjective (i.e. more interpretive) and objective (i.e. more factual)
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epistemological frames o f reference, and it appears to be somewhat domain and contextspecific. This finding can affect the overall way in which teaching and learning is
viewed. The educational significance o f this study and how researching children’ s
personal epistemologies can have an important role in im proving education for all
children w ill be discussed in this section. Knowing more about children’s
epistemological onset and development could have a significant impact on the fo llow ing:
(a) early childhood educational curriculum, (b) classroom instructional techniques, (c)
teacher education programs, and (d) how parents prepare their children to enter
preschool.
E arly C hildhood Education C urriculum
The more valid and reliable our research becomes the more lik e ly administrators and
government policy makers o f early childhood curriculums w ill be able to consider and
implement the value o f personal epistemological development. Gaining more knowledge
in children’s personal epistemologies stands to impact early childhood curriculums but
also can guide the current effort to implement preschool standards across the U.S (M artin
& Loomis, 2007). The National Association for the Education o f Young Children
(N A E Y C ) oversees that national, state, and local education facilities fo llo w strict
guidelines in order to obtain funding for their programs. The problem is that each state
has different laws regarding early childhood education. For instance, kindergarten is not
mandatory in every state; only 41 states require that local school districts offer half-day
kindergarten, and nine states require the districts to offer full-day. More alarming than
that is that only 14 states in the US require children to have a kindergarten experience
p rior to entering first grade; two o f those require a full-day o f kindergarten (N A E Y C ,
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2007). Further still, in 2006, only 43% o f all three-year-olds attended a preschool
program, and in the same year only 59% o f all four-year-olds attended preschool.
This should alarm us in that far too many children enter school unprepared. When
they begin unprepared, children begin behind and continue to fall further and further
behind. The government, educators, and parents should be informed about what it takes
to enter school ready to succeed. Knowing about very young children’s epistemie
development can contribute to other cognitive domain-specific tasks such as improving
school perfonnance, raising math and language abilities, sharpening thinking and
attention skills, reducing special education placement, and lowering the sehool drop-out
rate. More broadly, the more successfully we educate individuals, the less crime,
poverty, mental health issues, dependency addiction, and so on we may see.
It is also possible to add to the list the social and emotional benefits o f early
childhood education. For example, it improves and strengthens peer interaction,
decreases problem behavior, encourages more exploratory behavior, and helps
adjustment to the demands o f formal schooling. Other long-term benefits include savings
in tax dollars, increasing lifelong eaming potential, achieving better academic outcomes,
and lowering the rates o f teen pregnancy and incarceration (Galleghar, 2003).
Classroom Instructional Techniques
Perhaps i f there was less o f a focus on behavioral factors in early childhood teaching
and learning we could more evenly weigh the social, affective, and epistemological
factors in preschool learning. It appears that very young children have the propensity to
develop epistemologically, but we may not set them up for successfully reaching their
potential.
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How a teacher is trained to teaeh any grade level is important but especially important
in terms o f early childhood development. A teacher’s teaching philosophy, teaching
technique, communication skills, motivation, and even their epistemological beliefs
(Schraw & Olafson, 2002) are paramount in the teaching and learning o f preschool
children. As has been indicated, a p ilo t study was conducted using a similar
methodology as the current study. The teacher in the p ilo t was a 22-year veteran o f
elementary education, four years o f which were w ith preschoolers. It cannot be known
for certain i f her age, race, sex, experience, or education contributed to her phenomenal
abilities and effectiveness w ith her students and their parents, but she was very
knowledgeable about childhood development theory and practice. She regularly and
consistently applied critical thinking, problem-solving, and decision-making tasks in her
themes o f the week. She was consistent in addressing the needs o f the students in every
capacity. She engaged them in question-and-answer interactions, allowed and
encouraged the children to share their knowledge and experiences, and listened to what
the children had to say. She positively influenced her students’ personal epistemology; it
was truly an incredible experience to be in her classroom.
The current study, on the other hand, was conducted w ith a teacher who was young,
immature, and inexperienced. In faet he was still in the process o f obtaining his
Baccalaureate degree. It was his first year o f running his own classroom, and prior to that
he had been a student aide in the same classroom. He was quite hyperactive and
egocentric himself. Seldom did he listen to what the children had to say; he quickly
dismissed their comments in exchange for keeping order in his classroom. For example,
he responded to student comments w ith, “ Oh w ell that’ s very interesting, now go wash
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your hands.” He also implemented a behavioral technique during whole-class instruction
where the children could not ask questions or make a comment until after the story was
read, so he had them remain silent. I f they agreed w ith something or had a sim ilar
experience as that in the story, the children were directed to tap their noses. He was
pleasant and certainly polite and seemed to try very hard; however, it was d iffic u lt to see
the rationale behind many o f the activities in terms o f aligning the theme o f the week
w ith group or individual activities. I f he was applying cognitive developmental theories
to the classroom, they were d iffic u lt to identify. He rarely took the opportunity to answer
the children’s questions or explain the importance o f a topic or activity, and this could
have very w ell affected the students’ personal epistemologies.
Preschool teachers should use instructional techniques (i.e., discovery learning, block
and dramatic play, music and m oving activities) that are based on educationally sound
research and correspond to the m ultiple dimensions o f learning. Very young children are
capable o f a plethora o f cognitive, emotional, social, and physical activities, and
preschool instructional techniques should expose children to all o f the modalities o f
learning so that children can discover what they are good at and where their interests fall.
N ot all children are going to be good at every task, but they need to experience it.
A dditionally teachers should be aware o f each ch ild ’s zone o f proxim al development; this
way the teacher w ill know each student’s strengths and weaknesses. This w ill allow the
teacher to make quality and informed decisions about pairing students for projects and
play and have realistic expectations for each individual child.
Most importantly, the preschool teacher should have a teaching philosophy rather
than a play philosophy. Teachers should choose activities that incorporate novel
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situations that children are fam iliar w ith and can relate to. They should be explaining to
the children the importance o f topics and activities that they can relate to and understand.
Teaching and learning techniques in the preschool classroom should challenge the
children to think independently and collectively in solving problems, making decisions,
and thinking critically. Above all the teacher needs to engage in active relationship
building between themselves and each child and promote that relationship building
among the peers.
Perhaps the lack o f some combination o f these techniques speaks to possible
contributing factors that lim ited the children in the current study in terms o f sources o f
knowledge. It was expected that the children in this study would have demonstrated their
knowledge about external sources sim ilar to those children in the pilot. This did not
occur, and this could relate to the philosophies and techniques o f the teacher. I f teachers
are aware o f their beliefs about knowledge and knowing and how that relates to learning
w ith preschool children, perhaps children w ill be to understand their own beliefs more
intentionally. For this to occur, teachers would need to e xp licitly cover themes from an
epistemological perspective in the way tliey ask questions, answer questions, design their
lesson plans, and generally approach teaching and learning.
Pre-service Teacher Education Programs
In order to accommodate more cognitively sophisticated children, we would need to
make considerable adjustments to the education o f pre-service teachers. C hildren’ s
personal epistemology is important because it provides valuable insights into what
ehildren know and how they learn. The more understanding we have about children’ s
personal epistemology the better we w ill be able to prepare pre-service teachers to enter
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the classroom, no matter what level they are teaehing. In addition, better prepared
teachers w ill have more solid developmental and cognitive backgrounds and w ill be more
effective and efficient in the classroom. H ow individuals develop personal
epistemologies and the unique relationship they have to learning may assist teacher
instruction to fo llo w more closely to theories o f learning, hence, bridging the gap
between theoiy and practice.
Teachers need to have an understanding o f the importance o f child epistemological
development, and this may help teachers bring more real-world instruction and
assessment into alignment (Schraw & Olafson, 2002). As pointed out earlier,
evaluativism is a level o f personal epistemology that is not recognizable until later
adulthood and is thought to incorporate higher levels o f cognition (i.e. metacognition)
such as critical thinking, problem-solving, reasoning, and logic (Kuhn, ct al, 2002). I f we
can identify how to cultivate this more sophisticated way o f thinking and identify links to
epistemological development in early childhood, the results could lead to better
understanding o f the processes involved in life-long learning. Understanding how very
young children can produce evaluativistic thinking as seen in this study is one small step
in this process.
P arental Education about Preschoolers ' Preparat ion f o r School and Learning
Currently many states in the US do not have educational standards for preschool
children, and in some cases families do not even send their children to kindergarten as it
is still a choice in many locations. There is a direct relationship between parents’ views
about education and learning and how they value education (Laosa, 1978). W hile we
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train pre-scrvice teachers, parents also need to be educated about the effect o f early
childhood experiences on later cognitive and emotional abilities.
This is a d iffic u lt area o f educational significance to disentangle considering the
broad m ulticulturalism in today’s society. Some culturally shaped early learning
opportunities have been found to be more conducive than others to preparing children for
success in schools, which are typically not designed w ith diverse configurations o f
students in mind. One o f the challenges that this poses to early childhood educators, in
particular, involves striking a balance between demonstrating respect for cultural
differences and preparing children to participate successfully in formal school settings
(Prince and Lawrence, 1993). A starting point for addressing this dilemma involves
understanding how children's cultural backgrounds affect the skills, knowledge, and
expectations that they bring to school.
Culture plays a complex role in shaping children's earliest learning opportunities and
experiences in the home. Parents’ beliefs about when and how children learn schoolrelated skills, their daily interactions w ith their children, and the social rules that guide
these interactions combine in intricate ways to create what Luis M o ll has termed “ funds
o f knowledge” that are based in culture (M o ll, Amanti, N eff, & Gonzalez, 1992).
However, efforts to specify the mechanisms or dimensions o f culture that carry its role in
learning are in their infancy. There is a need to advance and include cultural beliefs with
beliefs about knowledge and knowing. Culture is a complex and multidimensional entity
o f human development, generally, and epistemological development, specifically.
Culture is described by the Board o f Children and Families as encompassing economic.
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ethnie, racial, social, structural, and other dimensions that constitute a constellation o f
influences on children's early learning opportunities (NAEYC, 2007).
It is critical when examining the research evidence to take careful note of the
investigator’ s definition o f culture and its implications for the results from any particular
study as it has multiple interpretations. A persistent problem in much o f this research is
drawing inferences about non-cconomic dimensions o f culture when, in fact, social class
may be the more influential variable (Laosa, 1978). Arc differences that are attributed to
children's ethnic backgrounds or immigrant status, for example, more accurately ascribed
to the educational backgrounds o f their parents?
Parents are most often motivated in their ambitions for the success o f their children
but do not have the insights to help them along the way. It is common for parents to
become less and less engaged in their children’ s education as they progress. There are
many contributing factors to this, but the largest contributing factor that parents w ill
report, with the exception o f time, is that they do not understand the material their
children are learning followed by an attitude that they do not understand why the material
has to be taught because it has no earthly significance to anything useful in the child’s life
(von Wyl, Perren, Simoni, & Bugin, 2008).
Parents are an important part o f the developing epistemologies o f young children and
an integral part o f the Dynamic Systems Framework fo r Personal Epistemolog)’
Development (See Figure 1) systems. The current study focused on the child’s
interactions with his/her peers. The pilot study that was conducted included the parentchild relationship and the parent-teacher relationship. Some o f the findings should
inform educators that parents have an important role in child development and epistemie
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development and require some training to inform and empower parents so that they can
more adequately prepare their young children for an education and see their role in their
child’s education for the full term.
Children’s personal epistemologies research can foster parent’s interpretation o f early
childhood developmental milestones and transition perceptions away from traditional
developmental limitations. Providing parents with a clearer vision o f children’s cognitive
abilities may help parents better prepare their children to enter structured classroom
environments. Perhaps i f there was less focus on behavior factors in early childhood
teaching and learning, we would be more evenly weighting social, affective, and
epistemological factors, as opposed to our finding o f predominantly social and affective
levels.

Part 4 Future Research
Researching young children’s personal epistemologies is an area that needs a
considerable amount of attention. Knowing about the early onset o f epistemological
thinking w ill advance research in early childhood development as well as research into
adolescence and adulthood (Chandler & Carpendale, 1998; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).
Gopnik, M eltzoff & Kuhl, (1999) found that children younger than two-years-old can use
verbal language, watch other individual’ s reactions to an object and make their own
preference judgment, and show empathy and compassion for others. Therefore it is
proposed here that future research in young children’s personal epistemology continue to
investigate children individually and their interactions with others. The Dynamic Systems
Framework fo r Personal Epistemology Development (See Figure 1) guides this section o f
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the discussion; suggestions for future research which are closest to children’s personal
epistemology w ill be discussed first, followed by some broader issues related to child
development in general. Personal epistemology in preschool children is quite exploratory
at this point. Future research should include continuing to identify developmental levels
and dimensions o f knowledge. Many o f the findings o f the current study build on areas
that support future research recommendations from scholars in the field: insight change
(Burr & Hofer, 2002), epistemie doubt (Bendixen, 2002; Boyce & Chandler, 1992), and
issues o f domain-dependence (Hofer, 2000; Paulsen & Wells, 1998; Schommer &
Walker, 1995).
Systems F ra m e w o rk

Using a systems approach should be considered in future research as this may be an
efficient and effective way to tap into a complex construct with a younger population.
Schommer-Aikins (2004) also promotes a systems approach although hers centers on the
individual’s personal epistemology, and the approach is more domain-specific. In her
view, one individual’s personal epistemology would be investigated by a professional or
scholar from each domain (i.e., math, science, English etc.) then conclusions could be
compared for the same individual across multiple domains. The current study was
preempted by a pilot study to help make decisions, and one o f the outcomes o f the pilot
study was a plan for future research in children’s epistemology, called the. D yn a m ic
Systems F ra m e w o rk f o r P erson al E pistem ology D evelopm ent (Winsor, 2005) (See Figure

]). It is a compilation o f important issues and individuals that may impact children’s
personal epistemology development and incorporates other systems approaches
(Bronfenbrenner, 1975; Mintichin, 1974).
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The Dynamic Systems Framework f o r Personal Epistemological Development
(Winsor, 2005) (DSFPED) is a comprehensive perspective on the influenees o f young
ehildren’ s personal epistemology. The child continues to be the focus o f the system; it
centers on relationships that impaet a ehild’s thinking about knowledge and knowing,
such as the relationship between peers as reflected in the current study, but it also
includes the relationships that exist between the child and his/her parent(s) and the
relationship between the child and their teacher. In addition, the dynamic systems
framework integrates the intrinsic and extrinsic facets o f the ch ild ’ s development, in
terms o f cognitive, soeial, and emotional eharaeteristies. Preschool ehildren are at a
cognitive milestone in tenus o f the theory o f mind (TO M ) development and w ith the
recent connections between theory o f mind and epistemie development in early
childhood; TO M is also a cognitive component o f the DSFPED.
Current research is just beginning to identify connections between theory o f mind
development and epistemologieal thinking (Bartseh, 2002; B urr & Hofer, 2002; Kuhn,
Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000; Mansfield & Clinehy, 2002). Further, researchers have
identified a stage o f epistemologieal development prior to an absolutist (dualistie) phase
o f development (Burr & Hofer, 2002; Chandler & Carpendale, 1998; Kuhn & Weinstock,
2002), and future research needs to progress in a sim ilar direction. However, future
research in children’ s personal epistemology requires more creative methodologies as a
means o f investigating their cognitive abilities; traditional survey measures used fo r adult
epistemologieal inquiry are inadequate due to ehildren’ s developmental lim itations sueh
as reading and w ritin g abilities. For example. B urr and Hofer (2002) administered
measures fo r both constructs (i.e. theory o f m ind and personal epistemology) using
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puppets. For the epistemological task, the puppets were used to engage the child using
their justifications for knowing to detennine dualistie or pre-dualistic levels. They
adapted the measure from Gopnik and Graf (1988) and O’Neill and Gopnik (1991), who
found that ehildren had difficulty identifying the other’s source o f knowledge and tended
to favor visual over tactile sources o f their own source o f knowledge. Therefore, the
epistemological task included each child completing two seeing tasks and two feeling
tasks. Further, Burr and Hofer (2002) related their finding on the epistemological task to
a theory o f mind task which was adapted from Lalonde and Chandler (1995). Burr and
Hofer (2002) used a misplaced object task and an unexpected contents task, and again,
the puppet was used to engage the child in the storyline. Then to better understand the
connections that might exist between theory o f mind and epistemological beliefs, they
repeated a set o f false-belief tasks and followed-up with epistemie questions that targeted
the child’s source o f knowledge and justifications for knowing.
In the current study the props used to probe children’s epistemologies were objects
that were familiar to them and were already present in the classroom (i.e., the books read
in whole class instruction, puzzles, sequence cards, items from the dramatic play area,
etc.) and the line o f questioning came from the theme-of-the-week topic (i.e., monsters,
winter, construction, family). These were the topics that they were concentrating on in
the classroom for the week and, therefore, were familiar to all o f the children. Then
follow-up questioning was constructed based on the children’s own words and the words
of others from the whole class instruction, center activities, and focus groups. More
research o f this developmentally appropriate caliber needs to continue with preschoolers.
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In comparing Burr & Hofer (2002) to the current study, each has a different
methodology; however, there are some sim ilar findings. This supports a need for future
research to include both structured, controlled and quantitative designs as w ell as semi
structured qualitative designs situated in an authentic environment. There needs to be
continued foeus on the subjective and objective views as they demonstrate their ab ility to
understand and shift between the two w ith ease and confidence.
Investigating the d iffic u lty and/or absence o f ehildren’ s source o f knowledge needs to
be addressed. For example, the question o f why preschool children have d iffic u lty
responding e xp licitly to source o f knowledge questions should be researched. More
information is needed based in this area based on the finding from this study and Burr &
Hofer (2002). Perhaps a mixed-methods approach to this question could be beneficial.
For example, fo llo w ing the story in the whole class instruction, the teacher could ask
source o f knowledge questions (e.g., how do you know that Max didn’t really go to the
forest to see the w ild things?). Using the theme o f the week, a vignette could be
designed, and the children could be asked source o f knowledge questions; however, the
vignette would need to be a novel scenario that was meaningful to the children and
developmentally appropriate. A follow -up individual interview could be done in which
children would be asked probing source o f knowledge questions about their responses in
the whole class instruction and the vignette. In this way the content would be fam iliar,
the contexts would be different, and the questions would be more structured toward the
source o f knowledge. The ehildren’s responses to the whole class instruction and the
vignette could be analyzed em pirically, and the content o f the probing questions could be
a qualitative investigation.
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K now ing more about young children’ s source o f knowledge, both internal or external,
could provide more insights into internal sources such as private speech, pretense,
imagination. This would address how it is that, even though much o f children’ s cognitive
development is taking place internally and w ith lim ited language development at that age,
much o f what and how they know seems im plicit to an outsider but not so im p licit to
their peers. Source o f knowledge is an important dimension o f the process o f knowing;
researching children’ s sources o f knowledge can inform us about developmental patterns
and patterns regarding the dimensions o f knowledge. This is an area that requires more
research in all each levels.
The use o f focus groups and videotaping are detailed in the methodological
implications section o f this chapter. However, observation was another technique used in
the current study that was effective in tapping into children’ s personal epistcmologies.
During whole-class instruction the class was obseiwed, checklists were completed, and
initial ideas for follow -up questions were generated w hile the activity was being
videotaped. Bogdan & Biklen (2003) recommend observation and field notes because
the researcher has the ideas and interactions fresh in their mind. Observational
techniques are often used in classroom teaching. Brophy (2006) found that there were
many contradictions between teacher self-reports and what was observed. He found
several teacher misconceptions and distortions, as w ell as things that teachers did not
report, such as how underappreciated they were by their students. Observation can be a
useful methodological tool for identifying what children do not explicitly report. Schraw
& Olafson (2002) recommend looking at teacher and pre-service teachers’ worldviews.
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In the DSFPED focus on relationships, this is an area that would benefit from more
qualitative research, such as phénoménologies or ethnographies (VanMaanen, 1994).
The Dynamic Systems Framework f o r Personal Epistemological Development
(Winsor, 2005) extrapolates the social dynamic o f the individual and accounts for the
importance and need fo r future research to investigate not only the child’s relationships
but also the relationships o f those individuals that directly impact the knowledge and
understanding o f young children. To clearly and effectively see the child’ s interactions
w ith others, it is necessary to explore m ultiple relationships including the relationship
between the parent and the teacher; the parent and the c h ild ’s peers; and the teacher and
the ch ild ’ s peers. This becomes quite a complex task, but interactions may be similar
among individuals.
Research should be conducted in the children’ s authentic learning environment.
Researching preschooler’ s personal epistcmologies in their classroom environment can
be effective and efficient, particularly in these early exploratory studies. Observing or
interacting w ith children in the environment that they know, feel comfortable in, and w ith
all o f the objects that they know and love at their fingertips places them in an
environment that they w ill function their best. It also gave the researcher plenty o f
opportunities to see more natural interactions and perhaps identify unexpected or
unanticipated thinking or behaving. It is more time efficient in that there is no need to
lug extensive amounts o f materials around in the hopes that one w ill assist you toward
your goal. Having no set up time or controlled environment also takes away from having
to bond w ith an individual child every time the researcher attempts to explore a measure
or activity. There is always that icebreaker-time, and preschool children have such short
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attention spans. It is much easier fo r a researcher to blend into the classroom, and the
children w ill automatically engage the researcher when they feel at ease.
As was stated, affect is another construct that is included in the dynamic system
approach and is also in its infancy in terms o f how it is linked to personal epistemology
and future research could address this (Bendixen & Rule, 2004). One’ s affective nature
is particularly poignant in researching young children’s epistemologies because it is used
in how they choose to communicate. Their emotions, interests, needs, motivations, and
attitudes get conveyed through their words and their actions and strongly impact their
past, present, and future knowledge and understanding. So, what is the epistemic role o f
affective dispositions? It is w idely agreed upon that being a good moral individual is a
result o f having sound moral judgment and reasoning ability (Kohlberg, 1984; Kuhn,
1991). M oral judgment requires being emotionally attuned to the world (G illigan, 1982;
Kohlberg, 1984), and moral decision-making is related to epistemic beliefs (Bendixen,
Schraw, & Dunkle, 1998; K ing & Kitchener, 1994). The current study uncovered
consistent affective characteristics w ithin individual cases and across individuals that
appeared to assist the children in adapting their epistemological position relating to the
moral knowledge and understanding, both in contexts- and content-specific. For
example, when a child had knowledge or experiences sim ilar to a peer or a storyline, they
were considerable more interested, engaged, brighter, more aware o f their successful
account o f linking and transferring information; they were more w illin g to participate and
did so w ith ease, animation, and laughter.
Current research strongly supports an integrated model fo r personal epistemology
(Bendixen & Rule, 2004), and this is also reflected in the dynamic systems framework.
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A ffe ct in the DSFPED is reflected as the ch ild ’ s dispositions (m otivation, interests,
emotions) and is represented w ith a broken line to indicate the affective nature o f the
child is expected to change based on the nature o f the interaction. In addition their affect
is guided by cognitive and social occurrences.
Future research needs to focus on how the environment impacts what the children
know and how they know. This type o f social perspective o f knowledge is currently
accepted in the fields o f social psychology and sociology; and termed “ social
epistemology” (Fuller, 2002, p. 36). The prim ary difference being that social
epistemology involves the social network o f the individual, but interestingly, social
epistemologists have the same d iffic u lty coming to a consensus about the intricacies o f
knowledge, just as the personal epistemologists have boundary concerns (i.e., do beliefs
about learning predict beliefs about knowledge?). They are two separate domains, but
perhaps given the complexities (language, conscious awareness) o f tapping into
children’ s personal epistemologies, it may be necessary to get to the root o f personal
epistemologies through investigations o f social networks. This is linked to Vygotsky
(1987) in which children develop from the outside in (i.e., interrpsychologically). It is
also consistent w ith Bronfenbrenner (1975) in that ecological systems intertwine
externally and become components o f the individual.
Language.
The complex construct o f language in terms o f childhood epistemic development is
critical. Language is a complex concept that has several areas that can be investigated;
however, this study utilizes language as a single internal factor because it is thought to be
a factor. This study is p rim arily concerned w ith the function o f language; children use
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the same system for representing (i.e. verbal thought) and communicating (i.e. verbal
diseourse). Future research should focus more on the preschooler’ s language
development more closely and be concerned more w ith pragmatic and semantic issues. It
is in this way that language has been enormously significant in theory o f mind
(Astington, 1994) and pretend play research (Gopnik & M eltoff, 1989).
Language is a prominent issue in theory o f mind development and a controversial one
at that (Astington & Baird, 2005; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Firth, 1985; Chandler, 1992;
W im m er & Pemer, 1983). Astington & Baird (2005) investigate possible explanations
for how children acquire their understanding for theory o f mind. Likewise, this stands to
be an important component for tapping into and understanding children’s epistemic
development and could also prove to provide significant information in adolescent and
adult epistemic thinking as w ell. Studying this area in preschoolers is an ideal starting
point because they are transitioning from nonverbal to verbal beings and they are
experimenting w ith language and developing linguistic abilities. In the current study there
were epistemic patterns that impacted the way the children communicated. Their
communication patterns ranged from strictly nonverbal interactions to a combination o f
verbal and nonverbal to completely verbal. The current study did not look at linguistic
patterns specifically, but based on the data transcripts, it is reasonable to think this is an
area that requires a vast amount o f research that might contribute enormously to the
research in child development and personal epistemology.
The current study indicates that other cognitive constructs may be developing during
this critical period o f development that have links to personal epistemology and these
need to be explored as well. For example, when asking children epistemologically
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challenging questions, they begin to present metacognitive characteristics in their
behaviors that resemble naïve or perhaps metacognitive infancy. Examples include
linking past and present knowledge and personal experiences to new information, making
associations w ith reoccurring sources (i.e., parents, peers, books), self-regulated
behaviors (i.e., practicing responses in self-talk, repeating others or the story, making-up
scenarios when they do not know), self-efficacy, and motivation. Future research to
investigate the cognitive constructs that may coincide w ith epistemic development should
include interactions between the child another component o f the DSFPED and include
more systematic and structured cognitive task. A mixed-methods approach could be
infonnative, but the qualitative component is critical for getting into the ch ild ’ s w orld and
better understanding the cognitive processes and how they w ork together. Cognitive
approaches could be complemented by also looking and language, affect, or social factors
as well.
Longitudinal Research
Longitudinal studies are deficient in personal epistemology research. Beginning
longitudinal research w ith preschoolers would be an asset to development and provide
infonnation about epistemological development over the lifespan (Hofer & Pintrich,
1998). There is plenty that remains unknown about the trajectory o f epistemological
development that needs to be unpacked, and conducting longitudinal research can
contribute to gaps in the literature. An ideal way to begin a longitudinal study to
investigate the personal epistemologies o f preschool children would be to use the
DSFPED and begin w ith 30 children and their families and fo llo w them through their
highest academic accomplishment.
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There are a tremendous number o f factors to consider when researching young
children, particularly in an authentic environment where many o f the factors cannot be
controlled. For example, it becomes complex when epistemic questioning is based on the
words and actions o f the children themselves and the teacher’ s teaching and learning
philosophies. However, the methodology o f this study could be replicated. This could be
viewed as important starting point for research in children’ s epistemic development
because as mentioned in the lim itations section, “ dependability,” “ trustworthiness,”
“ credibility,” “ transferability,” and “ confirm ability” o f research provide evidence for
reliability and validity which is needed to advance our knowledge in this area (Bogdan &
B iklin , 2003, p. 81).
More research w ith this age specific group o f children w ill help identify which
characteristics and themes, like those found in the current study, transfer to children in
sim ilar and different types o f learning environments. For example, important differences
and sim ilarities may be found in different teaching and learning philosophies, (i.e.,
Reggio-Emilia, Montessori); in different cultural backgrounds (Chen, 2000; Koss &
Chioino & Vargas, 1999); w ith different socioeconomic backgrounds and language
ability (Clegg & Ginsborg, 2006); or w ith learning and physical disadvantages such as
autism (Gelfand & Barron, 2005), attention-deficit (Wender, 2001), or physical illness
(A blin, 1997).

Final thoughts
One final thought about preschooler’ s personal epistemologies has to do w ith a
response that was received from a child-participant in the current study. The children
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were extremely curious and inquisitive about why the researcher was in their classroom,
as they are w ith any newcomer to the classroom. (It really is their domain). They had a
number o f questions, and as any doctoral student who really believes that young children
have capabilities beyond what is known would say I explained, “ I want to know what you
know about knowledge and other things that are important to you.” Apparently this stuck
w ith one o f the children and on the second day o f the second week, 1 asked, “ What do
you think you know the most about?” The response went like this, “ W ow what I know
the most about, w ell, 1 know about lots o f things but 1 couldn’ t tell you about all o f them
that I know but why are you asking me. H ow come you don’t know? I know about me
but w hy do you want to know? (40 second pause) What I know about, know about know
about know about, that is so silly, you’re silly, how do you know what you know about
know?” 1 thought it was a great question from a preschooler.
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0 ADAMRESULT#2
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Knowledgehave a
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familyandpeers.
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knowledgeand
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0 ADAMRESULT#3
Natureof Knowledge
ismoredeveloped
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Processof Knowing
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more integrated
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of Knowing{0-21}
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whenknowledgeis
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understandinghe
maintainshis
positivenature
Otherwisehis
knowledgebecomes
morefragmented
andhisdisposition
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negativeand
unstable. {0-1}

Staycloseto the
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y Simpleknowledgeis
moreaffectiveleads
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moreinternal
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get interpreted
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the result, {0-3!

Combinationof
sourcesishowhe
makesdecisions
about hisbehavior
andknowledge,
{0-5}

Q Whenknowledgeis
alreadylinkedand
more certainmore
animatedwith
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maybe Cococan
staywithyou

y Well yeahbut
tornadosgoes round
androundsoI can't
ever goonthere
because I don't like
aroundandaround
{0-3}

Because I needed
iotake the Karate
{0-3}

{0 -6 }

Q T thinksotheycan
goto sleepand
have energytofish
but maybenot,'
{0-3}

Q "It might me
megatronwhokilled
Blackout, I will ask
Elvis, he knows
more about- that
thanme," {0-3}

^ "All of themare the
samebut theylook
different, likeme
Mymommyiswhite
----------------* lilifi
you andmy
daddy isreallyblack.
I'mjust brown,"
{0-2}

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

EPI5TEMIC
PROF LE: AMY

Q RESULT All
PrimarilyAbsoluLisl
viewof knowledge
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Asher knowledge
andthinking
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complex shehas less
independent
thinking&
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andlessengaged.
{0-2}

/

isa

isa

\

y Nature of
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Certain {0-8}
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onself (egocentric)
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but dependent on
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Q Brief objective
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0 Mainly
demonstrated
nonverballyby
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rulesand
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statementsor
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52 Internal sourceof
knowledge isbased
moreonaffect than
experience, {0-1}
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Q RESULT #2:
Asher knowledge
andthinking
becomesmore
complexshe hasless
independent
thinking&
demonstrates more
animatedbehaviors.
Moredisruptive
andlessengaged.

52 RESULT «:
Stronglyinfluenced
by peers, often
requirespeer
interactionto
respond. Source
linkedtobookand
family, Her personal
experience
responses are rarely
coherent, {0-2}

{0 - 2 }

52 RESULT#4;
Associationsare to
the bookor followsa
peer response,
Veryanimated,
disruptive, and
incoherent, {0-2}

52 Nature andProcess
of Knowing{0-16}

Source {0-24}
52 Certain {0-8}

52 Tustification{0-13}

52Limitedbackground I
52 Regularlycombines 52 Extremelyfocused
verbal + nonverbal
o n s e lf (egocentric)
whether certainor
tut dependent on
uncertain, {0-1}
others. {0-1}
52 Doesnot deal well I
withuncertainty !
behavioraily, {0-1} j
52 Respondsbetter ini
groupactivities
because sheis
reliant o1 peers.
{ 0 - 1}

"Youcouldmake
' either one it all
dependswhat kind
of stuff youhave to
makeit,"(gestures)
{0-4}

I "OnlyI knowwhat
thisis. I'mdrawhg
it for mydaddyto
showhimwhat book
weread," (pointing
andfacial gestures)
{0-4}

knowledge. Sociallyg
knowsthe process
but cannot follow
through,{0-1}
52 Justifications arej
linkedtobookor I
peers, {0-1} I

52 Never really can
articulate her source
of knowledgeit is
moreinferredinher
statementsor
behaviors, {0-1}

52 Shestartstooffer
evidencefor
knowledgebut
quicklydiesengages,

I Internal source of
knowledgeisbased
moreonaffect than
experience, {0-1}

{ 0 - 1}

52 "Hew a n ts

to go
hom e b e cau se h e
misses his m am m a.
That IS v e ry sa d an d j
is sa d ," {0-4}

52 tf youcouldbuilda
snowmanwhat
wouldit looklike?
Likeareindeer anda
snowmanbecause if
I woulddothat I
wouldmakeabig
snowmanandalittle
reindeei. I would
give it eyes, and
nose, andforehead,
andhair. AnI
woulodput pinsin
it'shail soit would
lookpretty," {0-3}

52 Howdoyouknow
that plantsand
treesgrowoutside?
"Theygrowoutside
--------- ------* becausethey grow
outsidethe carpet
outside, they need
dirt andwater to
grow." {0-5}
|

52 "Theforest really
didgrowinfdax's
roombut that won't
happeninmyroom
because 1have
' » bunkbeds andI am
ontopbecause I'm
the biggest between
meandmysister."
{0-2}
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(J Carl Result#!;
Fluctuatesbetween
flbsobutist and
Hultiplist viewof
knowledge. Begins
withSimpleand
Certainresponses
but whenprobed
canhave more
Complex and
Uncertain
perspectives, {0-2}

Q Carl Result #2;
Complex and
Uncertaintyoccurs
due toteacher or
peer interaction.
Certainty evolves
frominternal or
familyideas,
Primarilyobserved
withingroup
settings. (0-2}

isa

isa

Nature of
Knowledge {0-14} M

W Simplicity{0-5}

Q Certainty{0-11}

jo Verbal -FNonverbal
responses, {0-1}
Q Initiallysingleword
responses.
Requiresprobing.

JJ Askingteacher r
peer questions.

isa

{0 - 1}

{0 - 1}

Quickandconfident
withbrief responses.
Generatedfrom
classroomrulesor
thestory. {0-1}

Q Responsesin
relationshipto the
book, classroom
rules, andpersonal
experience. {0-1}

QMultiplistic certainty
ismainlyinternal
(imagination) or
personal
experiences, {0-1}

Q ABSOLUTIST{0-5}

QMULTIPLIST {0-5} I .

0 "That was amonkey
inDorathe
Explorer."
Associatesthe
charactersfromthe
storytopopculture
toys. {0-5}

Yes, I likethe hot
weather and I liketo
get hot andit ishot
inthe summer here.”

m

QEVALUATIVI5T{CF^.

5Follows classrol
rules. {0-1}

Q "Weil they saidI
hadanightmarebut
I amnot sure. It
wasfunny andI had
towake-up whileI
wassleeping." {0-5}

J"I have beenona
planebut 1havenot
beenona
helicopter, I think
they ate different."
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^ "when wewere
outside andit was
hotwe wateredthe
tomato plantsbut
they still died
because the sunis
toohot for themto
bake."{0-4}
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isult #2;
îxand
aintyoccurs
teacher or
teracticn,
ity evolves
iternal or
ideas.
lyobserved
group
IS. {0-2}

.X

0 Carl Result #3;
Combinesverbal
withnonverbal.
Makesassociations
primarilyto personal
e/perience, pretend
andfamily. {0-2}

j Carl Result #4;
lustifications
revolvearoundthe
bookor themeand
personal experience j
andelaborationto
pretendworld. {0-2} I

Q Nature andProcess
of Knowing{0-12}

Q Source{0-16}]

Q

jo Askingteacher orI
peer questions. I

M

Q Justification{0-11} ]
Q Mainlyoff topic,
relatesto pretend
world. {0-1}

foIIows classroom]

rules. {0-1}

I

I

Q links hispersonal
experienceto
knowledgefromthe
bookor theme. {0-1}

I Followspeers. {0-1}
IQ Quickandconfident
withbrief responses.
Generatedfrom
classroomrulesor
the story. {0-1}

QRespects and
followsauthority.
{0 -1}

Q Multiplisticcertainty
' ismainlyinternal
(imagination) or
personal
experiences. {0-1}

J
Q "We all have to
listenanddowhat
Mr, I saysto do.
Heistheteacher
andhe will tell our
parents if wedon't.
{0-4}

Q "No, bears need
their bootsback
because it isn't right
totake somebody's
boots. That'swhy
they shouldsay
pleaseor they need
togivethembackor
youtake them
away." {0-5}

\
Q " I was hikinginthe
woodslikethem
(pointing) withmy
mommyanddaddy
andtheyshowed me
howtouse the stick
tohelp mewalkup
thebighill."{0-4}

asunis
themto

I}

Q "I was walkingupa
mountainwithmy
mommy and I got
tiredbecausethe hill I
was Nghandmy legs]
are short “{0-5}

Q^^'Theyweren't
friendsat the end
becauseshe took
her bootsbut then
they were wavingso
I thinkthat moans
they endedup
friends." {0-2}
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X

Q"1 knowhowthe
babybearsfeels
because I wasa
baby bear (pointing
to the picture) like
thisonelittlebaby
bear andsomeone
tookmyboots," "I
wouldtake them
away fromthembut
! wouldsayplease
andthey shouldget
inbigtrouble
because it isnot nice
totake other bears
things, "If someone
tookHannah's
bout...."{0 3}-

EMSTEMIC
PROPILE: GIGI
{04}
QQGIRE5ULT#1:
Knowledgeis
representedinall 3
developmental levels
andacrossalt4
dimensionsof
knowledge.
Overwhelmingly
MulUplisticviewof
knowledge. {0 2}

} GIGI RESULT#2:
KnowledgeIssimple
anduncertain.
Whenlimitedprior
knowledgeIsa
factor sheresorts
toarepetioreof
animatedbehaviors.

QG1G1RESU.T #3;
Sourceof
Knowledgeshifts
frominternal to
external,
Independent thinker
andcontemplates
responsesseriously.
Difficultymaking
decisionsbasedon
source, {0-2}

{0 -2}

\ isa

/

\

iQ Natureof
Knowledge{0-20} I ^

I Sourcejo-27} I

’isa

Q Short responsesbut
tanelabot'Stewhen
probed. {O-lf
Q Moreabsolutist
regardingpeersand
classroomrules.

p Associations
primarilyWith the
bookandlinkedto
personal
experiences.' {04}

JJUsesimagination j
andpretend. {0-1}

Q whenshedoesn't
knowshewill say“l|
don't know"or say f
"That'ssily"
accompaniedby
facial andbody
gestures. {0-1}

QMsotun^^,

QHUlTIPLlSTjO^.

[ EVALUAIWI5T

0 "No, youcanonly
wear your bathing
suit whenyougo
------------ ► swimmingandyou
don't goswimmingin
the winter time,"
{04}

({"They arehiding
fromtheir momand
theyarehidingin
the snow."
(pointing) {0-3}

(J “I wear ahat and I
mittenswhenitIs
winter soI stay
warmandI don't get
sick. If I get sick
then1don't want to
takemedicine,
YUCKI"{0-4}

Q “Iamnot your
friend. Littlebear
------------ ► hasonefriendand!
amfriendswithR,"
{0-3}

{J'Tf yougoaway
fromyour mommy
anddaddy,
stranoerscancome
andget you, But
sometime1get
scaredbecause I
thinkI dont want to
betakenawayfrom
mymommyand
daddy. Theymake
mesafe." {0-2}

,

Q "NoSilly, flowers
andtreescan't
growinsidebecause
theyneedtogrow
► bigandtalllikeme.
See, I ambigand
tail." (compares
hetself toapeer)
(gestures) {0 3}
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isa

/

} Beginswithinternal
sourceandlinksit to
thebook. Uses
manynonverbal
cueswithher
words, {0-1}

Q

"Inthestory, his
momsaid,'goto
sleepMax.' Uses
manyfacial and
bodygestures.
{04}

Q"I havetwodogs
andI thinktheyare
nicer thanthose
dogs(pointing). I
have LandI
lovethemandthey
lovemeback."{0-4}

{ j "Ma>'h,adJboat
o u tille Ins vv)nij-)w
iiilii-.urmijiridtiunj

liewcinied^iotw?
iMfjeiiii(), lift
w.mrcdi(
It».- w,liltedtil to
seeIIISfrRiriih, The
Wf’s,“{U-3}
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QEPI5TEM1C
PROFILE: GIGI
&E5ULT#1:
(edge is
►antedinall 3
fcpmental levels
[crossall 4
jsionsof
[edge.

RheblTigly

llistic viewof
ledge. {0-2}

\

{QGI RESULT#2:
KnowledgeIssimple
anduncertain.
Whenlimitedprior
knowledgeisa
factor sheresorts
to0 repetioreof
animatedbehaviors,

{02}

ca

{ GIGI RESULT#3:
Sourceof
Knowledgeshifts
frominternal to
external,
independent thinker
andcontemplates
responsesseriously.
Difficultymaking
decisionsbasedon
source. {0-2}

Q gIGI result #4:
Justificationsare
integratedwith
simpleandcertain
knowledge.
Associationstothe
book, classroom
rules, family, and
personal
experiences. {0 2}

\

/

0 Nature andProcess
of Knowing{0-18}

0 Natuieof
Knowledge{0-20}j

?Souice{U-27}|
CJAssociations
0 Usesimaçnation I
primarilywiththe
andpretend, {0-l}|
bookandlinkedto
personal
experiences."{0-l}l
Q Beginswithinternal
sourceandlinksit to
thebook, Uses
Q Whenshedoesn't
rr,anynonverbal
knowshewill say“1
cueswithher
don't know" orsay
words. {0*1}
"That's*"
accompaniedby
facial andbody
gestures. {04}

/

| 0 Justification{0-21}j

IL VTypicallyrelatedtoi
tf^ebookor
I
classroomrulesandl
procedures, {0-1} I

/

{jwhen referringtoj
familyit isinan I
abscdutist view. I
{0-1}

Q “Sometimeyou
havetowear your
coat becauseit is
isa---------- k cold, likeinthe
winter it iscold,"
{0-3}

Q "Theyarehiding
fromtheir momand
theyarehidingin
thesnow."
(pointing) {0-3}

0 "Inthe story, his
momsaid, ‘goto
sleepMax.' Uses
manyfacial and
bodygestures,
{0-4}

Q "I wear ahat and
mittenswhenit is
writer soI stay
warmandI don't get
sick. If I get sick
thenI don't want to
takemedicine,
YUCK!"{0-4}

Q "I havetwodogs
andI thinktheyare
nicer thanthose
dogs(pointing). I
haveB&Landl
lovethemandthey
lovemeback."{0-4}

Q "I liketosingthe
hellosongbecauseI
knowall of thekrds
names, youhaveto
watchmedoit
sometimeI want you
doseebowI know
al thenames," {0-3}

d'No silly, flowers
andtreescan't
growinsidebecause
theyneedtogrow
bigandtaSIikeme.
See, I ambigand
tall." (compares
herself toapeer)
(gestures) {0-3}

Q “Maxhada boat
outsidehiswindow
inhisimagination.
hewantedit sohe
madeit up, He
wantedit because
hewantedtogoto
seeNsfriends. The
WT's,“{0-3}

Q "I'mmakinga
monster tolooklike
theWT'sandI'm
goingtonameit J
isa--------- ^
likemysister andit
Isgoingtobeso
scarybut youwon't
evenknowit IS
scary."{0-2}
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I

EPISTEHIC
S
PROFILE; JEREMYj

{0-4}

JEREMY RESULT
#l;{0-2}

JEREMYRESULT

JEREMYRESULT
#3; {0-2}

#2: {0-2}

Nature of
Knowledge {0-16}®

^Simplicity {0-8}
mgle word
responses even
when probed, {0-1}

are
repetitive. {0-1}

Internal soirees areI
linkedto emotional
dispostition.{0-l} I

I

Verbal + Nonverbal
{0-16}

^ Mainly when
knowledge pertain:
to the book or
theme, {0-1}

are most typical.
{0-1}

Involves classroom
rules or personal
experiences related
to the story. {0-1}

characters to self'l
{ 0 - 1}

ABSOLUTIST {0-6}

; "We have to get
ready for the story
first and to get
ready for the story
you sit like this."

"Yes" "No" '
Things" {0-4}

{0-4}

isa

rMULT]PLI5T{0-6}l

^ "Look(pointing) |
that momma bear is
hugging the baby
---------- ^
bear. I likehugs, 1
my daddy gives me
hugs too." {0-3} p

I
I
I

{0-5}

t

isa

[EVALUATIVIST{0-5}J

.isa.

[ "I amafraid of
monsters but he
would have ttiemas
friends, not me.

isa

.isa.

f "When you don't
followthe right way,
you get lost. Once!
got lost and it no
fun." {0-3}
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.isa.
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EPISTEMIC
PROFILE; JEREMY
{0-4}

JEREMY RESULT
#3; { 0-2}

JEREMY RESULT
#4; {0-2}

Nature and Process
of Knowing {0-14}

Source {0-20}

y Responses are
repetitive, {0-1}
■f Nonverbal

Involves classroom
rules or personal
experiences related
to the story. {0-1}

Internal sources are
linkedto emotional
dispostition. {0-1}

Because."{0-1}

Parents and peers
are most typical

respond using
evidence from
classroomcontent or
personal
experiences. {0-1}

{0 - 1}

Compares
characters to self

Some of themare
purple and some are
green but some are
black(pointing)
Look can you see?
They are like
Transformers," {0-4}

I like the Wild
Things but I am
afraid of monster
so I would run real
fast, My mommy
says there isno
monsters." {0-4}

Those bears will
get introuble
because they ran
fromthe momma
bear and she will be
mad and thembears
will be inbig trouble.
{0-3}

^ "1had it first so he
can't h-ave it
because I'mstill
... 1 ► needing it to color
Blackout soit looks
how I want it, life on
the TV."{0-2}

I

isa
fan't
(jtway,
TOnce I

^"No, he looks like
Blackout just like in
the TV. Adamhas
one and I looked at
it." {0-2}
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EPI5TEMIC
PROFILE; TRLJOY
(0-4)

RESULT 1:
Fluctuates between
Absolutist and
Multiplist viewsof
knowledge. (0-2)

0 RESULT2
Certaintyof
knowledgeisthe
strongest
represented.
Strongassociations
withpersonal
experiences,
parents, or
imagination, (0-2)

Q Nature of
Knowledge (0-11)

^Sinple(W4^
0 Verylimited
interactionwith
others. Most
knowledgecomes
fromwithinor family.
Combinesverbal
andnonverbal
expressionsto help
conveymeaning.

(J Frequent use of "I
can't be sure."
"Sometimes' "You
never know." "I
don't knowbut my
mommydoes." (0-1)

(0-1)

Q Consistently
providesarelevant
response andmake
a connectiontoher
experienceor
pretendworldbut
typically
acknowledjesthat
theremaybeother
options.-(0-1)

Q Expressesher
knowledge interms
of rulesor closeto
the storyline, (0-1)

?ABSOLUTIST M]|-

^ "Nowthat'stwo
snails, theymove
slow. Andladybugs
they ttiovereally
slowtoobut not our
class, we movefast
but we are not real
ladybugs. We/they
gojust alittlebit
slow, likethis
(gesture).' (0-4)

Q "I learnedthat
everybodydon't hit
eachother andkeep
mybodysafe. My
knowledgeisI think
inmyhead." (0-3)

QEVALUATm5T(0-3)j.

"Youget punishedif
your bad,
Sometimes youcan
get punishedeven
whenyoudon't
know." (0-4)

'

I

isa

Q "I ammakinga
princessgoingto a
bigparty. Likewhen
I pretendI ama
real princessandI
dress-up. That's
when 1put ona
pretenddressbut it
isareal dressand I
pretendit is
beautiful (gestures),
"(0-4)

Q "Sometimesthe
bears shouldbein
trouillefor not
listeningtothe mom
but sometimesit is
different.
SometimesI have to
listentomymommy
andsometimes I
have tomydad's
way because I don't
want toget in
troublebut it is
different ' (0-3)
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Q References
classroomtopicor
story. (0-1)
U Linksknowledgeto
family. (O-I)
Q

fdakesassociations
topersonal
experiences and
internal affective
dispositions. (0-1)
Q Doesnot seemto
beimpactedby
peer verbal or
nonverbal behaviors
asa meansto
respond.(0-1)
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Q EPISTEHIC
I
PROFILE: TRUDY!

(04}

T2

RESULT3: Makes
associationsfrom
tier internal pretend
worldtottie real
world, Familyisttie
onlyexternal source
of knowledge
referenced. (0-2}

of
. istfie
St

nted,
associations
tsonai
lences,
ts,or
ation. (0 2}

} RESULT4;
.lustificatbnsare
limitedto Absolutist
andMultiplisticviews
andoccur onlywtien
probed. (0-2}

} NatureandProcessI
of Knowing(0-10} I

Frequent useof "I
can't be sure."
"Sometimes""You
never know." "I
don't knowbut my
mommydoes," (0-1}
Q Consistently
providesarelevant I
responseandmakej
a connectiontoher |
experienceor
pretendworldbut
typically
acknowledgesthat I
theremay be other |
options. (0-1}

fledif
pucan
even
n't

Q Seriousinher
responsesand
appearsto
contemplate,
Strongassociation
topretendworld,
personal
experiences, and
family. (0-1)

References
classroomtopicor
story, (0-t}
f j Linksknowledgeto
family. (0-1}
0 Makesassociations
topersonal
experiencesand
internal affective
dispositions. (0-1}

iJJ Typicallyuses
certain/uncertain
knowledgeto justify
her knowledge.
Stronglinkto the
classroom, personal
experiences, and
pretendideas, (0-1)

Doesnot seemto
be impactedby
peer verbal or
nonverbal behaviors
asa meansto
respond.{0-1}
J"Mymommyknows
howtodressInthe
winter, shemakes
mewear acoat and
hat andmittenssoI
keepwarmand
safe." (0-4)

U "Thosemonstersin
that book(pointing)
are scaryliecause
they are scaryand
ugly. Theyare
growlingtheir teeth
andthey have big
buggingeyes." (0-4)

!

isa
ga
ato a
ewfien
na
dl

Jiat's
na
sbut it
5andI

isthe
(be in
t
emom
mesit is
11 have to
ymommy
mesI
d's
|seI don't |
bin

"I knoweverything
that's about
penguins. I
watchedpenguins
at the zoo, soI
knowthey liveinthe
coldlikebearsdo
too." (0-4)

\

\

{J "I liketodress-up
likeaprincess
because mymommy
anddaddyttiinkTm
sopretty andthen 1
feel pretty and
beautiful, (0-3)

"1thinkthe mom
shouldbe different
because if he's so
badandit hurtsher
ears then shecould
havewalkedhim
right uptohisroom.
That'swhat my
mommywoulddoto
me." (0-2)
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"I wasafraidof the
monstersinthe WT's
becauseonce 1
watcheda scary
movieandit gave
mereallybad
dreamsandI
couldn't sleepgood,
so, I slept withmy
mommyanddaddy.
1don't likethose
baddreams." (0-2)

EPISTEHIC
PROFILE: ADAM

ADAMRESULT#2:
SimpleandCertain
Knowledge have a
strongrelationship
withhispersonal
experienceswith
family andpeers.
Integrationof
background
knowledgeand
classroomlearning.

ADAMRESULT #1:
Knowledgeis
representedinall 3
developmental levels
andacrossall 4
dimensionsof
knowledge,
Overwhelmingly
I'lultiplisticviewof
knowledge, (0-1}

\
Q ADAMRESULT#3]
Natureof Knowlef
ismoredeveloped
individually, wher|
the Natureand
Process of KnowiiJ
isrepresentedat I
more integrated
level. {0-2}

{0 -2 }

Nature of
Knowledge{0-23}* 4
; Acceptswhat Is
understoodand
articulates
justification, {0-2}

^ Nature andprocess
of knowingare
complex and
connected, {0-1}

Simple{0-23}~[

Q Certain {0-9}

} Themore
integrated or
complex his
knowledgeIsthe
more hecombines
verbal and
nonverbal
descriptions. {0-2}

0 Affectivelyand
behaviorailymore
stableandpositive
whenknowledgeis
certain. However,
whenknowledgeis
unscertainhe asks
questions, when
there is
understandinghe
maintainshis
positivenature.
Otherwisehis
knowledgebecomes
morefragmented
andhisdisposition
becomesmore
negative and
unstable. {0-1}

ptay closetoS
classroomtop|
{0-3}
0 Simpleknowledgeis
moreaffective leads
to questionsand
moreinternal
curoisity{0-2}
Q Nosignof external |
failurebut signsof
Internal conflict i.e.,|
poor eye contact
andvery quiet, not 1
soanimated, {0 2} [
JExternal sourceso
knowledgetypicalljj
get interpreted
internallyandif noj
disengagement is j
theresult. {0-3}

J"But angels liveIn I
Heaven, andGod,
andbugstoo, and
bugstoo." {0-4}

A

bsolutist {o-9}|

0 "Nowthat'stwo
snails. Theymove
reallyslow, And
ladybugs; tliey
movereallyslow
too, They just goa
littlebit slow, like
this(indicatingwith
gesture)." {0-4}

} "Sometimeswhen
I’msickI have togo
tothe doctor andI
get ashot right here
(pointstoarm) then
I got hurt," {0-6}

Q"Wehavetj
sweatersso|
cangooutsi
that's what'ij
mommysayr

T
QMULTIPtl5T{0^.

0 "1learnthat
everybodydont hit
eachother andkeep
> their bodiessafe
because I yrant to
have friends." {0-5}

"Because I thinkit's
disgusting." {0-4}

0 "Urn, I didi)l
Onlymygr)|
criedbee*
worrieda
TfientheyJ
m.iybe Cxi
staywithyg
{0 6 )

4
I
EVALUATIVlST{0-7}

---- :------ ►

"Somebodywould
steal it andbring
themhome, and
never comeback."
{0-3}

Q “Tthini'. sothey canj
goto sleepaniJ
have energy tofishI
but maybenot."
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^"11miljilting
iiipgfilKjriv*
hlcxWtivis, hehnji
more about ij
thanme."
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QEPI5TEHIC
PROF LE; ADAM

ADAMRESULT#2:
Simpleand Certain
Knowledge have a
strongrelationship
withhispersonal
experiences with
familyandpeers.
Integrationof
background
knowledge and
classroomlearning,

[ADAMRESULT#3;
Nature of Knowledge
ismoredeveloped
individually, whereas
the Natureand
Processof Knowing
Isrepresentedat a
moreintegrated
level. {0-2}

QADAMRESUtT #4:
Sourceof
Knowledgeisdearly
shifts frominternal
toexternal in
nature. {0-2}

(0 -2)

Nature andProcess
of Knowing{0-21}
^Accepts what is
understoodand
articulates
justification, {0-2} I

Q Certain {0-9}

Affectivelyand
behaviorallymore
stableandpositive
when knowledgeis
certain. However,
when knowledgeis
unscertainheasks
questions, when
there is
understandinghe
maintainshis
positive nature.
Otherwisehis
knowledge becomes
morefragmented
andhisdisposition
becomesmore
negative and
unstable, {0-1}

Staycloseto the
classroomtopic,
(0-3)
Q Simpleknowledge is
moreaffective leads
to questionsand
moreinternal
curoisity{0-2}
Nosignof external
failurebut signsof
internal conflict i.e.,
poor eye contact
andvery quiet, not
soanimated, {0-2}

j Usuallyintegrates
personal experience
or family. {0-2}

isa

t

\

isa

y

isa
Source{0-26} 1

t

ka

1
, Q Justification{0-21} ||+isa_

1

\

I External sourcesofI
knowledgetypically!
get interpreted
internallyandif not;
disengagement is
the result. {0-3}

Q Combinationof
sourcesishowhe
makesdecisions
about bisbehavior
andknowledge.
{0-5}

0 Whenknowledgeis
alreadylinkedand
more certainmore
animatedwith
justifcationsand
more confident.
{ 0 -2 }

I "Sometimes when
I I'msickI have togo
tothe doctor andI
get a shot right here
(pointstoarm) then
I got hurt." {0-6}

1done know. {0-4}

BecauseI thinkit's
disgusting,”{0-4}

Q "No. My sister said
nofighting; that's
bad." {0-4}
4V Q Becauseit'sonlyfor S
kids, {0-4}
5
Q "Wehaveto get
sweaterssothat we
can gooutside,
that'swhat my
mommysays,"{0-4}

"Urn, I didnTcry, ||
Onlymygrandpa
criedbecausethey
worriedabout him.
Thenthey said
maybeCococan
staywithyou,"
{0 -6 }

11 thinksothey can
gotosleepand
have energy tofish
but maybenot."
{0-3}

J|"Itiriightme
megatronwhokilled
Blackrut, I will ask
Elvis, heknows
moreabout that
thanme," (0-3}

t
isa
1
D Well yeah but
tornadosgoesround
androundso1can't
ever goonthere
because I don't like
around andaround.
{0-3} .
A
isa
1
Q Because I needed
to take the Karate,
{0-3}
isa
1
"All of themare the
same but they look
different, likeme.
My mommyiswhite
likeyouandmy
daddy isreally black.
I'mjust brown."
{0-2}
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EPI5TEM1C
PROFILE: AMY
(0-4)

JRESULT #1:
PrimarilyAbsolutist
viewof knowledge
across all four
dimensionsof
knowledge,
Requires probing
andredirection,
( 0 -2 )

------------------L
Q RESULT#2:
Asher knowledge
andthinWng
becomesmore
complexshehasless
independent
thinking8,
demonstrates more
animatedbehaviors.
Moredisruptive
andlessengaged.
(0-2)

/

isa

isa

\

Nature of
Knowledge(0-I8}' ^

Simple{O-iej-J

Certain(0-8)
Regularlycombines Q
verbal -f nonverbal
whether certainor
uncertain, (O-I)

Q Brief objective
phrasesabout the
story, (O-I)
JJ Mainly
demonstrated
nonverbally by
followingclassroom
rulesand
procedures, (0-1)

Q Doesnot deal wel
withuncertainty
behaviorally. (0-1)
Q Respondsbetter
groupactivities
becausesheis
reliant onpeers

0 Mainlylinkedto
classroomrulesor
familyactivities.
( 0 - 1)

( 0- 1)

y ABSOLUTIST(0-7) I

y "Shhhhh, youneed
tobequiet not it is
timetolistentothe
story," (0-4)

y "Youcouldmake
either oneit all
depends what kind
of stuff youhave to
makeit," (gestures)
(0-4)

yMULTlPllST(0-7}[

y "Inthat story
(pointing) Max
misseshismommy
I missmymommy
toobut 1knowshe
comestoget me
(0-3)

y "OnlyI knowwhat
thisis, Tmdrawing
it for mydaddyto
showhimwhat book
weread."(pointing
andfacial gestures)
(0-4)

|yEVALUATlVlST (0-6) |

Q Noevâlualivistic
statements, Does
not evenrepeat
peersevaluativistic
statements but
becomessilly,
animated, and
disruptive. It
appearsoftenas
copingmechanism
for alackof
understandingor
lackof background
knowledge,
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Extremelyfocused
onself (egocentric)
but dependent on
others. (0-1)
0 Never reallycan
articulateher source
of knowledgeit is
moreInferredinher
statementsor
behaviors, (0-1)
Internal sourceof
knowledgeisbased
moreonaffect than
experience. (0-1)

O'

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

yEPISTEHIC
PROFILE: AML
(04)

y RESULT #2;
Asher knowledge
andthinking
becomesmore
complexshehasless
independent
thinking&
demonstratesmore
animatedbehaviors.
Moredisruptive
andlessengaged.

y RESULT#3
Stronglyinfluenced
bypeers, often
requirespeer
interactionto
respond. Source
linkedtobookand
family. Her personal
experience
responsesare rarely
coherent. (8-2)

M

y RESULT #4:
Associationsare to
the bookor follows aj
peer response.
Veryanimated,
disruptive, anti
incoherent. (0-2)

Nature andProcess
of Knowing(0-16)

Justification(0-18)

Tisa^ y

n

Regularlycombines y
verbal + nonverbal
whether certainor
uncertain. (0-1)
'

y Limited bacliground
knowledge. Socially
knowsfie process
but cannot follow
through. (0-1)

Extremelyfocused
onself (egocentric)
but dependent on
others. (0-1)

'

y JustificationsareI
linkedtobookor |
peers. (0-1) I

y Doesnot deal wel I y Never reallycan
withuncertainty j
behaviorally. (0-1) I
y Respondsbetter in
groupactivities
because sheis
reliant onpeers.
(0 -1)

j couldmake
|r oneit all
fids what kind
kff youhaveto
tit,“(gestures)

articulateher source
of knowledgeit is
moreinferredinher
statementsor
behaviors. (0-1)

y Shestartsto offer
evidence for
knowledgebut
quicklydiesengages.

} Internal sourceof
knowledgeisbased
moreonaffect than
experience. (0-1)

( 0- 1)

y "Hewantstogo ^
homebecausehe
misseshismamma.
That isvery sadand
issad." (0-4)

^ Howdoyouknow
that plantsand
treesgrowoutside?
"Theygrowoutside
becausethey grow
outsidethe carpet
outside, they need
dirt andwater to
grow,"(0-S)

1

isa

f I knowwhat
I'mdrawing
1mydaddy to
phimwhat book
"(pointing
facial gestures)

y If youcouldbuilda
snowmanwhat
wouldit looklike?
tikea reindeer anda
snowmanbecauseif
1woulddothat !
wouldmakeabig
snowmanandalittle
reindeer. 1would
giveit eyes, and
nose, andforehead,
andhair. Anl
woulodput pinsin
it'shair soit would
lookpretty." (0-3)

y "Theforest really j
didgrowinMax's
roombut that won't
happeninmyroom
because 1have
bunkbeds and 1am
ontopbecauseI'm
thebiggest between
meandmysister,"
(0-2)
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Q Carl Result#!;
Fluctuatesbetween
Absolcutist and
Multiplist viewof
knowledge, Begins
withSinple and
Ceitain responses
but whenprobed
canhavemore
Complex and
Uncertain
perspectives. (0-2}

EPI5TEMIC
PROFILE: CARL
{0-4}

Q Carl Result #2;
Complexand
Uncertainty occurs
dueto teacher or
peer interaction.
Certaintyevolves
frominternal or
familyideas.
Primarilyobserved
withingroup
settings. (0-2}

Nature of
Knowledge {0-14}* *

Qamplicity{C^

QCertantHOC^

JJ Verbal -FNonverbal
responses, {01}
isa

{J Initiallysingleword
responses.
Requiresprobing.

Q Askingteacher c
peer questions.
{0 - 1}

Q Followspeers,1
isa

{0 -1}

Q Responsesin
relationshipto the
book, classroom
rules, andpersonal
experience. {0-1}

Q Quickandconfident
withbrief responses.
Generatedfrom
classroomrulesor
thestory. {0-1}

^ Multiplisticcertainty
ismainlyinternal
(imagination) or
personal
experiences. {0-1}

Q ABSOLUTIST{0-5} I .

^ "That wasa monkey
inDorathe
Explorer,"
Associatesthe
charactersfromthe
story topopculture
toys, {0-5}

Q "Well they saidI
hada nightmarebut
I amnot sure. It
wasfunny and1had
to wake-upwhileI
wassleeping," {0-5}

0 MULTIPLIST( 0 ^ .

^ Yes, I likethe hot
weather andI liketo
get hot andit Ishot
inthe summer here."
{0-3}

Q "1have beenona
planebut I havenot
beenona
-------------- p. helicopter, I think
theyaredifferent."
(0-5} ■

OEVALUATIVIST (0-4} | .

JFollowsclassror
rules. {01}

Q "Whenwe were
outsideandit was
hot we watered the
tomatoplantsbut
theystii died
becausethe sunis
toohot for themto
bake." {0-4}
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JJEPISTEMIC
PROFILE: CARL

#4}

isult #2:
!x and
ainty occurs
teacher or
teraction,
ityevolves
iternal or
ideas,
lyobserved
group
IS. (0-3

Q Carl Result #3:
Combinesverbal
withnonverbal.
Makes associations
primarilytopersonal
experience, pretend
and family. (0-2(

t

Carl Result #4;
Justifications
revolve around the
bookor themeand
personal experience
and elaborationto
pretendworld. (0-2)-

MatureandProcess
of Knowing(0-12(

Q Source(0-16}

Q Askingteacher or
peer questions.

^ Followsclassroom
rules. (0-1}

^^tficatioMOO^

isa

"153V

isa

'isa

. Q Mainly off topic,
relatestopretend
world. (0-1}

(0 -1}

Q Quickand confident
withbrief responses. |
Generatedfrom
classroomrulesor
the story. (0-1}

Linkshispersonal
experienceto
knowledgefromthe
bookor theme, (0-1} j

Followspeers. (0-1}
0 Respectsand
followsauthority.
( 0 -1)

V
Multiplisticcertainty
ismainlyinternal
(imagination) or
personal
experiences. (0-1}

I
ebut
It
I had
ilel
(0-5}

Q

"We allhave to
listenanddowhat
Mr. I saysto do.
Heisthe teacher
andhewill tell our
parentsif we don't.'
(0-4}

0 "No, bearsneed
their bootsback
becauseIt isn't right
totake somebody's
boots. That'swhy
theyshouldsay
please or they need
togivethembackor
youtakethem
away." (0-5}

\

t
ina
venot
link
■ent."

ye
was
edthe
shut
sunis
lemto

{ "I washikinginthe
woodslikethem
(pointing) withmy
mommyanddaddy
andthey showedme
howto usethe stick
tohelpmewalkup
the bighill."(0-4}

Q "I waswalkingupa
mountainwithmy
moirimyandI got
tiredbecausethe hill
washighandmylegs
are short." (0-5}

^ "Theyweren't
friendsat theend
because shetook
her bootsbut then
theywerewavingso
I thinkthat means
they endedup
friends." (0-2}
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\

"I knowhowthe
babybearsfeels
because I wasa
babybear (pointing
tothepicture) like
tillsone littlebaby
bear andsomeone
tookmyboots." “I
wouldtake them
away fromthembut
1wouldsayplease
andtliey shouldget
inbigtrouble
becauseit isnot rice
totake other bears
things, "If someone I
tookHannah's
boot " (U 3}"

{JEPI5TEM1C
PROFILE: GIGI
(04}
tjGlGl RESULT#!:
Knowledgeis
repfesenledhall3
developmental levels
andacrossall 4
dimensionsof
knowledge.
OverwheWngly
Multiplisticviewof
knowledge. {0-2f

0 GIG! RESULT#2:
Knowledgeissimple
anduncertain,
Whenlimitedprior
knowledgeisa
factor sheresorts
tea repetioieof
animatedbehaviors,

0 GIG! RESULT#3:
Sourceof
Knowledgeshifts
frominternal to
external.
IndependenUhinker
andconlerrplates
responsesseriously,
Difficultymaking
decisionsbasedon
source. {0-2}

(0-2}

\ isa

/r

\

Q Natureof
Knowledge(0-20) I

y
I^Simplicrty {0-ll}j

\

{J Certainty {0-17}

/

fjMore absolutist
regardingpeersand
classroomrules.
(0 -1}

CJ ABSOLUTIST(0-8}

Q MULTIPLIST

Q;evaluativisi{o-7}[.

Source{0-27(1

y
0 Associations
Q Usesimagination I
primarilywiththe
andpretend, (0-1}
bookandlinkedto
personal
experiences."(0-1} I
Q Beginswithinternal
sourceandknksit to
thebook. Uses
Q Whenshedoesn't
m
anynonverbal
knowshew®say"I
cueswithher
dont know"or say
words. (0-1}
"That's s^y"
accompaniedby
facial andbody
gestures. (0-1}

0 Short responsesbut —
canelaboratewhen
probed. (O-I}

0"No, youcanonly
wear your bathing
0
suit whenyougo
swimmingandyou ---------- -isa----------- ».
don't goswWng in
thewinter time."
(04}

Q 'I amnot your
friend. Littlebear
------------ ► hasonefriendand1
amfriendswithR."
{0-3}

Q "If yougoaway
fromyou mommy
anddaddy,
strangerscancome
andget you. But
sometimeI get
scaredbecauseI
thinkI don't want to
betakenaway'from
mymommyand
daddy. Theymake
mesafe," (0-2}

"Theyarehiding
fromtheir momand
theyarehidingin
thesncHv."
(pointing) (0-3}

...

* y
isa

Q"In the story, his|
momsaid, 'goto
isa------------------------- sleepMax.' Uses
manyfacial and
bodygestures.
(0-4}

Q "1wear ahat and
mittenswhenit is
winter soI stay
warmandI don't get
sick. If I get sick
thenI don't want to
takemedicine,
yUCKi" (0-4}

Qf "Nosilly, flowers I
andtrees can't
growinsidebecause
theyneedtogrow
------------ k bigandtail lib me.
See, I ambigand
tall." (cofTipares
herself toapeer)
(gestures) (0-3} |
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JJ "I havetwodogs
andI thinktheyare
nicer thanthose
dogs(pointing). I
have68rLandI
lovethemandthey
lovemeback." (04}

”H‘i' hôilàlMiîit
oitside hi', window
ii'iltrsioij'jnlitMi,
li'jw»r.lodrt soIk.*
iindf it uj), He
w,r,i f*dit because
hewantedtogoto
sechisfriends, The
m : (0-3}
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QEPI5TEMIC
PRCflLE: GIGI
(04}
Q GIGI result M:
Justificationsare
integratedwith
simpleandcertain
knowledge.
Associationstothe
book, classroom
rules, family, and
personal
experiences. {0-2}

isa

/
^ GIG! RESULT#2:
Knowledgeissimple
anduncertain.
Whenlimitedprior
knowledgeisa
factor sheresorts
toarepetiore of
animatedbehaviors.

Q GIGI RESULT#3;
Sourceof
Knowledgeshifts
frominternal to
external,
Independent thinlrer
andcontemplates
responsesseriously.
Difficultymaking
decisionsbasedon
source. (0-2}

{ 0 -2 }

\

Iture of
I
lowledge {0-20} I

Q NatureandProcess
of Knowing{0*18}

\
[Source (0-27}I

/

Q Associations
j j Usespagination
primarilywiththe
andpretend. (0-1}
bookandknkedto
personal
experiences," {0-1}
Q Beginswithinternal
sourceandlinks^to
thebook. Uses
Q Wtienshedoesn't
manynonverbal
knowshewill say"I
cueswithher
dont know"or say
words. (0-1}
"That'ssilly"

Q Typicallyrelatedto
thebookor
classroomrulesand
procedures. {0-1}

/

Qwhen referringtoi
familyit isinan J
absolutist view,
(0-1}

accompaniedby
facial andbody
gestures. (0-1}

JJ "Inthe story, his
momsaid, 'goto
sleepMax.' Uses
many facial and
bodygestures,
(0-4}

Q "I wear ahat and
mittenswhenit Is
winter soI stay
warmandI don't get
sick, If I get sick
then1don't want to
take medicine,
YUCKI" (0-4}

Q 'l have twodogs
andI thinktheyare
nicei thanthose
dogs(point'ng). I
haveB&l. andI
lovethemandthey
lovemeback."(0-4}

0 "1liketosingthe
helosongbecauseI
knowall of tftekids
names, youhaveto
watchmedoit
sometimeI want you
doseehowI know
all thenames." {0-3} 1

Q "Maxhadaboat
outsidehiswindow
intiisimagination,
liewantedit sohe
madeit up. He
wantedit because
hewantedtogoto
seehisfriends, The
WT's."(0-3}

Q "I'mmakinga
monster tolooklik.e[
theWT'sandI'm
goingtonameit J
likemysister andÆ|
ISgoingtobeso
scarybut youwontj
evenknowit is
fcary."(0-2}

Q "NosiHy, flowers 1
andtreescan't
1
Iba.

{J "Sometimeyou
havetowear your
coat becauseit is
cold, likeinthe
winter it iscold,"

Q "Theyarehiding
fromtheir momand
■- ■ — ► theyarehidingin
thesnow."
(pointing) {0-3}

growinsidebecausel
theyneedtogrow 1
higAnrltAlUiU=me. I
See, I ambigand I
tall." (compares 1
herself toapeer) |
(gestures) (0-3} |

,<a

,

{0-3}
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EPISTEMIC
PROFILE; JEREMY[
{04}

JEREMYRESULT

fl: {0-2}

JEREMYRESULT

JEREMYRESULT
#3:{0-2}

# 2 : { 0 -2 }

Nature of
Knowledge {0-16}* '*

^ Certainty {0-15}|

isa^

Single word
responses even
when probed. {0-1}

are
repetitive. {0-1}

/

Verbal -FNonverbal
{0-16}

Ü Mainly when
knowledge pertains
to the book or
theme. {0-1}
isa

Internal sources are I
linked to emotional I
dispostition. {0-1} I
f Parents and peers
are most typical.
{ 0 - 1}

JInvolves classroom
rules or personal
expeiiences related
to tfie story. {0-1}

characters to sq
{0-1}

: ABSOLUTIST {0-6}).

.isa.

f "Yes" "No" "Wild
Tfiings" {0-4}

1
isa

isa

Î MULTIPLIST

0 "We have to get
ready For the story
First and to get
ready for the story
yousit like this."
{0-4}

[ "Look(pointing)
that momma bear is
huggingthe baby
bear. I lik hugs,
my daddy gives me
hugs too,"{0-3}

^ "I amafraid of
monsters but he
would have themas
-isa------------------ ^
friends, not me.
{0-5}
t
isa

isa

1

lEVALUATIVIST {0-5}

.isa.

^ "when you don't
followthe right way,
youget lost, Once I
----------------------- >
got lost and it no
fun." {0-3}
1
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EPISTEMIC
PR' i^ILE: JEREMY
{0-4}

\
JEREMY RESULT
#3; {0-2}

JEREMY RESULT
#4: {0-2}

Nature and Process
of Knowing {0-14}

Source {0-20}

are
repetitive. {0-1}
Verbal + Nonverbal
{0-16}
Involves classroom
rules or personal
experiences related
to the story. {0-1}

Internal sources are
linked to emotional
dispostition. {0-1}

Because, {0-1}

y Parents and peers
are most typical.

respond using
evidence from
classroomcontent or
personal
experiences. {0-1}

{0-1}

characters to self
{ 0 - 1}

oget
he story
get
he story
this,

Some of themare
purple and some are
green but some are
black(pointing)
Lookcan you see?
They are like
Transformers." {0-4}

of
ut he
3them as
tme.

lilcethe Wild
Things but I am
afraid of monsters
0 1would run rea
fast. My mommy
says there isno
monsters." {0-4}

dont
Ight way,
t. Once I
it no

Those bears i
get introuble
because they ran
fromthe momma
bear and she will be
mad and thembears
will be inbig trouble."
{0-3}

^ "I had it first sohe
can't have it
because I'mstill
needing it to color
Blackout so it looks
how I want it, like on
the TV," {0-2}

"No, he lookslike
Blackout just likein
The TV. Adamhas
one and I lookedat
it." {0-2}
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EP5TERIC
PROFILE: TRUDY

OPESULM: '

1

Fluctuatesbetween
Absolutist and
Wtipkt viewso f
knowledge. tO-2(

JJ RESULT2:
Certaintyof
knowledgeisttie
strongest
represented.
Strongassociations
withpersonal
experiences,
parents, or
imagination. {0-2)

Nature of
Knowledge {0-11}

^Certainty {0-7} [
0 Verylimited
interaction with
others, Most
knowledge comes
fromwithinor family.
Combinesverbal
andnonverbal
expressionstohelp
conveymeaning,

Q Frequent useof "I
can't besure."
"Sometimes""You
never know." "I
don't knowbut my
mommydoes."{0-1}
Consistently
provides arelayant
respon'.ean'jmake
a connectiontoher
experience or
pretendworldbut
typically
acknowledgesthat
there maybe other
options. {0-1}

{ 0 - 1}

Q Expresses her
knowledgeinterms
of rulesor closeto
thestoryline, {0-1}

QÂësôSrërMj

—

-

JMULTIPLIST{0-4}l_Isa.

^"Nowthat'stwo
snails, theymove
slow. Andladybugs
they movereally
slowtoobut not our
class, wemovefast
tut wearenot real
ladybugs, We|they
gojust a littlebit
slow, likethis
(gesture)." {0-4}

^"I learnedthat
everybodydon't hit
eachother andkeep
raybodysafe. My
knowledge isI think
inmyhead." {0-3}

^ "Youget punishedif
your bad.
Sometimesyoucan
get punishedeven
whenyou don't
know,"{0-4}

T
^"1ammakinga
princessgoingtoa
bigparty, Likewhen
I pretend I ama
real princessandI
dress-up. That's
when I put ona
pretenddressbut it
isareal dressand1
pretendit is
beautiful (gestures).
"{0-4}

4

isa

I

UEVALUATIVIST{0-3}|

0 'Sometimes the
bearsshouldbein
troublefor not
listeningto themom
but sometimesit is
different.
SometimesI haveto
listentomytriomtfiy
andsometimesI
have tomy dad's
waybecauseI don't
want to get in
trouble but it is
different." {0-3}
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JJ References
classroomtopicor
story. {0-1}
0 Linkskno'wledge to
family. {0-1}

QMakes associationsj
to personal
experiencesand
internal affective
dispositions. {0-1} I
Does not seemto
beimpactedby
peer verbal or
nonverbal behaviors
asa meansto
respond.{0-1}
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^EPISTEMIC
PROFILE; TRUDY
{0-4}

RESULT4
Justificationsare
limitedtoAbsolutist
andfdultiplisticviews
andoccur onlywhen
probed,{0-2}

Q RESULT3; Makes
assodattonsfrom
her internal pretend
worldtothe real
world. Familyistfie
onlyexternal source
of knowledge
referenced. {0-2}

Delations
nal

f Nature andProcessI
of Knowing{0-10} I

Q Frequent useof "I
can't besure,"
"Sometimes" "You
never know." "I
don't knowbut my
mommydoes." {0-1}
Q Consistently
providesarelevant
responseandmake
a connectiontoher
experienceor
pretendworldbut
typically
acknowledgesthat
there maybe other
options, {0-1}

Justification{0-8} I

Q Linksknowledgeto
family. {0-1}

1
JMakesassociations
topersonal
experiencesand
internal affective
dispositions. {0-1}

/

Typicallyuses
certain/uncertain
knowledge tojustify
her knowledge.
StrongInkto the
classroom, personal
experiences, and
pretendideas. {0-1}

0 Doesnot seemto
beimpactedby
peer verbal or
nonverbal behaviors
asameansto
"Mymommyknows
howtodressinthe
winter, she makes
mewear acoat and
hat andmittenssoI
keep warmand
safe." {0 4}

0 "Thosemonstersin
that book(pointing)
are scarybecause
theyare scaryand
ugly. They are
growlingtheir teeth
andthey havebig
buggingeyes." {0-4}

1

jyhen

dl

3mom
;itis

^Serious inher
responsesand
appearsto
contemplate.
Strongassociation
topretend world,
personal
experiences, and
family, {0-1}

References
classroomtopicor
story, {0-1}

"I knoweverything
that's about
penguins, I
watchedpenguins
at thezoo, so1
knowthey liveinthe
coldlikebearsdo
too." {0-4}

\

\
0 "I liketo dress-up
likea princess
becausemymommy
anddaddy tNnkTm
sopretty andthen1
feel pretty and
beautiful. {0-3}

Q "I was afraidof the
monstersintheWT's
becauseonce I
watched ascary
movieandit gave
mereallybad
dreams andI
couldn't sleepgood.
So, I slept withmy
mommyanddaddy.
I dont likethose
baddreams." |0-2}

"I thinkthe mom
shouldbe different
because if tie's so
badandit hurtsher
earsthenshecould
have walkedhim
right uptohisroom.
That'swhat my
mommywoulddoto
me. "{0-2}
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